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1900–1916

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

AFRICA
AT THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR
SHOWING THE EXPANSION OF RAILROADS & STEAMSHIP LINES IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

RAILROADS IN OPERATION
" " UNDER CONSTRUCTION
PROJECTED RAILROADS
STEAMSHIP LINES

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

(1900–1916)

A HISTORY OF EUROPEAN COLONIAL EXPANSION AND COLONIAL DIPLOMACY

BY

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AUTHOR OF "THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE," "THE FOUNDATION OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE," "PARIS REBORN," ETC.

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To

JAMES GORDON BENNETT

WHOSE LIFELONG INTEREST IN
WHAT WAS BEFORE HIS DAY
"THE DARK CONTINENT"
HAS BEEN AN IMPORTANT FACTOR
IN DISPELLING THE
DARKNESS.

Semper aliquid noui Africam adferre.

Greek proverb, quoted by
Pliny, *Hist. Nat.* VIII. §42

CONTENTS

		PAGE
I.	GREAT BRITAIN IN THE SUDAN . .	1
II.	THE ISLANDS OF AFRICA . . .	31
III.	THE LAST YEARS OF THE BOER WAR AND THE PERIOD OF RECONSTRUCTION IN SOUTH AFRICA	43
IV.	THE TWO INDEPENDENT STATES: LIBERIA AND ABYSSINIA . . .	92
V.	BRITISH POLICY IN SOMALILAND .	106
VI.	THE COLONIAL VENTURES OF ITALY .	115
VII.	ALGERIA AND TUNIS: THE NUCLEUS OF THE FRENCH AFRICAN EMPIRE .	130
VIII.	THE BELGIANS IN THE CONGO . .	147
IX.	THE FIRST GERMAN COLONY: SOUTH-WEST AFRICA	173
X.	THE HERITAGE OF LIVINGSTONE AND RHODES	189
XI.	THE BRITISH IN EAST AFRICA AND UGANDA	206

PAGE

XII. The Germans in East Africa . . 228

XIII. The Problem of the Portuguese Colonies 244

XIV. The British in West Africa . . 276

XV. The Germans in West Africa. . 299

XVI. The French in West Africa and the Sahara 312

XVII. French Penetration into Central Africa 335

XVIII. European Rivalry in Morocco before Algeciras 355

XIX. France Gets Morocco . . . 374

XX. Egypt under the Last of the Khedives 391

XXI. Egypt Becomes a British Protectorate 421

XXII. The Creation of the South African Union 441

XXIII. The Rebellion in South Africa and its Aftermath 454

XXIV. The Conquest of the German Colonies 470

PAGE

XXV. AFRICAN PROBLEMS FOR THE PEACE CONFERENCE 481

INDEX 493

MAPS

FACING PAGE

I. AFRICA AT THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR . . . . . *Title-page*

II. AFRICA ABOUT 1850 32

III. AFRICA IN 1902 64

IV. THE MEDITERRANEAN COAST OF AFRICA 128

V. SKETCH MAP SHOWING THE GERMAN-FRENCH BOUNDARIES IN 1912 . . 360

VI. THE SOUTH AFRICAN COMMONWEALTH 448

FOREWORD

WHEN *The New Map of Europe* was written, at the beginning of the war, I had to forego dealing in a comprehensive way with colonial questions. Only the facts concerning European expansion in Africa that seemed to have direct bearing upon the diplomatic history of the ten years preceding August 1, 1914 could be included. But what has happened—and what has not happened—in Africa during the past two years revealed to me the necessity of reviewing the fifteen years of colonial development, effort and rivalry of European states in Africa, if I wanted to have a clear understanding of the forces that had driven Europe to war, of the issues that the war was bringing into clear light, and of the problems that would confront the Peace Conference.

The facts for a book on European colonization in Africa I had been gathering for years. But I had no idea until now how important these facts were, and how essential a knowledge of them was to the student of contemporary European history. This book has been written not at all in the way originally planned, but with the illumination that has come through more than two years of living in the midst of the great conflict and writing daily upon its

various phases. However radically and vehemently readers may differ from interpretations and conclusions, I hope none will feel it a loss of time to go with me through these pages that narrate the evolution of Africa from the Boer War to the completion of the conquest of the last German colony by General Smuts and the combined British, Belgian, and Portuguese armies in the autumn of 1916.

I trust that none will think lightly of my work because it is not accompanied by footnotes and a bibliography. Primary sources are the governmental "papers," containing texts of treaties, official correspondence and reports, consular reports, parliamentary speeches and debates; bulletins and reports of proceedings of chambers of commerce and other organizations interested in African colonization for economic, financial, political, scientific, and sociological reasons; and, occasionally, newspaper *comptes-rendus* of interviews and speeches. The books I have consulted are legion. The more important ones can be found in the bibliographical lists after each colony in the *Statesman's Year Book*. To the summaries of events from year to year in the London *Annual Register*, I gratefully acknowledge constant indebtedness. For the first half of my period, these illuminating annals were written by Mr. H. Whates. Statistics are taken from the *Statesman's Year Book;* French, German, Belgian, and Italian publications that come under the head of primary sources mentioned above; Augustin Bernard's *Le Maroc*, Angel Marvaud's *Le Portugal et ses colonies*, and A. P. Calvert's *German African Empire.* I have made

use also of my own correspondence to the *New York Herald* and the *Philadelphia Evening Telegraph.*

I want to express my keen appreciation of the hospitality and precious help I received during a visit to Africa in war time from H. H. Hussein Kamil, G.C.B., Sultan of Egypt; General Sir Reginald Wingate, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., etc., Governor-General of the Sudan; Sir Henry McMahon, G.V.C.O., K.C.I.E., etc., H. M.'s High Commissioner for Egypt; General Sir John Maxwell, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., etc., Commanding the British Army in Egypt; Hussein Rushdi Pasha, Prime Minister of Egypt; Col. E. E. Bernard Pasha, C.M.G., Financial Secretary of the Sudan; Ronald Storrs, Esq., Oriental Secretary to the British Agency; Arakel Nubar Bey, French Secretary to H. H. the Sultan; Major G. B. Symes, D.S.O., Private Secretary to H. E. the Governor-General of the Sudan; Gerald Delany, Esq., *Reuter's* Manager at Cairo; J. Edgar, Esq., sometime Professor in Cape Town University and later Editor of the *Johannesburg Star;* and Walter Harris, Esq., of Tangier, *Times* Correspondent in Morocco. Mr. Edgar and Mr. Harris were good enough to submit to the imposition of lengthy *questionnaires* on South African and Moroccan history, in which they have played an active and important rôle. Many a glimpse into the inside history of Egypt did I get from Artin Pasha, last of the "elder statesmen" of Egypt, who went over with me the books of Lord Cromer, Lord Milner, and Mr. Dicey, and gave me a copy of his own work on the Sudan.

To Mr. James Gordon Bennett and Mr. Rodman Wanamaker I owe the privilege of a visit to Africa in the early months of 1916, and to Boghos Nubar Pasha continuous and hearty encouragement to undertake work in a field where his knowledge and life-long experience make that encouragement worth more than can be estimated.

HERBERT ADAMS GIBBONS

VILLA EL FARN, RUE DES DUNES
HOULGATE, CALVADOS, NORMANDY.
October, 1916.

THE
NEW MAP OF AFRICA

The New Map of Africa

CHAPTER I

GREAT BRITAIN IN THE SUDAN

AFTER the failure of the Khartum Relief Expedition and the death of General Gordon, the British Government ordered Egypt and the British army to drop the Sudan. The whole Gordon and Sudan literature, which requires a separate bibliography and is filled with sentimentalism, misrepresentations, and party prejudices, is the historical monument and record of the activity of Englishmen *at home* and their interest in the problem of the Sudan during the decade that followed the shameful fiasco of 1884. The Gordon legend alone was in the mind of the Britisher who never left his tight little island, and who considered that fact a kind of virtue. The Mahdi reigned supreme in the Sudan, and after his death, his successor, the Khalifa, continued to exterminate the tribes of the upper tributaries of the Nile. For all British Cabinets and the British public seemed to care, the dervishes were welcome to keep the Sudan, and the early eighties were "past history."

But some Englishmen did care and did not forget. In fact, there was never a moment that the thought of the eventual reconquest of the Sudan and of the retrieving of the honor of British arms was not before them. They had the vision. They lived with eyes fixed on the goal. The uninitiated never look back of events to their causes. To them whatever of fortune through achievement falls to the other fellow is "luck." They believe that Lord Cromer blundered to fame through twenty-five years of hit and miss in Egypt, and that Lord Kitchener was "made" by the battle of Omdurman, "after all, you know, an easy butchery of crazy fanatics who had no chance at all against his superior weapons."

The battle of Omdurman on September 2, 1898, which made possible the reconquest and redemption of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and the foundation of its present splendid government, was the culminating event of more than ten years of herculean effort on the part of a handful of men whose enthusiasm was fortunately matched by their foresight, patience, and ability. The victory won at Omdurman was the beginning of a new era for the British Empire in Africa and throughout the world. History will give to those who worked for it and those who won it credit for far more than the rehabilitation of the Sudan.

British colonial administrators have succeeded in building an empire in spite of, rather than with the help of, their Government and the great mass of their fellow-countrymen. Problems confronting them in their field of action have never been more difficult

than the problem of getting and keeping support from home. London is the *bête noire* of the English official overseas. Cablegrams from home cause more trouble than native uprisings. In regard to foreign policy, Conservative and Liberal Cabinets are very much the same. They are guided by the fears and the hopes of General Elections, and they hate like poison:

1. To spend the British taxpayer's money overseas.

2. To sanction any policy that is likely to cause fighting in which British troops must be engaged.

3. To offend the nonconformist conscience.

Colonial administrators who keep in mind constantly these three points, and who plan to get results without coming into conflict with the Government on any one of them, succeed in making for themselves great careers, and gain honors, if not peace of mind. Those who do not keep these points in mind never get very far in a colonial career.

This is why the reconquest of the Sudan needed a decade of preparation. There was never any hope at all of convincing the British public of the necessity of pouring out blood and treasure to get back to Khartum. Unwillingness to pay the price had been the cause of the *débâcle* of 1884. The only other possible way of accomplishing what they had in mind was to put Egypt upon a sound financial basis, and to recreate an Egyptian army that knew how to fight and that would fight. The invasion of the Sudan and the winning of the battle of Omdurman was possible only because Lord Cromer made

Egypt's revenues exceed her expenditures and because Lord Kitchener got an Egyptian army into good fighting shape. When this was accomplished —and not before then—it could be pointed out to London that Egypt could contribute both in men and money very substantially to an expedition against the Khalifa. There had to be an appeal also to public opinion in England and to the nonconformist conscience. So for years one can read in Lord Cromer's annual reports the skilfully introduced and skilfully emphasized *leitmotiv* of the necessity to Egypt of the reclamation of the Sudan. Never could there be security in Upper Egypt until the dervishes were crushed. Never would irrigation projects on a large scale be justifiable or possible until the headwaters of the Nile were under Anglo-Egyptian control. Never would the African slave traffic be stopped until the region from the equator to Wady Halfa was policed by Europeans. Common humanity and moral responsibility also demanded the reconquest of the Sudan. For the native population was rapidly dying out everywhere because of the dervish cruelties and mismanagement. Last of all, from the standpoint of European prestige, the Italian defeat at Adowa must be counteracted.

Since Egyptian money and Egyptian lives were largely instrumental in the reconquest of the Sudan, and since the legal rights to the territories it would comprise rested wholly upon those of the Ottoman Empire and the Egyptian Khedives, it was impossible—though it would have been desirable—to

establish an English colony or a distinct Protectorate under direct British control. Then, too, the Sudan was going to look for an indeterminable period to the Egyptian army and the Egyptian budget for soldiers and money to hold, to rehabilitate, and to develop the vast regions which Mahdiism had so cruelly oppressed and ruined. And was not the principal reason for reconquest the political security and the economic advantage to Egypt through possessing the headwaters of the Nile? The problem was exceedingly delicate, owing to Great Britain's anomalous position in Egypt, both from the international and the Ottoman point of view.

A convention signed at Cairo on January 19, 1899, between the British and Egyptian Governments, stated that the territory south of the twenty-second parallel of latitude was to be administered by a Governor-General, appointed by Egypt with the assent of Great Britain. The British and Egyptian flags were to be used together. No duties were to be levied on imports from Egypt, and duties on imports from other countries, by way of the Red Sea, were not to exceed the Egyptian tariffs. As long as it should be necessary, Egypt was to make good the deficit in the Sudan budget. But the money invested in the Sudan by Egypt would be considered a loan, upon which interest would be paid as soon as possible. A portion of the Egyptian army should serve in the Sudan, under the command of the Governor-General, himself an officer of the Egyptian army with the rank of Sirdar. So long as the nations who enjoyed the privileges of a capitulatory

régime in Egypt did not demand the extension of the capitulations to the Sudan, and so long as Egypt remained under effective British control, such an arrangement, paradoxical as it seemed, was workable. It has worked out all right. But it is important to note that the exact status of the Sudan, both from the international and the Egyptian point of view, has not yet been determined. It will come up for settlement in the Peace Conference, when the affairs of the Ottoman Empire are liquidated, and international sanction is asked for the British Protectorate proclaimed over Egypt since the opening of the European War.[1]

Once the Sudan was reconquered, Cromer and Kitchener still held to the policy of "sound financial basis" that had made the conquest possible. For they knew that the Home Government would take little interest in, and do nothing for, the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan *unless it was demonstrated to them that the country could pay its way.* Immediate use could be made of almost unlimited sums of money, and the temptation was great to enter upon and urge London and Cairo to coöperate in ambitious development schemes. Cromer and Kitchener were in complete accord in not falling into this trap, and when Kitchener was suddenly called away to South Africa, Lord Cromer was fortunate in finding in his successor, Sir Reginald Wingate, an administrator fully aware of the danger of grandiose schemes of rehabilitation and rapid development. The initial financial policy laid down by Lord Cromer in his

[1] For the Egyptian point of view, see pp. 421–440.

address to the Sudanese chiefs at Khartum in December, 1900, to the effect that taxes were not to be made burdensome, even if communications and developments had to wait, has been faithfully and consistently carried out. To it more than to anything else is due the marvelous success of the Sudan administration. For the Sudanese have had from the beginning the contrast of the equitable taxation of the British with that which ground them down and ruined them under the Mahdi and the Khalifa: and the British Government has not been wearied and prejudiced against the Sudan by unreasonable demands for financial support.

The cost of the reconquest was L.E. 2,412,000,[1] of which the British Government paid L.E. 780,000. More money had, of course, to be invested in railways, in river transport, and in irrigation. The pacification of the country and the rehabilitation of its inhabitants depended upon means of transportation and the cultivation of the land. Everything had been destroyed or had fallen into decay during the years of anarchy: so all kinds of public works needed a substantial budget. Popular education had to be thought of, and the expenses of the civil administration and a considerable military establishment provided for. But though the financial task looked so formidable as to be almost hopeless, it was successfully grappled with, and the country saved from concession hunters and insolvency by the adoption and maintenance of the conservative policy of "go slow and pay as you go."

[1] L.E. = Egyptian pound, approximately five dollars.

In 1903, the Egyptian Cabinet authorized an advance to the Sudan for railway construction of L.E. 1,770,000 to spread over four years. This was a sound financial investment. For it was soon demonstrated that the increased revenue through the development of transportation facilities would cut down Egypt's contribution to the annual deficit more than the interest on this money. In 1906, the Sudan Railway administration yielded a net profit of L.E. 52,000,[1] and in 1907 the Sudan Government was able to pay to Egypt, L.E. 45,000 interest on part of the L.E. 3,000,000 advanced by Egypt for capital expenditures up to the end of 1906. The Sudan Government declared that it was now in a position to assist the development of public works in the Sudan. L.E. 100,000 was set aside for public works in 1908 and L.E. 285,000 for the purchase of rails for the Atbara-Khartum Railway. From January 1, 1908, the Sudan began to pay interest at 3 per cent. on L.E. 1,500,000 of the debt to Egypt. The deficit in revenue for 1908 was only L.E. 47,000, and in 1909 the

[1] Over and over again in Africa the tremendous financial advantage to a country accruing from state ownership of public utilities is demonstrated. The Sudan, like South Africa, Egypt, and other countries, gets a good share of its surplus revenue from railway profits —a surplus that comes even though hundreds of miles of line are built and operated at a loss for political reasons or for the ultimate benefit of the people. One striking illustration of what the Sudan has gained from keeping its transportation out of the hands of concession hunters is found in the little Khartum-Omdurman tram, which plies from Khartum to the ferry leading to Omdurman. This tram line, carrying wholly natives, was begged for often at the beginning by private groups. The Government kept it, and to-day it brings a net profit of ten thousand pounds per annum to the treasury.

annual subvention from the Egyptian Treasury was reduced by another L.E. 10,000. This encouraged Egypt to advance L.E. 380,000 for railway extension and improvement, and the completion of Port Sudan town and harbor. In 1910, Sir Reginald Wingate was able to report that the entire Civil Administration was paying its way and that the only deficit was on the military budget. As more land came under cultivation, trade would increase and the deficit disappear. Three years later there was a surplus of L.E. 40,000. The Sudan had made good.

Exports increased thirty per cent. in 1911, owing to the development of the cotton industry. In 1912, the creation of Port Sudan and the linking of the Red Sea with the Nile by railway made possible export without prohibitive transportation charges. Cotton, cattle, and sheep progressed rapidly. In 1913, the trade output jumped again, owing to the extension of the railway to El Obeid. Great Britain was supplying thirty-nine per cent. of the imports, and took twenty per cent. of the exports.

It is no surprise, then, that the British Parliament showed itself willing to guarantee the interest on a loan of £3,000,000 for cotton cultivation in the Sudan. The Chancellor of the Exchequer explained that this outlay, in irrigation and railway extension, would develop the cultivation of cotton of the finest quality, greatly needed by England for the manufacture of her unique grades of cotton goods.

A few months ago, I sat in the office of the Financial Secretary at Khartum. Colonel Bernard is a type of officer one finds only in the British army. If

he were a Frenchman, he would never have left Paris. If he were an American, he would be one of our captains of industry, with a yacht and a summer home at Newport or Bar Harbor, and wondering how he could spend his money. We occasionally get in our army and navy men with a genius for business: but they do not stay. It may be partly due to the fact that until the Spanish War there were no tasks to challenge this type of man. But it is mostly due to the entire difference in our social system from that of Great Britain. The Colonial Empire under the British flag has been built by men who have gone into Government service for reasons of caste. Among them there has naturally been a large number, like Colonel Bernard, with marked aptitude for business. In any other country most of these men would have gone into business. In England they rarely dream of such a thing. In order to enjoy the privileges of caste, young men of good families are willing to leave home and friends, to live separated from their own children, and to spend the thirty to forty best years of their life in exile. They are content with an occasional visit to England and with little or no money, if only they preserve their caste. This is the secret of Great Britain's world empire. The moment the Englishman of the upper classes considers business as honorable a vocation as Government service, Britain's Colonial Empire will resemble France's or Germany's—or will collapse altogether. All this passed through my head as I listened to Colonel Bernard explaining, budget estimates before him, the financial policy of the Sudan, with all the

enthusiasm and keenness and understanding of an American trying to attract capital to his latest enterprise.

Without the railway across the desert from Wady Halfa to Atbara, Kitchener's task against the dervishes would have been tenfold more difficult, and the victory of doubtful permanent value. As the invaders proceeded to Khartum, it was essential to lay ties and rails with unflagging haste. Only did the re-occupation seem a reality and worth while when through railway service was established from Khartum to Wady Halfa. As the political success of the reconquest was wholly dependent upon its proving a financial success, and as serious economic development was out of the question so long as the route through Egypt was the only exit from the country, the first task of the Government was to connect the Nile with the Red Sea by railway. In 1902, Lord Cromer pointed this out in his annual report, and the following year he succeeded in getting the Egyptian Government to furnish the money, as we have seen above. After untold difficulties with labor, and the construction of a bridge over the Atbara River, the junction was completed in 1907. Suakim was abandoned as the terminus on the Red Sea, and a harbor built some miles farther north at a hamlet which was renamed Port Sudan. The Atbara railway shops were increased and improved, and the Sudan Government itself bore part of the expense of remaking the line from Khartum to Atbara. In 1908, telegraphic communication was completed with Gondokoro, on the White Nile, two weeks by

steamer south of Khartum. The Blue Nile was bridged at Khartum for a railway into the Gezira district between the two rivers. El Obeid, the terminus of this southern railway extension, was reached in 1913.

A glance at the map is necessary to realize what a tremendous territory the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan covers and how impossible it is for the administrators of the country to pacify and civilize it completely, much less to develop its resources, until more railways are built, reaching into the heart of all the different provinces.

The greatest appeal to the imagination of the British public in connection with the reconquest of the Sudan was the fulfilment of the task for which it was generally believed that Gordon had given his life, the suppression of the slave trade. Although the difficulty of this task was enormous, insurmountable even, in so far as slavery within the tribes was concerned, Lord Cromer felt it incumbent to mention in his report almost every year the progress of the slave suppression crusade. In 1903, he confessed his disappointment that the slave trade was not extinct; in 1904, he announced a marked decrease in the slave trade; in 1905, he said that it was difficult to check slave traffic in the Kordofan province; in 1906, he believed that there would still be great difficulty in suppressing the slave trade; and in 1907 he attributed most of the trouble in Kordofan to the anti-slavery policy to which the Government was committed. The road to abolition, he remarked in his last report, "is a very long road, and it will take years to get to the

end of it." Improved communications, however, and the advance of colonial enterprise in British, German, Belgian, and French equatorial colonies, helped to put a stop to long-distance slave-running. The area of operations of slave merchants has been gradually circumscribed until in 1914 the official report announced that slave traffic was "almost impossible" in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.

British officials who have to deal with slavery at close range, however, especially the judges, consider this statement a bit too optimistic. Slave traffic can be detected and frequently punished, when it is carried on from district to district. But within tribal limits, especially if the tribes be Moslem, even where moral certainty of definite cases of slavery exists, legal evidence is hard to obtain. Where slavery is as established an institution as polygamy, decrees bind only those who dare or who want to take advantage of them. There are cases without number, also, where the slaves are ignorant of the abolition decree, and even if it were explained to them, they would not know what it meant.[1] Education is a

[1] One who has not traveled out of the beaten track has no more conception of the ignorance of people in uncivilized countries than the people of uncivilized countries have of our institutions. A *word* is meaningless—unless you can grasp the idea the word stands for. At the time of the proclamation of the Constitution in Turkey, I was traveling in Asia Minor. Everyone, Moslem and Christian alike, was enthusiastic about the new liberty. The Turkish word for liberty is *huriet*. Villagers who were celebrating the *huriet* looked at some photographs we had. One was a picture of an American missionary school building in Tarsus. They asked, pointing to the building, "Is this house the *huriet* we are so happy about? How wonderful!" And yet, colonial administrators are continually

necessary prerequisite to the functioning and enjoying of Occidental social and political institutions. Enthusiasts and sentimentalists forget the fact that our ancestors did not evolve, support, and use these institutions until we conceived and desired them as a result of education.

Lord Kitchener's first visit to the Sudan after the Boer War was to open Gordon College in 1902, when he was on his way to India. In his address he asserted his entire sympathy with the objects of the college on the lines originally conceived, although he admitted the necessity of using public funds for the advancement of primary teaching. He expressed the hope that he would be able to return in five years and find that higher education was being given at Gordon College.[1] Although Gordon College is not as yet in a position to offer courses such as are given in Robert College at Constantinople, the Syrian Protestant College at Beirut, and several Indian and Chinese universities, it is far ahead of any institution of

being taken to task by the people at home because a stroke of the pen has not immediately brought home to the natives under their charge "all the benefits of our civilization."

[1] Lord Kitchener did not return in five years, as he hoped. But he visited Khartum again in 1910, and was promising himself a long tour, after he went back to Cairo as H. M.'s Agent and Consul-General, when the present war broke out. Sir Reginald Wingate, writing to me from Khartum in June, said: ". . . I think it fell to few to get to know him as intimately as I did. Under his cold exterior beat a very warm and kind heart, but he was most successful in keeping this from the world. To this country he is a great loss, for I know his heart was in it, and he was almost worshiped by the people, from whom I have had hundreds of telegrams and letters of condolence and sympathy."

higher learning in Africa or Asia in the work of its research laboratories and in the cooperation it gives to the Government for the development of the resources of the country, the betterment of public health, and ethnological investigation.

Gordon College is a State institution, which works with and for the Government. I wish it were possible to speak here of the wonderful things that are being done by Dr. Chalmers and others in the Wellcome Research Laboratories. It is a revelation of the ability and the devotion of the scientists to whom the manifold problems of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan have been a challenge sufficiently engrossing to keep them far from the great world and yet develop their genius so strikingly that the great world's attention is continually called to what they are doing and discovering. But it is more than that. A visit to Gordon College and the Wellcome Laboratories opens one's eyes to the methods that are being pursued by Sir Reginald Wingate and his associates, and the goal they have before them. There is no highly civilized country in the world where more constant attention is being paid to means of developing resources and better ability being invested in the study of those means than in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.

In addition to the research work of Gordon College, the Department of Education has established a Central Research Farm at Khartum North. Here field experiments in growing what the Sudan might produce are tried out, and practical work is done in horticulture and forestry. At Gordon College and in three other cities, industrial workshops teach boys trades.

The criticism has frequently been made against the British administration in the Sudan as in Egypt that educational facilities are not as fully extended as they ought to be, and that the British have neglected the moral factor, and emphasized the material, in building up the country. This raises one of the most thorny problems that confront those who are engaged in bringing Africa and Asia under European control. On the one hand, in Egypt and the Sudan, it can be argued that there must be money before ambitious schemes of universal popular education are undertaken. Before the money can be found, the country must be developed economically. It is not that public works and material benefits are more essential than education, but that education *for all* is so tremendously costly that only a country whose resources are fully developed can maintain schools for its population. It is pointed out, moreover, that even if there were money, teachers would be lacking, and that it takes a whole generation to train enough teachers to meet even a portion of the needs of the next generation. On the other hand, especially in view of what we have said about the necessity of education before our Occidental social and political institutions can be wanted, understood, and taken advantage of by natives, is it not true that primary education is as necessary to a country's development as railways and irrigation, and that if the people are to benefit by material prosperity they must have a moral preparation?

Although I have taught for some years in educational institutions in the Near East, and have seen

this problem at close range in half a dozen countries, I do not profess to offer a solution. But we must make a wide and determined start in primary education, and that demands teachers. To get the teachers, higher institutions are necessary. When we put boys through the colleges, few of them want to teach or do teach. They become dissatisfied—as they have every reason to be—with existing conditions. But their patriotism does not inspire in them the will to make the sacrifice and to take up the cross individually in order that their people may be brought to enlightenment. Far from following the only possible way they have of serving their country wisely, they agitate for European institutions, for social and political recognition, judging the feeling and need of the race solely by their own exotic condition. The curse of our Western education upon Orientals is that we try to build where there is no foundation of character. Instead, then, of having wood that takes a polish, we get a veneer that cracks at the first test. Missionaries and educators have success only with boys whom they take away from their families and bring under their home influence very early in life. But they turn out young men who are foreigners to their own people, and who have no desire or ability to go back among their own people and impart what has been given to them. Good farmers and goatherds and blacksmiths and cobblers are spoiled to make imitation "gentlemen." The educated Oriental will not work even if he is starving.[1]

[1] Several years ago I was preaching in a small inland city of Pennsylvania. The local department store proprietor told me that a

Educating boys in trades, as the Sudan Education Department has started to do, is an excellent thing. But it ought to be done much more widely than is being done. And money ought to be spent more freely than it is being spent in primary education. The Sudan boasts of fifteen hundred miles of railway in fifteen years, and two thousand miles of regular river steamship service, and five thousand miles of telegraph wires. But less than five thousand Sudanese in schools of all grades, primary to college, is not a very good showing, despite the difficulties.

After the Cairo Convention was arranged between Egypt and Great Britain in January, 1899, the British Foreign Office was in a position to treat with other nations and other British colonies concerning the boundaries of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. The Anglo-French Convention of 1899 settled the *local* difficulties raised by the Marchand expedition to Fashoda. When French obstruction and ill-will that stood in the way during the first few years of reconstruction were removed by the epoch-making Anglo-French Agreement of 1904, the frontiers with Abyssinia and the Italian colony of Eritrea were arranged by several successive agreements.

The only serious difficulty after Fashoda, where

Christian Arab boy from "a college somewhere out in Turkey" was in town, and that he had somehow been unable to give the boy work. He was puzzled, for the boy seemed to be strong and husky. He brought him to me after church. I thumped the fellow on the chest and back, and, turning to the merchant, said, "Put him in your packing department." "Oh! no, sir," the boy cried out agonizingly, "I could not. I do not want *handful* work. I want *mindful* work."

Great Britain had once more to justify her presence in the Sudan by claiming to act as agent for the Egyptian Government, was when the Anglo-Egyptian troops occupied, in June, 1901, certain portions of the Bahr-el-Ghazal region, bordering on French Equatorial Africa and the Congo Free State. In Paris and Brussels it was contended that Great Britain had encroached upon territory leased to Belgium and had exceeded her rights under the Convention of 1894. The British counter-claim wholly depended upon "the former rights of Egypt in the Sudan."

The Sultanate of Darfur, between Kordofan and Wadai, was placed within the British sphere by the Anglo-French Agreement. Sultan Ali accepted the British Protectorate, and agreed to pay a tribute. But his country was never made a province of the Sudan, like Kordofan.[1] This cannot be successfully

[1] Owing to the absence of effective control, German and Turkish agents were able to persuade Sultan Ali to cast in his fortunes with them. He paid no tribute in 1915, and in the spring of 1916 declared the "Jehad" (holy war), stating that he had been ordered by the Khalif of all the Moslems to attack the Sudan. The railway to El Obeid made his threat of little importance from the British point of view. But General Sir Reginald Wingate decided to anticipate the threatened attack, and promptly sent a column into Darfur, which occupied El Fashr. It was the Sirdar's object to prevent the possibility of Ali making trouble for the French in Wadai: for the Kamerun operations had depleted greatly the Wadai garrisons, and Sultan Ali knew this. Ali was run down and killed in November. If the railway can now be extended from El Obeid to El Fashr, the last unoccupied province of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan will be brought under effective administrative control, and the cattle trade of the Sudan will be greatly increased. Darfur, up to this last expedition, has been one of the few countries in Africa without a European garrison.

done until the railway from Lake Chad to the Nile is built. Then Abeshr in Wadai and El Fashr in Darfur will be the two important points between the lake and El Obeid, which the Sudan Government railway reached in 1913.

Very soon after the British and Egyptians went back into the Sudan, the problem of irrigation began to be studied. In 1901, Sir William Garstin reported on the possibility of using the equatorial lakes as reservoirs. Lake Victoria Nyanza was rejected because a rise in its level would flood shores which were thickly populated, and half of which were German territory. Although the German factor may now be eliminated, the lake has become far more important than at the time of this report through the wonderful development of the colonies on its shores. It is hardly possible to believe that the opinion of Sir William Garstin will be revised. For the colonies bordering the lake would never consent to having the level raised and lowered for the convenience of the Nile territories. Lake Albert Nyanza presented similar difficulties, for Belgium owns the western shore. Then, too, the utility of irrigating the White Nile Valley is at the best questionable. For it passes through unreclaimable swamp lands for hundreds of miles. Irrigation in the Blue Nile Valley, and the free navigation of that river resulting from a control of the water supply, would bring a rich return. Lake Tana, in northern Abyssinia, on the western side of Mount Guma, according to Sir William Garstin, would make an ideal reservoir. The surrounding country is uninhabited, and en-

gineering difficulties are much less than in the case of Lake Victoria or Lake Albert.

By her treaties with Abyssinia, France, and Italy, Great Britain became ten years ago politically in a position to carry through the Garstin scheme. It has not yet been done. Reports on the Sudan have emphasized year after year the necessity and value of irrigation, and in 1913, as we have seen above, the Imperial Parliament guaranteed a loan, part of which was to be spent in irrigating the Gezira district, on the west bank of the Blue Nile south of Khartum. The success of the Tayiba demonstration station, in this district, in raising fine staple cotton proved, just before the European War broke out, that this irrigation scheme was a sound proposition financially. A wonderful development in cotton growing may be expected after the plan is carried through, and cotton may before long surpass the gum of the Kordofan forests as the premier export article of the Sudan.

In this necessarily incomplete survey of the Sudan, I have saved the political aspect of Sir Reginald Wingate's problem to the last, not because the task of pacification has been any less difficult or less important than the solution of the financial problem, but because the extension of civil administration through military operations had to follow rather than to go hand in hand with economic development.

The Khalifa escaped from Omdurman after the battle of September 6, 1898, and had to be pursued and put out of harm's way. When Sir Reginald Wingate succeeded in killing the Khalifa and his companions a year later, Mahdiism as a military menace

disappeared. But the country was vast and could not be penetrated in a few months or even a few years. The only policy with any chance of success was to direct the efforts of the Government toward the speedy amelioration of the unfortunate victims of the dervish rule, and to win their allegiance through lending them a helping hand. Their memory of Egyptian rule was hardly of a nature to recommend the new Government, and Egyptian soldiers were not looked upon as redeemers—even from Mahdiism, to which many of the most influential sheiks remained profoundly attached as a religious dogma. The British administration had to make itself known, not by force, but by winning confidence through refraining from exploiting the people and giving them as much material benefit as possible in as short a time as possible. This was Sir Reginald Wingate's policy, and I have been able to see with my own eyes the magic that it has worked upon people who are fanatical only if you provoke them to fanaticism, and savage only if you give them reason to be. From the very beginning of the new administration at Khartum, the process of pacification has been disturbed only by the ineluctable necessity of enforcing prematurely a too drastic anti-slavery policy.

Not often during the fifteen years from the death of the Khalifa to the outbreak of the European War has Sir Reginald been compelled to show the mailed fist. In 1903, a new Mahdi arose in southern Kordofan. He was immediately pursued, captured, and hanged at El Obeid. The criticism from England against his summary execution was very hard to bear,

even though it was inspired by sentimentality and total ignorance of the problem with which the officials in the Sudan had to deal. From 1884 to 1898 Mahdiism had meant the extinction of nearly six million lives.[1] The only way to prevent a return to the most intolerable and cruel despotism the valleys of the Upper Nile tributaries had ever known was to snuff out at the beginning every pretendant to the Mahdi's succession. In 1908, a body of ex-dervishes attacked and killed the deputy inspector of the Blue Nile province. This was just at the time the "Young Egypt" party was beginning to grow formidable, and their emissaries were working everywhere in the Sudan. A punitive expedition resulted in twelve death sentences, which were commuted to life imprisonment.

The pessimism of Sir Eldon Gorst's report for 1909 extended to his remarks on the Sudan. He declared that the tenth year of the occupation was full of tribal unrest, and that Mahdiism was not extinguished

[1] The population of the Egyptian Sudan was believed to be between eight and nine millions at the beginning of the Mahdi's reign. Five years after the reconquest, it was still *less than two millions*. In the last decade, the increase has been very rapid, so that, in spite of sleeping sickness in the south, it now exceeds three millions. The steady increase in population is the most striking proof of the benefit of British rule. Intertribal warfare has ceased. Security from raiding and Government aid in combating disease make cattle-raising once more profitable. There has been immigration from Abyssinia and from West Africa. Only about four thousand Europeans are in the Sudan. Aside from the officials and their families, the missionaries and a very few Europeans interested in development schemes and archæology, the foreigners are Greeks and Syrians, who lend money, engage in petty commerce, and sell spirits. In Khartum street signs are in Greek.

as a faith, and had to be carefully watched and checked at every turn. There was also much lawlessness along the Abyssinian border. The most dangerous districts were so unhealthy that the only means of maintaining order was to increase the Sudanese battalions. In 1912, there was an expedition into Mongalla, and an outbreak in southern Kordofan. There were nine distinct military operations during the course of 1914.

If one had only reports to go by, one would gather that fifteen years of Anglo-Egyptian occupation had not brought peace to the Sudan. But one has to consider the enormous extent of the country, and the difficulties of communication. Punitive expeditions and local uprisings stand out: for they are news. When one reads the newspapers, he sees only reports of divorces. Does he argue from this that marriages are generally unhappy?

Sir Reginald Wingate was at home on a vacation when the European War began. He hurried back to his post, and there were many who said that he would have very severe days before him. The entry of Turkey into the war was expected by the Germans to have serious consequences throughout North Africa. But especially did they hope for trouble in the Sudan. When I was in Berlin, in December, 1914, the collapse of British power in the Moslem portion of Africa and Asia was confidently prophesied. There was much faith in the fetish of Pan-Islamism.

A year later, when it looked as if Germany was planning the invasion of Egypt on a large scale, and the newspapers were full of alarming reports, I

traveled all over Egypt, and went to Khartum to see how matters stood in the Sudan. Although the Turks were reported to be moving again against the Suez Canal, and fighting with the Senussi was going on in the West, my journey of four days by rail and steamer south from Cairo was exactly as in time of peace.

It was patent that no insurrectional movement was anticipated or feared by the Sudan Government. One-fourth of the British military and civil staff (there were less than four hundred in all) had been allowed to return home to rejoin regiments or volunteer. No increase in the British effectives had been asked for, or was contemplated. For nearly a million square miles there were less than a thousand British soldiers.

At the beginning of the entrance of Turkey into the war, the Sirdar received telegrams and letters from all the principal chiefs of the Sudan, expressing whole-hearted loyalty to the British Empire, and condemning the action of the Young Turks. These were published in a remarkable booklet called *The Sudan Book of Loyalty*. Of all who came forward at that time with declarations of sympathy and loyalty, only two have since been put under formal restraint by the Government for political intrigue with the enemy.

Inside the Sudan there was only one revolt against the Government, which had to be dealt with as a military operation. It was that of a chieftain in the Kadugli district of the Nuba Mountains, who had been deceived by enemy agents into believing that the

power of the British in Egypt and the Sudan was on the point of eclipse. He surrendered at the end of 1915. There have been no others, and it cannot be too strongly emphasized that the police and inspection work in the Sudan, from the internal point of view, is only what is usual in time of peace. The Khalifa's proclamation of the Holy War left the Sudanese unaffected.

Seeing is believing. The Egyptians are so unwarlike a race and so lacking in personal courage and daring that it was easy enough to discount the German stories about the storm that was going to break in Cairo. I did not have to go to Egypt to reassure myself on this point. But the Sudanese, from the blackest of blacks to the most chocolate-colored of Arabs, have no fear of death, and are heroes, in the face of desperate odds, of many a charge that surpasses Balaclava. The Sudanese, too, are fanatical Moslems, with all the zeal and enthusiasm that belongs to primitive races and neophytes. I had been living for years in an atmosphere where Pan-Islamism was the absorbing topic of conversation and the nightmare of my British official friends. So I needed to go to Khartum.

By pure chance the trip into the Sudan was well-timed. I was there for the two important *fêtes* of the year, the birthday of the Prophet (*Muled-el-Nebi*) and the anniversary of the visit of the King and Queen of England, who had stopped at Port Sudan on the way back from India, and held a review at Sinkat, on January 17, 1912. King's Day was celebrated by an impressive service at the Khartum

Cathedral. After the garrison left the church, they stood on parade and Sir Reginald Wingate read a cablegram from the King. It was a stirring sight to see these few hundred British soldiers, the only military evidence of British power in the midst of war in one of the largest Moslem regions in Africa.

After dinner on the evening of King's Day, Sir Reginald took me down into the Palace garden to see the Sudanese band that had been playing during the meal. We passed through the circle around the conductor, and stood in their midst while they played some Niam-Niam marches. The Sirdar was in full-dress uniform, and bareheaded. A couple of torches gave light. The black faces and weird music made me feel that I was certainly surrounded by savages in the heart of Africa. But they were savages whose affection for their big chief was evident in the way they looked at him and the vim with which they played. I thought back a year, and I was in the Vaterland Café in Berlin. There was music, too, and I was listening to an authority on the Near East. "The Sudanese, you know," he said, "are certainly coming in with us—when they realize that the Sultan has raised the Green Standard. They are devils, and the black pagan tribes will follow readily the Moslems. They really hate the British rule. What happened to Gordon will seem little beside this approaching tragedy, just as the Sepoy Rebellion will seem little compared to what is going to happen in India."

Sir Reginald Wingate asked me to go to Omdurman with him to the dervish celebration of the Prophet's

birthday. We were a party of about thirty: the Grand Cadi, the Grand Mufti, several officers from the British regiment stationed at Khartum, Mr. More, the Civil Governor of Khartum Province, Sir Reginald's associates in the Government, and his personal staff. We left the Palace steps at nine o'clock in the evening for the trip on the Blue Nile to Omdurman. Our steamer was the *Elfin*, which was used by Gordon in the old days more than thirty years ago.

At the landing-stage, about half a mile from the city walls, a great crowd of white-robed dervishes was waiting to form the guard of honor. Each held a flaming torch. The Sudan women, harking back to jungle days, greeted the Sirdar with a shrill cry, which they make tremolo by pressing fingers on their lips. Into the city past the Mahdi's tomb and the Khalifa's ruined palace we rode to a large open space, where innumerable tents were dressed for the celebration. The Omdurman municipality, the important Omdehs (headmen) of the neighboring villages and various tribes, and the sheiks of the many religious orders had their separate tents. With untiring physical energy and good humor and capacity for "pink lemonade" of the good old circus variety, which was forced upon us in every tent, Sir Reginald Wingate led us from place to place. No tent was too humble to be omitted, no sheik too insignificant to be passed over. One religious leader, who received the Sirdar as an equal on this night, is a cook in private life. "And a good cook, too," the Sirdar told me.

I had the good fortune to meet and talk with the

most revered of the religious chieftains, El Sayyed Ali Morghani—now Sir Ali Morghani, K.C.M.G., for he received a knighthood from the King in the last birthday honors. Sir Ali is a modest, unassuming man of about forty, with a shrewd, keen mind. He knows what is going on in the world, for he asked me some searching questions about conditions in France and the Balkans. Sir Ali, who is revered as a "holy man" above all the religious leaders of the Sudan, has no doubt whatever of the sincere attachment of the Moslems of Africa to the cause of Great Britain. I think that he believes exactly what he told me.

When Sir Reginald Wingate explained to the sheiks who I was and what I had come to the Sudan for, they nodded their heads with satisfaction, and laughed. "Tell him to write what he sees," they declared. "We are glad that he came for the feast, for he can give the English and French and Americans a good report of us."

The last tent we visited was the most important, and around it gathered all the people of Omdurman and the tribes who had come into the city for the festivities. Thousands of white-robed howling dervishes were dancing and barking, having reached the point of frenzy. We sat sipping coffee in the midst of a crowd of sixty thousand Moslems, most of whom had been followers of the Mahdi and believers in the Khalifa. The Sirdar's guard of honor was four Sudanese lancers on horse. *There were no troops, either Egyptian or British. None of our party was armed.* The people of Omdurman, at the

moment of the greatest religious exaltation of the year, had here in their power the Governor-General and the chief representatives of British authority in the Sudan.

I know the feeling of Moslem fanaticism in an Oriental crowd. I have experienced it more than once when I knew that I was facing death. That feeling was not here. There was real love for the Sirdar, and no hostility to the rest of us.

As we were leaving the tent, one of the turbaned dervish chieftains who had followed the Sirdar to the entrance, put his left hand on my shoulder as he shook hands, and said, "I hope you have enjoyed the feast at Omdurman and will come again."

"Who is that sheik?" I asked Sir Reginald Wingate.

"One of the Mahdi's sons," he answered.

CHAPTER II

THE ISLANDS OF AFRICA

THE islands around Africa are owned by Portugal, Spain, Great Britain, and France, and the title to their possession generally goes far back beyond the period of European colonization of the mainland. In the old days of sailing vessels, when the route to India was around the Cape of Good Hope, islands had a unique value. There were, of course, ports of call on the mainland. But they were never free from the attacks of the savages, and did not afford security for the storing of supplies. Nor did the mainland lend itself as well as islands to economic development and the spread of civilization in the days when colonial forces were small and colonists few. Europe in Africa—on the large scale of administrative possession and economic development—was possible only after steamships and railways had passed the experimental stage, and when the intense production of the new industrial era created surplus population and surplus goods for which an outlet must be found. Europe did not take possession of Africa *as a result of* the explorations of Livingstone, Stanley, Peters, de Brazza, and others. The ex-

plorers were the pioneers of a Europe ready and needing to follow the path they blazed.

Aside from the Madeira Islands and the Azores, which are administratively regarded as integral parts of the Republic, Portugal has the important Cape Verde group, the Bissagos Archipelago off Portuguese Guinea, and the two little islands of Sao Thomé and Principe in the Gulf of Guinea, which are treated in the chapter on the Portuguese colonies.

The Canary Islands are administratively a portion of the Spanish monarchy: so the minister of colonies, who once had under his control an Empire that only Britain has since been able to match, gives most of the attention of his department to the one rich little island of Fernando Po near the mouth of the Niger, far in the Gulf of Guinea. The only interest of this island, in the international scheme of things, is the fact that it commands the approach to the German colony of Kamerun, just as Zanzibar controls the approach to Germany's principal port in her East African colony. Spain has also, southeast of Fernando Po, a foothold on the mainland, called Spanish Guinea, which is an enclave in the Kamerun (just as the British enclave of Walfisch Bay controls the outlet of the Swakop and Kuiseb rivers in German Southwest Africa). Should Spain ever desire to part with one or all of her colonies, France has the treaty right of preemption.

The British and French islands are most conveniently placed along the trade routes around the continent and across the Atlantic and Indian oceans.

Great Britain has, beside Walfisch Bay, the wee


AFRICA
ABOUT 1850
UNEXPLORED
EXPLORED—BUT NOT HELD BY ANY POWER
INDEPENDENT STATES
BRITISH
FRENCH
PORTUGUESE
TURKISH
SPANISH
CARAVAN ROUTES
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
ALGERIA
MOROCCO
TUNIS
TRIPOLI
EGYPT
NUBIA
FEZZAN
SAHARA OR GREAT DESERT
SOUDAN OR NIGRITIA
SENEGAMBIA
GUINEA
SOUTH GUINEA
CONGO
ANGOLA
BENGUELA
DAMARAS
GREAT NAMAQUAS
CAPE COLONY
KAFFRARIA
SOFALA
MOZAMBIQUE
ZANZIBAR
ABYSSINIA
SOMAULI
AJAN
MADAGASCAR
SOUTH ATLANTIC OCEAN
INDIAN OCEAN
Gulf of Guinea
Gulf of Aden
Red Sea
Persian Gulf
Tropic of Cancer
Tropic of Capricorn
EQUATOR
Canary Ids.
C. Blanco
Strait of Gibraltar
TANGIER
CEUTA
FEZ
MOROCCO
ALGIERS
BONA
TUNIS
MALTA
TRIPOLI
CRETE
CYPRUS
ALEXANDRIA
CAIRO
SUEZ
Nile River
OASIS OF TWAT
TIBESTI
TIMBUKTU
AGDASS
KANEM
L. Chad
WADAI
DARFUR
KORDOFAN
SOKATO
Niger R.
Senegal R.
Gambia R.
Mountains of Kong
SIERRA LEONE
LIBERIA
ASHANTI
DAHOMEY
IVORY COAST
GOLD COAST
SLAVE COAST
Cameroons Mts.
Fernando Po
Bight of Biafra
BIAFRA
GABUN
Congo R.
ST. PAUL DE LOANDA
EXTREME SETTLEMENT OF THE PORTUGESE
Nourse R.
C. Frio
Walfish Bay
Orange R.
Limpopo R.
Delagoa Bay
PORT NATAL
CAPETOWN
C. of Good Hope
GEORGETOWN
ZANZIBAR Id.
Zambezi R.
ASCENSION Id. (Br.)
St. HELENA Id. (Br.)
Wm. J. WILSON

Hollam's Archipelago and Possession Island off the coast of German Southwest Africa. The latter is at the northern end of Lüderitzland, not far from the port of Angra Pequena. Huge Madagascar lies off the coast of Portuguese East Africa, almost paralleling the entire stretch from Lorenzo Marques in Delagoa Bay at the south to Cape Delgado on the north. The distance is not great from the Portuguese port of Mozambique to Madagascar. In the southern part of the canal between Mozambique and Madagascar, France has the two small islands of Bassas da India and Isle de l'Europe. Between Cape Delgado, which marks the boundary of German East Africa and Portuguese East Africa, and the northern end of Madagascar, lies the Comores Archipelago, also belonging to France. Great Britain has Zanzibar and Pemba as sentinels between the German port of Dar-es-Salaam and her port of Mombasa. Farther out into the ocean, off the coast of German East Africa and north of Madagascar, Assumption, Aldabra, Astove, Saint Pierre, Providence, Cerf Islands, and the archipelagoes of Cosmoledo and Farquhar fly the Union Jack.

On the way to India from Zanzibar, beyond the islands just named, are Mahé, Felicité, the Amirantes and others, which form the Seychelles. They are under British rule. Five hundred miles east of Madagascar is Mauritius, with dependent islands, which England conquered from France in 1810. In the Atlantic Ocean, on the way to South America, are Ascension Island, St. Helena, and the Tristan da Cunha group, convenient sentinels to keep the ocean for the British.

From the standpoint of African colonial history, British Zanzibar and French Madagascar have alone influenced European colonial policy and the history of African colonial expansion. We can eliminate all the others. But brief mention must be made of the recent history and development of Zanzibar and Madagascar.

ZANZIBAR

Zanzibar and its small northern neighbor, Pemba, are, like Somaliland, connected racially, historically, and religiously with Arabia rather than with Africa. They came under the control of Muscat when the Portuguese Empire began to crumble. For twenty-five years, in the early part of the nineteenth century, Zanzibar was connected politically with Muscat. It became an independent sultanate again in 1856. Not until she found Germany installed on the mainland of Africa, north of Portuguese Mozambique, and France making plans for the conquest of Madagascar, did Great Britain feel impelled to get possession of Zanzibar and Pemba. A treaty establishing the British Protectorate was secretly made; and France and Germany were confronted with a *fait accompli*. These two Powers were placated by the agreements of 1890. France was given a free foot in Madagascar: and Heligoland was ceded to Germany. France and Germany recognized the Zanzibar Protectorate: and Germany paid one million dollars to the Sultan of Zanzibar for his rights on the mainland they had occupied six years earlier.

Since the rise of German naval power, Heligoland has proved of far more importance than the British Government ever dreamed it would be. In view of what has happened since the outbreak of the war in Europe, the British must have come to the opinion that the price paid for Zanzibar was pretty high.

The importance of Zanzibar as a trading center has diminished in recent years through the development of the coast ports of French and Italian Somaliland, and of German and British East Africa. The German railway from Lake Tanganyika to the coast at Dar-es-Salaam is the most important factor in preventing the expansion that had been hoped for in Zanzibar. The total trade has for some years remained stationary at about ten million dollars. The most lucrative industry of the island remains clove-raising.

In 1901, the old Sultan was succeeded by Ali, a youth of nineteen, who vacated the throne after ten years of an uneventful reign. During this period, however, British control became effective, and the Pan-Islamic movement brought no serious problem. In 1913, the control of the island was handed over to the Colonial Office by the Foreign Office, and a British resident given the title of High Commissioner. Zanzibar had been separated from British East Africa in 1904, although it had been included in the original charter of the British East Africa Company.

A recent movement to bring the two Protectorates under one control, as has been accomplished in British West Africa, has not yet succeeded. The problem of the Indians stands in the way. Indians

are numerous in Zanzibar. Since the abolition of slavery, they have become the real possessors of the land. As they ply the trade of money-lenders, the Arab farmers and planters are in their power. The majority of the Zanzibar Indians did not come directly from India, but are of South African origin. They left that part of the British Empire because they could not secure there the rights of British subjects. In their new home, they note the recent measures taken, and the new measures agitated, in British East Africa against Indians, and fear that incorporation with the mainland Government will once more make of them pariahs.

The most interesting contribution of Zanzibar to the experimental solution of European colonization problems in Africa is the method of abolition of slavery. It was a peculiarly advantageous field for the tackling of this problem. Zanzibar and Pemba are islands. The inhabitants are Moslems. Islamic law is the law of the land. Mr. B. S. Cave, British Agent and Consul-General, gave a valuable review of the successive steps of the emancipation policy in a report issued in 1909. It is well worth studying. The Sultan issued a decree in 1897, ordaining that no child thereafter born could be a slave, and made provision by which slaves could obtain freedom. In eleven years eleven thousand slaves were emancipated. Voluntary emancipation went very slowly at first. Older slaves were naturally unwilling to accept freedom. But the *gradual* process of enfranchisement did not arouse Arab fanaticism; the emancipated natives did not become demoralized by a

sudden change in their status for which they were not prepared; and local industries and agriculture suffered scarcely at all. During that time, the general and local problems arising from emancipation had been met and examined. So the experience of eleven years could be used to advantage in framing a general emancipation decree that would neither violate Moslem sensibilities nor upset the economic life of the country.

In June, 1909, the Sultan signed a decree forbidding recognition by the Courts of the status of slavery in the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba. Compensation was provided for slaves whose previous masters would now refuse to support them because age, ill health, or physical disability prevented them from earning a living. The rights of concubines under Moslem law would not be recognized, if concubines, taking advantage of the emancipation decree, left their former masters without consent. Nor would they have the right of custody of their children by the master whom they left.

One admires the sagacity and patient wisdom of those who had to deal with the slave problem in Zanzibar. Resisting the pressure brought to bear upon them by thoughtless sentimentalists in England, and enduring misrepresentation and vitriolic denunciation on the part of those who had not the slightest knowledge of the subject upon which they were talking,[1] the British administrators kept quietly

[1] The French Abolition Decree of 1896 in Madagascar was held up as the "only right and honorable step" for Great Britain to take. The two cases were totally different, of course, Zanzibar being under

at their task. When the moment of realization arrived, the vindication of their conservative policy was complete. Emancipation in Zanzibar has been so strikingly successful that it has given heart—and a potent argument—to others who are confronted with the same perplexing task on the mainland, and who have to bear all the while insult and impugnment of motives from cranks in England. If any one believes that the only way to effect a reform is to make it immediately and sweepingly, and that the British flag *must* mean freedom for all over whom it is hoisted by the very fact of its being hoisted and at the very moment it is hoisted, let him read Mr. Cave's report.

MADAGASCAR

Madagascar is by far the largest island depending upon the continent of Africa. The area of France is 207,000 square miles. Madagascar's area is 227,000 square miles. The population of the island, which is nearly a thousand miles long, is 3,200,000, of whom over 3,000,000 belong to the Malagasy race. The people are of many distinct tribes, with different languages. The most intelligent and numerous, the Hovas, number nearly a million.

France got a foothold in Madagascar between 1882 and 1884, at the time when Germany and Great Britain were feverishly putting under their flags all that was left up to that time on the African mainland.

Islamic law, and the *harem* consideration complicating the problem. Some of Zanzibar's most influential chiefs, *in close connection with Mecca*, had been African slave-traders.

As we have seen above, after Great Britain seized Zanzibar, she agreed to leave a free field to France in Madagascar. But the Malagasy, not having been consulted, were of another mind. Queen Ranavalona, loyally sustained by the Hovas, refused to recognize the legality of "treaties" made by local chiefs for the cession of bits of coast land to France. What government would recognize a right acquired in this way? By the same token, the Protectorate was not recognized. France had to enter upon a war of conquest, and annex the island without the consent either of government or people. The Queen was deposed and sent into exile. Madagascar was declared a French possession. The Malagasy who opposed were treated as rebels.

In the early days of French activity in Madagascar, there was much opposition to France and criticism of France in the British press. The agitation was fed by Protestant missionaries, who claimed that their work was ruined, and that the French were acting with great cruelty towards natives, whose only crime was love of country and liberty. But as Great Britain was at the time meditating the gobbling up of the Dutch republics in South Africa, the official ear was deaf to the cry of outraged humanity. The French went to Tananarive in the same year that Jameson went to Johannesburg: and Queen Ranavalona was exiled to Algiers in the same year that President Kruger made his desperate personal appeal to Europe. The French received Kruger with great enthusiasm, and the English held meetings in Albert Hall to wax indignant over the fate of the Queen

of Madagascar. But neither Government made the other hold back from the policy of arbitrary conquest. The friends of "liberty and justice and the freedom of small nationalities" did what they always have done—and no more than they always have done. They protested, and cried out against the iniquity in the world. No Government espoused the cause of Boers or Malagasy.

The results in Madagascar, just as the results in South Africa, have proved distinctly beneficial to the people of the country. If the end has not justified the means, it has at least caused the means to be forgotten. The South African Commonwealth brings credit upon the working out of British colonial policy. Madagascar is a credit to France. There was much initial suffering to native races, and a great amount of injustice in the early years. This is proved by the appeal of the Native Races Protection Committee, issued in Paris in 1900, which declared that the forced labor of the Malagasy was a crying scandal; that they were in a condition of slavery worse than that which the French Government had abolished by proclamation four years before they conquered the island; and that the taxes amounted to exploitation. It was asserted that forced labor on roads was reducing the robust male population on the island; that natives were arrested and imprisoned without trial, and then compelled to work, because they were prisoners, without pay. *Similar conditions have prevailed in all European colonies in Africa at the beginning of European administration.* But always in British colonies, and often in French and

German colonies, they have been remedied with the change from military to civil administration.

Madagascar to-day has over two million acres under cultivation. Although rubber is the principal product, sugar, coffee, cloves, cotton, vanilla, and vegetables are raised in considerable quantity. Scientific development of forest products, government initiative in cattle breeding, and the introduction of silk-worms have done much for the prosperity of the natives. Mines are being opened up. There are nearly nine thousand miles of telegraph and telephone lines. Railway construction has advanced slowly. But there are many good roads, and motor-lorries are in use extensively. The revolution in motor transport through the invention and development of the automobile has changed remarkably the problem of transport on islands. Where plantations are large and the haul to the port is not more than two hundred kilometers, it is a question whether the public interest is not better served by good roads than by railways. The planter can load the automobile truck in the field, and unload directly at the steamer. The haul is down to sea-level. The experience of the French army at Verdun furnishes an excellent means of computing wear and tear on roads, and expense of upkeep.

France was beginning to find a return in Madagascar when the Great War broke out. There was trade with France to the amount of seventy-five million francs in 1913. Of the ten thousand ships that entered Madagascar ports during that year, nearly seven thousand carried the French flag.

Some of France's most illustrious military men, of whom notable examples are Generals Galliéni and Lyautey, made their reputation and gained the experience that has enabled them to serve their country so well in the military and civil administration of Madagascar. With the different tribes and languages, and no railways through the interior, the task was arduous, and required unflagging enthusiasm as well as tact and nerve. In Morocco lately, and on the battlefields of the Marne and Meuse and Somme, France has much to be grateful for in having had Madagascar to train her chiefs.

Most important of all things is the fact that the French, in spite of their bad start, have succeeded in winning the natives. Second only to the Senagalese have been the Malagasy in their zeal to serve France in this war. I had been reading last April much that condemned the French in Madagascar. Just then General Galliéni died. I went with all Paris to pass before his bier in the *chapelle ardente* that had been made before the church door in the courtyard of the Invalides. The guard of honor around the coffin were Malagasy.

CHAPTER III

THE LAST YEARS OF THE BOER WAR AND THE PERIOD OF RECONSTRUCTION IN SOUTH AFRICA

BOTH from a military and political point of view, the year 1900 brought great disappointment to the British Cabinet and to the commanders of the British army in South Africa. It had been confidently expected that the overwhelming odds against the Boers would result in a few months in the complete collapse of their power, if not of their will, to resist. But the arrival of Lord Roberts and the surrender of Cronje's army in February did not prove to be "the beginning of the end." Although Ladysmith was relieved in March, and Mafeking in May, the task seemed almost as formidable as at the beginning. The British had to contend with the undisguised sympathy of the Boers in Cape Colony for the cause of the Republics. As war prisoners frequently escaped from Simonstown, Cronje and his army were deported to St. Helena. Although most of the Cape Colony rebels, after the withdrawal of the Free State commandos in March, took advantage of Lord Milner's amnesty proclamation, the Boers of the Colony continued to use political weapons

against the British. There was a ministerial crisis in June. Many members of the Cape Colony Assembly were under arrest for treason, and yet the new Progressive Government had only a majority of six.

Lord Roberts sailed from Cape Town on December 1st, fully satisfied that he was leaving to Lord Kitchener a guerrilla warfare that could not last out the winter. Five days after his departure, an Afrikander Congress met at Worcester which passed resolutions disapproving the attitude of Lord Milner, denouncing the British conduct of the war, declaring that the white population of South Africa would be exterminated if peace were not soon made, and demanding that the Republics be allowed to retain their independence. In Europe, French public opinion was bitterly hostile to Great Britain. Queen Victoria and the Prince of Wales, no less than Chamberlain and other members of the Government, were subjected in France to a campaign of caricature and scathing criticism hardly less violent than that which Kaiser Wilhelm, the Crown Prince, and von Bethmann-Hollweg have experienced since August 1st, 1914. President Kruger was received with hysterical enthusiasm in Paris. In view of the changes of the last fifteen years, it is curious to have to record that it was Kaiser Wilhelm's refusal to receive Kruger that checkmated the Boer hopes of receiving substantial aid from Europe.

Early in 1901 martial law had to be declared throughout Cape Colony. In Natal, as well as in Cape Colony, Ministers, unable to depend upon

parliamentary support, were driven to the ineluctable necessity of acting illegally. The Cape Parliament was twice prorogued. Newspapers were suppressed, and editors prosecuted. Trials for treason in Cape Colony and Natal resulted, in some cases, in the imposition of the death penalty.

On August 7th, Lord Kitchener issued a drastic proclamation, which announced the annexation of the Orange Free State and the "late South African Republic." He declared that "Her Majesty's Forces are in possession of the seats of government, the whole machinery of administration, and the principal towns and railway lines of these two territories; that only a few burghers are still under arms and, being short of ammunition, are unable to carry on regular warfare. Her Majesty's Government is determined to put an end to a state of things which is aimlessly prolonging bloodshed and destruction and inflicting ruin upon the great majority of inhabitants, who are anxious to live in peace and to earn a livelihood for themselves and their families." Therefore, Lord Kitchener, under instructions from Her Majesty's Government, declared that the leaders of the Boer armies who did not surrender before September 15th would be permanently banished from South Africa, and that "the cost of the maintenance of the families of the burghers in the field who had not surrendered by September 15th would be recoverable from such burghers and be a charge upon their property movable and unmovable in the two colonies."

Lord Kitchener was disappointed in the effect of this measure. It only exasperated the Boers, and

strengthened their will to resist to the bitter end. Ten thousand Boers were holding in check a British army of over two hundred thousand. Their hatred of the British was increased by the drastic step which Lord Kitchener felt compelled to take of establishing concentration camps, and of extending the area of "pacified" territory by means of a chain of block-houses. The terrible mortality among women and children in these concentration camps called forth a unanimous protest from the civilized world, which was especially strong in England itself. Who does not remember the bitter indictment of Miss Hobhouse's pamphlets? In July, 1124 children died from lack of milk; in August, 1525; in September, 1964. Many Boers who lost their loved ones in these concentration camps, and of whom a striking example is General Hertzog, have never forgotten the wrongs inflicted upon innocent non-combatants during those awful days.[1]

[1] I was living in London at this time, and know that the stories of Miss Hobhouse, W. T. Stead, and others, were accepted as true. But Lord Kitchener, when he finally left South Africa, did not hesitate to state in his farewell speech: "The Commander-in-Chief has special pleasure in congratulating the Army on the kindly and humane spirit which has animated all during this long struggle. Fortunately for the future of South Africa, *the truth of this matter is known to our late enemy, as well as to ourselves;* and no misrepresentation from outside can prevail in the long run against the actual fact that no war has ever yet been waged in which combatants and non-combatants on either side have shown so much consideration and kindness to one another." The truth of the matter is that women and children—all non-combatants for that matter—cannot help suffering horribly as a result of the invasion of the territory in which they live. If we condemn the fact of invasion, naturally the responsibility for resultant suffering and mortality falls upon the

Lord Milner, speaking at Johannesburg in January, 1902, declared that the only possible way of ending the war was to "squeeze" the Boers until they made overtures of their own accord. So the line of blockhouses was remorselessly extended. Lord Kitchener was aided appreciably in hastening the inevitable end by enlisting the services of five thousand burghers who had surrendered. Under the renegade General Vilonel, these "National Scouts" ("handsuppers," they were contemptuously called by the other Boers) contributed a skill in guerilla warfare and an invaluable typographical knowledge of the country to the final efforts of the British army. For the immediate purpose of finishing the war quickly, the use of the "handsuppers" was eminently successful. But it resulted in a bitter feeling, which has persisted

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Government that ordered the invasion and the army that carried out the order. But once that is said, is it not true that suffering and death cannot be prevented, or even always mitigated, when prevention or mitigation comes into conflict with military necessity? Lord Kitchener spoke with a clear conscience *as a soldier*, whose first duty was to accomplish his mission. Concentration camps and the blockhouse system resulted in the British victory. No other course of action was possible. Since all the cattle had been driven off the farms, where could fresh milk have been obtained? The children were victims of the war. It is not open to doubt that the British authorities did all they could to make the suffering and mortality as light as possible. If the concentration camps had not been established, it is probable that *all* the women and children would have died. The only direct responsibility that falls upon the army which executed orders given to it by the Home Government is from mistakes of judgment in placing some of the camps in unsuitable and unhealthy locations. But even here military men would argue that the exigencies of the situation necessitated the establishment of the camps in such places.

until now, against the men who sold out the cause. The irreconcilables among the Boers have never ceased to maintain that the treachery of the renegades alone made possible British success. The "hands-uppers" were excommunicated by the Dutch Reformed Church. Although the ecclesiastical ban was afterwards lifted, they have been considered ever since as outcasts even by those who are now loyal British subjects.

General Delarey's success in defeating and taking prisoner Lord Methuen in March was the last victory for the Boers. In fact, when Delarey released Lord Methuen, in order that he might receive proper medical attention for his wounds, Boer magnanimity could not be interpreted otherwise than as a confession that power of resistance had reached its end. Negotiations were begun on March 23d.

Kitchener and Milner had unequivocally stated that the restoration of Boer independence was out of the question. But the conference of burghers, which met at Vereeniging on May 15th, made the following proposals after three days of heated discussion: the relinquishment of foreign relations and embassies; the acceptance of the protectorate of Great Britain; the surrender of a portion of the territory of the South African Republic; and the conclusion of a defensive treaty with Great Britain in regard to South Africa. When Kitchener and Milner declined to discuss these proposals, or telegraph them to Mr. Chamberlain, and dictated terms of unconditional surrender upon which the burghers were to give a plain yes or no answer, General De

Wet urged the delegates to continue the war. But "handsupping" had now become so prevalent that common sense determined the burghers to submit to the inevitable. As General Delarey put it, "If the meeting insisted on a continuation of hostilities the nation would be driven into 'handsupping'; thus the war would end in dishonor and disgrace." The terms dictated by Great Britain, and accepted at Vereeniging, contained ten stipulations:

1. Unconditional surrender, and recognition of Edward VII. as lawful Sovereign. 2. Burghers in the field outside the limits of the two former Republics and all prisoners of war to be returned to their homes as soon as transportation and means of subsistence made this possible. 3. No burghers surrendering or returning to be deprived of personal liberty or property. 4. Immunity from legal action, civil or criminal, of burghers for any acts in connection with the prosecution of the war. 5. The Dutch language to be taught in public schools, where the parents of the children desire it, and to be allowed in courts of law, when necessary for the better and more effectual administration of justice. 6. The possession of rifles, subject to the taking out of a license, to be allowed to persons requiring them for their protection. 7. Military administration to be succeeded by civil government at the earliest possible date, and, as soon as circumstances permitted, the introduction of representative institutions, leading up to self-government. 8. The question of granting the franchise to natives not to be decided until after the introduction of self-govern-

ment. 9. No special tax to be imposed on landed property in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony to defray the expenses of the war. 10. The appointment of a commission, on which local inhabitants would be represented, for assisting the restoration of the people to their homes and their rehabilitation, and for this purpose the granting of £3,000,000 to compensate war losses suffered by the burghers: but no foreigner or rebel to be entitled to the benefit of this clause.

There were eighteen thousand Boers left to surrender. The war had cost Great Britain twenty-two thousand in killed alone.

Lord Milner became Governor of the Transvaal on June 21st, and two days later Lord Kitchener left South Africa, having accomplished a task which proved conclusively that there had been no mistake in choosing the victor of Omdurman to solve the most aggravating military problem that had ever confronted a British general.

There may be conflicting opinions, which history cannot reconcile, concerning the causes and the justice of Great Britain's war of conquest against the Boers. There can be no doubt about the benefit that has resulted from it for the Boers themselves, for the British Empire, and for the whole world.

The Boer War marks a distinct step forward in making Africa a white man's country. If we take the attitude that the white man should leave to indigenous elements the territories they have occupied (or, to put it more accurately, partially occupied) from the beginning of our knowledge of these terri-

tories, we deny that our civilization has a right to exist and to prevail. We deny the logic and the justice of the forces that have contributed to make the world what it is to-day. We deny that the Aryan race has had and still has a mission, and that that mission seems to have been peculiarly entrusted to the Anglo-Saxon element of the white race. The process of civilization is always painful, always fraught with temporary injustice, always prejudicial to the immediate interests of native races which refuse assimilation and resist enlightening influences.

If we are going to denounce and deplore Anglo-Saxon domination in South Africa, the conquest of the aboriginal races on the North American continent and the gradual absorption of weaker European elements by the Anglo-Saxon must be denounced and deplored. When we view and comment upon events as they happen, we are ashamed to hold that the end justifies the means. But when we review and judge events with the perspective of years, is it not human nature to approve *whatever* has happened, when the results are unquestionably beneficial?

Only the man who would like to see Africa still a "dark continent," completely out of touch with Europe and America, can indulge in destructive and vindictive criticism of European colonization in Africa. In passing judgment upon the activities of the different European states in Africa, there is only one sensible criterion—the results. So I have refrained from going into an appreciation of the causes of the Boer War, and have limited my account of the conflict between Boer and Briton to what was

strictly necessary in order to introduce the work of evolution that has been going on in South Africa since 1900. The same point of view, the same method of treatment is adopted throughout this book.

If the British Government, after the Boer War, had tried to exterminate the Boers, or to assimilate them violently and summarily, if they had denied to the Boers either the economic or political liberty they had enjoyed before, or that which they had a right to expect as British subjects, the Boer War would rightly be considered as a war of aggressive conquest, harmful to the interest of South Africans of all races, and would have resulted in a decade or more of terrorism. But, from the very day peace was signed, Great Britain began to work constructively for the happiness and well-being of all South Africans, irrespective of race. Local passions and prejudices tried to frustrate this typically Anglo-Saxon ideal. But generations of experience and of training, inbred with excellent tradition, had made the British Government uncannily wise in judging and dealing rightly with colonial problems.

The first test came immediately after the peace of Vereeniging. The British Cabinet refused to be persuaded by South African "Imperialists" to suspend the Cape Colony Parliament on the ground that it would refuse to pass measures necessary for the pacification of the country. Rather than start in upon the delicate task of reconciliation and reconstruction by adopting an unconstitutional policy for expediency's sake, it was rightly believed to be

better to risk the overthrow of a ministry favorable to the British Government. The Imperialist or Progressive Opposition was guided by Dr. Jameson rather more wisely than his past career would have indicated. In the years of reconciliation, a great deal is due to the wonderful growth, through responsibility, of this man who had led the Raid that bears his name. It is curious how invariably radicals, hotheads, and extremists become conservative when power is placed in their hands. With each succeeding year, Dr. Jameson became more moderate and charitable, and more able to impose moderation on his followers, many of whom advocated in the press and on the platform the policy of Prussia in Alsace and Lorraine.

The problems that confronted the British Government in South Africa were so many and so complex that Mr. Chamberlain decided in the autumn of 1902 to go to the Natal, Cape, Transvaal, and Orange River Colonies, so that he might investigate the post-bellum situation firsthand. His ostensible reason was to study the question of introducing Chinese labor on the indenture system. When the interrupted work of the mines in the Transvaal was resumed, it had been found that only fifty thousand natives were willing to work, although three times that number were imperatively needed. White labor on an extensive scale was considered too costly. But the underlying motive of the Colonial Secretary's visit was political rather than economic. It was his ambition to bring together the Dutch and English parties in Cape Colony, to discuss frankly with

the defeated Boer leaders in Pretoria and Bloemfontein the practical questions involved in reconstruction, and to appeal to the Dutch everywhere "to let bygones be bygones."

During this visit in the winter of 1902–1903, Mr. Chamberlain found that the settlement of the South African question had only begun with the Peace of Vereeniging. There were all sorts of currents, and cross currents, involving the parliamentary régime in Cape Colony; the economic relations between Natal and Cape Colony and the two newly conquered colonies, especially in the way of railway agreements and railway extensions; the introduction of Chinese labor, to which all parties were opposed (the only thing the British and Dutch were in accord upon in Cape Colony!); the repatriation of the Boers upon the breaking up of the concentration camps, return of prisoners and distribution of the three million pound grant; the settlement of Crown lands; and the assessing of a war debt upon the defeated republics.

Mr. Chamberlain was not sure that public opinion in England would receive favorably the proposition of Lord Milner to solve political difficulties by the introduction of British settlers upon Crown land. He found that the difficulty of pacification in South Africa was mostly through hostility to the National Scouts. The Boers insisted that it had not been the understanding that any portion of the three million pounds was to go to "handsuppers." Any grants to them would be open to the suspicion of payment of promised bribes to traitors and renegades, as

the "handsuppers" were regarded. At Pretoria, in answer to Mr. Chamberlain's plea for union, the Boers pressed for claims and advantages far beyond what the treaty had assured them. Mr. Chamberlain warned them that future amnesty and self-government would not come through pressure. At Bloemfontein a deputation of Boers headed by General Christian De Wet told Mr. Chamberlain that there were many irreconcilables among the Boers, especially in what had been the Free State, and complained that the terms of peace were not being carried out. The real trouble was animosity against the National Scouts. Mr. Chamberlain and General De Wet both lost their temper, and a rather undignified scene followed.

In connection with the labor question, the mine-owners of the Rand[1] declared to Mr. Chamberlain that, as the immediate future of South Africa depended upon the extension of the gold industry, the importation of indentured Chinese was the only thing that could save the situation. The possibility of employing whites, they said, was out of the question, not only on account of the high wages demanded, but because whites could not do heavy manual work in a country inhabited by people of an inferior race without sinking to the economic level of the blacks. Hindoos were not of the physical build demanded for working in mines, and, if imported in large quantities, would end by demanding the right,

[1] By the Rand is meant the mining area from Spring to Randfontein, a gold reef of thirty to forty miles, including Johannesburg and all the mining townships.

as British subjects, to remain. For the blacks, on the other hand, it was contended that the scarcity of labor for the mines was due to the unwillingness of mine-owners to pay wages that would compete with the considerably higher wages offered for public works and railway construction. The labor question was serious, not only from the standpoint of the mine-owners, but also from the standpoint of the entire white population of the colony. Half the stamps on the mines were idle for lack of labor. As the mines used coal and furnished the principal receipts for the railways, economic rehabilitation and development could not be hoped for so long as the mines were not being fully worked. Unless this question could be solved, the Boer War would have been fought in vain: for upon the Transvaal mines depended the economic prosperity of the whole of South Africa, and the justification of extensive railway construction, which alone could develop the agricultural resources of the four colonies and of Rhodesia. It was fruitless to talk of a war loan, unless the Transvaal was put in the position of meeting the interest on the loan.

The task of the Home Government was complicated by conflicting sentiments in the British electorate. There was a universal feeling that the tremendous sacrifice of treasure and of blood made by England should not result in an additional burden on the British taxpayer, while trade with South Africa (which had increased in ten years from nine million pounds to twenty-six million pounds) was diminished. On the other hand, the nonconformist

conscience and labor sentiment were hostile to the adoption of a program in South Africa that would mean the infringement of personal liberty and the denial of the principles which apologists had advanced in justification for undertaking the war. No post-factum substantiation must be given to the accusation so often made that the war had been instigated by and fought for the mine-owners.

The general result of Mr. Chamberlain's visit to South Africa was the adoption by the Imperial Government of the only policy that would avoid going from Scylla to Charybdis. The Cabinet tried, with varying fortunes at first, but with ultimate success at last, to base its South African policy upon the principle that South African questions be decided in the final analysis by South Africans, and that London abstain from overriding colonial wishes in regard to colonial interests. Extreme care, however, had to be exercised in finding out what really was the opinion on all these questions. Imperialist and Boer fanatics did their best to retard union, although the former thought they were working for it. For the extreme elements in both parties tried to make the Cabinet believe that they voiced the sentiments of the people, and to influence the Cabinet to decisions inimical to the real interests of South Africa.

Because the years between the treaty of Vereeniging and the establishment of the Commonwealth developed problems that are being faced or that will have to be faced soon in all African colonies, it is important to set each one of them forth in more

detail than would otherwise be justifiable in a book whose scope includes the whole of Africa. Then, too, it must be remembered that the formation of the Union, which could come only after these questions had been for years in the melting-pot, is a justification of Great Britain's rôle in Africa, and the goal towards which all the States who are colonizing Africa must equally work.

For the sake of avoiding confusion and in order to make these problems stand out beyond their South African setting, I deal with each one of them separately, and do not attempt to coordinate them chronologically between 1902 and 1910.

THE MINES AND THE PROBLEM OF WHITE, BLACK, AND CHINESE LABOR

The accusation against the mine-owners that they were endeavoring to compel blacks to work for a wage lower than could be obtained in the open market does not seem to be substantiated by the facts. I have been told by competent observers that the failure to secure native labor in 1903 was mainly due to the unsettled state of the country and the reluctance of the natives to leave their krals until they had confidence that order was restored. As they had been very prosperous during the war and had saved money, they did not feel the necessity of working. Where in the world do negroes work when they have money? If one bears in mind the fact that the Rand enterprises involved wholly "uitlanders," and that the Boers were exclusively agriculturalists, it is possible

to look for an economic motive underlying the political one. Farmers who could afford to give the blacks ten shillings a month at the most, regarded mines, with the wage rate of two pounds fifteen to three pounds with food, as the cause of their inability to get sufficient labor. All along, since gold was discovered in the Transvaal to the present day, animosity against the "uitlander" has been kept alive for this very patent reason. Far from sympathizing with the contention that the mine-owners were willing to give the blacks too little, the Boer farmers have complained of the blacks being too well paid. They have frequently tried to get the Government to legislate in their favor, but without success.

When it comes to white labor versus black labor, the cause of the failure to run the mines with white labor is neither wages nor climate. It is a social question. The white man will not work alongside the black man. He is physically able to do as much, if not more work, than the black, *but he will not do the same work.* Labor leaders in South Africa have failed utterly in their efforts to demonstrate that mines could be worked by whites, for the simple reason that white laborers, even when starving, refuse to do "niggers' work." White men demand positions in which there is not hard manual labor. It seems amply demonstrated that there is no place in South Africa for the white man who has no trade, and no opportunity to develop his own land. The poor white problem has become acute in South Africa. Europeans without a trade or commercial aptitude, and without money to develop land, are

discouraged from coming into the Commonwealth: for the white man who has no other resource than his hands is apt to become a charge upon the community and a menace. The South African Labor Party has now come to a position where it opposes only the use of natives who are brought into the labor market from outside the Union.

As to the rate of wages that it is possible for mine-owners to pay, it must be remembered that practically all the mines of the Rand are low grade propositions, and are worked sometimes to a depth of seven thousand feet. Many miles of reef are now unworked because the ore is too low grade to yield a profit, even at the native rate of wages. Some mines have paid nothing to their shareholders for years, and others are just above the margin of payability. Even if it be admitted that the cost of administration and the capitalization are in many cases excessive, a slight increase of wages would wipe out the margin between profit and loss in the most carefully run and most conservatively capitalized mine.

The sentiment against the introduction of Chinese labor was greatly strengthened in England by the resignation of Commissioner of Mines Wyebergh and Mr. Monypenny, Editor of the Johannesburg *Star*, who had been a brilliant advocate of the British cause during the war. Mr. Wyebergh championed the employment of white unskilled labor, denying that it would be impracticable or excessively costly. He charged that the financial houses on the Rand had unduly influenced the policy of the Government.

Mr. Monypenny refused to use his pen "in the interest of the mine-owners." There were undoubtedly two sides to the question, but when one tries to view it from the standpoint of the immediate interest of the Transvaal, takes into consideration the safeguards that it was proposed to put around the introduction of this new element into South Africa, and remembers that Chinese labor was proposed only *temporarily as an experiment*, it is difficult to understand the strong opposition that the suggestion aroused.

In the beginning of 1904, when Lord Milner saw that the Transvaal and Orange River Colony budgets were going to have a deficit of nearly seven hundred thousand pounds, he cabled to London for permission to introduce an ordinance to enforce Chinese labor, stating that opposition to such a measure was dying down, and declaring that white men would leave the Transvaal if it were not done. The Legislative Council passed the ordinance, and royal assent was published on March 12th. The first shipload of one thousand coolies sailed from Hongkong on May 5th. Australia cabled a protest to London. Public opinion in Cape Colony was frankly hostile. The influential Boers signed a statement to the effect that the overwhelming majority of Boers was unalterably opposed to the introduction of Asiatics under whatever conditions. Boer opposition, however, as one can gather from the statement of General Botha, was largely due to the fact that they believed such a step should not be taken before the responsible Government promised by the Treaty of Vereeniging had been granted.

At the beginning of 1905, there were 35,000 Chinese on the Rand and by the end of July the number had increased to 43,000. Strikes and assassinations in the compounds were followed by many Chinese breaking loose. White women were attacked. Then the Boers demanded of Lord Selborne that they be permitted to carry arms in defence against the Chinese, and that the immigration cease.[1]

The Chinese claimed that they had been imposed upon, and did not realize that they were coming to Africa to be virtual prisoners.

Immediately after the fall of the Balfour Cabinet in December, 1905, Lord Elgin ordered by cable the stopping of the importation of Chinese, pending the decision to grant responsible government to the colony. During that year, a thousand Chinese had already been repatriated for violation of contract or disorderly conduct. Repatriation continued in 1907 and 1908, as indentures expired. By the end of July, 1908, only five thousand were left, and the last left early in 1910.

If the intention of the experiment of Chinese labor was merely to set the wheels of industry working quickly so that the country could pay its way (as

[1] The Boers were really in favor of Chinese labor, though for sentimental reasons they professed not to be. Chinese recruitment for the mines enabled the Boers to get cheap Kaffir labor for the farms, which they never could do in competition with the mines. There was actually a proposal made in Parliament by a Transvaal member in 1913 to re-introduce Chinese labor for the mines on the ground that it would help the farmers to get Kaffir labor cheaper than was then possible. It found universal support among the Transvaal farmers.

practically the whole revenue of the Transvaal was derived directly or indirectly from the mines), the experiment was far from being a failure. Its warmest supporters had not tried to defend it, or to establish it as a permanent institution.

INDIAN COLONIST RIGHTS AND INDIAN IMMIGRATION

A bitter grievance of the British press against the Kruger administration had been its treatment of Indian British subjects. The British Government's technical ground for coming into open conflict with the Transvaal Government was the violation of the London Convention. For disabilities were imposed upon British Indians as to residence and freedom to pursue their legitimate callings in the Transvaal. But after the Boer War the treatment of British Indians was not remedied. Facts were laid before Parliament to show that rights enjoyed under Kruger had actually been curtailed by the new British administration! In 1904 the Government of India made a formal protest. Parliament was reminded of the old grievance against Kruger, and how the thesis at that time had been adopted by the British Government in dealing with the Transvaal, that the London Convention applied to all British subjects, irrespective of race, creed, color, or language, so that Indians had the right to enter, travel, or reside in any part of the Transvaal, without restrictions.

There has been no difference between Kruger's treatment of the Indians and that of the Government

which ousted him. No protest from Calcutta, even when backed by London and the press, had any effect. Upon this question there is perfect solidarity between English and Dutch in South Africa. The thesis of South Africa is that unrestricted right of entry to Indians will lower the whole standard of living for the white man and make his existence in the country impossible. It is the same thesis as is adopted regarding Asiatic immigration by California and our other western States, by Canada and by Australia. It has extended to the European settlers of British East Africa. Questions of justice, fair play, higher considerations of national interest fall on deaf ears when the Anglo-Saxon is asked to let in the Asiatic. He simply will not do it. There is no argument. Only those who are far away from the "yellow peril" and who would not be affected themselves by unrestricted Asiatic immigration espouse the cause of Japanese, Chinese, and Indians. I am not approving or condemning. I simply state the fact.

After nine years of futile protest, the British Viceroy in India decided to give up the struggle. All that is asked for now is liberal treatment of the Indian *already in the country*. The South African Union, imbued by the same spirit as Kruger, has not accepted the London Convention. Nor will it ever do so.

THE TRANSVAAL'S WAR "CONTRIBUTION"

One great question which Mr. Chamberlain went to South Africa "to settle" was the financial situa-


AFRICA
1902
SHOWING THE DIVISION OF THE CONTINENT AMONG EUROPEAN POWERS
BRITISH
FRENCH
GERMAN
ITALIAN
PORTUGUESE
SPANISH
BRITISH AND EGYPTIAN
TURKISH
RAILROADS
SCALE OF MILES
NORTH ATLANTIC OCEAN
SOUTH ATLANTIC OCEAN
INDIAN OCEAN
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
TURKISH EMPIRE
PERSIA
ARABIA
SPAIN
MOROCCO
ALGERIA
TUNIS
TRIPOLI
FEZZAN
EGYPT
Libyan Desert
SAHARA OR GREAT DESERT
SUDAN
EGYPTIAN SOUDAN
ERITREA
ABYSSINIA
BR. SOMALI LAND
SOMALI LAND
BRITISH EAST AFRICA
GERMAN EAST AFRICA
PORTUGUESE EAST AFRICA
MOZAMBIQUE CHANNEL
MADAGASCAR
Comoro Ids.
SENEGAL
LIBERIA
SIERRA LEONE
ASHANTI
DAHOMEY
TOGO
NIGERIA
CAMEROON
RIO MUNI
FRENCH CONGO
CONGO FREE STATE
PORTUGUESE WEST AFRICA
GERMAN WEST AFRICA
BECHUANA LAND
RHODESIA
TRANSVAAL COLONY
ORANGE COLONY
NATAL
CAPE COLONY
Gulf of Guinea
Gulf of Aden
Persian Gulf
Tropic of Cancer
Tropic of Capricorn
EQUATOR
Canary Ids.
Walfish Bay
Delagoa Bay
LORENZO MARQUEZ
PRETORIA
PORT ELIZABETH
EAST LONDON
CAPE TOWN
C. of Good Hope
PORT NOLLOTH
DURBAN
BULUWAYO
BEIRA
SALISBURY
MATABELE LAND
MOZAMBIQUE
MOMBASSA
ZANZIBAR
BAGAMOYO
KABINDA
LEOPOLDVILLE
ST. PAUL DE LOANDA
LIBREVILLE
Fernando (Sp.) Po
LAGOS
KUMASI
FREETOWN
MONROVIA
DAKAR
BISSAO
ST. LOUIS
TIMBUKTU
TANGIER
GIBRALTAR
MELILLA
FEZ
MOROCCO
AGADIR
ALGIERS
TUNIS
MALTA
TRIPOLI
BENGHAZI
BARCA
CRETE
CYPRUS
ALEXANDRIA
PORT SAID
CAIRO
SUEZ
SYRIA
ASSOUAN
WADY HALFA
NEW DONGOLA
SUAKIN
BERBER
OMDURMAN
KHARTUM
KORDOFAN
SENAAR
ADEN
LADO
L. Rudolf
Victoria Nyanza
UJIJI
L. Tanganyika
L. Nyassa
L. Dangwelo
Zambesi R.
Limpopo R.
Vaal R.
Orange R.
Congo R.
Niger R.
Benue R.
Nile R.
Senegal R.
Cape Frio
Canary Ids.
Juby
Rio de Oro
Bianco
Chad
Lake Chad

tion of the new colonies. He announced at Johannesburg that the Imperial Government would submit to Parliament a bill to guarantee a loan of thirty-five million pounds sterling, secured by the assets of the Transvaal and Orange River colonies, to pay existing debts of the former governments, to provide for expenditures for public works, land settlements, and new railways. There could be no reasonable opposition to this bill. For it was imperative to put a firm financial foundation as soon as possible under the new colonies, and to make possible the development of the territories through Government initiative. This was to the interest of all the inhabitants of the colonies.

But when Mr. Chamberlain added that a second loan of thirty million pounds would be floated, to be considered as a war debt secured on the assets of the Transvaal, for the purpose of paying the conquerors a portion of the expenditure of the conquest, and that the first ten million pounds of this loan was to be taken up by local mine owners, a howl of protest was raised that never ceased. The Boers maintained that their future could not be mortgaged in this way, and pointed out that the question of a war contribution was not mentioned in the stipulations of the Treaty of Vereeniging, and was contrary to the spirit, if not to the text, of Article 9. They said also that if Great Britain thought it worth while to undertake a war, which had not been of their seeking, in order to conquer them, it was up to the British to foot the bill, and look for compensation in pride over

the extension of their sovereignty and in profit from the development of their trade.

When it came to floating the first ten million pound installment of the Transvaal war loan, Lord Milner realized that the colony was in no position to pay the interest even on this one-third. He let London know clearly how much he feared the result of the imposition of this obligation. He felt strongly that the dissatisfaction resulting among the Boers would be a serious obstacle to reconciliation and reconstruction. The agitation was great at that moment against the Chinese Immigration Bill. So the British Government decided to postpone the measure.

At a congress in 1905, General Botha, speaking against the provisions of the proposed constitution, declared that ten capitalists had imposed a war loan upon the people without their consent. A day of humiliation and prayer was appointed in the Dutch churches. When responsible government was finally granted to the Transvaal, Great Britain wisely decided to forego entirely the war contribution arranged by Mr. Chamberlain with the mining magnates. Whenever it is a question of colonial problems, common sense generally wins in British Cabinet councils. The Balfour Cabinet knew well that one of the first acts of the Transvaal Government would be to repudiate the debt. They were happy enough to see the way clear to a solution of the Transvaal problem without borrowing trouble over the question of a few million pounds.

GRANTING RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT TO THE TRANSVAAL AND THE ORANGE FREE STATE

We have spoken of the wise decision of the Home Government to resist the demand of the extreme English party in Cape Colony for suspension of the Colonial Parliament on the ground that it would refuse to pass measures necessary for the pacification of the country, and also of the representations made to Mr. Chamberlain at the time of his visit to the Transvaal and the Free State during the winter after the Treaty of Vereeniging was signed. Mr. Chamberlain told the Boers that the British Government and the British people were in entire sympathy with the principle of self-government, and that the promise of the Treaty of Vereeniging concerning the establishment of responsible government would be fulfilled at the earliest possible moment. But he warned the Boers that agitation and pressure would retard rather than hasten the day when responsible government would be granted.

Mr. Chamberlain's warning might have come true had the Conservative Cabinet remained firmly in power, and had not the advocates of the union of the South African colonies felt that delaying responsible government menaced the success of their plan.

From the very beginning the Boers did agitate for responsible government, and they brought pressure to bear—unrest and racial animosity in the Transvaal and the Free State, political manœuvering in the Cape Parliament, economic threats in Natal,

and a powerful sentimental propaganda in England. When one reads the history of the years between the end of the Boer War and the downfall of the Chamberlain-Balfour Ministry, and wades through the mass of polemical literature on both sides, he marvels at the courage of the decision to give in to the Boers on this question when they were still showing themselves bitter and intractable. The Boers did not want responsible government under the terms granted to them—it had to be all their way or no way at all. The decision to give responsible government is a notable proof of the intuitive genius of the British as empire-builders.

The Boer agitation in both the conquered republics had much to feed upon, and was skillful in grouping itself around questions concerning which there was the strongest sort of public sentiment in England. In the stand they took on some of these "moral issues," the Boers were undoubtedly insincere. They were making a bid for support in England. They opposed the introduction of Chinese labor; the imposition of the war loan; what they called the running of the country by the mine-owners; Mr. Chamberlain's scheme to increase the taxation of blacks in order to make them work; the sacrifice of agricultural interests to mining interests; the discrimination against their language; the quartering of a big garrison upon them; and the "mulcting" of the Transvaal, especially in the matter of railways, to help Cape Colony and Natal. Many of the claims and assertions of the Boers were untrue. But they won the electorate in England at a moment when

Liberalism, the Labor party, and the nonconformist conscience were coming to their own. Nothing is more admirable in the world than the intuitive response of the Anglo-Saxon to an appeal for "fair play." Anglo-Saxon public opinion, for fear that it might not be "playing the game," demands that Government officials lean over backwards in order to do the square thing by a vanquished foe.

The detailed history of the local struggle from the end of 1902 to the end of 1905 is not material. We need only to give the result. A step was made towards changing the post-bellum régime in the Transvaal early in 1905, before the Conservatives had to quit the Government. On December 22, 1905, the new Liberal Colonial Secretary, Lord Elgin ordered by cable the suspension of Chinese labor, importation, "pending the decision by the Imperial Government as to the grant of responsible government to the Transvaal Colony." In fairness to the Conservative Cabinet, one must say that they had every reason to feel perplexed during the summer and autumn of 1905. For the Boers, moderates and extremists, were united in demanding that the Free State should receive responsible government at the same time as the Transvaal, and in maintaining that the constitution proposed for the Transvaal by the Orders in Council of March 31, 1905, was unsatisfactory in many of its details, and in its entirety "a breach of the terms of peace." One of the principal objections—and in this the Boers were perfectly right—was that the proposed constitution did not exclude from the franchise the Army of

Occupation. The soldiers were contemptuously referred to in the Boer protests as "hired foreigners." General Botha, upon whom Englishmen of clear head and foresight were already placing their hopes of the future, denounced the constitution. He claimed that the Free State had been a party to the Treaty of Vereeniging on equal terms with the Transvaal, and that ten capitalists had more influence with the British Government than all the inhabitants of the Transvaal Colony.

Throughout the year 1906—the first year of Liberal Government in England—the agitation waxed strong. Some Boers left for the Argentine, and others began to trek to East Africa. General Beyers, campaigning for Het Volk,[1] said: "The tree chopped at Vereeniging is sprouting again. A people bound together by blood and tears cannot be lost." The contention of Mr. Lyttleton, who drafted the constitution, was that self-government meant party government, and that if party government were conducted along racial lines, the result would be disastrous. The fact that the mining interests were lobbying in London for the support of the constitution in its original form alienated rather than gained English advocates.

The British Government gave in on the provisions

[1] *Het Volk* (the people) was the name of a newspaper published in Pretoria long before the war. The political organization of that name was the party in the Transvaal which began to agitate for responsible government immediately after the Treaty of Vereeniging, and which later spread to the other colonies. *Het Volk* is frequently used as a general term to describe the Boer party in politics.

allowing British garrisons to vote and directing that English alone be used in debates. The military were excluded, and parliamentary procedure was made bilingual. It also yielded in the matter of the Free State self-government. Responsible government was granted to the Transvaal on December 6, 1906, and eleven days later Parliament was told that the Free State also would receive responsible government. The Free State was granted a constitution on June 5, 1907.

The first elections under the constitution were held in the Transvaal in January, 1907. Het Volk won. A Johannesburg newspaper declared that the cabinet would be almost an exact replica of the staff of the Boer army. It was not quite that: but General Botha was Premier and General Smuts, Colonial Secretary. Although the local English residents, blinded by prejudice, could not see it, the beginning of responsible government under such splendid leaders pointed to a future which was realized in a most remarkable way in 1914. General Botha sent a message to the English people in defense of Het Volk. He declared that the Boers could not forget the generosity and the token of confidence of the British nation in granting them responsible government, and said that the question of the flag and sovereignty had been settled for all time.

In November, 1907, the Dutch party gained a sweeping victory in the first Orange Free State elections. Thirteen of the thirty-eight members of Parliament were returned unopposed by Het Volk. There was no racial conflict outside of Bloemfontein.

The Dutch gained all except eight seats in Parliament. Both in the Transvaal and in the Free State, the Dutch pronounced themselves in favor of federation. But in the Free State they were much more extreme and jealous on the question of the maintenance of the Taal language. The Free State Boers were also determined that in the future South African Union, Cape Colony should not give the natives right to vote, and Natal should withhold the franchise from coolies and other Asiatics.

In the general election of 1908, the Dutch party in Cape Colony secured a working majority. This made the Dutch supreme in three colonies. The Dutch of Cape Colony were quite at one with the Opposition under Dr. Jameson in desiring federation. In spite of the almost universal condemnation of the policy by English residents of South Africa, granting responsible government to the former Republics was from the first a success. How it has worked out is told in a later chapter.

THE TAAL AGAINST ENGLISH IN THE SCHOOLS

Nations cling to their language because they feel that language is the sign of nationality. As one speaks, so one thinks; as one thinks, so one is. Great nations, strong and advanced and numerous, prove their belief in the essential importance of language by the efforts they make as individuals and small communities, when surrounded by foreigners, to

maintain their language and pass it on as a precious heritage to their children. They prove it by the efforts they make as governments to ground and solidify their political influence in their possessions by spreading their language as rapidly as possible among subject races. Small nations demonstrate their belief in the national importance of language by the almost insane pride and jealousy they show in defense of their tongue. Subject races put their faith in language as the medium for awakening and sustaining national feeling, and keeping alive hopes of future emancipation. Is it to be wondered at, then, that the Dutch have put the language question first and foremost in their political program in South Africa? Are they to be blamed or to be denounced as fanatics because they hold dear to the living tangible sign that binds them to the past in the land which their fathers colonized and consecrated by their blood?

The Anglo-Saxon is at his worst—is insufferable even—when he is engaged in controversies where his tongue is involved. He simply cannot see the other man's point of view, and he does not want to see it. He believes that he has the best language God ever made just as firmly as he believes that his is the best race God ever made. We have a perfect right to our opinion (I say *we* because I am Anglo-Saxon by blood and tradition just as much as any Englishman), but have we a right to become impatient at and get angry with and look contemptuously upon the man who does not agree with us for the very good reason that he is not one of us?

From the day the Treaty of Vereeniging was signed, the language question received far more prominence than it ought to have had. In standing by his language, and insisting that it should be preserved in legislative assemblies and courts and schools, the Boer was acting by the instinct that moves every man. He was led to make it a great and bitter political issue, and to believe that it loomed up as the most important thing on the political horizon, because of the lack of consideration of the English element in South Africa. Instead of sympathizing with the Boer in his outspoken expression of a natural instinct, his language was ridiculed and his motive for maintaining it interpreted as purely political, with something sinister in it and subversive of public peace. The attitude of the English in South Africa (fortunately not officials representing the Home Government, but English residents) toward the Boers on the language question has been exactly the same as the attitude of the Prussians and Russians toward the Poles.

There is not space to go into a history of the conflict over the language question. It is very much the same as that which one finds in many parts of Europe to-day, and has the usual features: espousal of the subject language by the Church; establishment of schools supported by private subscription, and taught largely by the clergy; refusal to use the alien language in courts and public assemblies; insistence upon the retention of the subject language in public schools; establishment of institutions of higher education—even to universities—

where the medium prescribed is the native language.

As in everything else in South Africa, the extremists on both sides failed to carry the day. Imperturbable in the face of bitter criticism, High Commissioners refused to embody in reports to London the assertions of the Imperialists that the Boers were plotting treason through their solicitude for their native tongue, and Home Governments refused to give credence to these assertions when they came through other sources. The greatest credit in finding a *modus vivendi* is due to moderate Boer leaders, who braved the criticism of their own followers in the determination to follow a fair and intelligent policy in the relation of the two languages. The result has been as satisfactory as can be expected under the exceedingly difficult and delicate circumstances of two races living side by side, neither of which is very good at reconciling itself to the idea of "live and let live."

The Taal is used throughout the Union as the sole medium for instruction, *if it is the mother language*, for the first two or three years. Then English is introduced as a language, not as a medium. In the towns, English is the medium because it is the mother language of the majority of the children, and Dutch is optional and taught as a language. Boer children when they leave school now understand English, if they have gone through the secondary school course. English has gained greatly everywhere in Dutch-speaking communities. Although Dutch pastors foster the Taal, they cannot,

except in the "backwoods districts," oppose English. For in so doing they would fatally militate against the possibility of higher education, which is not obtainable in the Taal. And the maintenance of Boer supremacy in South Africa depends wholly upon the higher education of the younger Boers. The danger from remaining ignorant is greater than the danger of becoming denationalized through higher education.

In considering the movement to make the Taal a language for secondary and higher education, it must be remembered that this *patois*, with its large admixture of Kaffir and English words, is unfortunately not enough akin to Dutch to make possible the borrowing of Dutch literature and the use of Dutch text-books. Having no extensive literature, and the Afrikanders being without the financial means and energy and ability to make text-books in Taal for more than primary classes, it is easily seen that secondary education is impossible for the Afrikanders unless they learn some foreign language. As their fortunes are now cast in with the English, it is only common sense that secondary and higher education be in the English language. It is just as hard for the Afrikander to learn good Dutch as to learn good English. He has a thousand uses for English, and a wealth of literature to draw upon. Learning Dutch, then, which he never has a chance to use and whose literature is comparatively circumscribed, is sentimental folly—a protest that is a boomerang, reacting upon him against his best interests.

CONFLICTING LOCAL INTERESTS OF CONTIGUOUS COLONIES UNDER THE SAME FLAG HASTEN UNION

In colonies where the European population, outside of military and civil officials, is very small, the interests of contiguous colonies under the same flag are easily adjusted. The French and British in their West African colonies, and the British in arranging the boundaries and economic interests of East Africa, Uganda, and the Sudan, had little difficulty. Decisions were made in Paris and London, and the colonists had no say in the matter. If advice was asked, it was not necessarily followed. France brought her West African colonies under a common administrative control by a Presidential Decree. Great Britain incorporated Lagos in Nigeria and later joined Northern and Southern Nigeria, by Orders in Council. French Equatorial Africa had to cede large and important parts of her territory to Germany on word from Paris. Great Britain deprived Gambia and Nigeria of hinterland for the sake of making a good bargain with France over matters that concerned neither of these colonies. In South Africa the situation was totally different. Here the colonists were so numerous that they had to be let alone to settle their own affairs.

Long before the Boer War, there was friction between Natal and Cape Colony over many matters, but principally over the carrying trade with the two Dutch republics. When the Orange Free State and the Transvaal became British colonies, the conflict

of local interests, instead of being remedied, became more acute. To add to the difficulties of the Home Government, Rhodesia, now contiguous British territory on the north and very rapidly developing, had interests that conflicted in many ways with the four British colonies in the south.

One illustration alone will suffice to show the particularism of the colonies, the judicious restraint exercised by the British Cabinet in adopting a strict non-intervention policy, and the lesson forcibly taught that safety and strength for the future to all the colonies lay in union alone.

The shortest haul from the Rand mines in the Transvaal to the sea was through Portuguese East Africa to the port of Lorenzo Marques on Delagoa Bay. Portuguese territory formed the entire western and seaward boundary of the Transvaal. From Portuguese territory the Transvaal recruited annually an essential amount of native labor. When Lord Milner, on December 18, 1901, signed with the Governor of Portuguese East Africa a temporary agreement, maintaining the former treaties between Portugal and the Transvaal Republic, he took the only course possible under the circumstances. The surrender of the Boers was a matter of months. For the rehabilitation of the Transvaal all the railway outlets to the coast were necessary, especially this shortest one through Portuguese territory; and the Transvaal would need all the labor it could recruit from every source. Lord Milner bound the new colony in general to the terms established in 1875 for traffic between the Transvaal and Lorenzo

Marques. The former tariffs were maintained; equal treatment in the Transvaal for merchandise coming from Lorenzo Marques with that entering by Cape Colony and Natal ports; obligation to furnish to the Portuguese railway a fixed amount of freight every day; application to civil traffic from Lorenzo Marques to the Transvaal of the same principles and rules which govern the traffic of similar character coming from the Cape and from Natal; alcohol and liquors not to be taxed more than if they came from the Cape and from Natal; freedom of recruiting native labor for the Transvaal in Portuguese territory and right of the Portuguese authorities to supervise at Pretoria and Johannesburg the fulfilment of the contracts entered into with natives thus recruited.

The Lorenzo Marques Railway had reached the Transvaal frontier only in 1890 and Pretoria in 1894. Before that time the Cape and Natal railways had a monopoly of imports to and exports from the Transvaal. The profits were very great, and the two colonies had only each other as rivals. Between the time the Portuguese railway was opened and the outbreak of the Boer War, the Cape Railway saw its carrying trade with the Transvaal reduced from eighty per cent. of the total trade to thirty-seven per cent. Of this Durban in Natal received only three per cent. The other forty per cent. went to Lorenzo Marques. The loss was not only in railway receipts. There were port dues, better facilities of transport through the coming of more ships, quay dues, warehouse dues, and large sums

made by longshoremen and others who handled the freight from ships to railway.

Cape Colony and Natal both thought that the incorporation of the Transvaal in the British Empire would certainly mean the return to them of this valuable traffic. They were terribly upset when Lord Milner decided to maintain the treaty with Portugal. Powerful influences were set in motion in London to have Lord Milner's decision revoked. But the British Government stood firm. They saw clearly that if they allowed to be taken away from Lorenzo Marques the carrying trade which was the chief source of revenue for the whole Portuguese colony, Portugal would retaliate by forbidding her natives to go to work in the Transvaal. Pressure could not be brought to bear on Portugal on this point, because British colonies in Africa were doing the very same thing in regard to each other in order to conserve for themselves the labor of natives who were willing to work. Almost half the native labor in the Transvaal mines came from Portuguese East Africa. To jeopardize this valuable source of native labor was, in Lord Milner's opinion, a danger much greater than that of offending Cape Colony and Natal.

When the Transvaal received self-government, the situation became worse for the two old British colonies. From 1902 to 1907, they had tried every means of bringing the Transvaal to terms. But what could be done against a simple fact of geography? Lorenzo Marques is only about one-third as far from the Rand as Cape Town. It is more than a hundred

miles nearer the Rand than Durban. Even with equal tariffs, the shortest route was preferable. By lowering their tariffs to meet those of Lorenzo Marques, Cape Town would operate at a loss and Durban with no gain. In order to meet the deficit incurred in railway receipts by the Portuguese competition, Cape Colony and Natal raised their customs duties against the Transvaal. A tariff war ensued. At this point, common sense prevailed. The colonies got together, and discussed their common interests. From this discussion was born the federation, the story of which is reserved for a later chapter.

But even after the conferences for discussing federation were long under way, the Transvaal warned Cape Colony and Natal that too high duties, or duties against the Transvaal's particular interests, would lead to a refusal to enter the Union. To show the other colonies how independent she could be, a delegate from Portuguese East Africa was invited by the Transvaal to the conference of Pretoria. The Transvaal was willing, if necessary, to trade entirely through Lorenzo Marques!

Just on the eve of the Commonwealth, the Transvaal signed a treaty with Portugal regulating the recruitment of native labor, the railway and port of Lorenzo Marques traffic, commercial relations, and the customs question. The treaty guarantees to Lorenzo Marques from fifty to fifty-five per cent. of the maritime traffic of the Rand and other principal centers of the Transvaal. In return, Portuguese East Africa allows the Transvaal to recruit labor.

The treaty caused a violent outburst in Natal. The municipal council of Durban cabled to London, *demanding* that the treaty be denounced. But London turned a deaf ear. Salvation in this case, as always, was for the Home Government not to override decisions made by a colony for her own interests. Such a course would be justified only if the colony were acting in a way prejudicial to imperial interests.

When they saw they could get no help from home, the inhabitants of Natal, who had not the strong racial feeling that was working for union in Cape Colony, decided that the future lay in agreement with and not in opposition to the rich and powerful inland neighbor.

Union, as is often the case between nations as well as between individuals, came from seeing the folly of conflict rather than from feeling the desire for harmony.

A FLOURISHING COLONY WITH EXTENSIVE SEMI-INDEPENDENT NATIVE AREAS INCONVENIENTLY PLACED: THE PROBLEM OF NATAL

Natal ceased to belong to the Cape of Good Hope over fifty years before the formation of the South African Union, and after 1856 was a distinct British colony. It is separated from Cape Colony on the south of Griqualand East, in which the native population is very large. Between Natal and the Orange Free State lies Basutoland. Between Natal and the Transvaal are Zululand and

Swaziland, which form the angle of the valuable little Delagoa Bay corner of Portuguese East Africa. From Durban, the port on the Indian Ocean, a railway runs into Griqualand East, by way of Pietermaritzburg. But it does not join up with the Cape Railway. Another line, running northwest, bifurcates at Ladysmith, one branch going west into the Orange Free State, and the other due north to Pretoria. The Orange Free State branch makes a semicircular curve around Basutoland to Bloemfontein, which is almost directly west of Pietermaritzburg. The Transvaal branch skirts Zululand and enters the Transvaal without passing through the Free State.

Basutoland is a high plateau of nearly twelve thousand square miles, broken by several mountain ranges. It contains the headwaters of the Orange River. The Protectorate is not an integral portion of the South African Commonwealth. Like Bechuanaland, it is under the direct control of the Crown. But its Resident Commissioner depends upon the High Commissioner for South Africa. In all this territory, larger than Belgium and as large as Holland, there are hardly more than a thousand Europeans among a native population of over four hundred thousand. European settlement, in fact, is prohibited. The native government is exercised by chiefs, who owe allegiance to a paramount chief.

Swaziland, from 1903 to 1906, was controlled by the Transvaal. But since 1906, its government is like that of Basutoland. There are only a thousand whites among a population of over one hundred

thousand. The British Crown has kept the authority over these native regions because the whites of the neighboring colonies have not shown that they are capable of governing justly homogeneous native populations.[1]

Zululand, since 1897, has unfortunately formed an integral part of Natal. Between the Tugela River and the Swaziland and Portuguese boundary, the population is practically all native. Except along the coast and on the western edge, Zululand is served by no railway.

The European population of Natal has grown three hundred per cent. in the last forty years, while the native population has increased only fifty per cent. But even now among the million and a quarter inhabitants of Natal, there are less than one hundred thousand Europeans and about one hundred and fifty thousand Indians and Chinese. The

[1] In 1907, taking heart at the interest and sympathy aroused in England over the Zulu question, a deputation of native chiefs visited London, although they had previously been informed that their mission would be fruitless, to expose the griefs and discontent of the Swaziland natives. In 1909, when Lord Selborne visited Swaziland, in reply to the protest of the native chiefs of their unwillingness to enter the South African Union, the High Commissioner warned them that amalgamation was inevitable. In the same year, Lord Selborne opened the National Council of Basutoland. The assembled chiefs told him that they were afraid of being incorporated forcibly in the Union. Lord Selborne replied that Basutoland would sooner or later have to come into the Union, but that the British Crown would see to it that native rights inland and all other matters would be fully guaranteed. There is no doubt about the fear, resulting from Zululand's unhappy experience, among the natives of the protectorates of coming under the Government of the South African colonists.

native population numbers almost a million. Natal has not only the largest proportion of black population of the provinces of the South African Commonwealth, but it is cut off from its neighbors by territories wholly native, and in two of which the natives have managed to maintain semi-independence. Natal's Indian and Chinese problems, owing to the long settlement of Asiatic elements in the colony and their great number (as we have just said, they outnumber the Europeans), have been all along totally different from those of the neighboring colonies.[1] Similarly, Natal's native problem has for the British taken the place in Natal of the Boer problem in the other colonies.

Zululand wars and "punitive expeditions" were being carried on for twenty years before the incorporation of 1897. The troubles of Natal did not end then. After a long lull, a revolt broke out in northern Zululand in the beginning of 1906. The natives refused to pay the poll tax. The attack of armed natives upon police in February led to the proclamation of martial law and a punitive expedition. Twelve natives, who had murdered a white policeman, were sentenced to death by court martial. Lord Elgin, Colonial Secretary, interfered by cable to urge a retrial by civil court on account of public opinion in England. The Natal Ministry at once resigned. The colonists bitterly denounced the interference of the Home Government. The Colonial

[1] In 1908, the Indians of Natal subscribed the necessary funds to carry on a campaign in the Transvaal and in England on behalf of the Transvaal Indians.

Office withdrew its opposition, after learning that the Governor of Natal approved the sentence, and the natives were executed on April 2d. The incident, however, led to the first important clash between advanced Radicals and Imperialists in the New Liberal Parliament. Just as in Germany, the Socialists defended the natives, and claimed that the authority of the British Crown, by means of British troops, was being executed far away from the controlling influence of public opinion in England, to oppress and take vengeance upon a weak African race for the benefit of colonists. The Government, between two fires, declared that the matter of the executions had been gone into thoroughly, that the first telegram of Lord Elgin had not been in the nature of a remonstrance but rather a request for information, and that when full information was received, the Cabinet realized the justice and necessity of the sentence.

After the execution the Zulus renewed their resistance to white authority. Several chiefs led the rebels with great energy. The British troops, seconded by Natal militia, carried on a ruthless war of extermination against the Zulus, and killed without mercy those who were found with arms in hand. *The Zulus lost three thousand five hundred in a little over two months.* When one criticizes the campaign of the Germans against the Hereros, which was just drawing to a close at this time, it must not be forgotten that the British campaign in Natal, in proportion to the rebel effectives in the field, was just as merciless and just as disastrous to the Zulus as the

German campaign to the Hereros. So disgraceful was the conduct of the Natal troops that the Bishop of Zululand felt impelled, much against his will, to publish the information he had gathered of robbing kraals and native women, stealing stock, and shooting natives and throwing their bodies out to rot. By the end of July over three million dollars had been spent in putting down the uprising.

A commission was appointed to inquire into the reason for the growing gulf between whites and blacks, and to find if the natives had just ground for discontent against the whites. The report of the commission in July, 1907, was unanimous in declaring that the natives hated the whites and distrusted the Government. Government action seemed to have done nothing at all to raise the economic and moral level of the blacks. The rebellion was due to a desire to return to the old mode of tribal and family life. Was this not natural, especially as the whites had not, by their new and different method of government, done anything appreciable to benefit the blacks?

In the autumn of 1907, it was believed that Dinizulu and other chiefs were preparing a new rebellion. Dinizulu, when the Natal Government threatened to send an expedition against him, surrendered voluntarily. A new Governor was sent to Natal. Early in 1908 he pardoned the rank and file of those who had been implicated in the rebellion. But Dinizulu remained in jail. An English advocate, who came out to defend him, found that the attitude of the local authorities made impossible a fair trial

under English law. It was charged that the Natal authorities continued martial law in Zululand to protect local officials, who had been guilty of whipping and shooting natives, and to prevent Dinizulu from getting witnesses for his defense. In 1909, after a long trial, Dinizulu was found guilty of "harboring rebels," and sentenced to four years' imprisonment. The Natal Government had been unable to establish his complicity in the rebellion.

There was still disaffection of a serious character in Zululand when the South African Union was formed. Federation improved the chances of the Zulus to receive fair treatment, which they certainly never had had from the Natal colonists. The geographical position of Natal, and the large proportion of native tribes of semi-independent character surrounding the colony, made the task of government extremely difficult. But there can be no doubt that the white men acted exclusively for their own interest, and that when the natives protested against the collection of taxes, the benefit of which was never proved to them, they were treated as rebels, tracked down like wild beasts, and killed *in their own country*.

In this brief review of Natal relations with the Zulus, I have tried to be perfectly fair, and state simply the facts. They are very sad. When one considers the better fortune of the Basutos, neighbors of the Zulus, and the favorable opinion held of their Paramount Chief, Letsie, and his recent successor Griffith, by the British authorities, the wisdom of keeping native populations, where they are homo-

geneous and considerable in number, directly under the control of the Crown, is clearly demonstrated. British military and civil officials, who come out from England and who bring to the treatment of native problems and the management of the weaker races splendid ideals of fairness and justice, have always succeeded in keeping peace and winning the respect, if not the affection, of native tribes, and the confidence of their chiefs. But where natives are put under the control of colonists, and at the mercy of local militia officers and men, who are swayed by prejudice and vengeance, the results are what they were in the Zulu expedition of 1906—a disgrace to civilization and Christianity. One cannot insist too strongly upon the difference between public school and university men from England and men who have risen to the top in the African colonies, often by doubtful means. The latter are too frequently "bounders" of the worst sort, intolerant and intolerable when they have a little authority in their hands.

The story of federation is reserved for a later chapter. But this summary of the years of reconstruction in South Africa would be incomplete without a word about the two men who represented the British Government in the delicate office of High Commissioner during a period when courage and insight and tact were the *sine qua non* of success in piloting safely the four colonies to the harbor of federation. It was a decade when recalcitrant Boers and fanatical loyalists were doing all in their

power to obstruct the course. Lord Milner represented the British Crown until March 1905. He resigned on the eve of the granting of responsible government to the Transvaal. Lord Selborne was High Commissioner during the four years before the establishment of the Union.

Lord Selborne's resignation, coming just before the Union was formed, was not regarded in South Africa as being due to his wife's health. The Liberal Government was anxious to put Herbert Gladstone in some suitable post outside of England, and Lord Selborne fell in with their plans. Lord Selborne was not at all of the same caliber as Milner. But he was a new broom and had not been involved in the Boer War or in the years of crisis and conflict that followed. His popularity with the Dutch was largely due to the great and intelligent interest he took in agriculture, which led to an appreciable promotion of the well-being of the Boers. He did not make the mistake of considering railway and other economic problems too largely from the industrial point of view.

General Botha has probably since regretted saying in 1908 that "Lord Milner's rule was the most unfortunate thing that had ever happened to the Transvaal." Many statements, due to the political passion of the moment, cannot be fairly held as the real judgment of the one who made them, even at the time they were made. For the sake of assuring the rallying of all elements to the Imperial program that he kept constantly in mind, Lord Milner may have used his official position too strongly against

the Afrikander party, of which General Botha was the leader. But the present soundly established prosperity of the Transvaal is largely due to Lord Milner's initiative. The German in him betrayed itself sometimes in a political attitude that was open to objection. But it enabled him at the same time to lay the foundations for the educational, agricultural, and industrial development of the Transvaal. Lord Milner established a flourishing agricultural school, with research laboratories and model farms, which is changing the whole agricultural system. In the face of great difficulties he inaugurated educational reforms with the hand of a master. He had the financial sense of a Cromer in studying and taking lessons from the budget. His resignation showed keen political insight and at the same time self-abnegation. Just when the work of years was coming to fruition, he left to others the joy of realization. For he saw that his unpopularity among the Dutch was retarding reconciliation. Botha and Smuts and Merriman were ready to cooperate with a British official. But, even if they had been willing personally to work together with Milner, they could not have drawn their supporters with them. So Lord Milner insisted that his resignation be accepted, not because of ill health, or because he had lost his grip, but because he knew that another would find it easier to carry out the program he had inaugurated.

CHAPTER IV

THE TWO INDEPENDENT STATES: LIBERIA AND ABYSSINIA

PRACTICALLY every part of Africa has been brought under some form of European administrative control, with fixed boundaries, during the last fifteen years. Only two small states are still independent. Liberia in the west and Abyssinia in the east have succeeded in escaping "assimilation" or "protection." But during the past twenty years neither has been without its days of anxiety. Liberia owes her independence to the fact that she is the one protégé of the United States in Africa. Abyssinia was saved by the courage of her late Emperor Menelik, who alone of all African sovereigns was able to contest successfully the armed invasion of a European Power. He had the luck to try the fortune of arms with the unwarlike Italians. Abyssinia has since escaped through the mutual jealousy of Italy, Great Britain, and France, whose colonies surround her on all sides. The two independent states hold less than three and one-half per cent. of the area, and about two and one-half per cent. of the population of Africa.

LIBERIA

Liberia was constituted as an independent republic in 1847 by freed American slaves, the first of whom had settled on the West African coast during the administration of James Monroe, twenty-five years before. The capital is called Monrovia in memory of the initial settlement. Liberia is the only country in Africa where electors must be exclusively of African blood. The United States undertook, by the treaty of 1862, to aid Liberia, when necessary, to preserve her constitutional form of government and her independent existence. In 1885, boundaries were settled with Great Britain in regard to Sierra Leone Colony on the north, and in 1892 with France for the frontier with the Ivory Coast Colony.

For the first half-century of Liberia's existence, little that was satisfactory and definite could be established concerning the viability and success of the experiment of a negro state. It was only when Sierra Leone and other British West African colonies began to develop, and when France began to organize and consolidate her "spheres of influence" into colonies with local administrative and economic organization, that a comparison could be made, and a conclusion reached. Events since 1900 seem to prove conclusively that Liberia, under negro control, has little hope of becoming the rich and prosperous modern state that could exist on the West African coast. For the country possesses, climatically and in wealth of soil and forest, practically the same conditions that one finds in British and French and German West

Africa. The development since 1900 of Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast, the Ivory Coast, Senegal, Guinea, Togoland, Dahomey, Nigeria, and Kamerun are set forth in this book. He who reads, sees!

There are about twelve thousand negroes of American descent in Liberia, and about fifty thousand of the population of nearly two millions, including these twelve thousand, can be said to be civilized, *i. e.*, amenable to constituted authority. Liberians effectively control twenty to twenty-five miles inland from the coast. They have few good roads, and no railways. In 1905, the Government was bankrupt. The only portion of revenue not yet mortgaged was the sale of postage stamps. The trade with Great Britain was largely in spirits; and the drink traffic was demoralizing the country. The spread of drunkenness among the wild native tribes of the hinterland was checked only by the opportune appearance of the Mohammedan propaganda.

The lack of effective control of the natives in the interior became a serious international question when France and Great Britain began to penetrate and organize administratively adjacent regions. For recalcitrant natives took refuge in Liberian territory, and year after year raiders from Liberia seriously upset the normal conditions France and Great Britain were working to establish within their spheres. The anarchy of the Liberian hinterland became intolerable between 1905 and 1910, and the powerlessness of the Liberian Government to exercise effective control over the interior tribes might have led to the partition of Liberia, had not the United

States been willing, with the consent and goodwill of Great Britain, France, and Germany, to send a gunboat to Monrovia, and to offer to supervise the reorganization of the Government on a solid financial basis. In 1910, a commission sent out by the United States recommended that the United States take over the debt of Liberia, recreate the administration, use good offices for settling frontier disputes with France and England, and consider the question of having a coaling station on the coast. Both Liberia and the United States declared that there was no question of an American protectorate. But the United States undertook to reorganize the military and frontier police forces, and an international commission, under an American official, took charge of the revenues of Liberia. The following year a loan of nearly two million dollars was subscribed by American, British, French, and German banks to put Liberia on her feet, and give her a fresh start.

But the anarchy of the interior and the raids across the frontier had cost Liberia about two thousand square miles of territory, which was taken over by France in a new frontier agreement signed in 1911. A "rectification" of frontier on the north was also made with Great Britain during the same year to the advantage of Sierra Leone. The British colony had already occupied the territory, which it was claimed was essential to Sierra Leone's internal peace: Liberia's compensation was a small sum of money.

In 1913, the British soap firm of Lever Brothers leased twelve thousand square miles (about one-fourth of the territory of Liberia) for five dollars a

square mile. The firm was to have the monopoly of gathering and preparing the fruit of the oil palm, the uncontrolled use of the land, and the exclusive privilege of trading with natives. Germany regarded this agreement, which was a virtual transference of sovereignty to British subjects, as an infringement of treaty stipulations, and entered a protest against it.

It seems perfectly clear that after the present war, an effective American protectorate will be the only means of keeping Liberia alive—unless Monroe's doctrine prevents the salvation of Monroe's colony.

ABYSSINIA

The recent history of Abyssinia is a little more encouraging than that of Liberia, thanks to the fact that at the moment of peril from European encroachment a fearless, intelligent, and energetic ruler was at the head of the nation.

The Abyssinians are not a seafaring people, and the territories to the north and east and south-east along the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean nominally acknowledged Turco-Egyptian sovereignty before the British invasion of Egypt. They are inhabited by Arabic Moslem tribes, in close contact with Mecca, while the Abyssinians are mostly Christians. After the rise of the Mahdi in the Sudan, and the British withdrawal in 1884, Italy occupied the Arabic-speaking territory on the north, and a large piece of Somaliland on the south-east. France made effective the occupation, proclaimed in prin-

ciple some twenty years earlier, of the western shore of the straits leading from the Gulf of Aden into the Red Sea. England took over from the wreck of the Sudan a portion of the southern side of the Gulf of Aden. The fortunes of these territories, though intimately bound up with Abyssinia, are treated in another chapter.

Italy, new to colonial problems, felt that the moment was opportune to join her portion of Somaliland with Eritrea by extending her power over Abyssinia. In 1889 a treaty was signed with Emperor Menelik in which Italian trickery introduced an all-important discrepancy between the Italian text and the Amharic text. The Italian text bound Abyssinia to deal with the European Powers through Italy: while this was optional in the text that Emperor Menelik could read. When he discovered how his good faith had been imposed upon, Menelik protested against the treaty in a powerful letter to Queen Victoria in 1893, probably at the instigation of France and Russia. But Abyssinia was given only "moral support" by Europe. War with Italy resulted, and ended in a disastrous defeat of the Italians at Adowa in 1896. Italy was compelled to sign a new treaty at Adis Abeba, recognizing the complete independence of Abyssinia. This treaty afterwards received international recognition. Menelik's reputation in Europe was great. For he acted admirably towards his vanquished enemy, and did not make the mistake of believing that all Europeans were like the Italians, watching to take advantage of him—and supported by a weak army!

During the trying period that followed the reconquest of the Sudan, he cooperated with the British in their effort to reestablish order in the territories contiguous to Abyssinia, gave a British syndicate a gold-mining concession, and allowed British engineers to inspect the Sobat region and the White Nile sources as a possible route for the Cape-Cairo Railway. In 1901, he combined with the British in military operations against the Mullah Mohammed along the Somaliland frontier. He was always open to suggestions as to ways and means of stopping gun-running and slave-trading.

In the extension of European influence in Africa, native rulers have come into conflict with European Powers, and have lost their independence for two reasons. First, they have not understood the importance of fixing boundaries, and have lacked the power or will to prevent raiding from their territories into those under European control. European administrators, in order to pacify the territories they governed, had to look to the sources of disorder. This led punitive expeditions on farther than originally intended. Native sultans and kings and tribal chiefs who could not keep order in the European sense of the word were compelled to accept "protection." As no native sultan or king or chief could ever keep order in the European sense, Africa gradually fell under European control. Second, they had been the enemies of "progress" in the European sense of the word. Not wanting to develop their countries themselves, they have refused to allow outsiders to do so, and have resisted prospectors and concession-

hunters and traders until complaints of the outsiders have ended by embroiling them with the outsiders' Government—which was generally just waiting for the chance. The history of Kruger and Steyn is no different from that of a thousand petty native rulers.

Menelik impressed his neighbors with his good faith, and never gave them a loophole to encroach upon his kingdom. He did his best to prevent trouble arising for them from Abyssinian territory, and he was always willing to have frontiers exactly delimited. He welcomed civilizing influences, and did not turn a deaf ear to concession-hunters. But he made it the cardinal principle of his dealings with foreigners to have concessions arranged by treaty with governments and not with individuals. Thus he put the Powers on their honor not to allow Abyssinia to be cheated!

In 1900, the northern frontier dispute with Italy was settled by tacitly allowing Italy to occupy a portion of the high plateau, without which Eritrea would have been hardly worth while for Italy to hold. In 1902, a treaty with the British fixed the boundary of the Sudan, gave the British the right to construct a railway through Abyssinian territory to connect Uganda and the Sudan, and pledged Abyssinia to grant no concessions and undertake no works that would obstruct the flow of tributaries into the Nile. This made feasible Sir William Garstin's project of utilizing Lake Tsana for irrigation, and secured the fertility of the Blue Nile regions.

Dr. Rosen went to Adis Abeba in 1904 as special

envoy of the Kaiser. He was accompanied by an escort of cavalry, especially chosen for their height and clothed resplendently. The showiness of the mission led all the world to suppose that its significance was political rather than commercial. But Germany did not then try, nor has she since tried, to secure more in Abyssinia than equality of treatment with other nations. The German and Austrian commercial treaties were signed the following year, and have expired since the beginning of the present war. As Abyssinia is surrounded on all sides by the enemies of Germany, the question is bound to come up at the Peace Conference, or very soon after, whether the agreements entered into by Great Britain, France, and Italy compel the Abyssinians to accept for transit and shipment at their ports goods to and from Abyssinia irrespective of ownership and destination.

The desire to extend into every sphere of colonial activity the spirit of the Agreement of 1904 led France and Great Britain to negotiate an Abyssinian Convention, to which Italy adhered. The independence and territorial integrity of Abyssinia were guaranteed by the three Powers, and the sovereign rights of the Emperor were to be respected. No concessions were to be granted to one Power prejudicial to the interests of the other two. No matter what internal complications might arise in Abyssinia, intervention could come only as the result of a common understanding, and limited to the protection of the legations and the lives and property of foreigners. The neighboring territorial interests of the three con-

tracting Powers, and the possible effect upon them of Abyssinian internal disorders, were set forth and mutually recognized. The railway line from Djibouti to Adis Abeba should be owned by a French company, but equal privileges over the line and at the port should be given to the subjects of the other two Powers. The railways that might be built west of Adis Abeba were to be constructed by Great Britain, and that connecting the two Italian colonies from north to south by Italy. Great Britain was to be allowed a railway through Abyssinia from her Somaliland to the Sudan. Any of the contracting Powers could veto any agreement made by one of the others with Abyssinia, should the Power judge the agreement prejudicial to her interests.

This agreement, like many others that have been made between European states concerning African and Asiatic interests, has absolutely no international or national sanction. Turkey, Persia, Morocco, Egypt, China, Siam have had the same experience as Abyssinia. Their present and their future have been tentatively disposed of with no consideration whatever either for their wishes or their interests. Nor have the agreements, as a general rule, been submitted for discussion and approval to the Parliaments of the nations which have made them. What is worst of all, nations that are not a party to the agreements, and that have not been consulted in their making, may find in some future emergency that a *situation of fact*, with no legal or moral sanction, has been established that is wholly contrary to their interests. So far as I know, the Anglo-Franco-

Italian Agreement of 1905 has not injured the interests of any individual or nation in Abyssinia, or the interests of Abyssinia herself. But it might easily have done so. Perhaps it secretly has done so. It certainly will do so after this war, unless the principle of international sanction for agreements of this character be established.

In October, 1907, Menelik issued a decree constituting a cabinet on the European model, and appointed ministers for the various departments. The following month he enjoined free compulsory education for all boys up to twelve. The State was to provide schools and teachers. Cabinet councils were begun, but the education decree could not be very widely and effectively enforced. Ever since that time there has been, in spite of internal troubles, steady, even if slight, progress.[1]

Just at the time of his ambitious projects, Menelik had a stroke, and he gradually became paralyzed. Frequent to the point of becoming a joke were the newspaper reports, generally from Italy, during the period 1907 to 1913, announcing the death of Mene-

[1] The will of Lady Meux, who bequeathed her collection of Ethiopian MSS. to Emperor Menelik and his successors, made a great stir in 1911. Scholars were indignant that the precious parchments should go to a place where they would be inaccessible and in danger of destruction (although they had been preserved there for over a thousand years). But there is something splendid in the Puritanism of the noblewoman who considered herself the holder of stolen goods and under obligation to make restitution. The MSS. were part of the plunder of the British Expedition of 1868. What would happen to the British Museum and the Louvre and other "collections," if the public conscience became as sensitive about enjoying the results of thievery as did Lady Meux's!

lik. Each time they were contradicted, and when he finally passed away in December, 1913, many newspapers refused to publish once more the familiar biography.

Menelik's long illness was a great misfortune to Abyssinia, and it is still too soon to estimate the injury done by the anarchy of the regency to the Kingdom surrounded by land-hungry neighbors. In 1909, Lidj Yeassu, Menelik's grandson, who was thirteen, and the husband of the seven-year-old Princess Romaine, granddaughter of the old Emperor Johannes, was chosen as the successor. He, by his own blood and that of his wife, would reconcile the rival factions of the Imperial family. Notwithstanding the heralded harmony, civil war broke out, and dragged on, with varying fortunes, for several years.

Italy feared the breaking away from authority of the tribes on her Eritrean frontier, especially after the Tripolitan War began, and there was some apprehension of raiding in the Sudan. The anarchy caused no particular difference in the Somaliland situation, because Great Britain already had her hands full there, and the responsibility for the Mullah could in no way be chargeable to Abyssinian unrest. The troubles in Abyssinia seem to have been confined to the rival court factions: for the country as a whole remained quiet throughout the years of Menelik's illness. However, there was apprehension in Adis Abeba just before the outbreak of the European War over the sudden and inexplicable strengthening of Italian forces in Eritrea. Was Italy going to

"hold up" the young King for another slice—the third it would be since the battle of Adowa—of the northern plateau?

What effect the war is going to have on the fortunes of Abyssinia is unknown. Certainly there is no ground for attacking the territorial or political integrity of the country. For Abyssinia has not lent herself to German intrigues, and given cause for the Allies to punish her. What propaganda against the British and Italians can be traced to Abyssinia, has its origin in purely Moslem centers. The bulk of the Abyssinians, still Christian in spite of the great wave of Islam that has been sweeping over their country, have not believed in the possibility of a Turkish reconquest of Egypt and the Sudan. My dear friend, the late Col. C. H. M. Doughty-Wylie, V. C., British Consul at Adis Abeba, wrote me at the end of the first winter of the war that conditions in Abyssinia gave him absolutely no cause for present or future alarm, and that he was "consumed with impatience" so far away from the war. Two months later he fell in the first landing at the Dardanelles.

At the end of September, 1916, a movement that had long been gathering force and popular support came to a head. While Emperor Lidj, who is just approaching his majority, was at Harar—probably he had fled in fear of assassination—an assembly of the principal Abyssinian chiefs at Adis Abeba voted to dethrone him, and elected Uizorosso Uditu, a daughter of Menelik, Empress of Abyssinia. The patriarch of the Abyssinian Church, Mathias, solemnly pronounced Lidj an apostate, and unbound

all his chiefs and subjects and his army officers from their oath of allegiance. The charge against Lidj seems to be that he favors the adoption of Islam as the religion of state.

If they had been inclined to listen to the Turco-Germans, the Abyssinians could have made much trouble for the Allies. It remains to be seen whether their attitude will receive its proper reward.

CHAPTER V

BRITISH POLICY IN SOMALILAND

SOMALILAND is the most eastern portion of the African continent, comprising the coast lands of the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean in the peninsula that ends in Cape Guardafui. It is inhabited by nomad tribes of mixed Negro and Arab blood. The Arab strain is marked in the tribes on the north side in the French and British spheres. The tribes become more African in the Italian sphere. The inhabitants of the Juba region in the colony portion of Italian Somaliland (Benadir) are black. But throughout Somaliland the religion is Moslem, and the tribal characteristics and customs are more akin to those of the Arabian peninsula than to Africa. This whole region was nominally a portion of the Ottoman Empire, and fell to Egypt when the Khedives threw off the authority of the Turkish Sultan. The abandonment of the Sudan by Egypt in 1884 left Somaliland without legal political suzerainty.

Great Britain had too recently become Egypt's protector, and was too uncertain of her own position and authority in Egypt to lay claim to a vast, inchoate and imperfectly known territory. She was careful only to have to make sure that no other

European Power should instal itself along the shore of the gulf opposite Aden. So Italy took the Indian Ocean coast line, and France occupied the African side of the strait of Bab-el-Mandeb. Invoking a treaty made with the ruler of Obock in 1862, she extended her sovereignty around the bay to Zeila, the western end of the British sphere. These three Somaliland colonies, with their protectorates, and the Italian colony of Eritrea, north of French Somaliland, shut off Abyssinia from the coast. For twenty years their hinterland boundaries were unsettled. But after the Anglo-French accord of 1904, France, Great Britain, and Italy arrived at an understanding concerning their common frontiers, their boundaries with Abyssinia, and their economic and political relations with the inland Christian monarchy.

The French made a port at Djibouti in 1888, and started to build a railway south to tap Abyssinia. In the minds of French Imperialists Djibouti began to assume a great importance in the last decade of the nineteenth century: for they dreamed of a railway across Africa from west to east, passing from Lake Tchad, through Abeshr and El Fashr, by the Upper Nile Valley and the Sobat River to Adis Abeba, and ending at Djibouti. This dream was rudely shattered by the Fashoda incident. Since then, French Somaliland has become content to be an outlet for Abyssinia trade, and to develop its own resources. Owing to its fortunate position, its very good harbor, and its railway, the colony has prospered. There are coast fisheries and important salt mines. In the year before the War of 1914, over four hundred steamers

entered Djibouti, and the import and export trade from Abyssinia reached eight million dollars. So long as France remains friends with Great Britain and Italy, the colony has no political importance.

Nor has Italian Somaliland been of international political interest since Abyssinia was made inviolate by Italy's 1905 agreement with France and Great Britain. Italian Somaliland could have played a rôle in African history, only had Italy remained faithful to the Triple Alliance. For then, the Germans would have had a foothold to injure the British in the Sudan and East Africa, and to oppose Franco-British interests in Abyssinia.

British Somaliland, however, has had an interesting history since 1900, which has not been without strong influence upon the general colonial policy of Great Britain. In narrating this history, we must remember that British policy in Somaliland had been guided not by the advantages to be gained from developing the Protectorate, but by the geographical position of British Somaliland, which has given it an importance far beyond its present or potential economic value. It is not far from Aden, and its inhabitants are in constant communication with the tribes of the Arabic peninsula, both on the Red Sea and Persian Gulf sides of the desert. Because of the position of Imperial Britain as a Moslem Power, the British have been anxious about their authority in Somaliland, and have made great efforts and sacrifices, and incurred great expense, to maintain it.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, there arose in British Somaliland a menace to British

authority in the spreading political power of Mullah Mohammed Abdullah, the son of an Ogadan shepherd, who had founded a Mahdi sect near Berbera ten years before. After Kitchener's reentry into the Sudan, it was vital for the pacification of the southern provinces that no source of Moslem fanaticism find its way, through the Islamic propaganda in Abyssinia, into the valleys of the Blue and White Nile. So the suppression of the Mullah was decided upon, and an agreement was made between Great Britain and Abyssinia for a common action, in which the frontier should be considered as non-existent. The Mullah's forces were broken up, but he escaped. In 1902, he once more appeared in British Somaliland with larger strength than ever. A British force, which followed him into the Haud Desert, was badly defeated. Troops had to be sent from Aden and India, and the question arose as to whether a serious expedition should be undertaken to destroy the Mullah, regardless of expense or of loss of life.

While the Foreign Office was debating, the Mullah sent a message to General Manning, demanding a recognition of his sphere of influence and removal of restriction on the importation of arms. A hundred National Scouts of the ostracized Boers volunteered for service. Italy allowed the use of her territory for the passage of British troops and patrolled her Somali coast to prevent the importation of arms.

During the year 1903, the operations were inconclusive. The British had three severe setbacks, and the Mullah raided at will. In some mysterious way

the Mullah seemed to be getting all the arms and ammunition he wanted; Abyssinian cooperation was strikingly ineffective.

In the face of bitter criticism, the Foreign Office decided on a policy of "watchful waiting" throughout 1904. The Indian troops were sent home, and the British and Italian Governments arranged to give the Mullah grazing rights, in return for his pledge to keep the peace. The Mullah agreed to allow freedom of trade in his sphere, except in the case of slaves and arms.

In 1905, the British Government laid down the policy that there was no obligation to conquer the Mullah, so long as he remained tolerably peace-keeping. Great Britain would not allow tribes under her protection to be molested, but they, on their side, should do everything in their power to defend themselves. They could not, however, do this unless they were given arms and ammunition. But would arming these tribes be a violation of the Brussels Conference Act, which prohibited allowing arms to go to natives who were not under effective administrative control? The debates on the subject showed clearly the unwillingness of the Cabinet to sanction the expenditure required to organize administratively territories from which there could be no reasonable hope of financial return. The revenue for 1904 had decreased nearly £5000, and the expenditure had increased £25,000. The extension of the French railway from Djibouti into Abyssinia had seriously diminished the trade through Zeila.

For several years the Home Government policy

seemed to be justified by the absence of serious inconvenience or disturbance. In 1907, the country was normal enough for two English ladies, accompanied only by native servants, to spend several months at big game shooting in the interior. But in 1909, the Mullah again became active, and declared that there could be peace between him and the British only if his authority in the hinterland were not threatened. Reinforcements were sent from India, and a detachment of the King's African Rifles from Mombasa. A Military Governor was appointed for Somaliland. But Parliament was opposed to operations in the interior. Without sufficient forces to insure safety, it seemed only inviting trouble to maintain the advanced posts. They were withdrawn.

In March, 1910, notwithstanding raids on friendly tribes and several small victories for the Mullah, the Government decided to withdraw to the coast. Interior posts were given up. Peace did not follow this withdrawal. It was naturally interpreted as a confession of weakness. The Mullah had more prestige than ever. There was no more truth in the reports of his death than in those of the death of Menelik. A ferment of anti-European feeling drove the natives who had shown themselves notoriously Anglophile to the coast to seek protection.

When the report of Sir William Manning was published in London, the Somaliland controversy seized the public mind. Sir William said that the friendly tribes were being armed to repel raids: for, although the Mullah was certainly not organizing his forces to invade the protectorate, there would

undoubtedly be raids against unarmed friendlies. Lord Curzon complained in the House of Lords that the friendly tribes, because of loyalty to Great Britain, were now left to the mercy of their enemies, that the difficulties of Italy's problem were increased, and that British prestige had been greatly injured. The Earl of Crewe and other members of the Upper House contended that the only safe, honorable, and far-seeing policy was to send out immediately a large expeditionary force. Lord Lansdowne gave a *résumé* of the reasons of Imperial interest that had prompted the occupation of Somaliland opposite Aden. He showed how Great Britain had necessarily been led from the coast to the interior, and asserted that the appearance of the Mullah imposed obligations upon the British towards those who had submitted to the Protectorate. Members of the House of Commons also denounced the evacuation as ill-timed and premature.

The debates in Parliament and the press revealed that the underlying motive of British colonial policy was to put nothing into a country that could not be got out of it with interest. Colonial policy has a financial basis. Colonies are a national investment. The British taxpayer sanctions no expenditure where future profit is not reasonably in sight. There were only two justifiable reasons for a Somaliland expedition. The first was the probability of an economic development that would bring back the money it was to cost. The second was the defense of the larger general interests of the Empire. Somaliland did not seem likely to pay its way, or to help British

trade. The Government was not of the opinion that the Mullah could make trouble in Africa for other British possessions, or hurt British prestige in Arabia and the Persian Gulf. The friendly tribes would be provided with arms. Then they could defend themselves—just as they would have to do anyway, if there were no British protectorate.

The financial argument of 1905 was still potent in 1910, and was reinforced by the report of 1911, which showed that expenses had amounted to three times the revenue, although the administered area was now limited to the Berbera, Zeila, and Burhar districts along the coast. In 1911 the "political department" was abolished, and some troops disbanded.

After two years of an anomalous régime, the crushing defeat of a British camel corps, which was saved from annihilation only through the attackers' shortage of ammunition, showed how intolerable, from the point of view of prestige, was the protectorate that did not protect merely because it was a protectorate that did not pay. In spite of protests and a widespread agitation, the Cabinet refused to give up the policy of "watchful waiting." Indian reinforcements once more arrived from Aden. But no punitive expedition followed.

Before many months it was realized that the defeat at Dulmadoba was having serious consequences in Somaliland, and that loss of prestige was jeopardizing British interests. A state of war and anarchy prevailed. There was fear that the Mullah, who had again been raiding the friendly tribes of the interior, might attack Berbera. The House of Commons

was asked in February, 1914, for £25,000 "to meet additional expenses entailed upon Somaliland in connection with the activity of the Mullah." The camel corps was twice increased. Mr. Harcourt explained to the House of Commons that Burao, eighty miles inland, and an intermediate post were to be re-occupied. But the Government did not intend to attempt to pacify the interior, or to send a punitive expedition against the Mullah. The Mullah was old, and in an advanced stage of dropsy. He could no longer lead the dervishes, and, having been excommunicated by Mecca, was only a robber. None regarded him longer as a prophet. The wise policy was to go as far as Burao, and await the Mullah's death.

But Mullahs, like Villas, are feline in their insolent holding on to life. The Mullah's answer was to send cavalry within firing distance of Berbera. More troops were demanded from Aden in July. A few weeks later there were other fish to fry. London's attention was centered on the German advance towards Paris.

The dervishes were still on the offensive in November, 1914. Cannon and naval aeroplanes were used to put them to flight. It was their first experience with shell fire. But the encounter must have taken place pretty near the coast.

In spite of greater pre-occupations, there was constant anxiety about Somaliland until the revolt of the Sherif of Mecca against the Turks in the summer of 1916 sounded the last stroke of the death-knell that had long been tolling to the German hopes of Mohammedan help against their enemies.

CHAPTER VI

THE COLONIAL VENTURES OF ITALY

PORTUGAL, Spain, England, and France had an excellent start—a start of centuries—in Africa. Because her energies were expended exclusively upon the New World, Spain never got very far.[1] Portugal still holds two large colonies in Africa as the inheritance of days of glory and enterprise. Great Britain entered Africa by conquest and exploration. From the beginning of her colonization there was the strong motive that Africa was on the way to India and Australasia. To France, Africa was neighboring territory, just across the Mediterranean from her own coast. Russia had vast adjacent territories in Asia, and did not need to be interested in Africa. The three States that formed the Triple Alliance before the present war achieved their unity after the

[1] Although the colonies of Spain in Africa represent to-day all that is left of her vast colonial empire, they are not of enough interest to warrant special mention. For the Canary Islands are considered and treated as a part of Spain, just as the Madeira Islands are part of Portugal. There remain the Rio d'Oro, which is the Atlantic end of the Sahara desert; and two bits of mainland, very small, and five islands, of which Fernando Po is the only important one, in the Gulf of Guinea. France has the right of preemption, if Spain wants to sell any of these colonies. The fortunes of Spain in the Rif are treated in the chapter on Morocco.

best of Africa had been preempted: and the choice bits outside of European sovereignty or protection were being gathered in by the two Occidental Powers while the three Central Powers were finding themselves in the new status resulting from the events of the decade 1860–1870.

Austria-Hungary, her hands always full at home, has not aspired to colonies. United Germany was slow to awake to the political and economic advantages of a colonial Empire. But Italy, long before her unity was established, was inspired by the hope of a partial reincarnation of imperial Rome and mediæval Venice. One finds the *Risorgimento* literature permeated with the idea that the new Italy must become mistress of the Mediterranean, with sovereignty over the north coast of Africa, and predominant influence in the territories freed by the gradual dissolution of the Ottoman Empire.[1]

Italians had never given up intimate connection with the African and Ottoman Mediterranean coast line. Curiously enough, nearest home, they had been largely supplanted in Dalmatia by the Slavs and in the Ionian Islands by the Greeks. But they still remained in Ægean and Levant ports. Although the nineteenth century saw a marked cultural conquest by France of the Near East, Italian has survived as a language of communication with the foreigner in all the Levant ports. Italians settled in great numbers in Egypt, Tunis, and Algeria. Everywhere they competed with Greeks for small commerce and the carrying trade.

[1] See my *New Map of Europe*, pp. 123, 125–6, 241.

Unfortunately for Italian hopes, France and Great Britain had no idea of allowing the new State to become a menace to their hegemony in the Mediterranean. Historic claims and economic considerations are worth nothing, unless there is the force of arms to make them good. In the early eighties England installed herself in Egypt, and France took Tunis. Italy's indignant protests fell on deaf ears. She joined the Triple Alliance, and with Germany, her companion in ill luck, started to see what scraps she could pick up that had fallen from the Anglo-French table.

The withdrawal of Egypt and Great Britain from the Sudan gave Italy what seemed to be the only possible opening for the planting of her flag in Africa. A stretch of the Red Sea coast between Suakim and the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb was occupied, because Great Britain did not care enough about this country to oppose the occupation. After the fall of Khartum and the abandonment of the Upper Valley of the Nile, the British had kept a garrison at Suakim as a starting point of future reconquest. The French, on the other hand, could prevent Italy from controlling the western bank of the passage from the Red Sea into the Gulf of Aden by virtue of "prior claims," dating back to 1862, but which were not taken advantage of until 1884. The territory, with an undefined interior occupied by nomad Arab tribes, was organized in 1890 as the colony of Eritrea. Its chief port, Massowah, is the natural port of northern Abyssinia.

Farther to the east, the Italians entered Somali-

land, and gradually proclaimed and tried to extend their sovereignty over the long stretch of coast land from Cape Guardafui to the mouth of the Juba River, a distance of one thousand miles. Not much of the north side of the Cape, on the Gulf of Aden, could be occupied, because the British were installed at Berbera, and refused to allow the littoral of the gulf opposite Aden "to fall into the hands of another Power." Most of this territory, which is now called "Somaliland Colony and Protectorates," is still under the actual control of several Sultans, who nominally acknowledge the King of Italy—so long as he does not bother them. The southern end, at first called Benadir, is the colony. The port of Mogadisho is the capital.

A glance at the map will show that these two Italian possessions touch Abyssinia on the north and on the southeast, where the colonial administration is effective. It was the Italian ambition to extend their influence over Abyssinia. In this way, they would have had two possessions of great value, and railways to the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean would have carried to and from the outside world the trade of a rich and well-populated country. But they tried to accomplish this by a shabby trick, the disastrous results of which are narrated in the chapter on Abyssinia.

The battle of Adowa in 1896 was a crushing blow to Italian colonial aspiration in East Africa. Abyssinia remained independent, established friendly relations with France and Great Britain, and by the wonderful development of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan

and the creation of the French port of Djibouti, with its railway into Abyssinia, the two Italian possessions have not developed as was expected before Adowa.

Two advantageous frontier rectifications since the Treaty of Adis Abeba have given Eritrea a portion of the high Abyssinian plateau, without which the colony would have had no economic excuse for existence. As it is, the revenue is far below expenditures for civil administration. Italy has to make good a substantial deficit, and pay the charges of a considerable military force besides. Seventy-five miles of railway had been completed when the Tripolitan War broke out, and this was found to be very helpful in keeping the colony quiet. Eritrea, being opposite Arabia, was the nearest point of contact of Italy and Turkey. Her ports in the Red Sea enabled Italy to prevent much communication and gun-running between the Senussi of the Tripolitan hinterland and Arabia. The transit trade of Massowah has become more important of recent years, though not at all what it ought to be, if we compare the volume of trade with that of other African ports whose hinterland is much less advantageous. Were it not for pearl-fishing, palm nuts, and a little gold-mining near Asmara, Eritrea would cost Italy more than the voters of the colonial budget are probably willing to pay. During the first year of the present war, the Massowah hide exports (some coming from the British Sudan!) were a very precious help to Germany, who got them safely through the Mediterranean under the Italian flag.

Owing to the intractability of the native Sultans

and the successes of the Mullah Mohammed in defying the British in the neighboring colony, the Somaliland Protectorate has never meant much more than trouble and a valuable ground for wireless telegraphy experiments. But the Benadir Colony in the south has been organized and developed on sound lines since 1908, and Italy is beginning to sell on a large scale her cotton goods and other manufactured products to the natives, and get commission and transport profit out of a growing export cattle trade.

After the bitter disappointment on the confines of Abyssinia, Italy began to concentrate her energies upon Tripoli, the last Ottoman possession in Africa. A policy of "pacific penetration" was begun, and might eventually have been successful, had it not been for the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, the starting point of a new era in the history of the eastern Mediterranean.

At the beginning of the twentieth century Abdul Hamid, engrossed in his pan-Islamic policy, looked upon Tripoli as the *foyer* of the renaissance of Turkish influence in Africa. The religious propaganda of Islam had been making rapid strides in Africa, and the Sultan planned to use his position as Khalif to counteract the political arrangements of the European Powers for the final partition of Africa. He did not hope for much aid from Egypt. But in the hinterland of Tripoli, the Senussi sect could be used to resist, under his ægis, the spread of infidel rule in the Sudan and the Sahara.

France and Great Britain, after the Fashoda incident, had divided the interior of North Africa into

spheres of influence, and France had arrived at an understanding with Italy, by which Italian ambitions in Tripoli and French ambitions in Morocco were reciprocally sanctioned. Acting upon his perfect right, for he had not been consulted, the Sultan of Turkey objected to the Anglo-French Sudanic agreement, and refused to recognize it. When he lost what he believed would be a valuable and active local support by the death of the Grand Senussi in 1902, he showed the only possible means of effective protest by putting a strong Turkish garrison at Bilma for the protection of the Tripolitan hinterland, and let it be understood that the Turks would proceed immediately to extensive military operations for bringing under effective control *Turkish territory* up to Lake Chad.

As long as France and Great Britain were mutually distrustful and suspicious of each other in North Africa, and as long as Abdul Hamid could make trouble for the French by his strong influence over the Bey of Tunis, there seemed to be some hope of Turkish ambitions being realized. But France and Great Britain compounded all their colonial rivalries by the Agreement of 1904. The old Bey of Tunis died in 1906, and was succeeded by a ruler who had been brought up under European influence, and was wholly loyal to the French. The Sultan's only hope from that moment lay in superior military force. This he did not have. So the Sudan, and later the whole of Tripoli, was lost to the Ottoman Empire.

It was not a bad thing for French ambitions that the Turks tried to get into the hinterland of Tripoli.

For it enabled France, without violating her Italian agreement, to anticipate Italy, and to define what had always been a vague boundary. In June, 1906, the Turks sent a secret expeditionary force to occupy the desert oases, of which Djanet was the chief. France protested to the Porte, declaring that Djanet was outside of Tripoli, which the French claimed extended no farther than Ghat. The Sultan had to issue an *iradé*, recognizing that Djanet was in the French sphere, and countermanding the instructions given to the Turkish army in Tripoli to penetrate the Sudan.

But after the Young Turk Revolution, many *iradés* of Abdul Hamid were repudiated. When the French Ambassador at Constantinople tried to get a clear understanding about the hinterland of Tripoli, he met with a rebuff. So he warned his Government against the dangers to which the French in North Africa might be exposed. The fear was soon realized. In the autumn of 1909, the Turks began to show unwonted activity in the Sudan. It appeared that the Senussi sect was taking great comfort in Turkish promises. The Young Turks had an easy task in arraying the Arab tribesmen against France. For the only remaining outlet to the slave trade was by way of Borku to Tripoli.

I was away from Turkey during that winter, and was living in Paris. It was common knowledge there that the French were meeting with serious opposition in the hinterland of Tripoli, and that their losses were heavy. But little was allowed to be published, for France wanted to keep on friendly terms with Turkey,

and preferred to think that the Sudan opposition was due to local causes. Ottoman troops, however, occupied the oasis of Kafura, a Senussi center, and there were reports from Constantinople of the Turkish intention to cooperate with the Senussi to establish control over the caravan route across the eastern Sahara from Lake Chad. There was an enormous traffic of arms, the effects of which are still felt, from Tripoli to the desert tribesmen. Italian intervention could not have been looked upon by France with an unfriendly eye: for it drew bellicose tribesmen into the Turkish service in Tripoli, and left France a free hand. Shortly after entering upon her war of aggression, Italy annexed the African province of Turkey. But her politicians had no more idea than her soldiers of the interior of the country, what its boundaries ought to be, or what they were going to be. When Turkey finally agreed to oppose no longer the Italian occupation of Tripoli and Cyrenaica, the British in Egypt had occupied Sollum, and France was firmly established in the oases of the Tripolitan hinterland. There was no intention of allowing Italy, any more than Turkey, to enter the Sudan!

In the second Ottoman Parliament, I heard Nadji Bey, deputy for Tripoli, pleading with the Young Turks to follow the only policy that would save his country. He said:

"Do not have any doubt about the fact that Tripoli is to-day economically in the hands of the Italians, and that we are traversing a period of serious transition. Let me confine my illustration to public instruction. The Italians have a dozen

fine schools, and our Ministry has not known how to establish a single one since the constitution. There are four old schools, but they still lack professors, because there is no money to pay them. The Italian schools provide for the needs of thirty-two thousand inhabitants, whose children receive an education which has nothing in it of Ottoman. More than twenty thousand Jews are to-day won over to Italy. We have a population of a million and a half Moslems, deprived of educational facilities. Instead of establishing schools, you are occupied with forming school districts on paper. Comrades, the Turkish language is lost for our subjects in Tripoli. If you were to compare our schools with those of the Italians, you would weep. To-day——"

Here Nadji Bey was interrupted by a loud clamour, and his speech remained unfinished. It had no effect. Nothing was done. As we have seen, the Young Turks were devoting their energies and money to stirring up trouble in the Sudan, thus playing into Italy's hands. For France and Great Britain would now welcome the realization of Italy's ambition.

On September 27, 1911, Italy presented to the Sublime Porte an ultimatum, demanding consent in forty-eight hours to an Italian Protectorate over Tripoli. Turkey naturally ignored the ultimatum. Italy declared war, and sent an expedition to occupy Tripoli. The war lasted for a year, and was confined (since Italy feared getting the ill-will of the other Powers) to Tripoli, with the exception of a futile demonstration at the Dardanelles and the occupation of Rhodes and other islands of the Dodecanese. The

formation of the Balkan League, in September, 1912, and the inevitable approach of a new war, induced Turkey to consent to the loss of her last African province. By the treaty of Ouchy, October 15, 1912, Turkey was not asked to recognize the Italian conquest, but merely to grant complete autonomy to Tripoli. The Turkish army was to be withdrawn from Tripoli and Bengazi, after which Italy was to withdraw her army from the Ægean Islands. Commercial and diplomatic relations were to be resumed, and Italy was to take over Tripoli's share of the Ottoman Public Debt.[1]

The impotence of Turkey to resist Italy's occupation of Tripoli was due solely to the fact that Italy had control of the sea. It was impossible to send reinforcements and supplies of ammunition and arms. But, in spite of this handicap, Italy did not have brilliant success during the year of continual fighting. She was not fighting Turkey, but the natives of Tripoli, backed by powerful support from the Senussi and Arab tribes of the hinterland. Italy signed the Treaty of Ouchy in order to induce Turkey to use her influence to reconcile the Arabs to the Italian occupation. To accomplish this, Italy maintained her occupation of the islands of the Dodecanese, on the ground that Turkish officers were still in Tripoli, organizing and keeping alive what Italy now called the "rebellion" of the natives.

[1] The story of the "pacific penetration," the attempt of the Young Turks to check it, the Italo-Turkish War, and the negotiations which ended in the Treaty of Ouchy (Lausanne) is told in detail in *The New Map of Europe*, pp. 241–262.

This was perfectly true. I know many Young Turks who went to Tripoli, and never came home. They are even now by no means all dead. Their attitude was well expressed by one of them who went out to Africa after the Balkan War was ended, in May, 1913. Like many of his friends, he was going to Egypt, and if he could not succeed in getting through there, knew how it could be done by way of Tunis. He said to me, when I went down to Galata to see him off: "I know that Turkey is dying, and that Islam is dying. How can I do better than die with my country and with my religion? And where can I make the sacrifice more worth while than in Tripoli against the Italians?"

The Turks have affection for the French, and respect for the English. They have great faith in the ability of the Germans, and more or less sympathy with the German way of going about things, and getting things done. They have too much in common with the Russians, in blood and nature, not to be rivals. But the Italians they regard in the same light as the Greeks, untrustworthy morally and weak physically. They may accept as a social and military equal the Englishman, the German, the Frenchman, the Austrian, the Hungarian, the Pole, and the Russian—but never the Italian. It is necessary to make this statement, and to add that the Arabs adopt practically the same view, in order to explain how difficult is Italy's task in Africa. If a man respects you, you can conquer or ignore his hate. Italy will never make a success of African colonization unless she effaces the impression of Adowa,

which her four years in Tripoli have tended only to confirm.

While progress in Cyrenaica was too slow in 1913 to admit of organization of the new colony, for the tribes were uncompromisingly hostile and unconquered and the Italians had to stick to the coast, much was done in Tripoli to make a good impression at home and on the outside world. The city itself was transformed in a few months, and it was estimated that eleven thousand Italians, outside of the military forces, were already in the new colony. The country was being explored for mines and other possible ways of exploitation, and railways along the coast to the Tunisian frontier and inland to Ghadames were being surveyed.

Shortly before the European War broke out, Italy reported that *quiescent* conditions were prevailing on the other side of the Mediterranean, and the revised Treasury statements showed that the acquisition had cost up to 1914 over two hundred and twenty-five million dollars. The army losses have never been completely compiled. If Tripoli had really been *acquired*, and if Italy were quit of the problem of conquest with even a huge sum of money and heavy loss of life, perhaps some would think the game worth the candle.

The articles that have appeared in European and American reviews and newspapers about the value of Tripoli have aroused a great deal of interest, and resulted in much speculation. Directly opposite views have been set forth, and argued with plausibility. Tripoli supported a large population and was

a source of much wealth to ancient Rome. Why not to-day? Is it in Tripoli, as throughout the territories of the Ottoman Empire, the blight of Islam? Or was wealth and fertility magnified and exaggerated in classical history? Did what seems to us of no account appear to the Romans and Greeks a great deal? But we have refutation of this in our actual knowledge of their wealth: and, if architecture is a criterion, would a little seem much to those who built Baalbek and Palmyra? Or is Tripoli a hopeless proposition because of the truth of the theory of climatic changes?

Out of the confusion of opinion one does gain, however, a pretty good idea that Tripoli is to-day the least promising portion, potentially as well as actually, of the north African coast. Again we see strikingly illustrated the handicap that confronts in the twentieth century the Powers who achieved unity and ability for extra-European expansion after the best of Asia, Africa, and the islands had already been occupied.

In considering the colonial activity of these later Powers, we must add to the handicap of having to take the leavings the fact that we are too prone to judge the ability and qualifications of the newcomers by comparison with what the "old hands" are able to do after generations of experience. In writing this very chapter the thought has occurred to me that I have been judging Italy by what France or Great Britain could have done under similar circumstances. But let it be remembered that when France first entered upon her African Mediterranean

conquest in Algeria, it took her fifteen years to get from Algiers to Constantine, and certainly half a century to accomplish what we have expected of Italy in four years.

The repercussion of the war in Europe, which had no serious effect in Egypt or Tunis, hit the Italians hard, and proved that they had not conquered Tripoli at all. Native troubles were supposed to be the result of German intrigue, and the German Consul in Tripoli was arrested, together with other Germans who were under suspicion of being army officers conspiring with the natives. But even if this be true, it can be pointed out that German intrigues fell flat everywhere else in Africa. The unwelcome truth was forced upon Italy in a striking way when in the spring of 1915 the news reached Rome of the disastrous defeat of Colonel Miani, who lost nearly half his European troops and some guns by a sudden mutiny of native troops near Sidera. After killing a thousand Italians, four thousand native troops, with all their equipment, joined the rebels.

By the end of 1915 the Italians were back again on the coast, where they had started in October, 1912. What the end of 1917 will bring no man knows. But Italy has yet before her the task of conquering and colonizing Tripoli.

CHAPTER VII

ALGERIA AND TUNIS: THE NUCLEUS OF THE FRENCH AFRICAN EMPIRE

THE establishment of the French Protectorate over Morocco in 1912 was the culmination of eighty years of effort in North Africa. The French African empire, with the exception of Somaliland and Madagascar, is made up of contiguous territories, extending over a quarter of the continent, with numerous ports on the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. In this empire is included the Sahara Desert, a large part of the Sudan, the entire valley of the Senegal, two thirds of the Niger, and a portion of the Congo valley. All the colonizing European states, Italy, Great Britain, Germany, Belgium, Portugal, and Spain are somewhere France's neighbors. By her little colony in Somaliland, French territory touches Abyssinia in the east. Liberia is a neighbor in the west. In Madagascar France holds the one large African island.

The French African empire started on the Mediterranean under Louis Philippe, was spread to West Africa under Napoleon III., and across the Sahara and through the Sudan to Central Africa under the Third Republic. Algeria was the nucleus on the

Mediterranean, and Senegal on the Atlantic. It has been a curious combination of foresight and luck, the building of this empire, and, as in the case of every other African colony and every other Power, more the latter than the former. Luck deserted the French only twice in all the nineteenth century—when they let the British get a foothold in the delta of the Niger, and when they failed to push their expedition into the headwaters of the Nile before Kitchener started to reconquer the Sudan.

In studying the history of French colonial expansion, to which four chapters of this book are devoted, one is struck with several outstanding facts: the fewness of the men who dreamed dreams and thought the dreams could be realized; the peculiar suitability of Arab and desert warfare to the military genius of the French; the beginning of the solution of administrative problems and the realization of economic return only in the twentieth century. As with the British, generations passed of hit and miss, of blunder and improvisation, before government and people were converted to the wisdom and necessity of a colonial policy through placing before their eyes the goal of financial benefit. British imperialism, as a national and popular program, began with the reconquest of the Sudan and the Boer War. French imperialism, as a national and popular program, began with the humiliation of Fashoda. The new map of Africa was made during the fifteen years preceding the present war.

The late Europeanization of the Mediterranean is the great enigma of modern history. While remote

regions of the globe were being transformed and brought under the ægis of European civilization, the Mediterranean remained under the shadow of Islam, a closed sea, whose waters washed nations in the embryo and vast coasts where anarchy had reigned for fifteen centuries since the disappearance of the Roman Empire. France went into Algeria in 1830, and inaugurated the modern era of the Middle Sea, not because of a conviction that the time had come to do away with the pirates of the Barbary Coast, but because of a trivial dispute between the Dey of Algiers and the French Consul over a question of grain! It was an auspicious moment, however. The sea power of the Ottoman Empire had been irrevocably destroyed three years before at the battle of Navarino. Mohammed Ali was severing in Egypt the essential link of the chain that bound Africa to Turkey. Christian civilization was being reestablished in the Hellenic peninsula. Italy was at the threshold of the generation which was to bring national unity.

It took almost the entire reign of Louis Philippe to conquer Algeria. The Second Empire, although it made a beginning of West African conquest in Senegal, had no other policy for Africa than the intangible dream of reestablishing an Arab empire. Napoleon's energies were occupied in Turkey, Italy, Syria, and Mexico. France turned to Africa after the disastrous war with Prussia in order to find consolation for the loss of Alsace and Lorraine. But there was no certain goal. Energies and money and men were dissipated in Indo-China and Madagascar. Siam

received more attention than Algeria. Sentimentalists clung persistently to the hope of "getting back" Egypt. Even the imperialists who had faith and conviction in the colonial future of France groped blindly in the dark.

Fashoda was the awakening. This humiliation had to come. For the first time since 1870, France asked herself, "*Quo vadis?*" It aroused in the French nation a determination to hold and develop properly the heritage of whose possession the France of slippers and dressing-gown was scarcely aware. It pointed out clearly to the statesmen and empire-builders of France the one course that would give practical results. There must be complete understanding and cooperation with Great Britain. Hence the agreement of 1899 concerning spheres of influence in the Sudan, and, five years later, the solid, permanent foundation for empire-building in the agreement of May 8, 1904. In the meantime an agreement was signed with Italy providing for the future of Tripoli.

These international arrangements assured France a free hand and support in Morocco, sanction of her occupation of Tunis, the territorial changes and economic stipulations necessary for the proper organization and development of her West African and Equatorial African possessions. In return, Egypt was left to the British and Tripoli to the Italians. With aims definitely centered on definitely assured territories, the builders of the colonial empire were able to proceed to administrative organization along lines that would bring financial results. The money needed for economic development could then be

solicited and obtained from Parliament and from private capital.

But it would be a mistake to ignore what had been accomplished during the first three decades of the Third Republic. Three achievements prepared the way for the Aladdin's lamp transformation that has been wrought since 1900. One of the "keys to the house"[1] was secured between 1881 and 1883 by the invasion of Tunis and the establishment of a French Protectorate over the territory lying between Algeria and the Turkish *vilayet* of Tripoli. Intrepid explorers and brilliant soldiers carried the French flag from the Senegal to the Niger, to the coast through Kong and Dahomey, and from Gaboon to the Congo. Most important of all, the conquered of Sedan became the conquerors of Northern Africa through learning how to fight natives with natives and by using native methods.

West Africa, the Sahara, the Sudan, and Equatorial Africa are treated in later chapters. It is not my intention to give an historical outline of Algeria and Tunis, but to indicate the changes and problems and development of the north African coast under the French flag, in order to show the place and importance of what has happened recently in Algeria and Tunis in the building of the French colonial empire and in the general history of the spread of European civilization in Africa. For here we find the secret and the impetus of the movement that has established in fifteen years the *pax Gallica* from the Mediterranean

[1] Jules Ferry called Tunis and Morocco the keys to France's house in Africa.

to the Congo, from the Atlantic to the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, over territories inhabited by twenty-five millions, and that has doubled in the last ten years the commerce of these countries.

Algeria was completely conquered during the reign of Louis Philippe. For sixty years it was governed directly from Paris. After 1870, the French endeavored to make Algeria an integral part of France. The idea was to colonize this country with French colonists, and to make of it the panacea and compensation for the loss of Alsace and Lorraine. The problem was exceedingly difficult, more difficult, in spite of its nearness to the mother country, than any other colonial enterprise ever undertaken by a European Power, except, perhaps, the Dutch colonization of South Africa. In America and in Australia, French, Spanish, and English found vast territories with rich possibilities and sparsely inhabited. The natives were primitive and rarely settled on lands indispensable to their support. They were not firmly rooted to the soil. They were not bound together by social and political organisms that had developed with the exploitation of the land on which they lived. Aboriginal inhabitants were driven into the interior, and gradually exterminated or assimilated. In Algeria, after 1870, the French attempted to implant a new element in a country whose lands were owned and lived upon by a race that possessed political and social institutions. They were institutions, too, of a highly developed character, and the antithesis of the institutions brought by the colonists. The French were tackling a problem that European Christians

have never been able to solve, the problem of reconciling Islam and Christianity. It was altogether a different problem from that of colonizing a pagan country. It could not be compared at all to most of the colonizing attempts in Africa, and to the British in India or the Dutch in Java, where the idea is not to implant the ruling race in the country ruled, but merely to administer the country and exploit its foreign commerce by means of officials and traders. The French tried to make Algeria a part of France, inhabited by Frenchmen and other Europeans and assimilated natives, speaking the French language and governed by French laws.

Napoleon's idea of an Arab empire was abandoned. The natives could not be assimilated. Algeria could not be held indefinitely as a vast military camp. A European element—for the most part French—must be introduced, given means of acquiring land, and encouraged to come and stay by the granting of privileges not enjoyed by the natives. The first step was the law of 1873 concerning native property. It resulted in the unjust and wholly indefensible eviction of thousands of proprietors from their lands. Then followed the suppression of the Moslem system of administering justice through *kadis*, which resulted in the oppression of the natives and the awakening of religious antagonism. The third step was the extension to Algeria of the new French municipal law. This put the government of communes into the hands of minor officials and white colonists, who became *legally* the masters of the destinies of the natives among whom they lived. All sorts of advantages

were granted to colonists to bring them and to keep them in Algeria: partial exemption from military service, partial exemption from taxation, and a gift of lands of dispossessed natives. At the same time, the process of governing from Paris resulted in arrested economic development and administrative confusion. The Governor of Algeria had no control over the military authorities. Administrations, depending upon ministries in Paris, were directed by considerations and governed by rules totally contrary to the interests of Algeria and unsuited to its different economic and political situation and its peculiar problems. There was no coordination of policy and effort between branches of the Government. Finances were managed from Paris, revenues collected by Paris, and credits voted in the general French budget.

Algeria did not prosper. The natives regarded the French, as they had every right to do, as gendarmes and merchants whose one thought was to exploit them and to treat them unjustly. They resented bitterly a régime which forced intruders upon them, gave the intruders exemption from military service and taxation, and imposed upon them the burdens from which the intruders were free. The colonists felt that they had exchanged the orderly civil administration at home for a half-baked, improvised uncertain régime that was neither military nor civil, and under which they did not know exactly where they stood. They did not enjoy all the rights of French citizens, especially in the matter of voting upon how the money they paid in taxes and the revenue from the wealth they created should be spent.

Essential reforms were enacted after Fashoda, reforms that have brought wealth and prosperity, and make the days of the nineteenth century seem like an ugly dream.

In 1898, three delegations, to be elected separately by French citizens, taxpayers other than citizens, and natives, were established to decide upon the expenditure of the taxpayers' money. This was the beginning of self-government. But it had no real importance until the law of December 24, 1900, separated Algerian from French finances, and established a distinct Algerian budget. The Algerian delegations, now masters of their finances, discussed and decided how their money should be spent. The result was magical. Immediately there was an extension of public works. Natives as well as colonists began to take an interest in *their* country. Let one illustration suffice. Before 1900, the forests of Algeria brought in only several hundred thousand francs, which represented fines collected from natives. To-day there are practically no fines. But forest products figure in the budget for more than five million francs.

Since 1900, Algeria has become, after Great Britain, Germany, Belgium, and the United States, the best client of France. Eighty per cent. of her trade, which amounts to nearly $250,000,000 per annum, is with the mother country. Railways have been extended so that Algeria, whose means of transportation were limited fifteen years ago, has now two thousand miles in exploitation. This has meant a rapid development of mineral wealth, and the possibility of using

forest produce, especially cork. The great prosperity of Algeria, however, is in agriculture, where dry farming has brought under cultivation cereal-bearing areas that the natives never utilized. The most remarkable phenomenon in Algeria, from the standpoint of the colonists, is the way the soil takes to vines. Algerian wine has become a factor in the French markets, and brings to its producers financial returns far beyond their dreams. Algeria is also looked upon as a most important source of mutton for French markets.

Popular education was established in Algeria in 1892, and is more extended than anywhere else in Africa except in the South African Union. Since the inhabitants received the privilege of voting the budget, sums are allotted that would make possible primary education everywhere were it not for the unfortunate system of communal responsibility.[1] There are still a hundred thousand boys in populated centers who have no school facilities, and little has been done to educate girls. But it is the will of the Government to give education to all, and

[1] The communes, under French law, collaborate in the creation and construction of schools, and nothing can be accomplished without local cooperation. Since 1908, the Government has been giving from eighty to one hundred per cent. of the funds needed, but many communes in Algeria have not availed themselves of the sums appropriated for their local school uses. The reform urgently needed, now that the Government can pay out of the general budget the entire expense of native schools, is to have the control taken out of the hands of the communes and vested in a central board at Algiers, which shall appropriate the money, build the schools, and manage them. *Cf.* M. Augustin Bernard, in *L'Afrique du Nord* (Paris, 1913), pp. 52–3.

the funds for that purpose are provided. In the matter of schools the French in Algeria have felt much more keenly their stewardship than the British in Egypt. The effort they are making in all their colonies is rivaled only by what the United States is doing in the Philippines.

But education brings its problems, especially in old Moslem countries where the natives believe that they are superior to their rulers. In their attitude socially toward natives, the French are found by subject races to be far more pleasant to live with than the British. Especially among the upper classes life is happier and richer for French than for British subject races. The moment a Moslem is educated, he becomes reasoningly a more bitter enemy of the Englishman than he was instinctively before. He hates him with all his heart and soul. This revelation has come to me many a time, at a dinner table or in a home where the Moslem, urbane and charming, was guest or host. His eyes tell the story his lips keep back. The Moslem knows that the Englishman denies him—and always will deny him—social equality, whether he be Sultan or peasant. The Frenchman feels no racial antipathy for the native and the native knows it. So the Frenchman has not as much to fear from Moslem education as the Englishman. His political interest does not suffer greatly by the spread of primary education. Higher education of native races is not a nightmare for him. He can conceive of the day when the native holds the franchise, full and free, of French citizenship. What he asks is that the native learn to speak

French and become impregnated with French ideals. His only fear is being too greatly outnumbered in the midst of a native population.

Between 1901 and 1905, the territory of Algeria was greatly extended into the hinterland. By the decree of August 14, 1905, Southern Algeria was organized. It includes the oases on the northern edge of the Sahara. The extension of the railway to the desert and the pacification of the Sahara enabled the civil authorities to take over much sooner than was anticipated the administration of the Algerian hinterland. Not many years ago, a deputy declared in the Palais Bourbon that France would never hold Southern Algeria in any other way than by military posts, whose garrisons would be afraid to go out for a walk unless they were all together and all armed. Garrisons are few to-day, especially since they are needed more in France than in Algeria. The savages they were fighting fifteen years ago are now their comrades-in-arms before Verdun. Were Tartarin de Tarascon to return to-day "*chez les teurs*" he could go right into the desert, and still not find his lions.

Tunis was invaded in 1881. The treaty establishing the French Protectorate was signed in 1883. The European Powers and Turkey were confronted with a *fait accompli*. Great Britain's protests were loud and violent at first, but died down after the occupation of Egypt. Italy alone felt the full force of the blow of seeing France so close to her shores, in a territory historically Italian, and whose European inhabitants were mostly Italian. The "perfidy" of France drove Italy into the Triple Alliance. Only in

1901 did the breach begin to be healed by France giving tacit permission to Italy to do likewise some day in Tripoli. The family that had been reigning, under the suzerainty of Turkey, since the beginning of the eighteenth century, was wise enough to bow to the inevitable, and has been maintained on the throne. Tunis is controled by a Resident, who is Minister of Foreign Affairs in the cabinet of the Bey.

The progress of Tunis began to be marked before that of any other French colony. Its railways increased far more rapidly than those of Algeria, and its economic prosperity began early enough to confound in active public life those who opposed the acquisition of the Protectorate and the grants of money in the eighties and early nineties. A network of excellent railways stretches along the coast, and serves the interior. Sfax has become a marvelous center of olive culture. Wheat, barley, and oats are grown on large plantations. Lead, zinc, and iron are mined extensively, and the phosphates production is of mondial importance.

The reasons for the more rapid development of Tunis than of Algeria are mostly political. Tunis was administered from the beginning through the French Foreign Office. Italians in the colony were plentiful, and Italy took the French occupation to heart. It was imperative for France to show both the Italians of Tunis and the whole world how much better off the country was under the French flag, and to reconcile the Tunisians themselves to their loss of independence. Sums were voted for railway building and port construction and the development of indus-

tries, steamship communications were established and freight rates arranged, that would never have been put through on so large a scale on the ground of purely financial return. Budget estimates for Tunis were railroaded through the Chamber of Deputies year after year on the plea of the urgent necessities and considerations of foreign policy and national defense.

Fortunately, French energy and push and skill, and a masterly way of handling the native ruler and Moslem religious leaders, have enabled French officials to make excellent budget returns, and to report each year a remarkable agricultural and commercial development. Lands that Islam had rendered sterile were returned to the old prosperity of Roman days, not slowly and laboriously, but rapidly and as if by magic. The economic reward France gets from Tunis has nothing of luck in it. It is richly deserved.

At the same time the political advantages of holding Tunis are incalculable. The other "key to the house," Morocco, being off in the farthest corner of the African continent, with Algeria and the desert between it and the rest of Islam, never meant—even potentially—more than local disturbances for France. Tunis, independent or under the control of another Power, would have destroyed the possibility of a strong and easily defended French African empire. The importance of its possession by France was demonstrated when the Pan-Islamic propaganda began to be agitated by Abdul Hamid, and taken up by Germany. Without Tunis, France could not have

pacified the Sahara and installed herself in the Sudan.[1] Tunis, also, has offset for France the advantage gained after the Napoleonic wars by Great Britain in the possession of the island of Malta. To wrest in the future from Great Britain the naval supremacy of the Mediterranean, France needs only the ships. She has in Bizerta the base looking westward, and the Tunisian coast line lends itself easily to another base looking eastward.

If the French are to realize their dreams of making Algeria and Morocco and Tunis true *pays de France*, the very crux of their problem is building up French communities all along the Barbary coast from Sfax to Agadir. Ten million Moslem natives can never be French-speaking and French-thinking unless they are in constant daily contact with Frenchmen—not officials and soldiers, but colonists whose fortunes are as much bound up in the country as theirs. Any other method of making these Mediterranean countries French is bound to meet with dismal failure. Colonization cannot stand where it is. The native problem, the economic problem, the pacifying problem all depend upon one and the same thing—a great and widespread increase of the European element. The peculiar nationalistic ideal of the French owners demands that the new colonists be in overwhelming proportion French families.

According to the last census, Algeria has five and a half million inhabitants, and Tunis nearly two million. In Algeria there are seven hundred and fifty thousand Europeans, of whom three hundred thousand are

[1] See above, p. 121.

French. Tunis contains two hundred thousand Europeans, of whom less than fifty thousand are French. With all the increase of wealth of these two possessions, the French element has not greatly increased since 1900. French capital and French enterprise have doubled, but the Europeans employed in minor unofficial positions are generally Italians or Spaniards. They become often French citizens—but that does not make them French. It is in vain that the French flag flies over Tunis. Its European civilian element is distinctively Italian. Every Frenchman who visits Tunis sees this with a sinking of the heart.[1] In Morocco, France is dependent on Spaniards. During the past twenty-five years the native population of Algeria and Tunis has increased thirty per cent. In the same period the demographic chart of France has been very nearly stationary. It is no reflection on the work of the best soldiers in the world and brilliant administrators, models of patriotism and self sacrifice, to say that their work has not brought—from the standpoint of permanency and hope for the future—what it should have brought. The fault lies with their fellow-countrymen. The work of those who go out with the sword and the pen into Africa cannot be worth what it should be to France as long

[1] The 1911 figures for Tunis (official French census) give 46,044 French, exclusive of the Army of Occupation but inclusive of civilian officials; 109,143 Italians; and 12,410 "Anglo-Maltese." The last category is, of course, also Italian. This means that nearly 125,000 Italians are settled in Tunis. In Algeria there are nearly the same number of Spaniards. Figures have not yet been published for the French Protectorate of Morocco. The French, however, are in a minority to other Europeans all along the Barbary coast.

as the French nation refuses to rear children to take possession of the heritage.

The warning to France, especially at this moment when the best of her young manhood is being sacrificed on the battlefield, is one of poignant force. Military victories and the great colonial empire mean nothing unless there is a new generation to benefit by the sacrifices, the glory, and the success of those who are giving their blood. If after the fathers come not the children, nothing comes.

CHAPTER VIII

THE BELGIANS IN THE CONGO

STANLEY'S Congo River trip resulted in the establishment, in 1882, of the Congo Free State, which was placed under the sovereignty of its founder, Leopold II., King of the Belgians. Its neutrality and independence were guaranteed by the Berlin Act of 1885, and during the next decade, as knowledge of Central Africa became more precise, its boundaries were defined by treaties with Great Britain, Germany, Portugal, and France, who hold the neighboring territories. With the exception of the small British Protectorate of Uganda, and a spur of German East Africa, which stands between the Belgian Congo and Lake Victoria, this vast colony of over nine hundred thousand square miles may be said to cover the heart of Africa. For over two thousand miles it is the territory comprising the Congo River and its tributaries, and might have continued to include both banks of the Congo, had not the French explorer de Brazza anticipated Stanley by planting the French flag on the north bank of the river opposite Leopoldville. Like the Niger, although on a far larger scale, the Congo finds its way to the sea in a most unusual course, due north

for half its length through the very center of Africa, then west for five hundred miles, and then almost south for the last thousand. In the central bend, for a stretch of considerably over a thousand miles, the Congo is navigable. Steamers can run also on its principal tributaries. This has facilitated the problem of communication, and as in the Niger, Nile, and Zambesi valleys, has made less expensive and more rapid the work of developing and colonizing.

The larger portion of the boundary with German East Africa is formed by Lake Tanganyika, and the completion of the German railway from the lake to Dar-es-Salaam has given the eastern portion of the Congo an excellent outlet to the Indian Ocean. Southward there is railway communication through Rhodesia to Beira on the Indian Ocean coast of Portuguese East Africa and through the Commonwealth of South Africa to Cape Town and Durban. The southern region of the Belgian Congo will soon be connected also with the Atlantic Ocean by the railway from Katanga to Benguela in Portuguese West Africa.

Since the readjustment of territory between France and Germany after the Agadir crisis of 1911, German Kamerun touches the northwestern boundary of the Congo at two points. Belgian Congo shares with British Uganda, Lake Edward and Lake Albert, and touches the Nile at the northern end of Lake Albert. Until the death of King Leopold, the Belgians held also the Lado Enclave which had the west bank of the Nile for some distance north of Lake Albert. On the Atlantic coast, the Congo is hemmed in north

and south by Portuguese territory, but has a free outlet to the Atlantic at the Port of Boma near the mouth of the Congo River.

Belgian Congo is inhabited by about fifteen million natives of numerous tribes and dialects, the great bulk of whom are pagan. Mohammedanism and Christianity have made little progress in Belgian territory.

The history of the Congo during the first ten years of the twentieth century is one of the saddest and most revolting pages of modern history. Were it not for the fact that it has so essential a part in the study of European colonial problems in Africa, one would gladly pass it over in silence. For at the present moment the wrongs and sufferings of Belgium have awakened the indignation and sympathy of the whole world. Neutral nations may be divided in their attitude toward many things the Allies are fighting for and hope to win. But they are united in their desire to see the Belgians restored to independence, and compensated for what they have endured and are enduring. But one who undertakes to set forth a historical record, especially when it is his object to establish facts and principles that must serve as a guide for the solution of problems which the near future is going to bring into the limelight, cannot allow himself to be swayed by sentimental or partisan considerations.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the convention of 1890 between Belgium and the Congo Free State was about to expire. The question of annexation was raised in Belgium, *and in the rest of*

the world that of the Belgians' fitness to be the stewards of so large and important a part of the African continent. There had long been a suspicion that Livingstone's dream of Central Africa for Christ had been superseded by the actuality of Central Africa for rubber, and that European penetration of the Dark Continent, far from bringing civilization and happiness to the natives, had brought them barbarism and misery. In 1901, while the press of Brussels was discussing the conflict between King Leopold and Belgian politicians over annexation, the London press was full of statements of English travelers about scandalous management, tribal troubles, and coercion of natives by traders and Congo officials. In 1902, Morel's book, *The Affairs of West Africa*, brought the agitation in England to such a point that the British Foreign Office sounded the signatories of the Berlin Act as to the advisability of a common move to put an end to the maladministration of the Congo Free State. Failing to secure agreement among the Powers, the British Government in 1903 decided to act independently, and made strong diplomatic representations at Brussels. Belgium was told that this action was prompted not by tales of travelers and missionaries, but by reports from British consuls, one corroborating the other, in such a fashion that the evidence could not be controverted.

The Belgian public took this move in very bad part. There was a strong feeling throughout Belgium that England's motive was the desire to appropriate the fruit of the work which had converted the Congo into a rich domain. Discoveries of gold

had just been reported from the Congo basin. The analogy emphasized by the Belgians between this coincidence and the British treatment of the Transvaal Boers makes very curious reading now, and goes to show how Belgium, just as Russia and France, have awakened only recently—when it was their interest to do so—to the fact that the British are champions of liberty and right and the freedom of small nationalities. In fact, one can find less than ten years ago editors of serious Belgian newspapers declaring that Germany *par excellence* of all the Powers was free from suspicion of interestedness in her dealings with small nations! All the Belgian parties, with the exception of the Socialists, concurred in supporting King Leopold's management of the Congo Free State. In the face of indubitable testimony of horrible cruelties and barbarity of Belgian officials, the Chamber voted by ninety-one to thirty-five the following motion: "The Chamber, confiding, in agreement with the Government, in the normal and progressive development of the Congo Free State, under the ægis of the King, passes to the order of the day."

In February, 1904, the British Foreign Office published the report of the investigation made at its command by Mr. Casement, consul at Boma. Mr. Casement said that the Congo Free State had failed to govern according to the provisions of the Berlin Act, that the officials were deficient in their control of subordinates, that the suffering of the natives, through the unchecked commercial greed of the Europeans, was terrible beyond words. Mr. Case-

ment had the advantage of being able to make a comparison of present with former conditions from previous personal knowledge of the country. In one district where he had seen five thousand people in 1887, there were less than six hundred in 1903. Towns and villages on Lake Mantumba had diminished sixty to seventy per cent. in ten years. In six months on the Momboya River the lowest estimate of people killed or mutilated by having their right hand cut off was six thousand, and this did not include the children, whom the soldiers were instructed to kill with the butt of their rifles so as not to waste cartridges.

One loses all patience with the blind partisans who declare to-day that subsequent events have proved the falsity of this report, simply because Mr. Casement, afterwards Sir Roger Casement, conspired against the British in Ireland, and was hanged as a traitor. None who ever came in contact with Sir Roger Casement—whether they agreed with him on the Irish question or not—can possibly impugn the sincerity of his motives, or regard him in any other light than as a patriot of unimpeachable character. Like Battista and Sauro, whom the Austrians recently executed and whom the Italians are mourning, Sir Roger was a victim of the inevitable forces that have been awakened during the present transformation of the world. But even if one throws out the Casement report, what is he to do with the memorandum of Lord Cromer, published by the British Government at the same time? When Lord Cromer visited the Upper Nile early in 1903, he saw the horror

of Belgian rule with his own eyes. He declared that the population of the Belgian bank of the Nile was practically extinct, that the Belgians so were hated and feared that no Belgian officer could move outside of the settlements without a strong guard, that the natives fled from the Belgian officials, that the Belgian soldiers were allowed full liberty to plunder and rarely made payment for supplies. To quote exactly the opinion of Lord Cromer, I give the conclusion of his observations in his own words: "It appears to me that the facts which I have stated afford sufficient evidence of the spirit which animates the Belgian administration, if indeed it can be called administration. The Government, as far as I could judge, is conducted almost exclusively on commercial principles, and even judged by that standard, it would appear that those principles are somewhat short-sighted."

In the debate in the House of Commons on the Casement and Cromer reports, many members insisted that England was bound, by her signature attached to the Berlin Act, to intervene, and one member (Lord Edmund Fitzmorris) believed that the Belgian reply to the British representations justified naval action against Boma. But what Government in the history of the world has ever intervened by force to honor its signature to a treaty *except when its own interests were vitally at stake*?[1] Sir

[1] One searches history in vain for a single precedent of the action that political opponents of President Wilson declared *he was bound by The Hague Convention to take* when Germany violated Belgian neutrality. I wrote at the time, and have since written *and still*

Edward Grey, who was then of the Opposition, supported the policy of the Government on the floor of the House of Commons, and agreed that Great Britain could act only in common with all the Powers. He said that the Berlin Act ought to be revised.

Indignation in Belgium over the Casement and Cromer reports and the House of Commons debate was even greater than in the previous year. The Belgian public persisted in believing that the British were not at all moved by "the fair fame of European civilization at stake," as Lord Percy had said. They scouted the cruelty charges. They denied *in toto* Lord Cromer's observations, and believed that England wanted to grab the Congo as she had grabbed the Transvaal and the Orange Free State.

Another book written by Mr. Morel, called *King Leopold's Rule in Africa*, proved from comparing the value of exports and imports that there was no fair trade between natives and their task-masters. From 1898 to 1902 considerably over thirty-five million dollars of exports, chiefly rubber, were offset by only seventeen million dollars of imports. The figures of 1903 showed a worse exploitation: exports nearly eleven million dollars and imports less than four million three hundred thousand dollars. As much was being imported for construction and devel-

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believe, that it would have been a great and wise move, for the sake of humanity, if Mr. Wilson had protested. But that he was *bound* to protest is nonsense. The statement that he brought dishonor and shame upon the United States by not protesting, unless made by an ignorant man or a man unaccustomed to think, is hysteria pure and simple.

opment purposes and for the use of Europeans, what did the natives, who were paid in goods, receive in exchange for the rubber they brought in? The cynical and heartless exploitation of the natives could be possible only through the connivance of the Belgian officials. It was a more serious question than that of a weak and incapable administration. The provisions of the international agreement by which King Leopold had been entrusted with the Congo Free State were ignored. There was not even the pretense of living up to them.

Public opinion throughout the world was now so thoroughly aroused that a Commission of Inquiry, with unlimited powers, was appointed, composed of a high Belgian Magistrate, the President of the Court of Appeal in Boma, and a Swiss. Its report, issued in November, 1905, after the Government had braced up the administration as a result of the recent disclosures, emphasized the suppression of slave trade, cannibalism, and human sacrifices, the extensive establishment of railways, steamers, and telegraph, and the wonderful development of Leopoldville as a trading center, and remarked that the Congo villages "recalled seaside towns in Europe, with their schools and hospitals." On the other hand, there were abuses, certain "unfortunate populations" being subjected to forcible porterage of enormous burdens. They were "menaced with partial destruction." There was oppression in the collection of rubber, although it had been much reduced in the King's private domain. Female hostages were imprisoned when villages did not bring in the stipu-

lated amount of rubber; defaulters were lashed; black sentinels were placed over rubber gatherers; and military attacks—by Government troops—on defaulting villages were reported officially as if they were expeditions into an enemy's country. Some companies, which held extensive concessions, were openly denounced. By "defaulter" is meant a native who does not bring in the amount of rubber arbitrarily allotted to him.

The sum and substance of the report of the Commission is identical with that of Casement and other British consuls and of travelers and missionaries, to wit: The Congo Free State allowed the natives of Central Africa, in defiance of the obligations undertaken at the time of the constitution of the country, to be held in slavery worse than anything they had ever known. Not only did the Government countenance the compulsion and oppression practiced by the companies who held concessions and in the King's private domain, but they aided in putting down "rebellions" when the natives arose in desperation against their white task-masters; or refused, without violence, to work as hard as they were asked to; or even were unable, through lack of rubber, to find the amount imposed upon them. The natives were allowed to be tortured and maimed and slaughtered wholesale.

King Leopold, upon the publication of the report, said that from the beginning his motive in Africa had been philanthropic rather than commercial, that he was glad "abuses" had been exposed, and that he intended to appoint a new commission to devise

practical measures for carrying out the recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry for reforming the administration and ameliorating the lot of the natives whose interest he had always had at heart. There was little faith in King Leopold's sincerity, and in the desire of the Belgian Government and the will of the Belgian people to put an end to the scandal. When concessions were granted to American syndicates, it was interpreted as an effort on the part of the King to anticipate interference from the United States Government.

On December 4, 1907, the Belgian Government presented to the Chamber a treaty between King Leopold and Belgium, ceding the Congo Free State to Belgium. After some modifications the treaty was accepted by the Chamber and the Senate in the summer of 1908. Belgium took over the Congo, agreeing to pay allowances to Princess Clementine and Prince Albert and ten million dollars to the King in fifteen annual payments,[1] but refused to be responsible for the Congo Free State debt of nearly twenty-three million dollars. At the same time, the status of the colony was established by a

[1] The sum guaranteed to King Leopold and his successors was to be spent "for the benefit of the Congo," and the allowances to Princess Clementine and Prince Albert to cease on the marriage of the former and the accession of the latter. In the original treaty, King Leopold had made unacceptable reservations about the way the revenues of the Crown domains were to be spent. He wanted to establish, at the expense of the Congo, a sort of combined Rockefeller and Carnegie Foundation, for the promotion of scientific knowledge and the good of the inhabitants of Belgium and the Congo, which would have been a serious drain on the resources of the new colony.

special law, and provision made for its government. Europe was faced with a *fait accompli*. But did not the signatory powers have to recognize the validity of this transfer? In 1885 they had constituted *a free and independent state, and guaranteed its perpetual neutrality*.

The British Government published a parliamentary paper on November 1st, by which Sir Edward Grey is shown to have stated the unwillingness of Great Britain to recognize the annexation until assurances were given concerning the future. She had neighboring territories, which could be affected by a continuance of weak and unjust government in the Congo. *The government of the Congo Free State had been notoriously different from that of all contiguous colonies for many years*. Belgium was pressed for definite assurances with regard to native rights and commercial privileges of other nations in the Congo. On December 23d, the London newspapers contained a memorandum, signed by the most prominent men in England, expressing approval of Sir Edward Grey's stand and declaring that Great Britain must insist that Belgium give a definite guarantee for the assurance of native rights in land and in collection of forest produce.

In sharp contrast to the British attitude, Germany recognized immediately the transfer. Foreign Secretary von Schoen told the Reichstag on January 23, 1909, that Germany had been the first of all the Powers to recognize the transfer of the Congo to Belgium, and that though her acquiescence to the annexation did not imply approval of existing con-

ditions, Germany assumed, and was convinced, that under Belgian rule a cleansing process would ensue. Herr von Schoen stated explicitly that Germany had not considered herself entitled by treaty to interfere, as Great Britain had asked her to join in doing, to secure the introduction of Congo reforms. He gave an outline of the two treaties (that with the international Congo Association and the Congo Articles in the Berlin Conference Act), and showed that the signatory Powers had no right to a voice in the matter. In Belgium Germany's attitude was deeply appreciated.

During 1909 the United States and Great Britain continued to correspond with the Belgian Government, maintaining in common that the annexation could not be recognized until definite guarantees were given on the subject of the exploitation of natives. But Belgium took her cue from Austria-Hungary's recent action in Bosnia and Herzegovina. International agreements are not worth the paper they are written on. The transfer was celebrated at Antwerp by a colonial festival. King Leopold made a speech in which he was silent on the native question, but held up glowingly the commercial advantages to Belgium, urged the development of the merchant marine, and invited capitalists to take up concessions in the Congo. At that very moment, the Socialists in the Chamber exposed the fact that one of the first decrees of the new Colonial Minister was to impress twenty-six hundred natives for railway construction. The Colonial Minister justified forced labor on the ground of urgency and said that the

natives had no reason to complain, as the railway would be useful to them as well as to Belgium. His position was endorsed by the Chamber.

Belgian promises were still not believed in England. Sir Edward Grey declared that Great Britain would never have recognized the Congo Free State at all, if she had known what it was going to become, and that she would not now recognize it until she was sure that conditions would be radically reformed. But when it was suggested several months later that the British navy blockade the mouth of the Congo as a protest against the annexation, Sir Edward was frank in stating that allowing Belgium to rule the country was the ultimate solution. All the British wanted was a practical expression of willingness on the part of the Belgians to act decently in the Congo. When I say "the British," I mean not merely the Government but enlightened public sentiment, which in this matter dictated the Government's policy irrespective of international political consideration. On November 19, 1909, the demonstration at Albert Hall must have been a warning to Belgium that a solution of the Congo question was necessary, if good relations were to be maintained. The Albert Hall demonstration was presided over by the Primate, assisted by nine bishops, leading nonconformists, many peers, and about fifty members of Parliament. The Primate and the Bishop of Oxford expressed faith in the good intentions of the Belgian people, but denounced in most unqualified terms the administration, the ill will, the bad faith, and the atrocities in the Congo, declaring that King Leopold was per-

sonally and beyond any doubt responsible for them. The Bishop of London formulated the British demands: ill treatment of natives must cease, land be restored to them, proper soldiers and police substituted for the rubber-collecting bullies and assassins, "hostage houses" done away with, the method proposed for abolishing taxes explained, decimation of natives stopped, and the promises made at the time of annexation immediately fulfilled.

It is well to remind those who are arguing to-day (and there are many of them) that in continuing the Congo agitation after the Belgian annexation the British public was imposed upon and misled by prejudiced reports of missionaries and by the report of a now discredited traitor, of the testimony of Casement's successor at Boma. Colonel Thesiger reported officially to the Foreign Office at the beginning of 1909 that the whole system of Belgian taxation was fraudulent, and that the violation of laws and the heart-rending atrocities of the rubber collecting *were due to the wilful blindness, if not to the actual connivance, of the Belgian officials.* During the same year, in October, the native chiefs sent a memorandum to the Belgian Colonial Minister, praying for relief from taxation. They could obtain no rubber, and received no return for the taxes exacted of them. British prospectors and traders were prevented from operating in the Katanga Province. The Belgian Socialist leader, Vandervelde, made a journey to the Congo to defend two American missionaries, who had been arrested on the charge of libeling one of the big rubber companies. M.

Vandervelde secured their acquittal, and when he returned to Brussels, he gave testimony on the floor of the Chamber of the arbitrary exploitation, torturing and killing of natives, and the use of armed sentries over rubber-collecting slaves. All the Colonial Minister could answer was that he hoped the charges were exaggerated.

The death of Leopold II. on December 7, 1909, brought some ray of hope that the people of Belgium would have an awakening of conscience, and attempt to do away with the wholesale butchery and slavery in Africa that brought them as a civilized and Christian nation to shame before the whole world. Leopold's successor, the present King Albert, had visited the Colony during the year before his accession. Starting at Katanga, which he reached by way of Cape Town and Rhodesia, Prince Albert had walked fifteen hundred miles through the Congo forests. He was not allowed to see what was going on in the Congo, but he heard enough during his journey to make him dissatisfied with existing conditions. The passing of the Congo's evil genius Leopold gave Belgium a chance. But it is very interesting to note here that the Roman Catholic hierarchy of Belgium, who in 1914 appealed to the Vatican and the whole world against German cruelties in Belgium, "stood pat" only five years before, in the face of irrefutable evidence of the death and torture and maiming of many times the number of innocent women and children that the Germans had to their record in 1914. All parties and all circles in Belgium, with the exception of the Socialists, had supported

King Leopold and defended the Congo administration.

For the first three years of King Albert's reign, Great Britain still refused to recognize the annexation. In 1910, the Congo Reform Association and the Aborigines Protection Society, whose agents were touring extensively, convinced the Foreign Office that forced labor had not been abolished. In 1911, consular investigation showed that conditions were improved in many districts, but that the Belgian administration was still far from satisfactory. There was the controversy, also, over the question of freedom of trade. Sir Edward Grey doubted the desire of the Congo authorities to observe treaty obligations in this matter. The revocation, however, of the charters of three of the largest concession companies at the beginning of 1912 showed that Belgium was at last awakening to the necessity of abolishing monopolies and throwing the Congo open to free trade.

The last outstanding question between Belgium and the public opinion of the world was that of native right to land ownership. In this matter, Germany stood with Great Britain. Concessions to companies gave private individuals rights over large tracts of land which superseded preexisting native rights. This was a violation not only of elementary principles of justice, but also of a clearly formulated stipulation of the Berlin Act. By what right, other than that of the possession of superior brute force, is a man's land taken from him and the owner compelled to work for the interest of another by terms of

a unilateral agreement imposed upon him without his consent? In the old days, the natives of Central Africa suffered from occasional slave-raiding parties, which would take a few hundred at a time into captivity. Europeans abolished slave-trading—in the name of Christ and humanity—but they substituted a slavery far more degrading.[1] Not an occasional few hundred were victims, but *all* the people *all* the time were reduced to slavery. The companies answered the charge of the Aborigines Society, that native rights were being violated in the leased areas, by the statement that their concessions tended "to the uplifting of the native and his betterment." They professed the most benevolent intentions towards the people they were oppressing!

In June, 1913, after ten years of constant agitation, the victory appeared to have been won. For Sir Edward Grey announced in June that consular reports from the Congo made it no longer justifiable or expedient to withhold recognition of the annexation. Arrangements were being made to grant free land to natives for cultivation, and Belgium had

[1] I say Europeans instead of Belgians, because this evil was by no means confined to the Congo. At this very time it was under investigation in the French, British and German West African colonies, especially in connection with the cocoa and palm-oil industries. Violation of native land rights and forced labor go hand in hand—inseparably—in almost every concession in what is known as Protectorate areas. If you take the black man's land to develop it, you must use him as the laborer. If he does not want to work on your terms, you make him. Hence the abuses. It was on the ground of violation of the Berlin Act that Germany in 1913 protested against the extensive concession granted by Liberia to the British firm of Lever, the soap manufacturers.

accomplished much in improving her administration. The personal knowledge and influence of King Albert, the pressure of the Belgian Socialist Party, and the increasing revelation of the richness of the Congo basin were the decisive factors in the work of reform. One searches in vain to find, outside of the Socialist organization, a campaign for Congo reform in Brussels and Antwerp during these ten years. The Belgians seemed to have no sense of responsibility toward the Congo, and the stories of the atrocities of which their officials and soldiers were guilty, supported though they were by incontrovertible testimony, made no impression upon them.

Fortunately, unchecked exploitation by concession companies and maladministration of officials is not the whole story of the Congo since 1900. As was indicated in the report of the Commission of Inquiry, there is another and brighter side of Belgian activity. In May, 1902, an agreement was signed in Brussels for the extension of the Cape to Cairo railway from the northern border of Rhodesia to Lake Kasala. It was the idea to have the Rhodesian line, which was to pass through Katanga, join in this region a line from Benguela, an Atlantic port in Portuguese West Africa. Rhodesia would then have a much shorter connection with the sea coast, and a northern route would be opened up through the Congo valley across to Lake Albert and up the Nile. At this time the Reichstag had refused to vote the credits for the extension of the line from Dar-es-Salaam to Lake Tanganyika, and it was believed that the German line would not be built. The line from the south into Katanga Pro-

vince of the Belgian Congo reached, in 1912, Elizabethville, only a few miles from the Rhodesian frontier, but over one hundred and sixty miles from the point at which it enters Belgian territory. It had been surveyed north to Bukama, and construction work was being rapidly pushed in 1914.

Progress has been made also in opening up the Congo valley south from Stanleyville, where the river makes its sharp bend, through the heart of Central Africa, into Katanga. In September, 1906, the railway from Stanleyville to Ponthierville, a stretch where the Congo is not navigable, was completed. The Congo from Ponthierville to Kindu is navigable. From Kindu to Kongolo two hundred and twenty miles of railway have been built. A glance at the map will show that these are important sections in the Cape to Cairo railway. From Stanleyville to Lake Albert Edward the survey was completed in 1911, and an agreement reached to connect the Katanga railway with the Portuguese frontier, and the Congo with Lake Tanganyika. The latter line, because of its importance in the campaign against the Germans, was completed in March, 1915. There are also railway lines from Matadi (near Boma) to Leopoldville,[1] and from Boma to Tshela.

[1] "Leopoldville, on the opposite side of the Congo River from Brazzaville, is less pretty and picturesque; but one feels there more activity, or an activity more concentrated, and much more order and method. The state is proprietor of almost all the land, and of almost all the houses, as well as of the camp on the outskirts, where is found grouped the entire black population. The Belgian line from Matadi to Kinchassa is a narrow-gauge railway over the mountains. It takes two days to go the 500 kilometers. Its construc-

As the Congo from Leopoldville to Stanleyville is navigable, communication by rail and steamer is now practically complete all the way across the continent, and from the heart of Central Africa south for nearly two thousand three hundred miles to Cape Town.

Unstinted credit is due to Belgian engineers and Belgian officials for vision, for energy, and for ability to surmount seemingly unsurmountable difficulties in making these railways possible. There has always been, on the part of the Belgian authorities, wholehearted cooperation with British and Germans in opening up Central Africa, and the three states have worked together, without too much thought of selfish advantage, in furthering transportation schemes. In March, 1914, the Colonial Minister, in a remarkable speech presenting the Congo budget, admitted that the completion of the German line from Dares-Salaam to Lake Tanganyika was going to modify transport conditions by attracting traffic that would otherwise go west through Belgian territory all the way to the Atlantic. But he believed that there was room for all, and that the influence of German activity on Belgian railway plans was much exaggerated. He thought, on the other hand, that Belgium would ultimately draw advantages from the increased means

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tion was to cost five million dollars: it has cost thirteen millions. Commenced under great obstacles, it has admirably succeeded. Travelers and freight increase each year; and the company is able to lessen tariffs, which are still very high." M. Felicien Challaye, a member of the de Brazza investigating party, writing in 1905. See *Le Congo Français* (Paris, 1909), pp. 21–2, 28.

of transportation in all directions. He submitted new railway projects for over two thousand miles of interior lines.

Aside from slight difficulties with Great Britain over the Bahr-el-Ghazal and Uganda frontiers, and the evacuation of the Lado Enclave, Belgium has worked in harmony and in a friendly spirit with France, Great Britain, Germany, and Portugal in the establishment of frontiers. Too much praise cannot be given to the members of the frontier commissions everywhere in Africa for the completion, without friction, of tasks that are little appreciated and talked about, though arduous and perilous. How often have frontier commissions had to make their own maps, decide on questions that may in the future be of tremendous importance, and at the same time be ever on the alert to defend themselves against hostile savages and keep in check jungle and swamp fevers!

Belgium has a rich possession in the Congo, especially since the solving of means of transport has done away with dependence upon native porters and has made possible the development of mining. In the Katanga region, copper and tin and diamonds have been discovered. In many valleys of the Congo tributaries there is gold. The palm oil and palm nut industries are developing encouragingly. In view of the rapid decrease of forest produce, this means economic salvation for the Congo. For concession companies, knowing that they had to make hay while the sun was shining and as indifferent to the future as if they had been American lumber companies, deliberately killed the goose that laid the

golden egg. In 1912, forest produce fell off nearly ten per cent., and in 1913, the export of rubber decreased fifty per cent. There are left in the world few virgin territories. It is a pity that governments have followed the line of least resistance in the development of new territories, farming them out on concessions, and have not waked up to the fact that private corporations have no interest in the commonweal, until it is too late to save much of what might have been conserved. The days of chartered companies, with a free hand to milk dry vast regions, are over. Belgium in the Congo, like other European nations in their colonial possessions, is waking up to the fact that the State alone feels its responsibility towards unborn generations, and that only by governmental restrictions, enforced by capable governmental supervision, can individuals and corporations be prevented from sacrificing the future for immediate gain. The rubber industry in the Congo illustrates this principle perfectly. Big dividends to-day, for to-morrow our leases may be revoked. The devil take the future.

Belgian experiences in administration and finance in the Congo have not been very different from those of Germany and Italy in their early days as colonizing states. An official class, accustomed to deal with colonial problems, cannot be created in a generation. Pioneers make many mistakes. Socialist parties—every Opposition in fact—use colonial blunders and mismanagement, real or fancied, for attacks upon the Government, especially in connection with budget estimates. In Belgium as in Germany the Socialists

have been the voice of conscience. We have already mentioned Vandervelde's courage in speaking the unwelcome truth after his visit to the Congo. Time and again he and other Socialists criticized in the Chamber what they considered unjust decrees of the Colonial Minister, and exposed abuses. But the Socialists, while performing this useful service, are obstructionists in money matters, and oppose consistently "throwing good money after bad" in colonial enterprises. They oppose also military service abroad. There was a howl when Belgium sent nearly four thousand soldiers for Congo duty in 1909, and the deficit revealed in the 1910 budget added to the complication of the British attitude. As far as revenue goes, things have not been improved. Just before the war the revelation of a deficit of nearly five million dollars in the 1914 estimates made difficult getting the ear of the Chamber for railway grants. The customs yield of the Belgian Congo is not much larger than that of Sierra Leone, with one-thirtieth of the area and one-fifteenth of the Congo population.

Although reforms have been sincerely effected, Belgium has still the same great problem of colonial administration that France and Portugal face in Africa. These states possess enormous territories, which are not as well administered and developed as they might be *because they have not the surplus population able and willing to undertake the task.* Before the war, the Belgian Congo was run by a staff of Europeans of many nationalities, some of them adventurers of the worst type. Even among the high officials, many were not Belgian. They were in the

Congo only because they saw there an opportunity to have influence and to make money that was denied to them in their countries of origin.

Belgium has given valuable assistance in the long two years campaign against German East Africa. I have understood, on good authority, that she has been able to train, equip, officer, and put into the field twenty thousand native troops.

During the first year of the European War, there was much discussion about the future of the Congo, and it is certain that Germany intends to use her hold on Belgium, if she is able to maintain it until negotiations for peace begin, as a trump card in the readjustment of European spheres in Africa. Should she be successful, it would mean the realization of German dreams of a path from east to west across the continent. The Germans have not hesitated to insinuate that the great sums loaned to Belgium by the Allies, especially by Great Britain, would be secured by Anglo-French economic, if not political, control of the Congo. In order to make clear the intentions of the Allies, and to set at rest the minds of the Belgians and allay suspicions of neutrals, the French Minister handed to the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Havre on April 29th, 1916, the following declaration:

"Referring on one hand to the agreements with Belgium of April 23–24, 1884, February 5, 1895, and December 23, 1908, and on the other hand to the note handed on September 19, 1914, to the Belgian Government by the Minister of Great Britain on the subject of the Congo as well as to the declaration of

the Powers guarantors of the independence and neutrality of Belgium on February 14, 1916, the Government of the French Republic declares that it will lend its aid to the Belgian Government at the time of the peace negotiations with the view of maintaining the Belgian Congo in its present territorial status and of having attributed to this colony a special indemnity for the losses incurred in the course of the war."

On the same day, the British and Russian representatives at Sainte Adresse stated that their Governments adhered to this declaration, and the Italian and Japanese representatives that Italy and Japan approved the French note.

CHAPTER IX

THE FIRST GERMAN COLONY: SOUTHWEST AFRICA

GERMAN Southwest Africa occupies more than a quarter of the area of the continent south of the Zambesi River. Its coast line, running from Portuguese West Africa to the Orange River, which is the boundary with Cape Colony, is, with the exception of the Spanish Rio de Oro, the most barren and forbidding littoral of all Africa. It was formerly known as Damaraland in the north and Namaqualand in the south, and was as completely ignored in the early days of European colonization as Bechuanaland and the Kalahari Desert, which form its interior boundary. The British neglected to proclaim a protectorate over territories which had so little promise. They awakened to what they had missed only when Germany anticipated them.

In 1883, an enterprising Bremen merchant acquired from a native chief the southern portion of this territory from Angra Pequena to the Orange River and called it Lüderitzland after himself. The following year Germany's entrance into Africa—and into colonial politics—was announced by Bismarck's telegram to the German Consul at Cape Town:

"According to a communication from Herr Lüderitz, the British Colonial officials doubt whether his acquisitions north of the Orange River can claim German protection. You will declare officially that he and his settlement are under the protection of the Empire."

The German flag was rapidly extended north along the coast to Portuguese territory at the mouth of the Cunene River, which is some distance beyond Cape Frio. Between 1884 and 1890 the Germans penetrated to the desert of Kalahari. A boundary was established with Great Britain on the edge of the Bechuanaland Protectorate, and in 1890 the Germans made good their claim in the extreme north to a narrow strip which gave them access to the Zambesi River not far west of Victoria Falls.

The occupation of Togoland, Kamerun, and German East Africa followed that of Southwest Africa in less than a year.

Many English writers, and particularly the few who have written on the German African colonies since August 1, 1914, have described the German penetration in Southwest Africa and elsewhere as the result of contemptible trickery and bluff. They try to prove that the whole history—from the diplomatic and political side, and even partially from the economic side—of Germany in Africa is a disgraceful chapter of brutality and failure. The heat of conflict has led them to distort facts and to express hopelessly biased judgments. It is unfortunate, at a moment when the question of the future of the German colonies needs a dispassionate attitude, that sources

of information in the English language should be so one-sided.[1]

There is much to deplore and condemn in German methods of colonization in Africa. But there is no more to condemn in German methods than in French and Italian, and not as much as in Belgian. The results of thirty years are not encouraging, if one compares them with the results obtained by Great Britain during the same period. It must always be borne in mind, however, that Germany, Italy, and Belgium are new hands at colonizing. It is as unfair to compare German colonial administration with British colonial administration as it would be to compare British General Staff officers with German General Staff officers. As for the methods by which colonies are acquired, Germany has done nothing, in bringing territories under her flag, that has not been done by every other colonizing Power. The European colonial game has always been one of grab when you can and how you can, and the last word has *invariably* been to him who was the strongest. The

[1] "In something less than a year Germany had intrigued, lied, and tricked Britain into acknowledging her sovereignty over 1,000,000 square miles of Africa, or an area about nine times as large as the whole of the United Kingdom, with a total native population of nearly 14,000,000."—A. F. Calvert, *German African Colonies* (London, 1916), p. xiii. of preface. Mr. Calvert claims that all the territories were virtually British, and that their chiefs had begged for the establishment of a British Protectorate. He pretends that the native population of the German colonies welcomed the British recently as deliverers, in sharp contrast to "the Boers, converted by British rule to be its enthusiastic supporters," who defended South Africa against the German invasion.

title to possession of the territories held by European states outside of Europe is a title won by force.

German development has been hampered from the very first days by the British possession of Walfisch Bay, the only natural port along the coast. The two important watercourses that reach the seaboard in German Southwest Africa empty into Walfisch Bay, and England is able (as the events of 1914 proved) to dominate the coast without difficulty from this important strategic point. The harbor has good anchorage, and is sheltered from the most frequent winds. The British have never been able to make anything out of Walfisch Bay for themselves. By continuing to hold it, they have compelled the Germans to spend enormous sums of money in creating the port of Swakopmund in a far less favorable locality. It is a striking example of a dog-in-the-manger policy that a more liberal and wiser attitude towards German extra-European expansion should have prompted Great Britain to abandon long ago. Walfisch Bay is one of the pin-pricks that have developed in Germany the spirit which is now taking terrible vengeance upon the world.

Absence of water from perennial rivers and a limited rainfall give Southwest Africa a soil that makes agriculture exceedingly difficult. In dry years the rivers cannot be depended upon. Irrigation is so costly that the prospect of the colony becoming agricultural is very slim indeed. But the country is covered with a grass that possesses unusual nourishing properties, and there is sufficient water for cattle in almost every district. The only

way to utilize the land to advantage is by stock-raising. Dr. Rohrbach, who looked over the country for the German Government in order to see what the prospects of systematic settlement were, declared that about five hundred thousand out of the eight hundred thousand square kilometers could be used as grazing land. This means five thousand good farms. On April 1, 1913, there were over twelve hundred farms in private hands.

The Government has done much to encourage stock-raising by importing bulls and cows, by paying the cost of transporting Australian sheep, and by organizing a splendid veterinary service. During the years immediately before the war there was a remarkable increase in cattle and horses and ostriches.

In 1913, the Government inaugurated a Land Bank, with a capital of two and one half million dollars, to lend money at easy rates to farmers for the purchase of stock and for tiding them over bad years. The system is worked out to the very smallest detail, and shows the German genius for finance. Advances, which are made up to fifty per cent., are secured on the value of the property. The arrangement for looking after existing mortgages satisfies the creditors. From the Land Bank money can be obtained at two per cent. lower rate than from other sources.

Dr. Rohrbach's hope that there might ultimately be five thousand prosperous stock-raising farms in the colony—and this was the estimate if every available acre was used—would not make the tremendous sacrifices of Germany, both of blood and treasure, seem worth while, were it not for good

prospects of mining exploitation. The country has been frequently gone over by geologists and prospectors. There is gold at a number of places. Rich gold-bearing lodes have not yet been discovered. What ore there is, is of the same low grade that has made mining development on the Transvaal Rand possible only by companies with large capital. Copper had just passed the experimental stage before the war, and was becoming a valuable export. In the first six months of 1913, copper was exported to the value of three-quarters of a million dollars—a substantial increase over the same period in 1912. Copper development has been started on an admirable scientific and financial basis. Lead and silver are found with copper. Smelting is done on the ground. Electric power is used. The by-products are carefully saved. Tin has been discovered not far from Swakopmund, and over a hundred tons were exported in the first six months of 1913. If the industry grows as in Nigeria, it ought very soon, with the short railway haul, to become a valuable asset.

But by far the richest find in German Southwest Africa is the discovery of diamond fields. Herr Lüderitz went to Angra Pequena in the first place for minerals and with no thought of agricultural development. The gold and diamond discoveries in British South Africa led him to hope for a rich reward. Neither gold nor diamonds came to him, or to those who followed him. The fortunate man was the German railway superintendent of the Lüderitz-Auas railway. He believed that there were diamonds in the neighborhood of Lüderitz Bay, and kept

talking about it until people thought he was crazy. He instructed his employees to have their eyes open while they were digging the railway bed, and to bring him curious stones which they did not know. In April, 1908, his hopes were rewarded. A native brought in several diamonds. The exploitation began immediately. Within eighteen months the whole of the coast line to the Orange River had been prospected. Companies were formed and another railway was built. In five years the diamond industry became the most important in the colony, and a source of revenue that was a godsend to the administration. The diamonds are small, but of exceptionally good quality, and a good half of them clear white.

A railway was constructed from Kolamanskop to Bogenfels through the diamond country in 1913. Most of the mines and settlements are lighted with electricity from Lüderitzbucht. Nowhere in Africa are mining enterprises and railways equipped and running as well as in the German colonies.

The Government originally took a royalty on diamonds. It was changed in 1912 to a tax on profits amounting to about forty per cent. The change shows the acumen of a Government in which brains is the essential factor. Under the old royalty system the miners picked up the stones that were easiest to obtain. For the royalty made no distinction between the stone found by hazard and that which cost a lot of money to unearth. Taxation on profits encourages the mining companies to develop consistently all their fields. The Germans saw that if the industry

was to become a permanent source of wealth to the Government, it was imperative to discard the royalty system.

The profit that the Germans derive from the diamond industry is shown by the development in six years from less than forty thousand carats to nearly one million six hundred thousand carats. One mine alone produced over six hundred thousand carats in 1913. The German output during 1912 increased over the figures of the previous year, in proportion to the total output, twice as much as that of the South African Union.

Until 1892, when the German people first began to believe in colonies, Southwest Africa was exploited by companies, who held concessions and were partly subsidized by the Government. There were less than fifty soldiers in the colony, and the natives had no conception of a powerful German Empire. Government officials were very few, and were at the beck and call of the companies. The hinterland was not under administrative control, and absence of ports made coast communications difficult. Colonial history begins only with the twentieth century, when the British aggression against the Boer republics awakened interest in Germany. The Germans realized that they must develop the territories they held—or quit the game altogether. Over two million dollars was granted to Southwest Africa in 1901, and arrangements made to begin railway construction into Damaraland northwest from Swakopmund. The line was to have its terminus at Otavi, four hundred miles from Walfisch Bay. Another line,

already started directly inland from Swakopmund, was completed in 1902 as far as Windhoek, which is almost exactly in the center of the colony.

At this moment began the conflict in the Reichstag between the Radicals and the Imperialists, which extended over five years, *and which must be taken into account constantly in a study of German colonial expansion.* It was not until 1907, when the Colonial Office was established, after the question of colonial expansion had been referred to the electorate, that Germany can be said to have entered with a free hand and with parliamentary and popular support into the work of colonizing. When one criticizes German colonial administration, and tries to estimate the ability of the Germans to develop colonies, it is not fair to begin before 1907. The German nation and the German Government must be judged only by what has been accomplished since that date.

When the Government proposed to the Reichstag in 1902 to subsidize the immigration bureau established by the Colonial Society, the proposal was rejected. The Reichstag majority was unwilling to use state funds to encourage immigration to colonies that were unsuitable for European settlers. The argument of *Germans abroad living under the German flag* did not appeal at all. It was urged on the floor of the Reichstag that if emigrants were to be assisted, they ought to be directed to South America, and especially to southern Brazil. The subsidy proposal was made the occasion for a bitter attack upon the acquisition of the Spanish islands in the Pacific. There were less than three thousand five

hundred Europeans in the Protectorate in 1902, spread over a territory one and one-half times as large as the German Empire, and more than a thousand of these were not Germans. A serious question arose as to the future from the entry of a great many Boers who had trekked once more to escape the extension of British rule. Severe measures had to be taken to prevent the country from being overrun by Boer irreconcilables. If they were allowed to come in large numbers, they would undoubtedly soon be at loggerheads with the Germans and other Europeans.[1]

When the future of the German colonies was being seriously compromised, their existence, in fact, imperiled, by the radical attitude in Germany, an event happened in Southwest Africa that has changed the course of history. A revolt of Hottentots at Warmbad in December, 1903, resulted in the death of a

[1] Capital has since been made of the inhospitality of the German Government to the trekkers of 1902. I have looked into this question very carefully, and cannot see where the Germans acted in any other way than it was imperative for them at the moment to act. The Boers quickly outnumbered in some districts the German settlers. The very fact that they trekked was a proof that they were either an unsuccessful element at home, who had nothing to lose, or intractable to an extreme degree. The pastors with them immediately demanded a promise of education in the Taal language under much more liberal provisions than the Boers have obtained in South Africa. Many of them, demoralized perhaps by three years of undisciplined warfare in commandos, wandered about the country, killing game, cutting timber at will and wastefully, and pasturing their flocks over wide areas. Many wells were destroyed. What Germany insisted upon was only that the Boers should submit to the laws and regulations governing German settlers in the colony; and the same terms of land settlement were proposed to them as to colonists from Europe.

German officer and several non-commissioned officers and soldiers. During another native rising some settlers were massacred. In January, 1904, the Hereros began to murder settlers and destroy railway bridges and telegraph lines. In October the Witbois revolted. These events were due to the inevitable clash that comes in Africa when Europeans penetrate into the interior with their railways and their ideas of taxation and administrative control. Every nation that has attempted to colonize the interior of Africa has met with the same opposition. The wrongful treatment of natives by colonists and mining companies, who had obtained land by fraud and extortion and who were attempting to make the ousted natives work for the benefit of those who had ousted them, was frankly admitted in Berlin. This also has happened everywhere in Africa, when a government has parted with large areas of land on concession, and has not simultaneously organized an official supervision to protect native rights.

The mistake of the Germans was in the way they tried to put down the uprising. *Experience in colonial administration, and the presence in the colony of skilled administrators, might have saved all the trouble that followed.* It was decided to send out German troops, under the command of a general who knew nothing whatever about native fighting and native psychology. The German military system is presided over by an officer caste, whose arrogance robs it of tact and whose methods are abhorrent.

We have not space to go into the long and sad story of the war that lasted until the summer of 1907.

Instead of trying to conciliate the natives and organize the country administratively through the tribal chiefs, as Sir Frederick Lugard did so admirably in Nigeria during the same period, Lieutenant-General Trotha tried to "stamp out" the rebellion by frightfulness. He set a price on the heads of insurgent chiefs, and issued a proclamation menacing the natives with extermination if the insurrection continued. When this became known in Germany, a storm of indignation swept over the country, and Chancellor von Bülow was compelled to declare null and void the disgraceful proclamation. Von Trotha criticized the Chancellor's "weakness," and attributed the continued opposition of the Hereros to the repeal of his proclamation. He was removed from his command.[1] But the mischief was done. It had now become a life and death struggle.

More troops and more money were required as the result of von Trotha's stupendous folly. Germany now felt that the war against Hereros and Hottentots had to be seen through to the bitter end. This feeling was shared by all the Powers. For white supremacy throughout Africa was compromised. When von Trotha's successor passed through Johannesburg, Lord Selborne, the British High

[1] The German people felt that the honor of Germany had been compromised by von Trotha's conduct, but not so the military caste, of whom Emperor Wilhelm is the high priest. After von Trotha's return to Germany, the Kaiser awarded him the decoration "*Pour le Mérite.*" It is this contemptuous disregard of public opinion and the dictates of humanity, *tolerated by the nation which does not and cannot approve it*, that has alienated from Germany the sympathies of the world in the present war.

Commissioner for South Africa, at a public banquet wished him success, and spoke in emphatic terms of the community of interests between German and British in South Africa. Many Boers enlisted with the Germans, and the Cape Colony forces rendered valuable assistance by killing and capturing the natives who were forced to cross the border. When the war ended and peace was once more established, nearly twenty-five hundred Germans had been killed and half the Herero nation was dead. The Germans had to undertake a complete disarmament of the natives. There were sixteen thousand recalcitrant prisoners of war on their hands, each one a Toussaint Louverture, who knew many German Leclercs.

The war in Southwest Africa, unjustified in its origin and barbarous in the way it was conducted, has played, like the Boer War for Great Britain, an important part in colonial history, and marked the beginning of a new era in the history of Germany. Like the Boer War again, good came from evil. For it put the issue squarely before the Germans as to whether they intended to become a colonizing Power or not. It revealed to them the deficiencies and weakness of their administration up to that time, and the necessity of assuming heavy burdens if they were to build up an overseas empire. The year 1907, that saw the end of the rebellion, was the year of crisis with the Germans. The decision was in favor of colonization. Germany, freed of handicaps at home, was making rapid progress when the European conflagration of 1914 caused the temporary, if not permanent, disappearance of her colonial empire.

German Southwest Africa was radically transformed, root and branch, by the three and a half years of war. Administrative control, under civilian officers, superseded the old *régime* of private concessions and military posts. Railways that would have taken long to build (or might not have been constructed at all, because of lack of economic justification for putting up the funds), were built for military purposes, and left as a precious heritage to the colony. The advertisement from the struggle brought colonists who would not otherwise have been attracted. Then, suddenly, just when colonists and money were needed for consolidating the new era of peace, the discovery of diamonds was the *deus ex machina*.

In 1909, German colonists increased three hundred per cent., and the Government began to work hand in hand with the settlers to develop in every possible way the agricultural and mining resources of the colony. There were ten thousand Germans, exclusive of the army, in the colony in 1914.

At the outbreak of the war one thousand four hundred miles of railway, twenty-five hundred miles of telegraph line, and over four hundred miles of telephone line were the achievement of a decade. A cable touched at Swakopmund. The wireless stations—as the Allies found—were the last word in efficiency. The state had taken over the ownership of mines and railways, and farmed them out on leases. In the north the railway from Swakopmund to Otavi was extended in two branches to Tsumbel and Grootfontein. The southern railway formed a

semicircle in the interior, with its termini at Swakopmund and Angra Pequena. A branch of this line south through the Hottentot country had nearly reached the Orange River.

A crisis arose in 1910, the solution of which demonstrates the wisdom and foresight with which Germany has been treating colonial problems in recent years. Herr Ertzberger proposed to the Reichstag that the expenses of the Herero war be met by an extraordinary tax on the property of the colonists. Dr. Dernburg, Colonial Secretary, promptly replied that the military operations had been the fulfilment of the Empire's duty to protect people and property under the German flag, and that the charges, or the greater part of them, should fall upon the Empire. He showed that three-fourths of the inhabitants of the colony had gone out since the Herero campaign. Such a tax would not only be unfair to them, but would kill the interest that was just beginning to be taken in colonial settlement. After three days of debate, the Chancellor was asked to initiate legislation for the relief of the Imperial Treasury by taxing the settlers and companies who lived in the colony before the outbreak of the uprising. In March, 1911, the Colonial Office published a statement, containing a review of British colonial policy from 1767 to 1906, to prove that the taxation of possessions abroad was unwise, until the financial and economic position of the colonies made taxation justifiable and tolerable. As far as possible, the Empire should seek its compensation for the sums expended by the colonial budget in the development

of commerce with the colonies. Local colonial taxation should be determined by the colonists themselves and its proceeds used in the colonies.

German Southwest Africa was conquered in 1915 by the South African Union Army, and is under the British flag. Its future is being decided now on the battlefields of Europe, where British South Africans are fighting in the British Army to make the conquest permanent.

CHAPTER X

THE HERITAGE OF LIVINGSTONE AND RHODES

NYASALAND and Rhodesia are names written on the map of Africa by the sacrifice and the vision, the will and the courage, the devotion and the endurance of two men. The missionary, Livingstone, was thinking about the Kingdom of God, and the business man, Rhodes, was thinking about the Kingdom of Great Britain. But the former was not unmoved by worldly considerations: nor was the latter unmoved by philanthropic considerations. Livingstone cared very little about money and world fame: Rhodes cared a great deal about both. But missionary and promoter were at one in the desire to bring the blessings and not the curses of civilization to the natives of Central Africa, and in the belief that this could be accomplished better under the ægis of Great Britain than of any other Power. Obstacles, such as lack of maps and of knowledge of the interior, were nothing to the missionary who had devoted his life to blazing a path for the Cross. He was undaunted in the face of the hostility of tribes who knew not the white man and this white

man's mission, wild animals, fevers, and—by far the worst of all—solitude. Obstacles, such as the presence of the Boers on the road to the north, the territorial appetite of other Powers than Britain, the skepticism of those from whom the money had to be obtained, and the engineering difficulties of rivers, mountains, jungle, and swamp, were nothing to the promoter who had devoted his life to advancing the British flag by means of a railway from one end to the other of Africa. Both Livingstone and Rhodes were doers as well as dreamers. They were pioneers in fact and not in fancy. But, as we look back upon their life work, we see that their ability to fire the imagination of their fellow countrymen and to inspire others to join in the work they were doing has meant far more to South and Central Africa than their actual achievements.

The name of Livingstone is connected with Central Africa from the Zambesi to the Congo. But his great work was in the valleys of the Zambesi and Loangwa and Shiré and in the region west of Lake Nyasa. Nyasaland, where he was buried, is his particular country. Livingstonia, at the southern end of Lake Nyasa, perpetuates the missionary's name, and Blantyre, in the Shiré Highlands, his birthplace. The name of Livingstone has also been given to the town on the Zambesi, where the Cape to Cairo Railway crosses the great river, just east of Victoria Falls.

The name of Rhodes is borne by British territory in South-Central Africa north and south of the Zambesi River. Mashonaland and Matabeleland

are Southern Rhodesia; Marotseland is Northern Rhodesia; and the valleys of the Loangwa and Chambeze Rivers, and the little angle between the southern end of Lake Tanganyika, with the eastern side of Lake Mweru and the western and northern sides of Lake Bangweulu, are Northeastern Rhodesia.

The Nyasaland Protectorate is a narrow strip of territory running north and south. The northern portion touches German East Africa on the north and shuts off Rhodesia from Lake Nyasa the whole length of the lake. The southern half, south of the lake, is an enclave in Portuguese East Africa, extending along the valley of the Shiré River almost to the point where the Shiré empties into the Zambesi on its lowest navigable reach.

The Zambesi, from German to Portuguese territory, forms the division between Northern and Southern Rhodesia. Northeastern Rhodesia is almost separated from the other portions by projections of Belgian and Portuguese territory, which make Rhodesia as a whole look like an hourglass. Both east and west Rhodesia has Germany and Portugal for neighbors. Belgian Congo is on the north and the Transvaal and the desert on the south. German Southwest Africa penetrates in a narrow strip of land up to the Zambesi River, not far west of Victoria Falls and Livingstone, through which the Cape to Cairo Railway passes.[1]

After the present war there will be readjustment of frontiers, especially if the Allies are able to impose

[1] This was seized by Rhodesia in the early months of 1915.

their will upon Germany and if they do not intend to keep the faith with Portugal. But the frontiers of 1914 will always be a valuable historical record of how explorers and colonists and Government officials, with no knowledge of topography farther than their eyes could see, followed river valleys, and planted the flag of their countries wherever they happened to penetrate the unknown interior of Africa. Their controling idea was to keep clear the path back to the coast from which they had come.

Nyasaland has only eight hundred Europeans and four hundred Asiatics among a native population of a million spread over forty thousand square miles. It cannot be said, except in the Shiré Highlands in the extreme southern part of the protectorate around Blantyre, that Nyasaland is colonized at all. It is like Uganda and the Sudan and all the West African colonies—a country where the white man rules and trades, but where he does not settle. Strenuous attempts, since communications by railway and river with the Portuguese coast were projected and started, have been made to encourage European colonization. But from 1906 to 1914 the European population increased by only two hundred. Dysentery and malaria have proved too much for the whites.

In 1909, the Government of the Protectorate prohibited the recruiting of blacks for work beyond the confines of Nyasaland. This measure caused some irritation and denunciation in Rhodesia. But it was principally directed against the Transvaal, and was enacted for purely humanitarian reasons.

It is interesting to note here that this measure made it impossible for the British Government to help the Transvaal in the negotiations with Portugal regarding the amount of traffic demanded by the Lorenzo Marques Railway at the expense of Natal and Cape Colony. For if Portugal had threatened to prohibit the yearly exodus of laborers from her East African colony, the British could have said nothing at all.[1]

The two matters of general interest in Nyasaland since the beginning of the twentieth century are native antagonism and the spread of Mohammedanism.

In 1908, a native prophetess by preaching that the Europeans would leave the country, and that it was a sin to pay the hut tax to the white men, obtained a great following. The tax fell off, and there was much trouble and ill-feeling in getting the natives of districts along the Portuguese frontier back to the habit of paying this tribute to the white man. It was believed that black fanaticism was on the wane. This was a grievous mistake. A religious organization, known as the "Ethiopian Church," with which it was impossible to find cause to interfere, spread in Southern Nyasaland, in the Shiré Highlands, where the blacks came into contact with the whites. The doctrine of the "Church" is that Africa belongs to the black man, and that the white man is an intruder, who ought to be killed off until he is discouraged from coming to take the black man's lands and oppress him. In 1915, a very serious uprising, which had no connection whatever with the European

[1] See pp. 78–82 above.

War, took place at the beginning of the year. On an estate at Magomara, the manager was beheaded and other white men killed. The heads were taken to the church for a Thanksgiving service. Simultaneously an attack was made upon Blantyre, where arms and ammunition were captured. The rebellion miscarried, owing to a lack of coordination among the ringleaders. After two weeks, the police had dispersed all the bands in arms. It was found out in the investigation that the natives of Shiré Highlands were more or less all in sympathy with this movement, the purpose of which was to exterminate the white men in Nyasaland and to carry off their women. It is easy enough for a thousand armed men to keep in respect a hundred thousand natives. But one wonders whether colonization is worth while in a country where there are many more soldiers and police and officials than there are colonists, and where security is assured only as the result of eternal vigilance.

Some ten years ago it was reported that a bastard form of Mohammedanism was pervading the masses in Nyasaland. Its growth had been remarkable since 1903. All the villages along the Shiré had huts set aside for mosques. By 1910, from Lake Nyasa to the coast in Portuguese and German territory, and all around the lake shore and in the southern district of Nyasaland, a Moslem teacher was to be found in every village. When the Protectorate was formed in 1891, Mohammedanism was non-existent. The propaganda had been carried on by Zanzibar Arabs. Although it is frankly hostile to European influence,

British officials have not felt it incumbent to oppose the propaganda. The Nyasaland natives do not make fanatical Moslems, and it is believed that the movement will not spread south of the Zambesi. Christian missionaries are making strenuous efforts to combat Mohammedanism, and are, as in Uganda, meeting with considerable success because of the great desire of the natives to learn to read and write. In the country where David Livingstone died, and where an obelisk now marks the tree that bore his heart, militant Islam and militant Christianity have met to fight for the allegiance of the people whom Livingstone loved.

The development of Rhodesia began only a quarter of a century ago, when the South African Company, under the management of Cecil Rhodes, was granted a charter for the exploitation of territories whose limits were vaguely defined. As settlers entered the country, and the necessity was imposed upon the British Government of organizing Rhodesia administratively, the south and north and northeastern parts were separated politically, and have undergone several changes in the last two decades.[1] But all of Rhodesia has remained under the economic control of the South African Company, whose charter was granted for twenty-five years.

Cape Colony took in the whole southern tip of Africa, south of the Orange River, which traverses almost completely the continent from west to east. There were to the north, on the Atlantic coast,

[1] Distinct administrative districts have been called Western and Northwestern Rhodesia.

German Southwest Africa, and, on the Indian Ocean coast, the British colony of Natal. Directly north of Cape Colony, Bechuanaland and an unclaimed and undesired hinterland lay between Cape Colony and the interior of the continent that Cecil Rhodes was developing. It was largely the Kalahari Desert. The hostile Orange Free State, north of Cape Colony and west of Natal, barred the way from the Cape of Good Hope to Rhodesia, and north of the Orange Free State lay the Transvaal, a country founded and developed by Boers who had trekked to escape British rule. These independent states were strong in fighting power, as the British had long ago discovered, and their conquest was not worth while until diamonds brought the British to the western frontier of the Orange Free State and gold made the Transvaal a prize that would return interest on enormous sums of money. Before the development of the Rand, a Jameson raid would have been regarded as the mad and criminal folly of outlaws. With the Transvaal stamps turning out gold, it was a wise and patriotic enterprise of pioneers.

The Cape to Cairo Railway did not need to pass through the territory of either of the Dutch republics. It has not, in fact, done so. The line runs through the Kimberley diamond field, skirts the western frontiers of the Orange Free State and the Transvaal without entering either, and strikes north across the Khama Country to Bulawayo in Matabeleland. But it would not have been safe with two hostile states so near to it, and Transvaal trade and money were needed to make it, in conjunction with the lines

running south, a good investment. The Boer War was essential to bring to fruition the dream of Cecil Rhodes to found an Anglo-Saxon state in South Africa. His last years were spent in the uncertainty and agony of the conflict which he had indirectly precipitated. He died the very week that the Boers gave up the struggle.[1]

Between the Union of South Africa and the British possessions that are now united under the name of Rhodes, are the Kalahari Desert, Khama's Country, and the land of the Bamangwatos. The heart of southern Africa is a protectorate called Bechuanaland. The native chiefs have a large amount of freedom, and are under the direct authority of the British Crown. They pay for each hut five dollars per year to the British Commissioner, who resides at Mafeking in South Africa. The Protectorate is in the South African customs union, and, when Rhodesia is ready to enter, will become an integral part of the Union.

Rhodesia touches the Transvaal border on the Limpopo River,[2] near 22° S., and extends to the

[1] Naturally there is a division of opinion in South Africa in regard to Rhodes. While the British look upon him as the greatest statesman produced among African colonials, to the Boers he is the enemy of their race, and the unscrupulous financier whose only object was to exploit their country for his own benefit. Fifteen years after his death, their implacable hatred is still shown in the opposition to the scheme of having the national university placed at his Table Mountain residence near Cape Town.

[2] Who does not remember "the great grey green greasy Limpopo River, all set about with fever trees," upon whose bank the Elephant's Child, "with his 'satiable Curtiosity," got his nose with the help of the Bi-Coloured Python Rock Snake, of Kipling's *Just So* stories?

southern end of Lake Tanganyika near 8° S. At its widest point (including Nyasaland) on the 14th parallel of latitude, it broadens from 22° to 36° longitude. British authority in Rhodesia is represented by administrators for Southern Rhodesia and Northern Rhodesia, appointed by the British South Africa Company, with the approval of the Secretary of State, and a resident Imperial Commissioner, who is the same for both the northern and southern administrative districts.

Bulawayo, near the southern frontier, is the junction point of the two lines from the Cape to Southern and Northern Rhodesia. The southern line runs to Salisbury and connects there with the railway through Portuguese East Africa to Beira. From Salisbury there are several spurs, two from Gowelo and one from a point near Bulawayo to West Nicholson in the south. The northern line makes a wide detour to cross the Zambesi at Livingstone, and passes through Broken Hills into Katanga Province of Belgian Congo. This will be the main line of the Cape to Cairo Railway, unless a different future for German East Africa and for the spur of Portuguese East Africa between Mashonaland and Nyasaland makes possible the connection of Salisbury and Blantyre, and a line from Lake Nyasa to Lake Victoria. In this way an all-British railway from the Cape to Cairo could be realized.[1]

[1] I found, however, in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan a strong feeling that the railway connection of Lake Victoria and Khartum, by the valley of the White Nile, is the very last project to be thought of in building the Sudan railway system. Economic and engineering reasons seem to militate against the building of this link of the Cape-Cairo all-rail route.

The history of the development of Southern and Northern Rhodesia is not unlike that of Southern and Northern Nigeria, one territory developing rapidly and becoming self-supporting, and the other, because it must take in a hinterland of protectorates, costly to pacify, slow to yield returns, and showing each year a large deficit. Naturally the colonists of the prosperous portion—as well as officials anxious to present a good budget—do not feel enthusiastic about the pooling of interests that would follow administrative union. But there is a difference in the fact that white colonists have become much more numerous in Rhodesia than in Nigeria and have good hopes of making the entire country a white man's land. The problem of unification has been complicated by the grievances of colonists against the chartered company, and by the demand, as in British East Africa, for self-government.

As early as 1904, there were plans afoot among the settlers of Rhodesia to start an agitation to make the British Government expropriate the Chartered Company, and make a Crown Colony of Southern Rhodesia. In 1906, when Lord Selborne visited Salisbury, he heard the grievances of the settlers against the company, and promised to bring them to the attention of the Home Government. In 1907, representatives of Matabeleland settlers told the directors of the company who were visiting the country that the white colonists demanded a voice in their government. The directors favored the idea of federation of all Rhodesia, and an ultimate

union with the new Commonwealth that was in the process of formation in South Africa. But they did not see how the settlers could ask for a voice in the Government, when all the financial responsibility was being assumed by the company, and when the company was investing huge sums for railway development. But in May the Legislative Council of Southern Rhodesia passed a resolution asking the British Government to extend representative government to Rhodesia. There were now fourteen thousand Europeans in Southern Rhodesia, and the revenue of 1907 exceeded expenditure.

In 1908, the South Africa Company yielded to local pressure and issued new regulations, which made taking up land much easier, and afforded settlers better facilities for transport and travel on the railways. In 1913, after five years of unexampled prosperity, political activity was renewed. The twenty-five-year charter of the South Africa Company was to expire on October 29, 1914, and in extending it, the Crown reserved the right to add provisions or repeal provisions in the existing charter. The company claimed as its property a million acres of unalienated land, exclusive of native reserves, in Northern Rhodesia. There was already a big land question in Southern Rhodesia. Colonists held that unalienated ground is not the property of the company, but Crown land administered by the company only because there is no other form as yet of administration. The Rhodesian Agricultural Union petitioned the Imperial Government to constitute

a Royal Commission of Inquiry.[1] The Executive Council passed resolutions stating that the Union could not cooperate in the general scheme of defense for South Africa *as long as the Chartered Company were responsible for the government.*

Throughout 1913 and 1914, there was much confusion and division of opinion about the future among the Rhodesian colonists. They were all at heart against the Chartered Company, and preferred some other form of government. Rhodesia could hardly become a Crown Colony, for then the Imperial Government would have to indemnify the Chartered Company, and the country would be saddled with a very burdensome debt. Not many of the settlers were in favor of the alternative of entering the South African Union. Sir Starr Jameson, who had recently become president of the company, urged the settlers to support the Chartered Company, for the sake of their own prosperity and for the sake of the future political status of Rhodesia. He

[1] The land question in Rhodesia is very obscure. It depends upon the legal interpretation of the terms of the charter, and there is a case pending before the Privy Council at the present moment. The European settlers are against the company to a man on the land question. But the company—up to this time—can scarcely be accused of exploiting Rhodesia in their own interests. The shareholders have spent millions upon the country, and have been most liberal in their attitude toward railway extension. They have never had a penny of interest. It is natural that they should look somewhere for a little reward for their confidence and a little return for their money. The case is not at all as if the company had been enjoying huge profits for years, and was trying to grab more, and to prevent colonists from getting the power into their own hands in order to keep going a profitable investment.

warned them that the downfall of the Chartered Company would mean the inclusion of Rhodesia in the Union instead of a wonderful independent future.

The elections to the Legislative Council in March, 1914, resulted in the return of pro-charter candidates. It cannot be interpreted as an out-and-out victory for the company, but rather as the decision of Rhodesia not to amalgamate with South Africa. The colonists want self-government, and are, as in British East Africa, determined to get it. But they do not want it enough to enter the South African Union. There are only twenty-five thousand Europeans in Rhodesia, and they would be swamped in the midst of the electorate of over a million in the other colonies, the majority of whom are Dutch, and would interfere in many ways, especially in compelling the Taal to be taught in schools. Most of the Rhodesians are of British extraction, and have had a growing feeling since the federation was formed that they are "jolly well out of it." And they do not want to be a dumping ground for all the failures and poor whites who would work their way quickly into the new province. Only when Rhodesia has a large enough European population to be able to maintain local interests in a federal parliament, and to turn the balance in favor of the English against the Dutch, will Rhodesian colonists be ready to join the Commonwealth. In South Africa, too, the English extremists think as the Rhodesians do, and are praying for the day when a strong Rhodesian province —markedly Anglo-Saxon—will put the Afrikanders in a minority in the Commonwealth Parliament.

Southern Rhodesia, nearest to South Africa, nearest to the mouth of the Zambesi, and with railway communications (to the Indian Ocean at Beira and into the Commonwealth) of much shorter distance than the rest of the country, has shown a very healthy development since 1900. Since 1907, revenue has exceeded expenditure. In 1909, the gold output was over two and a half million pounds. In 1910, cotton-growing was started on an extensive scale. The cotton already sent from Rhodesia brought a higher price in the London market than that of any other variety except Sea Island cotton from the West Indies. Tobacco, citron, and rubber were yielding excellent results. In 1911, the railways were earning sufficient to meet interest charges and leave a margin. In 1912, it was announced that over a million acres were being cultivated in Southern Rhodesia, and that the Liebig Company had bought half a million acres for ranching purposes. When the war broke out, the gold production was increasing rapidly.

As in other South African colonies, the two main factors of economic development are white settlers and native labor. Efforts were made in 1907 to attract immigration from England through the Salvation Army. Great hopes were based upon General Booth, who had taken up the scheme enthusiastically. It never came to anything. *Assisted immigration is wise nowhere in Africa.* Since whites will not do manual labor of the kind that blacks do or any kind in company with blacks, the only settlers who have a chance to succeed are those

understanding farming or stock raising or with a trade. In addition to being skilled laborers, colonists must also have some capital. Even where the State gives immigrants a start, after having assisted them to come to the country, a year of bad luck in the way of drought or personal illness (both are very likely to happen in Africa) is apt to ruin a man who has not funds to tide him over.[1] Native labor is always a serious question. After Nyasaland prohibited labor recruiting in 1911, immediately there was a scarcity of hands for agriculture in Southern Rhodesia and for mines in Northern Rhodesia. Complaint was made against the action of the Protectorate. But what could the Home Government do to Nyasaland for adopting a law which Rhodesia herself was enforcing?

Northern Rhodesia, aided greatly by the boom in gold-mining and by the extension of the railway to Katanga, has been developing rapidly since 1910. In 1912, Lord Grey, in a speech at Bulawayo declared that Northern Rhodesia was likely to surpass Southern Rhodesia in agriculture as well as mining during the near future. A land bank was founded, as in German Southwest Africa, to aid settlers in getting started by advancing money on the security of their land. There were about fifteen hundred

[1] Owing to the fact that grants for assistance are a fixed amount in the budget, and cannot be overstepped, an "assisted" colonist can look for a stipulated sum from the State, and no more, no matter what happens. There is no way of remedying this, because a special fund, set aside to meet unusual cases, would be swept away at the first drought or epidemic.

Europeans in Rhodesia, north of the Zambesi River, at the outbreak of the war.

One-sixth of the population of Rhodesia was under arms in 1915, and five hundred went to join Lord Kitchener's army. Rhodesian regiments cooperated for the conquest of Southwest Africa and East Africa. It is their hope to get an outlet both to the Indian Ocean and to the Atlantic through German territories. If this is realized, the British, through Rhodesia, will have done in the southern part of the African continent what, through Rhodesia, they prevented the Portuguese from doing—opening up a path under one flag across the continent.

CHAPTER XI

THE BRITISH IN EAST AFRICA AND UGANDA

SOUTH and north of the equator to the fourth parallel of latitude East Africa is dominated by the British. The large Protectorate of British East Africa stretches from the coast of the Indian Ocean between Italian Somaliland and German East Africa back to the headwaters of the Nile. The Juba River forms an eastern inland boundary with Italian Somaliland from the equator line nearly to 4° north. On the north are Abyssinia and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. The British Protectorate of Uganda is on the west, and Lake Victoria and German East Africa on the south. The Uganda Protectorate is a quadrangle at the headwaters of the Nile, between Lake Albert, Lake Edward, Lake Victoria, and Lake Rudolf, and surrounded by British East Africa, the Belgian Congo, German East Africa, and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.

Uganda first came under British influence by exploration. The British title was not established until the Germans and British began to organize the hinterland of their East African colonies. In 1894, a protectorate was declared over the kingdoms

of Uganda and the tribes in adjoining territories that were known and accessible. During the first decade of the twentieth century almost the whole territory of the Protectorate, whose population is now about three millions, was brought under direct British administration. Where they have shown loyalty and ability, native chiefs have been maintained. One province, Baganda, is still recognized as a native kingdom. Although the soil is exceedingly fertile, and the development of lake communication and the completion of the railway through British East Africa to the coast have given excellent means of transport, the climate of Uganda causes it to be avoided by settlers. There are only a thousand Europeans in the country, of whom considerably more than a quarter are Government officials.

The railway from Mombasa reached Lake Victoria in 1901. It enabled the British to bring Indian troops into the country in fourteen days. The importance of the Protectorate, from the moment of its establishment, has been political rather than economic. It was essential for the British to have control of this district in order to destroy the power of the Dervishes in the Sudan. Money and energy were put into Uganda, as into Somaliland, to keep it from falling into the hands of another Power. If the British had not gone into Uganda, the Germans certainly would have extended their territory north around the western coast of Lake Victoria.

Winston Churchill, after his African visit, declared that Uganda was the jewel of the Empire in East Africa, that its negroes were the most intelligent he

had seen, and that the country was one of the most beautiful gardens in the world. He believed that when Uganda was developed, its traffic would make the railway a paying concern. At last reports, however, Uganda was still costing Great Britain very much more than it yielded, and trade was alarmingly large with the Germans and Belgians.

The importance of Uganda in the history of European expansion in Africa is that its creation prevented the Germans from controling Lake Victoria and the Belgians from reaching Lake Victoria. It has rounded out the territory of the British East African Colony, and gives to Britain control of the headwaters of the White Nile.

During the period of our review, the devastation of sleeping sickness, the remarkable development of Christianity, and the interest taken in farming by the native chiefs are the events of general interest in Uganda.

Throughout central Africa sleeping sickness, a fever carried by the tsetse fly, is the most formidable barrier to the progress of European civilization. It has prevented the spread of white colonization. By suddenly ruining great districts, calculations of financial return are made so uncertain that railway construction, where there is no political reason to prompt and justify it, has been retarded. In German and British East Africa, in northern Rhodesia, in the two large Portuguese colonies, in the Belgian Congo, and in French Equatorial Africa, sleeping sickness has made great ravages during the past twenty years. It has hampered the development of

the southern Sudan. But its worst effects have been felt on the islands and the Uganda shore of Lake Victoria, which were entirely depopulated in 1908. Two-thirds of the population of the protectorate had died in six years. In many places the disease disappeared for lack of people to attack. Famine followed plague. The survivors were starving to death by the thousands. This calamity, far worse than any earthquake and comparable in modern times only to Chinese and Indian famines, awakened the Powers who had interests in Africa to the necessity of common action for combating the plague. But no more in medical than in political matters are international jealousies able to be compounded. The second international conference in 1908 closed without coming to any decision, because the French and Italian delegates were opposed to establishing in London the central bureau of the international organization.[1]

The British sent a special sanitary mission to Africa. Segregation camps were established in Uganda, where the Pères Blancs of the Algerian mission did a work that brought much power and influence to the native Catholic Church. After three years it was announced that preventive measures were beginning to save lives from sleeping sickness. But the problem still remains.

In Uganda, Christianity has made more rapid progress than in any other part of Africa. There are over two hundred thousand baptized converts, and

[1] Great Britain and Germany later appointed a joint commission to study sleeping sickness for three years.

the rest of the Baganda race is under Christian influence. The adherents are almost equally divided between English Protestants and French Catholics.

Unique in African history is the way that agricultural development, along European lines, has been taken hold of by the Uganda natives. One can attribute this for the most part to the influence of Christianity. We cannot expect Moslems and Pagans to comprehend and appreciate and take advantage of the European way of doing things until they have adopted the European religion. Not only our institutions, political and social and economic, but also our manner of thought, are the result of centuries of an evolution that has been shaped and dominated by Christianity. In 1913, the Baganda chiefs were reported as owners of large rubber and cotton plantations, and fast growing rich. The official report stated: "It is gratifying to note that contact with civilization has not had a deteriorating effect." Is the reason of this to be found in an inherent superiority of the Uganda natives to those of other parts of Africa, or in their acceptance of Christianity? The British Government has organized the country, spent large sums of money on it, and brought it into railway communication with the outside world. But to the French Catholic and English Protestant missionaries is due the unique place of the Uganda natives in Africa. Unless they are given the moral foundation upon which to build, material prosperity that comes with European control is to aboriginal races certain destruction—a rapid disappearance following deterioration.

The British came into possession of the southern half of the coast line of the East Africa Protectorate, from the northern mouth of the Tana River to the Umba River through the connection with Zanzibar. The Sultan's dominions extended only ten miles inland, and were leased from him by the British. Between the Tana River and the Juba British sovereignty was established, as in the interior, by a vague harking back to Egyptian rights and a practical opening up and occupation of the country, treaties being made with local chieftains as the penetration progressed. A frontier was gradually decided upon with the Germans on the south, carried from the coast where spheres were definitely established, to Karangu Bay on Lake Victoria.

The frontier with Uganda is marked by Lakes Victoria and Rudolf and a line drawn from one to the other. While the British were establishing the hinterland of East Africa and extending their Protectorate over the natives of Uganda, British and Egyptian troops were reconquering the Sudan. The settling of Sudan frontiers with Belgium and Abyssinia and Italy was accompanied at the same time (1902 to 1906) by the fixing of Uganda boundaries with Belgium and East African boundaries with Abyssinia and Italy. The British possessions then came to an understanding among themselves, made easy by the fact that their interests were all in the hands of the same arbiter, and that local opposing influences were lacking. The "all red" stretch from the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean by way of East Africa, Uganda, the Sudan, and Egypt became

a reality between 1898 and 1906. Although the British flag waves over nearly a third of the continent, this is the only place in Africa where British possessions reach from one sea to another.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the East Africa Protectorate was an inchoate jumble of territories under the administration of the Foreign Office. Not until the end of 1906 were Orders in Council issued to establish a definite status for the country. A Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief were appointed, and Executive and Legislative Councils, the former consisting of the Governor and four members, and the latter of eight official and four unofficial members. Although still called a Protectorate, British East Africa has become virtually a Crown Colony. When the strip on the coast leased from Zanzibar was freed of foreign consular jurisdiction in 1908, the last vestige of the technical Zanzibar connection disappeared. The four provinces of 1900 have now been increased to seven, and effective administrative control is exercised throughout the Protectorate, except in the northeastern districts.

As in German East Africa, the history of pacification and economic development is the history of the progress of the railway from the coast through the interior to the western confines of the country. The line starts at Mombasa on a small island close to the coast in the southern part of the Protectorate and ends at Port Florence on Lake Victoria. On the lake, steamers make the connection with Uganda. From Nairobi, the capital and most important interior city, there is a spur north to Fort Hall.

Some distance nearer the coast a branch runs west to Lake Magadi. The railway was completed soon after the opening of the twentieth century. The southern portion of British East Africa has enjoyed the advantages of railway communication throughout the period of our survey.

The railway has cost over £6,000,000, two and one-half millions in excess of the estimates. But there has never been any doubt about the political wisdom and financial soundness of the investment. As everywhere else in Africa, railway communication is a *sine qua non* of effective administrative control and of economic development. As in the neighboring Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, the railway, *owned and run by the State*, brings in a handsome profit, which makes the difference between deficit and surplus in the budget. From 1910 to 1913, the deficit of British East Africa, thanks to the railway, was cut down substantially and progressively. In 1914 the colony became self-supporting.

We have seen how the business basis upon which the finances of the Sudan were organized and managed, and the excellent budget showing, prompted the Imperial Parliament to pass without hesitation, shortly before the outbreak of the European War, a bill to guarantee interest on a three million pound loan. The same facility was accorded to British East Africa and Uganda in 1914.

Up to 1908, the railway to Lake Victoria from the coast had profited enormously by Belgian and German through trade. But after the remarkable achievement of the Germans in pushing through

their railway to the upper end of Lake Tanganyika, a serious falling off in railway receipts was expected. The rapid development of the country, however, produced the surprising and gratifying result of a railway profit of £66,000 in 1911. Sheep were doing very well in the highlands. There was a great increase in cotton, lumber, and hemp export. Silver was beginning to be exported. Gold was discovered. In 1913, although there was a decrease in rubber and the ivory trade was dwindling rapidly, the total amount of the trade of British East Africa had increased seventy-five per cent. in five years, and a good seventy per cent. of it was with the British Empire.

The northern part of the Protectorate, between the Tana and the Juba rivers and west from Lake Rudolf to the border of Italian Somaliland, has not yet been developed, and is the only part of British East Africa to which the authority of the Government does not extend without constant military expeditions. The Ogaden Somalis, who cause so much trouble to the British and Italians in Somaliland, raid frequently the northern part of British East Africa. As in Somaliland, the Home Government has opposed a forward policy, and has refrained from occupying interior posts. The Ogaden Somalis are left to quarrel among themselves. After ten years of comparative quiet, the Somalis proved in British East Africa as in Somaliland that they would and could take advantage of a Government which shirked its responsibilities. In the spring of 1914, there were serious disturbances in Jubaland province. The

Somalis seemed to have got a plentiful supply of rifles and ammunition from Abyssinia. They refused to submit to disarmament, and attacked British fortified posts. Troops had to be hurried from Uganda and Nyasaland. The Somalis, abandoning bush tactics, tried to rush the British forces, who were saved only by their machine guns. When the general war began, the trouble had died down, but by no means could it be said to have ended. After peace is restored in Europe and Africa, the British Government must either occupy this northern country, or by strict coastal control and bringing pressure to bear upon Abyssinia effect a stoppage of traffic in arms. As long as the Somalis have good rifles and plenty of ammunition they will be a thorn in the flesh.

Christian missionaries working in common or adjoining fields have found throughout the world that unity is essential, if real progress is to be made in converting pagans and Moslems. In the untutored mind there is room only for the essential fact of Christ redeeming men from sin through their confession of faith in Him and their dedication of life to His service. Antagonistic and competitive missionary propaganda is damning to the common cause. A native may be able to appreciate the difference between the Catholic and Protestant point of view. But when it comes to distinctions between various Protestant sects, the effect on the native convert is disastrous. From personal investigation in many mission fields, I have come to the conclusion that denominationalism in missionary propaganda is

criminal folly. It leads to lives wasted in fruitless effort and useless sacrifice. It creates a prejudice against Christianity on the part of those who are being "reached." It means throwing away for nothing the money of those who support missionary organizations.

Anglicans and Episcopalians on the mission field must make common cause with other Protestant denominations, emphasizing the evangelical note in their preaching, or "renounce their schism" and join the Roman Catholic Church. There is place for a middle ground in Europe and America, where Christianity has a historical background. But there is no place for "straddling" in a pagan country. This truth was brought out in the missionary conference at Kikuyu, where Anglicans, Presbyterians, Baptists, Methodists, and Congregationalists met to discuss plans for unity of action among the natives. The Bishop of Uganda described the aim of the Conference to be for an ultimate "union of native Christians in *one native Church.*" At the close, the Bishop of Mombasa, assisted by the Bishop of Uganda, administered the sacrament to members of the Conference, irrespective of their denomination, in the Scotch Presbyterian Church. It was an epoch-making event in the history of Christian missions in Africa. The fraternizing—even to the sacraments—of Anglicans and other Protestants aroused a great deal of excitement and indignation among narrow-minded fanatics in England. When the Bishop of Zanzibar charged the Bishops of Uganda and East Africa with heresy, it showed that mediæval bigotry

had found its way into the church militant in Africa, to weaken and paralyze effort where strength and stimulus were needed.

The chief interest of British East Africa from the point of view of Europe in Africa since 1900 is the experiment of white colonization. It is important for us to follow the movement to attract white settlers to the Protectorate, and to note how the same questions presented themselves as in other British colonies in Africa, economic competition with natives, the color question, the exclusion of Asiatics, the demand for self-government. What has happened in this colony is of utmost value in throwing light upon the solution of problems that arise everywhere in Africa.

In 1902, Commander Whitehouse completed a survey of Lake Victoria, which had taken him more than a year to make. He announced that he had found on the east side of the lake a forty-mile stretch of enclosed water at the mouth of which was a valuable tract of high country and a large population. He was of the opinion that there was a possibility of this becoming a white man's country. Mr. Chamberlain took back to England the same opinion, after he had visited Mombasa and had gone inland for a short trip on the railway. In 1903, the Governor, Sir Charles Elliott, said that a large part of the Protectorate was a white man's country, and that, if European settlers and merchants were encouraged, British East Africa would pay its way in ten years at the very most. In 1907, Mr. Winston Churchill crossed the Protectorate on his way to Cairo via the

Great Lakes. At Nairobi he declared that the highlands was certainly a white man's country, that the Government would reward settlers with marketable titles, and would prevent absenteeism by expropriation. In 1909, Mr. Roosevelt said at Nairobi that the country was "a real white man's land," and besides, "the most attractive playground in the world."

Glowing official reports, added to the widely heralded remarks from distinguished travelers, attracted white settlers. They began to flock to Mombasa. The discovery of diamonds near Nairobi in 1907 brought more white men to the interior, and Nairobi became rapidly a European city. But from the very beginning there were difficulties. Racial and political agitation arose, as is inevitable wherever the Anglo-Saxon goes.

Like many other colonies, beginning with the famous example of India, a chartered company was the original developing agency. As long as there were only natives to exploit, the company met with no opposition. But the moment the British colonist appeared, the company was a competitor, and was opposed at every turn. The conflict was brought out in rather an unusual and very public way by the quarrel between Sir Charles Elliott and the Home Government. In 1904, Sir Charles resigned the High Commissionership, and asked for a public inquiry into the circumstances of his resignation. He charged that Lord Lansdowne had ordered him to refuse grants of land to certain private persons, while giving monopoly of land on unduly advantageous

terms to the East Africa Syndicate. Sir Charles resigned rather than execute instructions which he regarded as unjust and impolitic. The Foreign Office ignored the demand for a public inquiry, but issued a statement to the effect that the East Africa Syndicate employed a large staff, was a responsible body, and had spent a great deal of money on its enterprises up to that stage. Sir Charles replied that the money had been spent on a fruitless search for minerals, and that the principle of a new company concession was bad, for it would exclude genuine colonization and European settlement. The granting of small private concessions was the only policy to follow, if the proper sort of white settlers were to be attracted to East Africa.

The white colonists were opposed not only to company concessions, but also to the introduction of Jews and Indians, limited leasehold of land grants, "favoritism" toward natives, and government without representation. Wherever John Bull goes he holds out for the good and bad in Anglo-Saxondom, just as vigorously if the flag over the land where he settles is British as if it is of an alien government.

1. *No Jews or Asiatics.* When Mr. Chamberlain visited the Protectorate, he conceived the idea of offering land to the Zionist movement. When he first broached the subject in England, a howl of protest went forth from the few hundred Englishmen already in British East Africa. No Jews from Central or Southeastern Europe, of the type that private charity would set up in life, were wanted as neighbors in agriculture. They certainly were not

wanted as competitors in small commerce. The Imperial Government paid no attention to the protests. A commission was sent out to examine territory available for Zionist settlement. The commission went to Uganda, and decided to offer land there to the Zionists. The Zionist Congress at Basle, in 1905, declined the offer. Small wonder! For I suppose some of them had read the report of the High Commissioner of Uganda for 1904, which was published shortly before the Congress assembled. In it occurs this sentence: "Uganda will never be a white man's country, for it has no areas, as in East Africa, suitable to white colonization."

There were many Indians in Zanzibar and East Africa before the coming of the white settlers. Here was a country, directly controlled by the British Crown, where conditions, which Her Majesty's Government made a *casus belli* against the Boers of the Transvaal, did not prevail. The Indian, being a British subject, had the right to settle wherever the British flag flew. But the moment white settlers came in numbers to British East Africa, agitation against the Indians commenced. When Mr. Winston Churchill said at Nairobi that the whites required the cooperation of Indians in developing the immense areas of the highlands, the statement was received in silence. But much approval was expressed at his later modification that it was a mistake to introduce artificially Asiatic population before the country was ready. Only he was told that the country never would be ready for that, unless he wanted to drive away the white men there and discourage other white

men from coming. In 1910, the London All India Moslem League protested to the Colonial Office against the exclusion of East Indians from the highlands, where the best areas for settlement were alone available. It was contended that as indentured Indian labor was being used to develop British East Africa, it was unfair to prevent Indians whose time had expired from getting the good lands of the country for which they were performing essential service. The Government was warned that the maintenance of anti-Indian prejudice and discrimination in East African legislation would react on the political situation in India. It is the same story as in South Africa. Although when the war broke out, the question of the reservation of the highlands for European settlement had not been decided, it is certain that, unless this action is taken, British East Africa has no chance whatever of becoming a white man's country.

2. *No land grants with a string attached.* When the Britisher leaves his island, where all the land is in the hands of a few, to start a new life, he wants to own land, and to know that it is really his and that its increased value through his own efforts or the development of the community will accrue to him. He wants the chance of enjoying what the privileged classes of England enjoy. The British Government did not seem to appreciate this in adopting a land policy for East Africa. In order, as Lord Elgin said, to hamper speculative acquisition and the locking up of the land, such as had occurred in the earlier years in Australasia, land was to be leased for ninety-

nine years, with reassessment after the thirty-third and sixty-sixth years. The settlers protested against these terms. They said that this form of land grant would bar the flow of capital into the country, and would not attract the right kind of settlers. In 1908, after the limited leasehold policy was adopted, there were several failures among small farmers in the highlands, and applications for taking up land fell off.

For several years there was continued agitation to return to the old system of out and out alienation of land. Sir Percy Girouard (who would not have been a high British official were he not enjoying the fruits of his ancestors' refusal to assent to any such scheme) defended the Colonial Office in their refusal to change the leasehold policy, and advised the settlers not to retard the development of the country by renewing the agitation. Sir Percy painted in glowing terms the possibilities of the future. British East Africa might soon be regarded as a new source of wheat supply for Britain, for the wheat grown compared favorably with that imported from France. Beans of various kinds could be produced in abundance for export and cattle feed. There were immense possibilities in timber and silver. A rich harvest in cotton, rubber, and hemp was awaiting the white men who would cast in their fortunes with the colony. Men with capital of from £800 to £4000 were urged to come. Men without means were needed to work under large landowners. But in spite of the increase of the prosperity of the Protectorate, land under the leasehold policy went begging.

In 1913, the Legislative Council was informed that

the Colonial Office would accept the following principles of land policy: abolition of occupation licenses and issue of transfer licenses; abolition of requirement of personal occupation, if a manager be left in charge; stock to be included in assessing value of development work, expenditure on which would be extended over five years. These concessions were regarded as a step in the right direction. But the agitation continued.

In abstract principle, the Colonial Office has acted in an enlightened manner in regard to land settlement provisions. Experience has certainly taught the advisability of a government, when conditions of land ownership are to be created, making those conditions preventive of absentee landlordism, fraudulent transfers, and holding land undeveloped until the development by neighbors or the work of the community gives the proprietor a wholly unearned increment. But in land legislation one can neither go against human nature, nor prevent the working of the old law that to him who hath shall be given. Large estates are inevitable. The only logical way of securing for the Commonwealth the advantage of land values created by Government initiative and the industry of the whole people, and of preventing selfish landowners from holding undeveloped land for an unearned increment, is to put the tax on land values and not on improvements.

3. *No social or political equality for the black man.* Experience would have led one to prophesy in all safety that the coming of white colonists into British East Africa would soon create a native question.

Very few years of white colonization led to the necessity of a special parliamentary paper on the relations between whites and negroes.[1] The official element in the Protectorate had long been accustomed to act with severity against Europeans who maltreated natives. For there were few Europeans, and those generally a bad lot; and injustice and cruelty on the part of whites often brought serious troubles with the natives. From the official point of view, wholly aside from considerations of justice and humanity, it was easier to be severe on one white man than to have to send an expedition to put down a native uprising. But when colonists began to come, the officials discovered that there was a most alarming solidarity among them to prevent justice being done to native victims of the white man's temper and arbitrary punishment. Some Englishmen were prosecuted for flogging natives in 1907, and were convicted and sentenced. Much feeling was aroused against the officials, and serious consequences might have resulted had not the sentences been reversed upon appeal.

In 1908, there was an unruly demonstration before the Governor's residence, largely on the ground of what the white settlers called his "pro-native" policy. In 1911, the Honorable Galbraith Cole shot dead a native who was trespassing on his farm. Although incontestable evidence of his guilt was produced at the trial, and only a verdict of manslaughter asked for by the prosecuting attorney, the white jury acquitted him. The Colonial Secretary

[1] See Cd. 3562.

then ordered the deportation of Mr. Cole. The settlers in British East Africa protested against the illegality of this action and what they termed the persecution of one of their number, and urged Mr. Cole at the time of his forced departure to bring action against the Colonial Office in the English courts. In 1913, a native labor commission, studying the serious difficulties that were arising from the presence of white settlers, recommended the appointment of a native commissioner, a demarcation of native reserves, increased taxation and registration of natives, government control of labor recruiting, and restriction of liquor consumption by natives.

4. *No government without representation.* As we stated above, East Africa was a growth. It started in the coast-land lease from the Sultan of Zanzibar, and gradually developed by a penetration in the hinterland, and a proclamation of sovereignty over Jubaland. The original economic development was in the hands of a private company, whose charter included also Zanzibar. Not until 1906 was there a settled form of government. Colonists in numbers and diamond prospectors first came at that time. Not a year had passed after the system of government had been established before agitation started for some form of self-government. When Mr. Winston Churchill passed through the country in 1907, he told the settlers that the Legislative Council had been established for criticism of the administration and not for its control.

The unsatisfactory land policy of the Colonial Office and the agitation over the punishment of

white men who acted as their own judges of natives hastened what inevitably would have come later—the demand for local representation in the Government of the Protectorate. The Indian agitation of 1910 increased the determination of the settlers to have some voice in decisions affecting their interests. Sir Percy Girouard's tactic of calling attention to the material benefits that settlers were receiving, and the advantages that would be theirs in the future "if only they ceased to harm the colony and scare away colonists by their senseless agitation," was typically Tory, and did not go where there were Englishmen instead of natives to deal with. English newspapers were established at Mombasa and Nairobi.[1] The settlers began to organize to compel the recognition of their right to participate in the Government of the Colony. In 1913, the Settlers' Association petitioned the Colonial Office that the unofficial minority of the Council be elected instead of nominated. Mr. Harcourt, radical in England, had no sympathy with liberalism in East Africa. His reply evaded the issue. The unofficial members of the Council, except one, resigned. Up to the outbreak of the European War, Nairobi was the center of continual agitation for a form of self-government, which would begin by making elective the representatives of the Legislative Council, and liberally extending the powers of that body.

The Home Government point of view, unanimously sustained by officials in British East Africa, is that the white settlers of British origin are as yet far too

[1] In 1913 also at Entebbe, in Uganda.

few in number to make self-government feasible. The country is large, and must depend upon the Home Government to guarantee its loans, to safeguard capital already invested, and to attract new capital in London that will be put into the Colony only if the investors are assured that the reins of government continue to be firmly held by the Colonial Office. Then, too, settlers have not yet given proof of a desire to deal justly and equitably with the natives, who are the wards of the British Empire.

Since the outbreak of the European War, the white settlers in British East Africa, regardless of origin, have shown great devotion to the Empire, and many of them have risked and sacrificed their lives in the long and arduous campaign against the German Colony on the south. Some, also, in the early days of the war left everything and went back to England to volunteer in Lord Kitchener's army. As in South Africa, the colonial problem will be elsewhere in the British Empire. The settlers of East Africa will undoubtedly profit by the privileges that Great Britain will be forced to grant to her colonials all over the world.

CHAPTER XII

THE GERMANS IN EAST AFRICA

ALTHOUGH East Africa was the last of the four German colonies in Africa to receive recognition from Berlin, and the last to have its definite status as German territory assured, it has become during the past ten years by far the most important of German possessions, and stood, in 1914, as the most remarkable achievement in the world of German colonizers and German merchants. Southwest Africa, with its forbidding harborless coast and its poor territory, illustrates the indomitable spirit of men who made the very best of the worst possible circumstances, and created a self-supporting colony in spite of adverse political, geographical, economic, and financial conditions. Togoland and Kamerun share the general characteristics of other European colonies in West Africa. Although better "organized" than their neighbors, they show no outstanding marks of superior ability or superior energy. Then, too, in the last analysis, they share the handicap of all West African coast colonies of a climate that makes impossible the hope of a white man's country.

German East Africa is a totally different proposition. Its situation is admirable. It has good ports,

navigable rivers, and mountain-lands. The climate is suitable for white colonization. Agricultural and mineral resources are very great, and not difficult to exploit. The colony is surrounded by rapidly developing neighbors, whose prosperity aids the Germans in many ways: the practicability of more frequent steamship service on the coast and lakes; profitable transit trade on the railway; adjacent markets for local and metropolitan trade, developed by German merchants settled in the colony; and emulation. German East Africa has the most advantageous coast line of African colonies: for there is an inland coast as well as a seacoast. On the north, half of Lake Victoria is in German territory. Almost the entire western boundary is formed by Lakes Nyasa, Tanganyika, and Kivu.

The colony is bounded on the north by British East Africa and Uganda, on the west by Belgian Congo, and on the south by Rhodesia, Nyasaland, and Portuguese East Africa. The islands of Zanzibar and Pemba, off the northern portion of the coast, form a British protectorate. Mafia Island, off the delta of the Rufiji River, was saved by the Germans. A conventional line from the mouth of the Umba River to Lake Victoria forms a boundary with British East Africa. The Uganda boundary is also a conventional line. Lakes Kivu and Tanganyika, with the river between them, form a natural boundary with Belgium. The southern boundary with Great Britain is the mountain range running from Lake Tanganyika to Lake Nyasa. The Rovuma River forms almost the entire boundary with Portugal.

Some distance out in the Mozambique Channel, off Cape Delgado, the coast boundary with Portugal, and the mouth of the Rovuma River, lie the Comoro Islands, belonging to France. Considerably farther out, all the islands (and there are many of them) directly east of German East Africa, and north and northeast of Madagascar, are owned and occupied by Great Britain.

Germany owes East Africa to the enterprise of the great explorer, Dr. Peters, who founded the German Colonization Society in 1884, against the advice of, and with the warning of no support from, Prince Bismarck. Late in 1884, Dr. Peters made a series of treaties with the Sultan of Zanzibar for the possession and exploitation of the mountainous territory back from the Indian Ocean coast between the headwaters of the Wami and Rufiji rivers. When he returned to Berlin in February, 1885, with the treaties in his pocket, he succeeded in getting an Imperial Charter. The German East Africa Company was formed. During the next three years, Dr. Peters gradually extended his privileges and territories on the Zanzibar mainland by successive agreements with the Sultan. In 1888, the Sultan leased all his mainland territories, south of the Umba River, to the German East Africa Company for fifty years, under certain stipulations. When the East Africa Company tried to assume the control of the country, some of the local authorities refused to recognize their Sultan's treaty, and rebelled. The German Government had to intervene. In 1891, the Company was in full control, and, during the last decade of the

nineteenth century, developed its territories along the lines of similar British and French companies in other parts of Africa.

The rebellion, however, changed radically the political status of the Protectorate, in reference to Zanzibar, to Germany, and to the world. When the British saw that the German Government was intervening on the Indian Ocean coast, they invoked old shadowy rights of the middle of the nineteenth century, and made the lessor accept a protectorate. They, in turn, leased the mainland of Zanzibar north of the Umba River. At the same time, the British claimed a protectorate over Uganda, and warned Germany that all territory north of Lake Victoria Nyanza was in the British sphere. Germany, in return, was recognized as owner of what the East Africa Company had leased from Zanzibar, and of the hinterland back to the lakes. In addition, Heligoland was ceded to Germany as "compensation." At the time, there was so little public opinion in Germany favorable to an aggressive colonial policy, that only Dr. Peters and his friends felt bitter about being shut off from Central Africa. On the other hand, British statesmen congratulated themselves on having turned a clever trick. They never dreamed of the quarter of century of German naval expansion that was to follow, and the vital importance of Heligoland in making impregnable the German coast line and home naval bases.[1]

[1] Because of Heligoland, Winston Churchill's boast of two years ago, that the British would go into German ports and pull the Germans out of their holes like rats, was absurd.

The Treaty of 1890, however, was a great advantage to the British, not only because it prevented German colonial expansion in Central Africa, and gave them the coast line north of the Umba that Dr. Peters hoped to include in his colony, but because the control of Zanzibar and Pemba prevented Germany from establishing a naval base at Dar-es-Salaam or Pangani or on the coast line between those two ports. Zanzibar stands to German East Africa as Walfisch Bay to German Southwest Africa, the mouth of the Volta and Cape St. Paul to Togoland, and the Niger delta to Kamerun, an everlasting command—THOU SHALT NOT!

The claim of partisan writers that Germany acquired her African colonies by trickery and bad faith is unfounded. In support of the assertion are cited the change of attitude of the German Government towards Herr Lüderitz in Southwest Africa and Dr. Peters in East Africa between 1884 and 1885, and the "conversion" of Bismarck. We are told that the German Government all along was behind these two men, and that the seeming opposition was a blind to deceive the British Foreign Office. The evidence is overwhelmingly against this accusation. Not only in 1885, but right along for almost twenty years after that, few German statesmen were favorable to colonies. The colonial budget was a constant embarrassment to the Government in the Reichstag. The German electorate was opposed to colonization. Not until 1906 did the change come. Before Dernburg, Germany had no colonial policy. Her acquisitions and her interferences in Africa, Asia, and

Oceania, far from being the result of deep-laid Machiavellian plots against the peace of the world, were as much hit-and-miss, as hesitating and vacillating and uncertain of popular support, as the British Imperial program before 1898. I do not at all believe that Great Britain went into Egypt in bad faith, and that her repeated assurances about evacuating Egypt, frequently given to the Powers, were a wilful deception. I think that the statesmen who told the Powers so positively that Great Britain intended to evacuate Egypt meant what they said. But if a writer went at the Egypt situation between 1884 and 1890 in the same way that English writers are going at the German colonial situation during that period, he could build up, from the attitude of British Ministers and their official utterances, as damning an indictment of Downing Street as of Wilhelmstrasse.[1] Both Foreign Offices were probably innocent of intention to deceive, and were continually embarrassed and perplexed about the way events forced their hand. How often are those who get the credit or the blame for events as surprised when they occur as are outsiders! None believes them, however, and they have to take the reputation of being *wise* or *sly* or *incapable*.

Instead of receiving the encouragement and the honors they would have had, if they were British pioneers and British organizing officials in British

[1] Able French writers, in fact, have done this very thing. England's honesty of purpose in Egyptian diplomacy has been accepted in France only since 1904—and then, not because of new light or new facts in the case!

colonies, Germans who had to do with the foundation and early development of East Africa were treated with signal ingratitude. In England, Stanley was rewarded with a knighthood and election to Parliament; in Germany, Dr. Peters was slandered and discredited. In British East Africa, Uganda, and the Sudan, the British Government helped the local officials in every way possible, and Parliament never turned a deaf ear to railway projects essential for the pacification and economic development of these colonies. The Colonial Loans Act, passed in 1899 right in the midst of the Boer War, of which we have spoken elsewhere, has been of great aid to British colonies during the period of our survey. There was nothing similar in Germany. The Reichstag discouraged East African development by throwing out budget appropriations, *while the Uganda Railway was being built directly north of the German colony from the coast at Mombasa to Lake Victoria!* When one reads through the Reichstag proceedings during the first six years of the twentieth century, he marvels at the optimism and courage of the officials who "held on" in East Africa. They were denied the funds for railway construction. The rival British colony was getting, because of its railway, not only Belgian trade, but also German hinterland trade. In spite of all this discouragement during the years from 1900 to 1906, trade more than doubled in the German Protectorate.

The railway across British East Africa was completed soon after the beginning of the twentieth century. The Germans interested in colonial de-

velopment knew how important it was not to allow the rivals on the north to get too far ahead of them in establishing their trade in Central Africa. They tried their very best, by conferences, newspaper and magazine articles, public meetings, and Reichstag and Bundesrath discussions to get public interest in, and public money for, white colonization and railway extension in East Africa. The former could not come without the latter. Railways were essential for pacification and administrative organization of the interior. After the completion of the British Uganda Railway, a small—very small—beginning was made. A private company had started in 1896 a railway from Tanga, opposite Pemba Island, along the Pangani River valley into the mountainous Usambara country. Half way from Tanga to the river it was stopped for lack of funds. In 1902, the Government took over the line, and pushed it forward to Korogwe on the river. In 1904, it reached Mombo. In the central part of the Protectorate, the route from Lake Tanganyika to the coast was served by slow, expensive caravan transport to Bagamoyo opposite Zanzibar Island. Porters carried on their backs the ivory, rubber, and other hinterland products to the sea, and returned inland with the imports in the same way. In 1896, when the line from Tanga was started, a railway inland from Dar-es-Salaam was projected also. Nothing was accomplished. In 1900, when the Uganda Railway was triumphantly progressing inland, the Reichstag refused to vote twenty-five thousand dollars for a survey of the first section of a transcolonial railway in East Africa! In

1904, the Deutsche Bank got a concession for a single track from Dar-es-Salaam to Mrogoro. Work was begun in 1905.

The dissolution of the Reichstag, in 1906, referred the question of colonial policy to the country. The general election was a victory for Imperialism. A completely new era commenced for German East Africa and all the other colonies. The Reichstag began to cooperate with Dr. Dernburg and the new Ministry of Colonies. Generous imperial grants were voted, and railway construction by Government initiative and by Government expense was started.

In December, 1907, train service was initiated from Dar-es-Salaam to Mrogoro. The next stage was to Kilossa, which rapidly became the great inland city of the colony. In six years the remarkable feat was accomplished of continuing the railway directly across German East Africa to Lake Tanganyika. It reached the lake port terminus at Kigoma in 1913. Immediately the German railway became the shortest and best route from Belgian territory to the coast. The upper valley of the Congo, the extreme northern part of Rhodesia, and even portions of Nyasaland and Uganda Protectorates, found in the German line the best outlet for their trade. Economic conditions in the Central African lake country were completely changed. No single engineering feat in African history has been wrought in so short a time and brought so important results. During the same period the ocean terminus of the railway, Dar-es-Salaam, has been transformed from a negro village, in whose suburbs lions prowled,

to a "clean and imposing residential town, laid out with handsome squares and avenues, and furnished with substantial churches, hotels, and public buildings, and neat, white tropical houses. The 'harbor of peace' still shelters native craft, but majestic liners now ride on its well-sheltered waters."[1]

Before the construction of the railway—they could not wait for that—the administrative organization of the colony was started by the authorities on an extensive scale. After each punitive expedition, military posts were established. Following the remarkably successful example of the Italians in Somaliland, wireless telegraphy was included in the scheme of military operations almost from the beginning of the placing of upland posts. In 1903, a departure was made from the custom of other German colonies, which levied a head tax, and the hut tax, so satisfactory in some British colonies, was adopted. The Germans were continually studying the results obtained by British and French administrators. The reports of German consuls and special commissioners all over the world included their section for the Colonial Ministry. Since 1906, a larger budget has made it possible for Berlin to receive information concerning the administration of rival colonies fully as complete as that which had long been received concerning their trade. The

[1] See Calvert's *German African Empire* (London, 1916), p. 196, to which I gratefully acknowledge my indebtedness for the fullest and most illuminating account available in English of what the Germans have accomplished in Africa. The maps in this volume, and its careful statistics, are as valuable as Mr. Calvert's text.

Germans, like the Japanese, owe much to the fact that they are the best students in the world of what others in the world are doing.

There has been, however, the handicap in East Africa as elsewhere of a too rigid bureaucracy, and the unfortunate Teutonic disregard of the rights of others when they come into conflict with Teutonic rights—or what are believed to be Teutonic rights. German missionaries had the same experience as in China. A bishop was murdered in the south-eastern part of the Protectorate, near Lake Nyasa, in 1905, and several of his colleagues suffered the same fate. There can be no doubt of the truth of the charge that German missionaries, like Belgian missionaries in the Congo, exacted unpaid labor of natives, and that the system of entrusting administrative districts to low caste native officials resulted in unjust exploitation and persecution. Until the Germans can recruit for colonial service a better type of men than they have had, German colonies will not be administered as well and as justly from the point of view of the natives, as British Crown colonies, which are the model and admiration of the world.

A curious speech of Prince Hohenlohe to the Reichstag in March, 1906, showed the difference between German and British ideas of treating Mohammedanism. He explained that there was a broad distinction between the advantageous cultivation of friendly relations with Mohammedan foreign powers and the attitude the German Government should adopt toward its own Moslem subjects.

In the one case, German policy was dictated by "the necessities of the general international situation." In the other case, it was the duty of the Government to promote the spread of Christianity in the German colonies. If favor was being shown to Mohammedans in Government schools in German East Africa, and if Moslems were selected for petty posts in preference to native Christians, it was because they had to accustom the natives to a Christian atmosphere before attempting to teach them Christian doctrine. Nothing could be more reprehensible and more pernicious than such ideas. Proselytizing is not a Government's business: but if it is undertaken, it should be undertaken openly. Moslems are too clever to be fooled. Being missionary enthusiasts and propagandists themselves, they respect the man who tries openly to convert them. He is doing only what they themselves would do, and they understand his motive. They see without difficulty through the dissimulation of indirect methods, and they despise the dissimulator—all the more so because he has made religious zeal the excuse of his hypocrisy.[1] No German needs to wonder why

[1] As far as the eastern end of the Mediterranean goes, the French have made a fatal political mistake in laying emphasis upon their traditional position as defenders of the Catholic Church. In Turkey and the Balkans, Moslems of very mediocre knowledge of the world know that France ten years ago drove the religious orders out of France and confiscated their property, and yet in Moslem countries was granting at the same time large sums for the schools and religious propaganda of these very orders, and jealously defended their property rights even from fancied infringements. Books like Psichari's recent posthumous *Voyage du Centurion*, in which the

Islam has not followed the Turks in the present war. Arab Moslems are at heart enemies of all *ghiaours* (infidels). But, from personal and frank intercourse with them, in several countries, I have found that the Englishman is the only *ghiaour* they trust. They like the Frenchman better than the Englishman. But they do not trust him. The German they neither like nor trust—except where they have never come into contact with him and know nothing about him.

In 1908, after a visit to East Africa, Dr. Dernburg said that he had found the condition of the natives unsatisfactory, and the judicial system unfavorable to them. There were too many officials on the coast, and too few in the interior. He was opposed to the encouragement *at present* of European immigration, but he had sent an Under Secretary to study the capabilities of the highlands for white settlement, as was being done in British East Africa. He returned with the firm conviction that it would be bad policy to restrict Indian immigration. The Indians were indispensable to the Government in many ways, and were an essential part of the economic life of the

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French soldiers in Northern Africa are represented as being each "a Christopher, carrying Christ," show that Prince Hohenlohe's views are not without sponsors in France. Among Englishmen, also, "Chinese" Gordon has not been the only colonial official who believed he had a proselytizing mission. A very recent example is General Sir Ian Hamilton, whose proclamation to the Turks assured them that the English were coming to Turkey with no intention to destroy their independence or religion, and whose speech to his troops on the following day, when they were disembarking at Gallipoli, ended with the words, "You are starting upon the last Crusade!"

country. This was in contradiction to the view expressed by the German Colonial Society's Congress the year before. The Congress had recommended that the authorities issue regulations and adopt measures with a view to the better protection of small German traders and settlers against Indian merchants, and suggested restrictions similar to those in South Africa. There were nearly fifteen thousand Asiatics in the colony at the outbreak of the European War. The European settlers had passed the five thousand mark, and over four thousand of them were native-born Germans.

In the ten years from 1903 to 1913, the trade of German East Africa increased five hundred per cent. In 1912, it had reached over twenty million dollars, and jumped two and a half million dollars upward in 1913. In spite of extensive public works, the budget did not show a large deficit.

Contrary to what has been frequently asserted during these past two years, public opinion in Germany, as we have already seen in the matter of the putting down of the Herero rebellion in Southwest Africa, has been very much alive to the responsibility of Germany toward her native wards. One has only to read the newspapers and reviews, and to look over book lists, and to go through parliamentary debates during the past fifteen years, to realize that only in Great Britain, among all the European colonizing Powers, has there been manifested as much humanitarianism and idealism as in Germany with regard to the establishment and maintenance of a just and enlightened colonial régime. At this

moment, it is exceedingly important that this statement be made by one who cannot be suspected of sympathizing with Germany in the present war or of trying to plead the German cause. The truth is the truth. Only on the truth can the future be built. In France, in Belgium, in Portugal, in Italy, in Russia one looks in vain to find so widespread and so important a championing of the cause of native races as one finds in Germany.

In the early part of 1914, the Reichstag passed a resolution asking for the abolition of serfdom in East Africa before January 1, 1920. A Government white paper pointed out that it would be dangerous to fix a date for abolition. But at the outbreak of the war German public opinion was still demanding that this date be fixed. In East Africa, Germany had been dealing with the slavery question very much as Great Britain dealt with it in Zanzibar. It was enacted in 1905 that no native could be born in slavery after that year, and that slaves could purchase their freedom for a small sum, which masters are not allowed to prevent them from earning. In eight years nearly twenty thousand had emancipated themselves by their own efforts. It was estimated that only eighty-five thousand were left, and that in fifteen years slavery would disappear entirely. The white paper used practically the same arguments as those of the British authorities in Zanzibar against the hastening of the emancipation process by fixing an arbitrary date, while there were still many old slaves alive. For these would be left without means of existence.

To mark the thirtieth anniversary of the colony, an exhibition was being prepared for August, 1914, at Dar-es-Salaam. When August arrived, the Germans in East Africa were cut off from the rest of the world. Left to their own resources, they managed to carry on a resistance that is just drawing to a close when these lines are being written in October, 1916.

CHAPTER XIII

THE PROBLEM OF THE PORTUGUESE COLONIES

IN the fourteenth century, one hundred years before a united monarchy ruled over Spain, dislike and fear of the Spaniards led Portugal to seek foreign aid to prevent absorption in the unification of the Iberian Peninsula. There were later treaties with Charles I., Cromwell, and Charles II. The infeodation of Portugal to England was completed by the Methuen Treaty, signed shortly after the outbreak of the War of the Spanish Succession. For over two hundred years Britain has held the Portuguese in a state of complete vassalage. She used the Portuguese against Spain and against France to break their sea power and their budding colonial empires. Now Germany is having the same experience.

The Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of 1703 put Portugal in economic as well as political dependence upon England. During two hundred years this dependence was contested only by Napoleon. At the end of the nineteenth century the British began to feel anew the danger of a change in the comfortable *status quo* they enjoyed in regard to Portugal. Ger-

many loomed up as a successful economic rival. Her representatives started to "intrigue" at Lisbon. The reason for Germany's interest was the valuable Portuguese colonial empire, which financial difficulties and political decadence made Portugal incapable of exploiting. Spain saw the disappearance of her colonial empire in the war of 1898 with the United States. Could Portugal hope to hold much longer her overseas possessions?

When Germany entered Africa her two great southern colonies became neighbors of Portugal. She installed herself on the coast of the Atlantic south of Portuguese West Africa, and on the coast of the Indian Ocean north of Portuguese East Africa. In 1887, a treaty was signed delimiting the Germano-Portuguese frontiers on the Indian Ocean side of the continent, which was immediately followed by an extension of commercial interests in Portugal and in the Portuguese colonies.

It was an advantageous moment for Germany. The British penetration north from the Cape towards the center of Africa brought Great Britain and Portugal into conflict. Portugal, relying upon the general interpretation as to hinterland possessions agreed upon in the international conferences about African spheres of influence, believed that she had the right to the interior of Africa between her colonies on the Atlantic and the Indian Ocean. But the British won over native chiefs in Nyasaland and along the Zambesi valley. An ultimatum was presented to Portugal in 1890. The oldest colonizer of Africa had to bow to force. On June 11, 1891, a

treaty was signed which destroyed forever the hopes of Portugal to a transcontinental African colony, just as the same argument of force, applied eight years later to France, destroyed forever similar hopes of French Imperialists in North Africa. I do not mean to imply that the British were acting towards Portugal and towards France in an indefensible manner. The enterprise of British explorers and the energy and ability of British military and civil officials to profit by the principle of *carpe diem* brought the reward which is "the way of the world." But, as is also "the way of the world," the final and convincing argument applied both to Portugal and France in Africa was superior force. Yet that the Lisbon and Fashoda ultimatums did not alienate Portugal and France definitely from Great Britain is a tribute not only to British diplomacy but also to the confidence born of experience in Anglo-Saxon fair dealing—once Anglo-Saxon pretensions are acknowledged and claims admitted.

The last years of the nineteenth century were marked by an event which, in the light of present events, might have been a turning-point in history. Chamberlain, Rhodes, and other British Imperialists of the early days were firm believers in the necessity of building the future of Great Britain, especially in Africa, upon the foundation of an understanding with Germany. *Rhodes saw peace and prosperity for Great Britain, and the realization of his dreams in Africa, only in harmony between the two great Teutonic races of Europe, which was to be shared with Anglo-Saxon countries overseas, the United States, Canada,*

and Australia. His South African empire was to cooperate with German Southwest Africa and German East Africa. If Portugal could be made to develop her African heritage herself, Great Britain and Germany were to stand behind her and help her. If Portugal proved hopelessly beyond reform, Great Britain and Germany should divide the Portuguese colonies.

Mr. Rhodes visited Berlin, and talked over with the Germans his plans of railway expansion in South and Central Africa. He secured Germany's consent to join in railway schemes that would bind the system he had in mind for British penetration in the interior with outlets through German and Portuguese territories to the coast. Mr. Chamberlain signed a treaty with Germany in 1898, providing for an eventual partition of the Portuguese colonies between Germany and Great Britain. This treaty has never been published: but it was not officially denied at the time, nor has it been since. Germany was to have the Portuguese possessions in Asia; East Africa south to the junction of the Zambesi and Shiré rivers; and West Africa north to Cape Santa Maria, including the whole of Mossamedes. Great Britain was to cede Walfisch Bay to Germany, and receive the rest of Portugal's African possessions. According to British explanation, semi-officially made after the secret leaked out, the two Powers had no intention of buying or seizing the Portuguese colonies or of impairing the legitimate sovereignty of Portugal. They were simply arranging "economic spheres"—something like the

later Russian and British spheres in Persia, I suppose![1]

The Boer War and the accession of Edward VII. brought a change in Anglo-German relations. German industry, German commerce, and the German naval program alienated British opinion from the policy of Rhodes and Chamberlain. Germany and Great Britain drifted apart. In 1904 came the agreement with France. In 1907, the agreement with Russia made it clear that Great Britain had thrown in her lot with Germany's enemies. But the will of Cecil Rhodes stands as the record of what he believed was the hope of the future of Anglo-Saxondom and the basis of peace for the world in the twentieth century. He expressed the hope that his countrymen would cultivate the friendship of Germany in the most unmistakable terms. He felt deeply the necessity of Anglo-Saxon solidarity. He left money to enable Americans and Germans to study at Oxford, in the "implicit belief that a good understanding between England and the United States of America and Germany would secure the

[1] See Berlin *Lokalanzeiger*, December 28, 1899, and London newspapers *passim*, during January, 1900. *Cf.* A. Marvaud, *Le Portugal et ses Colonies* (Alcan, Paris, 1912), p. 58. "Il est difficile de pousser plus loin l'hypocrisie," writes M. Marvaud. I gratefully acknowledge my indebtedness to this illuminating volume, a careful economic study of the Portuguese colonies, which has helped me greatly. Most of this chapter, however, and especially what is said of the rivalry between Germany and Great Britain and the effect of the problem of the Portuguese colonies on their foreign policy, is taken *verbatim* from an article I wrote in Constantinople two years before the appearance of M. Marvaud's book and four years before the war.

peace of the world and that educational relations form the strongest tie."

Events may not have proved that Cecil Rhodes was right: but they have yet to prove that he was wrong.

As elsewhere in the world, and especially in Africa, the increase of German trade and the multiplication of German enterprises has been especially marked in Portugal and the Portuguese colonies since 1900. German imports to Portugal more than doubled between 1900 and 1910, and the German carrying trade was threatening to displace that of Great Britain in 1913. Germany's increase, proportionately, was far greater than that of any other nation, both in trade and shipping. In the Portuguese colonies the figures are eloquent. In spite of vexatious tariff discrimination and port regulations, German ships were bringing each year a notable increase of German goods to Portuguese colonies in Africa and were taking the exports to Hamburg, very often to be resold and reshipped there in German bottoms to the very country which owned the colonies![1]

The alarm that has been felt in recent years by the British over the possibility of Germany getting a foothold for coaling stations and naval bases in the Portuguese colonies is illustrated by the sanatoriums incident in Madeira. In April, 1903, a German artillery officer, who had gone to Funchal for his health, secured a concession for sanatoriums and hotels for invalids. He had formed a company and the terms of the concession allowed gambling.

[1] See below, p. 320.

The London press immediately took up the matter and declared that Germany was trying to "invade" Madeira. They called attention to the fact that the island was "only some hours distant from Gibraltar," that the Germans would expel English merchants, create a "diplomatic incident," and end up by installing themselves in the Portuguese islands. The British Minister at Lisbon was instructed to declare to the Portuguese Government that Great Britain would not permit the German company to acquire any privilege to the detriment of British subjects. The German concession had in it a clause allowing expropriation. When the Germans tried to expropriate a property belonging to an Englishman, the crisis became acute.

The Portuguese Government was not allowed to refer the matter to the Hague Tribunal, or even to offer the Sanatoriums Company another property in exchange for the one they desired to expropriate. Great Britain insisted on the concession being cancelled. For years the matter hung fire: the German company demanded a large indemnity. Later, a new company, almost entirely English in its stockholders, applied at Lisbon for the gambling concession, with the intention of working along the German lines. In 1909, there was again a great campaign in the London press over German "intrigues" at Lisbon. It was claimed that Germany was trying to buy some small islands off the Portuguese coast, and that Germans were being given privileges at Lorenzo Marques.

British public opinion has always been unalter-

ably opposed to transfers of territory anywhere in the world that might affect her position as "mistress of the seas." To maintain her world supremacy, Great Britain is always willing to fight. That is reasonable. One likes to keep what one has, and to prevent others from changing the *status quo*. The historian has no quarrel with the frank expression of this determination. But he has a quarrel with the strange and altogether untenable idea that other nations are "faithless" and guilty of "treachery" and "brutality" and "disturbing the world's peace," who try to carve out for themselves a place in the world by following the same path of acquisition along which Britain and her predecessors in world empire have intrigued and bluffed and fought their way. Denying that the past has any effect on the present is as illogical as it is pernicious. We cannot be surprised at and denounce and try to remedy effects *unless we make a sincere and detached study of causes*.

The Madeira and Azores islands are an integral part of Portugal. Since Spain lost her colonies, the Portuguese colonial possessions in Africa and Asia are, in extent of territory, larger than those of any country in the world, except Great Britain, France, and Germany. They have not, however, as large a population as the colonies of Holland. Aside from a foothold in China at Macao, and small bits of territory in India and the Malay Archipelago, which mean little more than the memory of ancient glory,[1]

[1] To a Power like Germany, which has so few footholds in the world, Goa, Damao, Diu, Macao, and Timor might prove of value

Portugal as a colonial Power has her interests in Africa, and is important only in Africa.

Portuguese colonies in Africa consist of the Cape Verde Islands, a group in the Atlantic off the western shores of the continent, where its bend is most accentuated; Guinea, an enclave, wholly surrounded by French West African territories; São Thomé and Principe, two islands in the Gulf of Guinea; Portuguese West Africa (Angola), from the mouth of the Congo south to German Southwest Africa; and Portuguese East Africa from Cape Delgado, boundary with German East Africa, south to Delagoa Bay, which cuts off the Transvaal from the sea, and is just north of Natal. These colonies cover nearly eight hundred thousand square miles, and have a population of over eight millions.

There are fourteen islands, some very small, in the Cape Verde group. As they are on the route from Europe to South America, and command the coastal passage around Africa, their situation is of unusual importance. The cables to Brazil and to South Africa touch St. Vincent, and also the line to Bathurst, in British Gambia. In the hands of a Power like Germany, these islands could easily become an incomparable naval base, coaling station, and wireless telegraphy center. To Portugal they have no value. The Portuguese have not been able to develop them in the interest of their inhabitants: nor have they made use of the advantage that the

as naval, coaling, and wireless stations. To Great Britain or France, who have many ports and islands in the same waters, they would be of no value, except to keep out someone else.

route to South America passes between the two northern islands of the group, St. Anthony and St. Vincent. Agriculture is in a deplorable state. The inhabitants have not even been taught to use plows. They have been allowed to destroy the trees of the islands by unchecked goat pasturage. The natives are in a state of distressing degradation. An enterprising nation would not only make the islands pay by their cultivation, and lift the inhabitants to the level of European civilization; but would also profit by the situation on the trade routes to establish coaling and provision depots and dry docks. The lamentable state of civilization in the Cape Verde Islands is a striking proof of Portugal's inability to discharge the duties of her stewardship.

Guinea tells the same sad story. It is traversed by three deep rivers, and off its coast are numerous islands. The possibilities of a strong fortified harbor and of developing a splendid trade with the interior are greater in Guinea than in the neighboring possessions of France and Great Britain. What Senegal and French Guinea and Gambia and Sierra Leone are, is the strongest possible indictment of Portugal as a colonial power. The colony has fertile soil, rich forests, unrivaled means of communication by water with the interior, and the protection of a compact group of islands just off the coast. Where France and Great Britain have wrought miracles in the immediate neighborhood of Guinea under far less favorable conditions, Portugal has done absolutely nothing. The French and British colonies more than pay for themselves. Guinea shows a large

yearly deficit. Outside of four towns, the Portuguese occupy few places and develop none. Portugal's title to Guinea is a disaster to the inhabitants, who are good workers, owning good land. When the boundary between France and Portugal was definitely fixed in 1906, the French Commissioners saw what a rich country, easy to exploit, was being ruined. To those on the Portuguese side it was "abandon hope, you who are fated to remain here." The wealth of the forests is almost entirely neglected.

The port of Bissao is connected only monthly with Lisbon. The greater part of the commerce, both exports and imports, is in the hands of Germany.

São Thomé and Principe are beautiful islands, fertile, and, when one takes into consideration their nearness to the equator, salubrious. Almost everything in the way of tropical product has been tried on these two islands. But during the past quarter of a century, cocoa has been grown so successfully that it now furnishes ninety-five per cent of the total exportation, and has given to the Portuguese Ministry of Colonies the delightful and unaccustomed surprise of a colony with a budget surplus. And yet only a third of the total area is cultivated and only a sixth is worked to yield in a scientific modern way. For there are no satisfactory means of communication. When cocoa first became a source of wealth easier to tap than gold mines, the question of establishing means of transport and communications that would put the two islands wholly under modern cultivation was raised. In fact, a law was passed in 1899 for

railway construction. It has been pushed (?) in so typically Portuguese a manner that nine miles have been completed on São Thomé in fifteen years, and the plans for Principe are still being studied. Roads and little coast ports and overhead cables have also been planned. They may come in time. Up to now, the backs of negroes still afford the chief means of transport. The trouble is that the Portuguese Government uses the surplus from the cocoa industry of these islands to try to meet the huge deficits of the other colonies.

Portuguese exploitation of native labor in São Thomé and Principe stands forth, next to the rubber atrocities of Belgium in the Congo, as the darkest page of European colonization in Africa. In 1907, when the Congo agitation was at its height, Mr. H. W. Nevinson made a trip through Angola, starting inland from Loanda and coming out to the coast at Benguela. He then visited the two cocoa islands. His book, *Modern Slavery*, is a terrible indictment of Portuguese officialdom and greed. He proved that the method of recruiting laborers in Angola for the cocoa plantations was slave trade of the most heart-rending sort. Portugal was compelling her mainland natives to go to São Thomé and Principe to work on the cocoa plantations. They were recruited with no consideration whatever for principles of humanity, and were allowed to suffer and die on the islands, driven to work as the Pharaohs used to drive their subjects to pyramid-building. Mr. Nevinson said that the callous indifference of the Portuguese Government to treaty obligations should call for the

intervention of governments "more sensible to the claims of civilization and Christianity." The great English cocoa firm of Cadbury sent out a competent and reliable man to investigate the accusations of Mr. Nevinson. His report confirmed in every particular the story told in *Modern Slavery*.

The British Government made representations at Lisbon. But, just as at Brussels, English agitation was interpreted as due to commercial jealousy. The Portuguese resented what they called "unfounded accusations"[1] and "hypocritical sentimentality." Only when Portugal saw that British public sentiment was resulting in a boycott of her cocoa were measures taken to reform the heartless methods of exploiting natives. The menace to the pocketbook and not the appeal to humanity led Lisbon to announce in November, 1907, that the administration of the Portuguese colonies would be reformed. More than a year passed before anything was done.

In July, 1909, a royal decree suspended for three months recruiting of natives on the Angola mainland for island plantations. Sir Edward Grey told the British Parliament that Portugal seemed now to give proof of an honest intention to correct the abuses. Portuguese action was hurried by the news that the large cocoa firms of the United States had decided (in the summer of 1909) to join British manufacturers in boycotting Portuguese cocoa. Portugal had to take the matter up with the British Antislavery

[1] A Portuguese official investigator reported that the natives were "not badly treated," but fifty thousand were being retained after the expiration of their "contracts."

Society, and assure its officials, by giving them a chance to investigate themselves, that the Angola slave trade had been stopped. The heavy mortality among the laborers in Principe was attributed by the Portuguese to sleeping sickness. It was proposed to recruit laborers, under proper safeguards, from Mozambique, with the promise of repatriation on the completion of a two years' contract.

The Portuguese settled at the mouth of the Congo before Columbus discovered America, and have had coast settlements from the Congo south to Tiger Bay for four hundred years. Portuguese West Africa, or Angola, as it is commonly known, is fourteen times the size of Portugal, and has a wonderful coast line with many ports of great value, and rivers through all the interior, navigable for long distances from the ocean. Its hinterland is a continental watershed, containing sources of Congo tributaries and the headwaters of the Zambesi. And yet although its soil is fertile and its forests rich, the colony has never been properly exploited. It still imports more than it exports, and costs Portugal yearly enormous sums of money, which are only met by taking the surplus of the cocoa producing islands and increasing the Portuguese national debt. Had it not been for the necessity of forming fixed boundary lines with Germany, Great Britain, and Belgium, much of the interior would still be unexplored. As it is, there are portions of Angola of which the Portuguese know very little. The tribes of the interior have not all accepted Portuguese authority. They have necessitated, especially during the period of our

review (before that they were mostly let alone), numerous military expeditions. The hinterland is not organized effectively either from the military or civil point of view.

In 1904, native troubles were serious. After two hundred and fifty soldiers in outlying posts had been massacred, the authorities felt the necessity of sending out a punitive expedition five thousand strong. In 1905, there was a new revolt of considerable extent near the German frontier. In 1907, regiments had to be sent in a hurry to Angola from Lisbon. In 1912, there was considerable fighting on the Katanga border. In 1914, the natives of the south and of the Congo frontier were once more in rebellion. With all these military operations, costing sums that Portugal had to borrow at high interest, large portions of the interior are not even organized as military districts, much less brought under civil administration!

The Belgians to the north, with their very narrow coast line,—enjoying only free access to the mouth of the river, in fact,—have got the trade from the interior, which ought to be Portuguese, largely in their hands. The Germans on the south, with a colony that has no ports and a hinterland not one tenth as rich as that of Angola, have covered their possession with a network of railways, and made their colony self-supporting. When we see what the British have done in the hinterland in the creation of Rhodesia, we realize how fortunate for the world it is that a British ultimatum, twenty-five years ago, prevented Portugal from extending her sovereignty from one coast colony to the other. Rhodesia, with

its rapid economic development and its extensive railways, is a reproach to Portugal.

Unlike Germany and Great Britain, Portugal has tried to make her colonies a preserve for herself. Her tariff scheme in Angola is calculated in such a way that Portuguese ship owners and Portuguese merchants will make all the profit out of the exploitation of the colony. Portuguese products pay only ten per cent of the tariff. Other products, disembarked at Lisbon, and reexported from there to Angola, enjoy a reduction of twenty per cent. Imports entering Angola under the Portuguese flag pay only half the tariff. The result is, of course, insufficiency of shipping facilities for exports, and contraband over the Belgian frontier and a prohibitive price of articles coming into the colony from abroad. The Portuguese customs lose far more revenue than they gain by their tariffs, and the high cost of living prohibits successful colonization. If Portugal had the shipping facilities for developing herself the possibilities of Angola trade, or if she manufactured in Portugal articles to sell to her colony, there might be some justification for this tariff policy. As it is, Portugal cuts off her nose to spite her face. She has huge sums to pay to retain possession of the colony at all; colonists and natives are in a bad economic state; and Africa suffers from the maladministration and nonproductivity of one of its richest areas.

Formerly, Angola lived from slave traffic. When that was stopped, sugar cane was grown to manufacture spirits for native consumption. The Brussels Act of 1899, in which the European states

holding African possessions pledged themselves to put excessive taxes on alcohol in order to stop its use by natives, ruined this industry—if it can be called by that name. The Brussels Conference of 1906 raised the tax by thirty per cent. for a period of ten years. Portugal was allowed to retain the old tax in Angola, but the industry was already condemned. Nothing has replaced it.

Cotton is indigenous to Angola. Before the development of the rubber boom, it was the great industry. It could become so again: for Portugal uses nearly half a million pounds of American cotton.[1] This could easily be raised in Angola. Laws were passed in 1901 and 1906 to encourage the cotton industry in the Portuguese colonies. But results have not been encouraging. Methods of planting and harvesting are primitive; means of transport are lacking; the tariff régime discourages colonization and foreign capital; and Portugal has no capital herself.

One can say, however, that Portugal has of recent years tried hard to remedy conditions in Angola. The trouble is that her handicaps are too great for her. She fears that giving out concessions on a large scale to foreign concerns will mean the eventual loss of the colony. Her own people are ignorant and poor. Her Government has no conception of a free trade régime. To illustrate the evil of the Portuguese protective system, one has only to cite the reason for lack of labor. It is not due to lack of hands, but to the high price of food to feed the

[1] Eighty thousand families in Portugal are dependent upon cotton industries and trade.

hands and to lack of machinery for development. When the freight charges, due to trans-shipment at Lisbon or to high Portuguese steamship and railway rates, or the direct entry duties, are added to the original price of everything that is imported, it puts the cost of production so high that developing the country does not pay.

There are three lines of railway into the interior at the present time, from Loanda, Benguela (Lobita Harbor), and Mossamedes. The Loanda line is owned by a private Portuguese company, the Benguela line is an English concession, and the Mossamedes line is state-owned. The Loanda line has reached about half way to the Belgian frontier. The Mossamedes line, after ten years, has not progressed much more than a hundred miles. The English line from Lobita Harbor, which leaves the coast at Benguela, was started in 1902 by a British engineer, who formed a company for the purpose of building a trans-continental railway to join the line from Beira to Rhodesia. In ten years this line reached Bihe, and at last accounts was being rapidly pushed toward the Marotseland frontier. It will follow the valley of the Lungwebungu River to the Zambesi and then down the Zambesi to Victoria Falls, where it will meet the Cape to Cairo railway. When this line is completed, the mails from the Cape to London will save four days, and Rhodesia will be nearer England in time than the Commonwealth. A northeastern branch to this railway will run from Bihe into the Katanga province of the Belgian Congo, opening up an enormously rich and still partially unexploited

territory. Although this railway is being financed and constructed by British capitalists and engineers, there has been some official opposition to it in British Government circles, on the ground that it will deflect considerable trade from the Cape to subsidized Portuguese and German steamship lines.

The annual deficit of Angola increased rapidly before the war, and reached in 1912 double the revenue. In 1913, the situation of the colony was desperate. A group of Portuguese banks offered to loan eight million dollars to the Government at six and a quarter per cent. to be used exclusively for railway development in Angola. In the spring of 1914, however, the Colonial Minister told Parliament that not less than forty million dollars was required, *and that something must be done immediately to demonstrate to the world the ability of Portugal to administer and develop this colony.*[1] He declared that the lack of effective administrative control was clearly demonstrated by the yield of the hut tax, which was only one hundred and forty thousand dollars, when it ought to be three million dollars. His remedy was incorporated in a project of the law, providing for a huge loan to finish the railways, roads, and ports; revision of laws concerning land concession, native labor, commerce and industry, revision of tariffs; creation of new lines of navigation between

[1] Señor Lisboa e Lima had undoubtedly received official intimation of the serious "conversations" going on at that moment between Great Britain and Germany. He accepted during the same month, *without Britain opposing* offers of a German syndicate and German banks to help in Angola.

Europe and the colony, organization of a liberal banking and credit system in the colony; new law for colonization, to encourage small colonists; and a revision of the tariffs of the mother country in everything that concerns colonial products. Within three months came the war.

Portuguese East Africa was, like Portuguese West Africa, a fifteenth-century colony, settled as a stopping-place on the way to India. It is fortunate in its geographical position. One has only to look at the map to see how essential to the British in South Africa is the retention of this vast country by a weak nation, which can be held under British tutelage. For over a thousand miles the western boundary of the colony touches the Transvaal and Rhodesia. The southern portion of Nyasaland, including the whole valley of the Shiré, is an enclave in Portuguese territory. The Zambesi, from the junction of the Loangwa River to its mouth, runs through Portuguese East Africa. The northern part of the colony touches the shore of Lake Nyasa. To the port of Beira, in the center, runs the railway from Rhodesia to the sea. To the port of Lorenzo Marques in the south runs the railway from the Transvaal to the sea. Were it not for the outlet through friendly Portuguese territory, Nyasaland and Rhodesia would be badly landlocked. The same can be said of the northern portion of the Transvaal. For the mining portion of the Transvaal, outlet through Portuguese territory is shorter and cheaper than through Natal. To have this colony pass into German hands would be a calamity to British supremacy in South Africa. From the

standpoint of France, also, Portugal is a safer neighbor than Germany. For Madagascar lies off the coast of Portuguese East Africa, and the Comoro Islands are in the channel between Madagascar and Mozambique.

It is difficult to overestimate the importance and tremendous possibilities of the territories under the Portuguese flag along the Indian Ocean. Mozambique, in the north, neighbor of German East Africa and British Nyasaland, and holding a generous coast line on Lake Nyasa, is the territory through which the railway from Lake Nyasa to the coast must run. Quilimane, just south of Mozambique, will some day be as important as Delagoa Bay in the south. For it is not only the key to the Shiré River valley of Nyasaland, but to all the Zambesi valley, which runs for a thousand miles in Portuguese territory. Sofala Bay, in which is Beira, increases in importance as Rhodesia is developed. Delagoa Bay, in which is Lorenzo Marques, is the outlet for the richest country in Africa.

To the Union of South Africa, the possession of Delagoa Bay by Portugal is extremely unfortunate, and has been the cause of internal complications for the South Africans. When gold was discovered in the Transvaal, Delagoa Bay became the natural outlet for the Rand. After the British conquest, Natal expected this extremely profitable transit trade to be deflected to Durban. This might have been possible were it not for the fact that Portugal is the Transvaal's neighbor all along the Transvaal's eastern frontier. Even were it possible to send and receive the Rand and southern Transvaal trade

by way of Durban, the haul would be considerably longer for the northern Transvaal. Then, too, the Rand depends upon the Portuguese colony as a recruiting ground for native labor. So the port of Lorenzo Marques has prospered wonderfully from its transit trade with the Transvaal.

Over fifty years ago Great Britain tried to claim Delagoa Bay, in spite of the fact that the Portuguese had been in effective possession since the end of the eighteenth century. The British founded their claim on the fact that the Portuguese had not occupied both sides of the bay and all the islands in it. On the south side of the bay and on an island the British flag had been planted in 1823 and 1861. The question was submitted to arbitration. The decision rendered in 1875 was in favor of Portugal. Not until after the Boer War did the British realize what this award had cost them.[1]

[1] During the Boer War, however, Great Britain constantly violated the neutrality of Portugal in East Africa. Ammunition and troops passed from Lorenzo Marques and Beira into the interior whenever it was convenient to have them pass that way. The British Government declared that Portugal was bound by treaty to Britain, and that this gave the right. But Portugal was bound also by treaty to the Transvaal, particularly in regard to the very Lorenzo Marques–Pretoria Railway in question. It is the same thesis as that used by the Allies to defend the Salonica disembarkment. Greece is the ally of Serbia, etc. But at the same moment the Allied Ministers sustained exactly the opposite thesis at Bucharest, when it was a question of German reservists and officers and war material passing to Turkey. Still, Rumania was at that moment the ally of Germany and Austria-Hungary. All of which goes to show that Governments are bound by treaties and international law only when it is to their interest to evoke treaties and international law on their side.

In 1888, a railway line, built by a private international company, was completed from Lorenzo Marques to the Transvaal frontier. It was only fifty-five miles long. Taking advantage of the technicality that the actual frontier of the Transvaal was several miles beyond the terminus of the railway, and that the concession was for the construction of the railway *to the frontier*, Portugal confiscated the line. After ten years of litigation, the builders of the railway were awarded damages that fell considerably short of their claims. There were rumors current that Great Britain and Germany were going to divide Portuguese East Africa in return for advancing the indemnity Portugal was condemned to pay. Upon this the Transvaal Government offered to loan Portugal the money. But Portugal found the amount of the award in a disinterested quarter, and saved what has become her most valuable bit of territory.

When the British became masters of the Transvaal, Lord Milner confirmed, as a *modus vivendi*, the former treaties of the Transvaal with Portugal for transit trade through Lorenzo Marques. Immediately after peace was reestablished, the rivalry became acute between Cape Town, Durban, and Lorenzo Marques for the Transvaal carrying trade. The story of this competition, which ended in the treaty of April 1, 1909, between Transvaal and Portugal, is told elsewhere.[1] Its importance to Portugal is the fact that it assured to Lorenzo Marques a minimum of fifty per cent of Transvaal trade for ten years, and

[1] See above, pp. 78–82

thus establishes for Portuguese East Africa a large revenue from the fact of the lucky position of this port. It is not probable, however, that if Lorenzo Marques remains Portuguese territory, it will continue to be able to exact a lucrative toll without giving more in return than is given now. There is reason to believe that the South African Union will make every effort to bring Delagoa Bay and Lorenzo Marques under the British flag with the peace settlement of the European War.

In 1907, autonomous government on the representative system was granted by Portugal to the Lorenzo Marques district. In 1910, on the strength of the Transvaal Treaty, Lorenzo Marques secured a loan of four million dollars to construct coal depots and stone quays, dredge the channel, and renew the rolling stock of the railway.

The problem of Portuguese East Africa is different in every particular from that of Angola. Angola is a colony whose prosperity and economic development depend entirely upon the way it is administered. Its five thousand square miles of Africa, held by a nation that has neither the ability nor the money to make its possession worth while, remain stagnant —but without serious consequences to any one except the owners. Portuguese East Africa, on the other hand, must be opened up and pacified and developed, in spite of the hopeless maladministration of the Portuguese. It is too far away, also, from Portugal to suffer, as Angola is suffering, from the policy of preferential tariffs. Portugal simply cannot assume to trade with her East African colony

as she trades with her West African colonies.[1] The imperative necessities of Nyasaland, Rhodesia, and the Transvaal have made Chinde, Beira, and Lorenzo Marques open ports for through trade, and have led to the establishment of bonded warehouses under foreign control. Thanks only to the development of the interior by Great Britain, the Portuguese have succeeded in extracting sufficient toll from transit trade to balance the budget of this colony.

Nor has Portugal been allowed to say in East Africa, as in Angola and Guinea: "If we are unable to take advantage of our colony, that is our affair. We shall keep others out." The fear of being forcibly dispossessed compelled the Portuguese to make tolerable conditions of transit trade at the ports, the proper running of railways, and the maintenance of suitable transport facilities on the Zambesi. Covetous neighbors have been kept from encroaching politically by the farming out of large

[1] In spite of the monthly P. and O. and Messageries Maritimes services, the Germans enjoyed almost the monopoly of foreign trade. For a while the British gave up the north bound regular sailing. The rates of the Deutsch Ost Afrika Linie to Hamburg were less than the French rate to Marseilles. The same conditions prevailed even in the British Indian Ocean ports. German goods for Portuguese territory, and for transit into the Commonwealth and Rhodesia as well, were rapidly supplanting English goods. Colonists as well as natives preferred German goods, not so much for the reason that is so frequently given by English and French writers, *i.e.*, cheaper price for shoddy goods, as for their suitability. The Germans put on the market everywhere in the world what they knew, from studying local conditions, customers wanted—not what they thought customers ought to buy.

portions of the colony to foreign capitalists, After the scare of the British "big stick" in the hinterland question, it was believed that if subjects of the "Great Powers" were given concessions on a liberal scale, such as Rhodes and his associates enjoyed in the interior, powerful capitalists might find it to their interest to champion the maintenance of the colony under the Portuguese flag, and Lisbon would have an unanswerable argument to the accusation that the country was not being developed. Chartered companies, also, would enable Portugal to collect a revenue without investing any money and doing any work.

It is impossible in the limits of this book to go into the history of the chartered companies. The most important are the Mozambique, Nyasa, and Zambesi companies, which were formed in 1891, 1892, and 1894. Their twenty-five-year concessions are just drawing to a close. To these companies Portugal gave practically complete sovereignty, in return for seven and a half per cent. of their revenue. The companies have had to build the railways and telegraph lines wholly at their own expense. They have enjoyed the right of giving sub-concessions. What agricultural and mining development has taken place in Portuguese East Africa is due to these companies. The Mozambique Company founded Beira, built the railway to Rhodesia, and has developed the port. The Zambesi Company is building the railway from Quilimane to Shiré, and manages the Zambesi River transport through a sub-concession.

None of the chartered companies, in spite of their

possibilities, have succeeded well under Portuguese rule. There are too many discouragements, and too many disagreements with Lisbon. Shares soon became a speculation. For several years there has been a movement on foot to suppress the charters entirely or to make radical changes. Certainly a completely new system of government will have to be arranged for Portuguese East Africa. To the prosperous and growing hinterland a continuation of the present régime is intolerable.

In 1911, the shooting of a British missionary by a Portuguese official on the Nyasaland frontier led to a diplomatic incident with Great Britain that shows how Portuguese colonial administration was viewed in England just before the war. The shooting was established by the evidence of competent witnesses to have been wholly unprovoked. It took a year to bring the official to trial and then he was sentenced to *one year's imprisonment.* The trial was a farce. In remonstrating, the British Foreign Office demanded that this man be not reemployed in a responsible position. The note stated that the tragedy was the result of having an uneducated soldier, totally unfitted for his place, in a government post. Portugal was told plainly that Great Britain could not let this incident pass without declaring that in the future only properly qualified officials must be appointed to posts in which they would have to deal with British interests of serious importance.

In going over the statistics of Portuguese East Africa for the decade before 1914, one is struck with the fact that the Portuguese revenues are practically

wholly parasitical, due to the lucky accident of geographical position. The British pay for the use of ports and railways. The Germans pay for the privilege of running Zambesi River steamers and for carrying the export and import and coastal trade. The natives find work in the Transvaal. From fifty to sixty thousand go yearly to the mines in British territory, and carry back to spend in Portuguese territory three to four million dollars a year. The chartered companies pay for the privilege of existing under an obnoxious régime. I wish I could find something encouraging and kind to say about Portuguese colonial administration.[1] There is nothing in the facts but ground for destructive criticism. This is the only chapter in my book where I cannot do what I like always to do—find the bright spots and bring them out strongly.

Since the beginning of the twentieth century, with the exception of one year, Portugal has had to increase her national debt to meet a serious budget deficit. The balance of trade is also increasing against Portugal. The last available statistics before the war showed imports considerably more than twice the value of exports. Only Turkey of all the European states is so hopelessly in debt. But Turkey's debt is not larger than Portugal's: and Portugal has a quarter of Turkey's population and

[1] The Portuguese themselves have evidently passed adverse judgment on their colonial administration. For in Africa more Portuguese live outside of Portuguese rule than under it. There are more Portuguese in the American colony of Hawaii, on the other side of the world from Portugal, than in all the Portuguese colonies put together.

not a tithe of Turkey's resources. Portugal's debt, in fact, is nearly as large as that of the United States and bears more interest. Half of Portugal is uncultivated, only two per cent. of her area wooded, her merchant marine smaller than that of any nation with an ocean coast except China, and her navy smaller than that of any nation except Norway. Between seventy and eighty per cent of her population is illiterate.

In every nation an anti-colonial policy has been adopted by advanced radicals. European governments have had the same experience as that of the United States. The Socialists of Germany, Belgium, Italy, France, and Spain, and the Labor Party of Great Britain, have been untiring in their criticism of colonial administration and their opposition to colonial budgets and colonial military expeditions. Radicals are almost always anti-imperialists. Portugal has been no exception to the general rule. Her radicals have found the armor of their government much the easiest in the world to pierce. To understand the internal history of Portugal, and her colonial policy since the accession of the ill-fated Dom Carlos, it is essential to keep constantly in mind the struggle of Republican elements against the dynasty. The Republican party has always used the colonial question to attack the monarchy. One moment the Republicans would be the champions of Portuguese pride against Great Britain and Germany, and the next the defenders of Portuguese taxpayers against the Colonial Minister's demands upon the budget.

The assassination of Carlos and his heir in 1908, followed by the expulsion of Manoel in 1910, brought the problem of the Portuguese colonies once more before the world as a question of far-reaching international importance. During the four years between the birth of the Republic and the beginning of the European War, there were constant rumors of the intention of Portugal to sell her colonies to Germany. Discerning readers could see in the way these reports were commented upon a clear indication of how Great Britain and Germany were drifting towards war.

The unwillingness of the British to execute the Chamberlain Treaty of 1898 or to allow Germany to deal directly with Portugal in this question was a sure sign of their determination not to allow Germany to establish naval stations and coaling bases that might jeopardize Britain's maritime supremacy. The articles of Blatchford and the general campaign of alarm against Germany in the British press were indicative of this determination. There were many liberals in Great Britain and Germany who determined that the two nations should not be allowed to drift into war. They tried their best to bring about an understanding between the governments on the naval program and other points at issue. Among the important questions that came up in these informal and semi-official *pourparlers* was the problem of the Portuguese colonies.

Shortly before the outbreak of the war, it was the belief in Portugal that the two great rivals had come to a new understanding. This time, Germany was

to have all of Angola, and was to give up in return to Great Britain privileges that her subjects had acquired in Mozambique. So persistent were these rumors that they were noticed editorially in the London press. The *Times* declared that there was nothing in the new Anglo-German accord to diminish the value of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance, and no intention to despoil Portugal, either by purchase or any other means, of any of her colonies. An important German newspaper at the same time, speaking of the law for the development of Angola, just presented to the Portuguese Parliament by the Colonial Minister, said: "These plans seem to us deserving of commendation. The exposition of the Minister of Colonies is characterised by undoubted sincerity, and his project of law seems to be well worked out in all its details."[1]

Three days after Great Britain joined France and Russia against Germany, Premier Machado stated that Portugal could not disregard the duty of her alliance with England, and the Lisbon Parliament declared that Portugal was on the side of the Allies "as much as is necessary and up to whatever point is necessary." But for nearly eighteen months there was no certain indication that Portugal intended to embroil herself with Germany. The people certainly wanted to fight, especially after an actual state of war had arisen in Angola, where German and Portuguese soldiers came into frontier conflict. It is not easy at the present writing to

[1] See leaders in *London Times*, May 28, 1914, and *Kölnische Zeitung*, May 22, 1914.

give a clear idea of what has happened in Portugal during these past two years. According to the sympathies of the man to whom you talk or the newspaper you read, is the information given to you. As far as I can gather, the question of intervention or non-intervention in Portugal was the old question of Republic or Monarchy. The Germanophiles and anti-war partisans were monarchists. The Government got into the hands of the reactionaries. Although troops were sent to Africa to fight the Germans, and although the Portuguese Cabinet received from Parliament on November 23, 1914, full power to declare war upon Germany, Baron von Rosen, the German Minister at Lisbon, seemed to retain great power. Parliament was closed by armed force, municipal councils dissolved, and functionaries of the old régime reappointed to prefectures and sub-prefectures. It required what was virtually a second revolution to maintain the Republic.

When Germany declared war on Portugal in the spring of 1916, a new situation was not established in Africa, where the Portuguese had long been in open conflict with the Germans. But it made easier the final stages of the conquest of German East Africa.

Portugal's alliance with Great Britain and France may save her colonies for a while. But they certainly will not be retained permanently, unless, with French and British help, they are properly developed. The parable of the Ten Talents works in colonies as well as in everything else.

CHAPTER XIV

THE BRITISH IN WEST AFRICA

THERE are four British colonies in West Africa. On the extreme western coast of the continent, Gambia, extending back for several hundred miles along the banks of the Gambia River, is a narrow enclave in French territory, just south of Senegal. Sierra Leone has a considerable extent of coast line, but not much hinterland, south and west of French Guinea, and west and north of Liberia. Farther east, on the north littoral of the Gulf of Guinea, the Gold Coast Colony parallels German Togoland, and is, together with Togoland, an enclave in French territory between the Ivory Coast and Dahomey. The northern frontier of the Ivory Coast Colony is an arbitrary line, which marks equally the northern confines of Togoland. But the Gold Coast is almost twice as wide as Togoland, and has a very much more extended coast line. In fact, as elsewhere in Africa, the Germans are shut off from a logical and natural portion of their coast line by a projection of British territory. Nigeria is much larger than the other three colonies put together. It has a very important portion of the coast line on the Gulf of Guinea, just west of the bend, and contains the lower valley of the Niger River, with its delta, and the

outlet of Benue River, which, with all its tributaries except one, has its source in German Kamerun. The northern boundary of Nigeria extends nearly to 14° N., and has most of the western border of Lake Chad. Its southern and eastern neighbor is Kamerun. Nigeria projects into the German colony far enough to control Yola at the confluence of the rivers which form the Benue.

All four of these possessions are protectorates in the hinterland and Crown Colonies on the coast. The latter two have been formed gradually by the same process of penetration as in East Africa, and are still in the process of transition. Just as in British East Africa, the Government has been changed—or rather organized and consolidated—during the period of our survey.

Gambia and Sierra Leone are extensions of the old British West African settlements of Bathurst on the Island of St. Mary and of Freetown. Both colonies are extremely interesting as examples of prosperity that has come during the past fifteen years, and of the unadulterated profit that England enjoys from the possession of bits of territory like these scattered all over the world. In Gambia, trade doubled from 1906 to 1912, and reached over £2,000,000 in 1913. Forty per cent. of the imports were English goods from Liverpool. The surplus of revenue over expenditure was nearly £30,000, and the whole country was kept in order by one hundred and twenty-five soldiers and native policemen. The colony has no debts, and is no expense whatever to the mother country.

In Sierra Leone revenue has exceeded expenditure since 1905, and trade almost doubled between 1908 and 1913, passing in the latter year £3,000,000. Two-thirds of the imports were furnished by England, and two-thirds of the total trade was carried on British ships. A narrow gauge railway, owned by the Government, runs directly across the colony from Freetown to the Liberian frontier, and another line is being constructed through the northern portion of the colony to the French frontier. Freetown is a fortified coaling station.

Two matters of general interest in the history of European colonization stand out during the past fifteen years in Sierra Leone. In the hinterland, when the Protectorate was organized administratively, nine-tenths of its revenue came from the imposition of a hut tax. The natives protested against this, and it was exceedingly difficult to make them understand the reason for it. There were many revolts, and in some cases tribal chiefs, who assisted the authorities in its collection, were killed or driven into exile. Some Europeans took the side of the natives, and claimed that the prosperity of the colony was steadily declining because of the persistence in exacting this tax. But in an uncivilized country, where import duties are negligible and where the Government can hardly adopt the former customs of warlike tribes to collect a tax on through trade, seeing that they went into the country on the pretext of destroying this very practice, how can expenses be met during the years of economic development in any other way than by a head tax or a hut tax? Until protec-

torates are fully organized, the hut tax is by far the more feasible. Homes can be located, their number established, and difficulties of identity avoided—especially where a population is migratory or can easily become so to avoid taxation. By quiet and steady persistence, the Sierra Leone authorities were able to report in 1913 that there was trouble over the hut tax collection in only one district.

The second matter is the fight against secret cannibalistic societies, whose practices are repugnant to European ideas of humanity and justice. As British control spread to the interior, it was the policy to continue to keep order and to administer justice, as well as to collect taxes, through native chiefs and in accordance with native laws. But where an organization known as the "Human Lecpards" was holding secret meetings, with a ritual demanding the sacrifice of boys and girls, followed by a cannibalistic feast, the authorities felt compelled to intervene, and declare that such practices would be treated as murder. In 1905, there were twenty-eight murder convictions for the crimes of this organization. After eight years of unremitting effort, the authorities reported that they had not yet succeeded in getting the better of the "Human Leopards." In 1913, over three hundred persons, including several paramount and tribal chiefs, were arrested, and a special court was set up to try them. It was exceedingly difficult to get evidence even from the relatives of the victims. Only twenty-four could be brought to trial, and nine convictions for murder were secured. There were seven executions.

Organizations like the "Human Leopards" furnish one of the most perplexing problems of the European administrator in the interior of Africa. They have probably existed for centuries, are ingrained in the character and habits of the people, and are believed to be a medicinal and spiritual necessity. Aside from officials, there are probably less than fifty Europeans in the protectorate portion of Sierra Leone among a native population of nearly a million and a half. It is open to question whether one can compel the natives to adopt a European attitude toward practices that are repugnant to *our* nature, until, living among them and revealing to them our civilization by example as well as by word, we make these practices repugnant to *their* nature.

In regard to both of these problems, which are found in the recent history of other protectorates besides Sierra Leone—every protectorate, in fact, that claims sway over the interior of the African continent—the reader may ask whether it is logical and just to force an alien Government and alien standards upon the natives against their will, compel them to pay taxes to support what they do not want and hate, and punish them when they violate an ethical code *which is peculiarly ours and of which they have no conception.* This question comes up everywhere in the pages of recent African history. The answer is very simple, much more simple than it seems on the face of it. We ask the question only because Africa to-day affords the example of transition that long ago took place in Europe and more recently in America. In Africa we see with our own eyes and

in our own day the working out of the inevitable law of the imposition of the superior civilization upon the inferior civilization. It is the triumph of mind over matter, of knowledge over ignorance. The survival of the fittest is a spiritual rather than a physical test. We cannot get away from the white man's burden. The impulse to make others like oneself has always been as strong in the human race as the impulse to propagate the species.

The man who opposes and ridicules and deprecates missionary effort is logical only if he is sincerely willing to have himself, his family, and his country, lapse back into the period when his ancestors walked through the forests of Germany with untanned skins hanging from their necks and clubs in their hands, looking for men from the next village to kill. By the same token, the Government official, who is grappling with problems of civilizing natives under his charge, is logical, when he condemns missionary effort, only if he denies that Christian influence has created the institutions he is trying, by purely secular means, to force the savages to understand and accept. Education alone will civilize Africa. The spread of commerce and the opening up of trade routes alone will make workable and permanent European institutions in Africa. Education is possible only through missionary agencies, and the whole history of Europe extending outside of Europe teaches that the flag follows the cross.

Is it not significant that in Sierra Leone, as well as in the neighboring republic of Liberia, the substitution of Islam for paganism—so marked in the last

decade—has done more to check the evil of drink, to turn the natives away from cannibalism and to reconcile them to the necessity of submitting to a central constituted authority than all the efforts of French, British, and German military and civil officials? How much more could Christianity do?

The littoral between the French Ivory Coast and German Togoland, for 350 miles along the Gulf of Guinea, is known as the Gold Coast Colony. Accra, the capital, has nearly twenty thousand inhabitants. From Secondee to Coomassie, the capital of Ashanti, 170 miles in the interior, there is a railway, which cost £2,500,000. Two other small lines, in the eastern part of the colony, will in time reach the upper valley of the Volta River, the boundary line between Togoland and the Gold Coast. In the hinterland of the Gold Coast are Ashanti and the Northern Territories.

The Kingdom of Ashanti was a very recent British Protectorate at the beginning of the twentieth century and its wealth in gold mines and forests was just beginning to be realized. In 1900, a new governor of the Gold Coast, Sir Frederick Hodgson, visiting Coomassie, heard that the Ashanti had a golden stool or throne. He sent the police to find it. The Ashantis had long been wanting to rebel against British authority, and reinstate their King. This gave an excellent reason for an outbreak. The Ashantis invested Coomassie, and for several months it was believed that the garrison, who were defending the Governor and Lady Hodgson, would succumb before help reached them. The official party, with a por-

tion of the garrison, managed to break through the besieging forces after several months, and arrived at Accra nearly starving only a few days before Coomassie was finally relieved. The folly of Sir Frederick Hodgson compelled the British to undertake a regular war against the Ashantis, which, after a summer campaign, ended, as all native wars must end, in a decisive victory and annexation. Ashanti became British territory by Orders in Council of September 26, 1901, and has since been governed by the administration of the Gold Coast Colony.

When Ashanti was annexed, another farther bit of the hinterland was placed under British protection, and frontiers arranged with Germany and France. This is known as the Northern Territories, and is governed by a Commissioner at Tamali, subordinate to the Governor of the Gold Coast. There are many Mohammedans in the Northern Territories. It is believed that valuable gold mines may be developed when railway communications are established through the valley of the White Volta.

The annexation of Ashanti was the beginning of a new era for the Gold Coast. It gave impetus to the railway construction to Coomassie, which was imperative for permanent pacification. The railway, in turn, stimulated the gold industry, which grew in the ten years from 1903 to 1913 from £100,000 to over £2,000,000. The Ashanti War cost £400,000, which was imposed upon the Ashantis as a debt. It involved the British Government in 1904 in the expenditure, also, of nearly £300,000 in the Northern Territories.

Like Gambia and Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast is proving a valuable market for British trade. Liverpool supplies a substantial part of the imports. Sixty per cent. of the carrying trade is under the British flag. Trade doubled between 1906 and 1912, and jumped ten per cent. over the figures of 1912 during the year before the European War. Year after year the surplus of revenue over expenditure increased until it reached £200,000 in 1912. In 1913, the large accumulated surpluses were spent in harbor works, water works, and sanitation, and new railway lines were planned to the cocoa districts. In the Northern Territories, however, it was estimated in 1914 that many decades would be required before that part of the Gold Coast paid its way.

As its name implies, this region attracted Europeans for its mining wealth. But gold has been exported since the fifteenth century, and the mines, under present conditions of intensive development and large production, cannot be considered as a permanent source of wealth. The British have been experimenting in the Gold Coast and Ashanti, as in almost every other African colony, in cotton growing. The British Cotton Growing Association sent experts throughout Africa in 1903 to stimulate a movement that they hoped would in time make Manchester wholly independent of American cotton. Although the Ashanti chiefs were reported to be interested, and were started in cotton growing, the propaganda cannot be said to have succeeded in this part of Africa. Gold still holds the premier place in Ashanti exports, and is surpassed in the Gold Coast only by

cocoa, which is being grown on enormous and constantly enlarged plantations.

British efforts in the Gold Coast have been stimulated by French and German activities around the colony. The remarkable development in gold mining, which has paid railway expenses and enabled the colony to accumulate a surplus, has been very fortunate for those who have been working along lines of agricultural development. But sanitary conditions have never been satisfactory, and the mortality among officials and other Europeans is exceedingly high. The possibilities of the country are unlimited, if only it can be made habitable for Europeans on a large scale. At present there are less than two thousand Europeans in the colony, and very few indeed, outside of officials and missionaries, in Ashanti and the Northern Territories.

Little Togoland was easily conquered in the first month of the war by the Gold Coast forces, cooperating with the French. The Gold Coast Legislative Council, enthusiastically hopeful of keeping permanently the German colony whose wonderful development is sketched elsewhere in this book, offered to pay the total expenses of the conquest, and to contribute £80,000 to the general war expenses of the British Empire during 1916. If Togoland remains in British possession, the Gold Coast will have not only the entire valley of the Volta River, but will gain possession of the thriving port of Lomé, just beyond their coast line, and the two railways leading back into the interior of Togo. Hope is expressed in British Imperialist circles, not only that Togoland

will remain British, but also that France, by receiving compensation elsewhere, will be willing to cede Dahomey and Bornu to Great Britain. If Nigeria keeps Kamerun, and the hopes of ousting the French from Dahomey be realized, Great Britain will be master of the whole of the Gulf of Guinea coast line, and British West Africa will become a colonial possession second to none in Africa.

Nigeria, whose interest and importance to the British Empire has been realized only now that the dreams of the future include the German Kamerun, is largely a product of the twentieth century. The British flag first appeared in what has grown to be Nigeria, in the little kingdom of Lagos, which was "bought" from a native King more than fifty years ago, after France had begun to extend her influence over the neighboring kingdom of Dahomey. It belonged first to Sierra Leone, and then to the Gold Coast, but was made a separate colony in 1886, after the Germans had got a foothold in Togo and Kamerun. Lagos was the nucleus from which the great territory of Nigeria has been built. If one glances at the map, it will be seen that the hinterland of this territory reaches the Niger at its second bend. Immediately after the colony and Protectorate of Lagos was constituted, the National African Company, which had prevented the Germans from getting the delta and the lower valley of the Niger, obtained a charter from the British Government under the name of the Royal Niger Company. The charter was surrendered in 1899, and the two Protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria were formed of its territories

on January 1, 1900. Southern Nigeria absorbed two smaller Protectorates, one of which was the "Oil Rivers," hurriedly constituted in 1885 to prevent Germany from approaching the mouth of the Niger. In 1906, Lagos was incorporated in Southern Nigeria, and on January 1, 1914, Northern Nigeria was taken in, and the whole Niger valley territory organized as a colony and Protectorate of Nigeria.[1] There is a governor-general, an executive council, which acts for the Protectorate as well as for the colony, and an advisory council with neither legislative nor executive authority.

The population of Nigeria is probably twenty millions, and its area is nearly three times that of the United Kingdom. Most of the inhabitants of the Hausa States in the northern Protectorate are Mohammedans, and the Islamic propaganda has made rapid strides south along the valley of the Niger. Lake Chad is at the northeastern end of Nigeria. The caravan routes across the desert lead to Tripoli, by which access to the Mediterranean is very much shorter than through Algeria. So Nigeria has been extremely interested in the development of French and Italian influence in North Africa, in the decline of Ottoman power, and in the Pan-Islamic movement. In regard to slavery, the same policy of gradual emancipation has been adopted as in Zanzibar, and the

[1] A special silver coinage for all the West African colonies was introduced shortly before the Nigerian unification. In size, weight, and value the coins correspond to those of the United Kingdom. The reserves to guarantee the coinage are deposited in London, under the control of the West African Currency Board.

results of fifteen years demonstrate the value of this policy in doing away with slave-dealing, if not with slavery, among Moslem tribes, who are under Arab and Moslem influence and who have fashioned their social institutions and customs and laws by Mohammedan precept and example.

Lagos, before the amalgamation of 1906, was growing in the same rapid way as Sierra Leone and Gambia. In 1905 there was an excess of revenue over expenditure of £30,000. Lagos is another illustration of the profit British manufacturers and merchants and shippers derive from colonies. For Lagos in 1905 took over seventy-five per cent. of her imports from Great Britain. The Colonial Loans' Act of 1899 enabled Lagos to secure the money for a railway into the interior, which has since been extended to Jebba on the second bend of the Niger River, and connects there by ferry with the line from Kano to the Niger.

The 1905 report of Lagos admitted that much of the revenue was derived from spirits duties, but declared that the importation of spirits could not be prohibited without seriously dislocating the finances of the colony. The growing sentiment against alcohol in Great Britain, and the belief that African natives were being demoralized by rum, led to agitation in Evangelical Church circles and among Nonconformists. Missionary reports and speeches of missionaries home on furlough did much to deepen the conviction that an enlightened Christian nation should not abolish slavery and introduce civilization in Africa only to demoralize the freedmen with the

curse of Anglo-Saxondom. After the coming of the Liberal Government to power in the General Election of 1906, a victory won by Nonconformist votes, political pressure was brought upon the Colonial Office to investigate the liquor traffic in West Africa. In December, 1908, a committee was appointed to go to Nigeria for this purpose.

The findings of the committee were very different from the representations of some travelers and all missionaries. The committee reported that in Southern Nigeria spirits furnished twenty-two per cent. of the total imports and provided fifty per cent. of the revenue. Rum paid two hundred per cent. and gin three hundred per cent. duty. But the merchants engaged in liquor importation were almost exclusively Dutch and German, and the spirits came chiefly from Rotterdam and Hamburg. The Commission stated that the standard of sobriety in Southern Nigeria was much higher than in Great Britain, and concluded that "there is absolutely no evidence of race deterioration due to drink . . . hardly any alcoholic disease among the native population, and with the exception of one or two isolated cases, we found no connection between crime and drink." But the agitation continued. The Colonial Secretary was asked to extend the Sierra Leone system of local option throughout the West African Colonies, and to make illegal the use of gin as currency and the practice of pawning children for gin. He gave a non-committal reply.

It is extremely difficult to come to a definite conclusion on this subject, of which one hears and reads

so much. On the one hand, it is easy to believe that those who are anxious to preserve the equilibrium of budgets are very greatly, if unconsciously, influenced in their attitude toward a question of this kind by their desire not to lose a vital item of revenue. On the other hand, it must be remembered that the missionaries consider drinking a sin, wholly reprehensible in itself, and are apt to exaggerate—unconsciously also—the evil effects of a practice they condemn *on principle*.

The conquest of the hinterland of Nigeria occupied a period of five years, from 1901 to 1906, and is one of the most remarkable feats ever accomplished by a British colonial administrator. Sir Frederick Lugard not only had to work with inadequate military and civil establishments and with grants far below his needs, but he was also hampered by the same *laissez aller* policy of the Home Government which rendered the situation in Somaliland so difficult during the same period. If he had depended upon guidance and advice from London, and had not possessed initiative to an extraordinary degree, France and Germany might have cut the British off from Lake Chad, occupied the Yola Province on the River Benue, and anticipated the British in establishing a protectorate over the Hausa States.[1] On the other hand, the task of extending British sovereignty over the hinterland received powerful support from Imperialists and from local sentiment in the Lagos

[1] A portion of the area, *potentially* British through the enterprise of Sir Frederick and his associates, was sacrificed by the compensations to France in the Anglo-French Agreement of 1904.

and Southern Nigeria colonies. France and Great Britain were bitter rivals, and Germany was beginning to develop the neighboring Kamerun in what was, from the British Imperialist point of view, "an alarming manner."

Nigeria had to lend troops to the Gold Coast for the relief of Coomassie and the subsequent Ashanti campaign. As soon as they came back, a vigorous forward policy was decided upon. For France was still smarting from the humiliation of the Fashoda affair, and determined to make as much as possible out of her paramount position in the Upper Niger Valley and in the eastern Sahara and Sudan. Her aim was to have Lake Chad wholly French and to limit by anticipation the British and German penetration north and northeast from the Gulf of Guinea. Against the British, the French plan was to get control of the valley of the Sokoto River from the border of the desert to its junction with the Niger, and also to control the whole basin of the Komadugu Waube running along the southern edge of the desert eastward into Lake Chad. They entered what the British claimed was their "sphere" and nearly precipitated a second Fashoda crisis by killing an English officer. But at the same time, the troops who had come back from Ashanti overthrew the Emirs of Kontagoro and Beda, two of the most powerful feudatories of the Sokoto Empire. During the autumn of 1901, the province of Yola, in the Upper Benue Valley, which the Germans coveted, was brought under administrative control, and a resident placed at Yola.

In 1902 the diplomacy that foreshadowed the Anglo-French Agreement of 1904 was initiated. It was decided to make a delimitation of French and British spheres south of the Sahara, to determine the Lake Chad boundaries, and to modify—or rather to make more precise—the Convention of 1899 in regard to the Sudan spheres of influence. As the French were claiming a frontier from the Niger to Lake Chad, which would give them access to the Benue River, thus shutting the British off entirely from Lake Chad, the Nigerian officials sought to make effective their occupation of this region. Their success depended upon the acceptance by the Emir of Kano of the British Protectorate that Sir Frederick asserted his predecessor had agreed to. The Emir proved recalcitrant and refused the bribes of British agents. Sir Frederick announced that the only possible policy for the future of Nigeria was to include in the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria the entire territories of the Hausa States. In spite of the lukewarmness of the Colonial Office, he precipitated a conflict with the Emir of Kano and other Sokoto vassals in 1903. Sokoto was occupied on March 15th, and, after much difficulty and one serious reverse, the Emir of Kano was tracked and killed in June. Less than one thousand men were at Sir Frederick Lugard's disposal, but with them he was able to include the entire Sultanate of Sokoto in Nigeria, and to bring the British sphere up to the edge of the Sahara.

The Anglo-French Agreement of 1904 compounded the rivalry with France. But there was still much

work to be done to pacify the territories left to the British. For several years after Lugard's resignation, there was much fighting. Emirs who proved refractory were killed or deposed. On the Anglo-German frontier, Germans and British combined to subdue the resistance of remote tribes, and in the north those who resisted the European penetration were caught and crushed between British and French. After the Europeans came to an understanding, resistance on the part of the Africans was hopeless.

The railway from the Niger was pushed on to Kano. The British worked in the organization of Northern Nigeria through the local emirs. By respecting their customs and laws, and by granting civil lists to the emirs and fixed salaries to native officials, the loyalty of the "protected" to the "protectors" was established upon the solid basis of financial interest. In 1910, Sir Frederick's successor in Northern Nigeria held a court at Kano, to which the emirs came from long distances. Fourteen thousand native cavalry formed his escort. An Imperial proclamation declared the land of the Protectorate under the control of and at the disposition of the Crown, in order that natives might be assured of their rights to the land and to forest produce.[1] In 1911, when the railway to Kano was completed, the Government claimed that unarmed Europeans and natives could now travel with perfect security from one end of Northern Nigeria to the other. In

[1] It is interesting to note that Great Britain showed her good faith in the controversy with Belgium, which was acute at this time, by doing in Nigeria what she asked Belgium to do in the Congo.

1912, Sir Frederick Lugard returned to amalgamate the northern and southern Protectorate and the colony. He held a Durbar at Kano on New Year's Day, 1913, which was attended by emirs and chiefs representing sixty-eight tribes, loyal and contented under British rule.

While Northern Nigeria was being penetrated and conquered, Southern Nigeria increased in prosperity every year. After the inclusion of the Lagos colony, Southern Nigeria was more than self-supporting. In 1908, there was a revenue surplus of over £200,000 and grants from the Imperial Government had been discontinued. The revenue had doubled in five years, and the sound financial condition of the colony made possible the issue of a loan of £3,000,000 at four per cent. for harbor works and railway construction. 1910 brought an increase of £350,000 revenue (25 per cent.) over 1909, and trade increased £2,000,000. The tin mining area in exploitation had tripled. One ton of tin was exported in 1903: fifteen hundred tons in 1912. In 1913, it was reported that the total trade of Southern Nigeria had more than doubled in six years, and that the surplus of revenue had reached £120,000. In 1914 the Colonial Office was able to reduce railway rates and the scale of tin mining royalties.

Although during the same period Northern Nigeria was still costing much more than it brought in, it was considered wise, as in the case of Sierra Leone, to unite the Northern Protectorate with the prosperous colony and Southern Protectorate. Hinterland development would mean prosperity for the coast.

The coast had every reason, then, to be glad to contribute to that development, and to supervise and manage it.

On January 1, 1914, the union was effected, and the public debt unified. In view of the war that followed so soon, with the long and arduous campaign that had to be undertaken against Kamerun, union came at a most fortunate moment.

In Nigeria as in the Sudan, East Africa, Uganda and Nyasaland, the first decade of the twentieth century was marked by an extraordinary interest in cotton-growing experimentation. In 1902 a movement was begun, backed by money and specialists from the British Cotton-Growing Association, to make cotton the staple industry of British West Africa. Ginning mills were erected and premiums offered—in many cases facilities for loans granted to those who were willing to undertake the cultivation of cotton. For several years there was much enthusiasm. In spite of some failures in 1906, cotton cultivation was believed to be the great industry of the future. Mr. Winston Churchill evidently believed of West Africa what he had said of East Africa during and after his trip from Mombasa to Cairo overland. When the bill for the Kano railway was introduced in 1907, Mr. Churchill told Parliament that this railway would mean the development of a new cotton-growing area *which was going to save Lancashire from dependence upon the United States!*[1] It was a typi-

[1] Sir Gilbert Parker remarked that the commercial uses of the Kano railway, as Mr. Churchill exposed them, made the bill inconsistent with the free trade policy of the Government. Mr. Churchill re-

cally Churchill utterance, very much like later combined boasts and prophecies about the defense of Antwerp, dragging the Germans out of Wilhelmshaven like rats, and walking across the Gallipoli peninsula to Constantinople. Cotton is not exactly a failure in Nigeria, but the promises and hopes of 1907 have certainly remained unfulfilled. Only £150,000 of cotton was exported in 1913, less than one-thirtieth of the value of the palm-oil export. Tin, which just began to be a Nigerian industry in the year of Mr. Churchill's speech, was an export four times the value of cotton in 1913.

For all this, the activities of the British Cotton-Growing Association bear watching on the part of the United States: and the progress of cotton cultivation in Africa and in Asiatic Turkey foreshadow a time—perhaps not far distant—when Europe will no longer need the cotton of our Southern States. The cotton-manufacturing industry in America ought to be developed along with the cotton-growing industry in Africa. When the day arrives that Lancashire will no longer need our raw material, we must be in the position no longer to need Lancashire's manufactured goods.

This summary review of the history of Nigeria is sufficient to indicate the secret of British success in African colonization. It is in the character of the men entrusted with colonial administration, their enterprise, their vision, their ability to conciliate,

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plied that there was a wide difference between improving traffic communications and erecting a tariff wall.

and make happy the natives whom they have subdued. Up to the present time, England has furnished the unique example of a nation able to utilize its best talent in the building of an overseas Empire. Napoleon was not wrong when he called the English a nation of shopkeepers. They are merchants *par excellence*, and their foreign policy has been dictated ever since the days of Cromwell by purely commercial considerations. They spend their money and they sacrifice the blood of their people only when they know it is going to pay them to do so. But by a curious paradox, the men who have made Great Britain the premier commercial nation of the world have been led into the work of building the Empire because they themselves looked down upon and scorned to enter trade. Just as in feudal days the fighting men purchased the right to a place above their fellows and became the aristocracy by being willing to take the risk and the burden of defending the peasants of the field and the artisans of the city, so up to the present time the British aristocracy has preserved its caste and its privileges by devoting its energies and its brains and its blood to the enrichment and protection of traders and manufacturers. The Liverpool and London merchant and the Manchester and Sheffield manufacturer grows rich. The Liverpool and London ship-owner grows rich. He is perfectly willing to take off his hat to the military and naval officers and the colonial administrators who are making possible his prosperity. In the city and in the country he yields precedence to the nobility and the county families. Their children are

sacrificing themselves for his children. When he teaches his son the mysteries of the bank balance, he teaches him at the same time what is due to those who make that bank balance possible. Why not? As long as he is content with the station of life to which God has called him, and his "betters" are content with theirs, why not indeed?

Perhaps the war is going to change all this. But if it does, it will change the colonies also.

CHAPTER XV

THE GERMANS IN WEST AFRICA

ON the north side of the Gulf of Guinea, Germany is ensconced in a narrow strip of territory called Togoland. This colony, with Great Britain's Gold Coast colony, is an enclave in French territory between Dahomey and the Ivory Coast. The German boundary on the west with Great Britain is partly formed by the Volta River. On the east, the Mono River divides Togoland from Dahomey. Both with France and Great Britain the lateral boundaries of the hinterland are conventional lines not exactly defined. Togoland has very little coastline. For Great Britain holds both sides of the Volta River and its mouth, including all of Cape St. Paul, and France holds Great Popo Island. Lomé, the railway terminus of Togoland, is as much at the mercy of the British, as Swakopmund, the terminus of German Southwest African railways.

On the west side of the Gulf of Guinea, between British Nigeria and French Gabun, Germany has the large colony of Kamerun, with an extensive coastline that includes most of the Bight of Biafra. Kamerun extends north to Lake Chad in a narrow wedge between the Shari and Yedseran rivers, and south-

east to the Congo in two wedges cutting through French Equatorial Africa. Rio Muni, or Spanish Guinea, is a little enclave in Kamerun, on the east side of the Gulf of Guinea, not far from the Franco-German border. The island of Fernando Po off the Kamerun coast, in the Bight of Biafra, is also Spanish territory. Since France has by treaty the right of preemption to Spain's African colonies, Germany has been in Kamerun, as elsewhere, not wholly master of her own destinies.

Togoland was neglected by France and Great Britain, although they had established themselves prior to the time when Germany began to have colonial ambitions at several points along the coast. There was just one wee opening for the Germans on the coast, Little Popo Island, on which German merchants had established factories in order to escape the duties levied by the British on the Gold Coast. The chief from whom these Germans had obtained concessions died opportunely in 1883, and the dispute over his succession gave the German Consul for West Africa the chance to slip in and hoist the German flag. By exploration of the hinterland, and successive treaties with tribal chiefs, a wider interior came under German sovereignty. In 1897 and 1899, treaties with France and Great Britain settled the general limits and the international status of the colony. The natives were brought under administrative control with much less difficulty than France experienced in Dahomey and Great Britain in Ashanti. In 1900, a military force of seven Germans and 150 natives was all the colony needed.

In the early days of the colony, Germany received a decided setback from the fact that France was able to make good her claim to Great Popo Island, which controls the larger portion of the coast. But the Germans consoled themselves for this political setback by starting commercial development of Little Popo and the Togo hinterland on a remarkably successful basis. Almost from the beginning they were able to substitute cash payments for barter to the great satisfaction and advantage of the natives. They put their minds, also, on the problem of getting out of the palm oil and palm nut industries all there was in them. So they were soon able to control the greater part of the Dahomey production. By establishing regular steamship service and by being able to offer a higher price for palm products, they succeeded in making Hamburg the depot for Dahomey as well as for Togoland.[1]

Togoland is one of the few happy colonies in Africa without a military and political history. Both from the administrative and economic point of view, the colony was well organized and on the way to self-support at the beginning of the twentieth century. By 1905, a coast railway was completed from Little Popo to Lomé. In the next five years two railways were built into the interior from Lomé, and surveys have since been made to extend the Lomé-Atakpame line to the very north of the colony.[2] Lomé, like

[1] See below, pp. 320–322.

[2] Togoland has had the common experience of colonies which keep railways and other public works in their own hands. Railway receipts in 1912 were seventy per cent. in excess of running expenses. After interest charges were paid and depreciation reserve laid aside, the profit to the colonial budget was considerable.

Swakopmund, Lüderitzberg, and Dar-es-Salaam, represents Germany at her best in Africa. In buildings, public works, and sanitation Lomé is the model city of the West African coast.

Germany has outstripped other colonizing powers in Africa in four things, all of which are strikingly illustrated in the little colony of Togoland: road-building for cooperation with railways and transport; accommodation for travelers in the interior; scientific forestry; and supervision of public health.

In a quarter of a century, with very limited means at their disposal, the Germans have built 750 miles of roads over which motor cars can run. Every mile has been placed to feed communities whose products for export justify the money put into the road. Nowhere in Africa, where white colonists are lacking, are the natives so well served in the way of roads as in Togoland. One can say the same of conveniences for travelers. Togoland is unique in its rest-houses for Europeans and for natives. At the end of the day's journey, one can always be sure of a comfortable place to sleep, where cleanliness is invariable. From personal experience on the Bagdad Railway in Asia Minor, I can testify to the joy the traveler finds in the modest little hotels that go with the German wherever he penetrates. In sharp contrast to the uncomfortable and filthy native accommodations in the Near East and in Africa are the clean beds and rooms and the wholesome food of the German inns.

None accuses Germany of not having got the most, *from the European standpoint*, out of the colonies she

possessed in Africa. We have spoken above of Dr. Rohrbach's report about the possibilities of Southwest Africa for cattle-raising, and the generous assistance given by the Government to encourage stock-breeding. In Togoland, the problem of forestation has received long and intensive study, and been the subject of reports, that have aided immensely the officials of other colonizing Powers. Herr Metzger, Forestry Superintendent of Togoland, found that sixty per cent. of Togoland was covered by non-productive growth, due to wasteful methods of the natives through many centuries. The reclamation of that land, and the better yielding of the forty per cent. under cultivation and virgin forest, was one of the principal ambitions of the Togoland Government. Mahogany was scientifically grown to a certain extent; but the marvelous development was in teak, which thrives everywhere. As in Hungary and Bulgaria, German forestry experts were reconstructing the forests by planting seedlings.

What the Germans accomplished in educating the natives in preventive medicine, and in caring for their personal and communal health and cleanliness, is marvelous. Not only were Government officials tireless in preaching the value of keeping clean, being vaccinated, burning or burying refuse, making a war on the fly and the mosquito, and other matters that are still not fully appreciated in many parts of Europe, but they enlisted the cooperation of paramount and local chiefs to an extent unknown elsewhere in Africa. The fight against malaria, yellow fever, sleeping-sickness, skin diseases, and tuberculosis, was carried

on with unremitting vigilance and enthusiasm. The greatest success was in vaccination. Smallpox is the most dreaded scourge of the country. The German propaganda made the native so alive to the value of vaccination that they came and asked for it and many paramount chiefs established compulsory vaccination by law.

In the same week that Dr. Nachtigal hoisted the German flag in Togoland, he succeeded in getting a foothold on the Kamerun coast by making treaties with native chiefs. He outwitted the commander of an English gunboat, who had proceeded to the Gulf of Guinea to prevent the Germans from getting a foothold there. Almost a year of discussion between the London, Paris, and Berlin Foreign Offices followed. Great Britain and France both had claims to footholds on the Kamerun coast. But Germany advanced similar claims to footholds at the mouth of the Niger and at Konakry, in French Guinea. German, French, and British claims all rested on shadowy foundations. If one be admitted, the others were equally good. As Germany's claim at the mouth of the Niger was just like the claim by which the British at that time were hoping to oust the Portuguese from Delagoa Bay, London thought it best to make a treaty with Berlin, recognizing Germany in Kamerun in return for German recognition of British rights in Nigeria. France ceded Great Batanga to Germany in return for Konakry.

For fifteen years not much was done by British and Germans to develop the hinterland between Nigeria and Kamerun and Lake Chad. Great

Britain and Germany got busy only when they saw the French trying to put the whole Lake Chad region under the French flag. In 1902, Germany and Great Britain cooperated in a military and surveying expedition along their common frontier *with the object of fixing boundaries*. The underlying motive was, of course, to prevent the French from getting into the Bornu country, between their colonies and Lake Chad. Nigerian and Kamerun authorities were in perfect accord, and the official reports of 1903 are much in the nature of a mutual admiration society. The object of cooperation was accomplished. Native tribes were "pacified," and at the beginning of 1904 France saw that she had to accept Britain and Germany as neighbors on Lake Chad. British and German authority was firmly established in Nigeria and Kamerun in 1904 from the coast to Lake Chad. The definite Anglo-German boundary was not fixed until 1913—*except at the farther unknown Lake Chad end*. That was the only part of the game which needed hurry and an understanding. That the British Cabinet did not hesitate, even after *pourparlers* were under way, to continue to work with Germany in Morocco and to seek German aid in doing France out of her "legitimate rights" to Bornu is one of the factors in causing France to yield a few points she was holding out for in making the agreement with Great Britain. The Anglo-French Agreement of 1904 was business from beginning to end. There was no sentiment in it—except in retrospect.

Germany had much trouble with native outbreaks in Kamerun. The hinterland is vast and mountain-

ous and does not possess navigable waterways such as the British have in Nigeria. Military and administrative expenses were very heavy. But mahogany, ebony, ivory, rubber, and cultivated products made the colony actually as well as potentially one of great wealth. Kamerun is a splendid rubber country. The Germans looked at the rubber question from a broad scientific standpoint, keeping always in mind the future. Private *concessionnaires*, with their killing off of rubber trees and rubber gatherers, have not been allowed to give Kamerun the bad name of adjacent French and Belgian territory. Cocoa plantations doubled between 1908 and 1913. Timber export nearly quintupled in the same period. Mining industries, being wholly dependent upon transport, are not developed: although many minerals exist. The colony found fortune enough in forest and agricultural produce.

Kamerun territory was substantially increased, and given an outlet in two places to the Congo River, by the "compensations" granted by France in exchange for the recognition of the Protectorate over Morocco. The New Kamerun was enthusiastically and glowingly depicted to the German people by those who had to justify the Agadir *coup* and its aftermath. But the Reichstag thought very little of the diplomacy of the Foreign Office and the results accomplished by it. Almost immediately after the Congo territories were ceded by France, Germany had native troubles, which compelled the establishing of garrisons and the expense of a large punitive expedition.

Before Germany adopted a colonial policy, backed

by popular support, there was maladministration in Togoland and Kamerun, involving the governors of both colonies. In 1905, native chiefs of Kamerun protested directly to Berlin against the system of government of Von Puttkamer. To prove their charges, the Kamerun chiefs presented a register of arbitrary acts committed by the governor and his subordinates. These were numerous well-authenticated cases of brutality and administrative oppression. The whole matter was aired in the German press and in the Reichstag. The governors were recalled and tried. Both were found guilty of maladministration, and one of cruelty. Popular indignation was as great as at the time of the Peters trial.[1] Had there been no strong, irresistible public opinion, aroused by the appeal of the chiefs and the presentation of their pathetic evidence, the governors would have escaped trial. For Berlin bureaucracy went to the extent of destroying documents on file in the desire to save the culprits. The scandal led to the resignation of Prince Hohenlohe, and the abolition of the disastrous system of entrusting the manage-

[1] Dr. Peters, like Stanley and other famous African explorers, was charged with the most unbelievable cruelties to natives in the course of his trips in Central Africa. Stanley was never brought to book, as was Peters, but I have been assured by the Countess di Villamarina, whose first husband was a scientist who died on one of Stanley's trips, that her husband's diary gave irrefutable proof of Stanley's heartrending brutality. The mania to torture natives seems to attack often the white man in the jungle. It is a mental malady. Whatever might be said in extenuation of explorers or of lonely officials in remote posts, who become neurasthenic and lose their grip, there is no possible excuse for a governor of a colony who allows excesses to go on unpunished under a civil administration.

ment of the colonies to aristocrats and bureaucrats. Dr. Dernburg, a bank manager, succeeded Hohenlohe. The General Election brought to the new business management of the colonies Reichstag support. It was the beginning of a new era.

Like the British and French, the Germans had great hopes of finding a source of cotton supply in their African colonies that would make them independent of the United States. We have spoken elsewhere of British and French efforts and hopes, and the disappointments experienced, especially in West Africa. British initiative, in the matter of encouraging cotton-growing in West Africa, was largely private. The German Colonial Society, both in East Africa and West Africa, took up the matter of cotton-growing along the lines of the British Cotton-Growing Association. If success in the experimental stages was greater in the German than the British colonies in West Africa, it must be confessed that this success was largely due to the greater power over the native given to Europeans by the Germans than by the British. In British West African colonies, a European is fined who strikes a native. In the German colonies, one can flog a native up to twenty-five lashes. This helps greatly in making the native work. But the method is incompatible with Anglo-Saxon ideas of the way things should be done.[1]

[1] It must not be forgotten that the explanation of German success in road-building and in enforcing measures for health and cleanliness is due partly to compulsion of a character British Government officials (I am sorry I cannot say also British colonists) would not use.

In 1907, in his great speech before the Chambers of Commerce, Dr. Dernburg expressed the same opinion and the same prophecy as Mr. Winston Churchill, that West and East Africa were both admirably adapted to growing cotton and that the development of the industry in the African colonies would make the mother country independent of the United States. In German East Africa, cotton export increased from less than a thousand pounds in 1902 to half a million pounds in 1908, and nearly a million pounds in 1913. Over two hundred and fifty thousand acres were laid out and in the process of development for cotton plantations in German East Africa when the war broke out. Togoland began cotton production in 1901 with twenty thousand pounds. In 1908, Togoland produced about a million pounds. Not much has yet been done with cotton in Kamerun. But the Germans have been studying possibilities with all the keenness and energy they put into every economic problem. From the reports of Steubel, Dernburg, Warberg, and Solf, one gathers that Germany had high hopes of a glorious future in her African cotton cultivation. East Africa was growing Egyptian cotton, and the price of land compared favorably with prices in Egypt and in Texas. After plow cultivation could be introduced,[1] the probable yield of the African colonies was estimated at two and one-half million bales, which would satisfy the needs of German industry.

[1] Plowing in many parts of Africa will not be practicable until the discovery of a means to destroy the tsetse fly or to protect from his bite makes possible the use of draft animals. The tsetse fly is the greatest drawback in Africa both to man and to beast.

From Duala, at the mouth of the Kamerun River, a railway runs north behind the Kamerun Mountains into the Manenguba Mountains. A second line southeast from Duala had crossed the Sanaga River and was being constructed along the valley of the Nyong River, when the war broke out. A railway into the hinterland of Kamerun is going to be an extremely slow and costly project. But it is bound to pay expenses, and, until it is constructed, the hinterland will remain largely undeveloped for want of means of transport. Animals cannot be used, and porterage is too expensive except for rubber and ivory. In the fifteen years from 1899 to 1913, imports increased from less than ten million marks to considerably over thirty million marks, and exports from less than five million marks to considerably over twenty million marks. The railways, as far as they were opened, were paying well, and the finances of the colony were on a very sound basis.

Telegraphic communication in Togoland and Kamerun had been developed in recent years fully as rapidly as anywhere in Africa, and telephonic communication more rapidly. The natives of Togoland have better telephone service, and avail themselves of it more freely, than in many European countries. In 1913, Kamerun was connected with Germany by direct cable, and at Kamina, north of Atakpame, in Togoland, was erected in the same year the largest wireless station in Africa, which was able to communicate directly with Germany.

Aside from what they accomplished in the matter of sanitation and the spread of the knowledge of

preventive medicine, the most remarkable achievement of the Germans in West Africa was their school system. Although Kamerun has hardly more than half the area of its neighbor, Nigeria, and one-seventh of the population, its Government and assisted schools in 1913 were proportionately better attended than those of the British Protectorate. Similarly, Togoland has better school opportunities than its French and British neighbors. In 1910, Kamerun made school attendance obligatory for children of both sexes. There was plenty of zeal and pedagogical ability, and a very earnest desire to lift the natives to a higher level, morally as well as materially. But the education was given without much affection and astonishingly little attention was paid to native psychology. There was too much of the idea of Germanizing what could not be Germanized and of willing that the natives learn rather than of winning them to learn. German colonization shows the same weaknesses and the strong points of the Teuton that have been revealed to the world during the last two years of Herculean struggle. Matchless in their commercial aptitude, in their industrial resourcefulness, in their scientific genius, and in the organization of their administration, the Germans are pitifully weak in political understanding, in diplomacy, and in ability to appreciate and handle other nations.

CHAPTER XVI

THE FRENCH IN WEST AFRICA AND THE SAHARA

THE French African Empire touches the Atlantic coast at six places from the Sahara Desert to the Congo. Gambia and Sierra Leone, British colonies, the republic of Liberia, and Portuguese Guinea, are enclaves of French territory on the Atlantic coast. The British Gold Coast and German Togoland are surrounded by French territory coming down to the Gulf of Guinea on either side. The French Empire also completely surrounds the enormous territory of British Nigeria and German Kamerun, reaching the Gulf of Guinea on the north in Dahomey and on the east in Gabun. The coast colonies of France in West Africa are Senegal, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Dahomey, and Gabun. All these colonies have the same general characteristics, and are confronted with the same general economic and climatic conditions as their British and German neighbors. But they have the advantage of being connected with each other by contiguous territory and with a hinterland that goes to the very heart of Africa, and extends from the Congo to the Mediterranean without passing through foreign territory. The import-

ance of this advantage is demonstrated by the fact that the growth and prosperity of the coast colonies in West Africa have followed the French penetration into the upper valleys of the Senegal and Niger and Congo and the spread of French territory in the Sahara and the Sudan.

French West Africa was almost all opened up and colonized and connected during the last decade of the nineteenth century. But its unity and official status were not determined until the decree of October 1, 1902, which divided French West Africa as follows: the colonies of Senegal, French Guinea, the Ivory Coast, Dahomey, and "the territories of Senegambia and the Niger." Gabun on the west side of the Gulf of Guinea was made a portion of French Equatorial Africa. In the following year the territory between Senegal colony and Spanish Rio de Oro was organized as the Protectorate of Mauritania.

Senegal is the oldest French colony in West Africa, and goes back to the days of Richelieu. Its capital, St. Louis, was settled in 1637, and is at the mouth of the Senegal River. But the most important city of Senegal is the modern fortified naval station of Dakar on Cape Verde, the western point of the African continent. A railway connects these two cities. There is river navigation from St. Louis for nearly five hundred miles to the interior. But the great railway into the hinterland of West Africa joining the Senegal and Niger, to Kayes, the former capital of the region, has its terminus at Dakar. A government cable has connected Dakar with Brest since 1905, and there are other coastal cables, and cable

connection with South America. French, German, and British lines make Dakar a regular port of call. Largely because it is the route of through trade from all the vast interior, Senegal has more than half the total trade of the French West African colonies, and reached nearly thirty million dollars in 1913.

French Guinea lies between Portuguese Guinea and the British colony of Sierra Leone. Its large port, Konakry, has been free since the Anglo-French Agreement of 1904, when the Los Islands, which command the coast, were ceded to France. If this had not been done, Konakry would have been in the unfortunate position of Swakopmund in German Southwest Africa—at the mercy of the British. This is one illustration of the many advantages that have accrued to France from the compounding of colonial rivalries with Great Britain. After the Anglo-French Agreement, the railway was pushed inland rapidly, and reached Kurussa on the Niger River in 1911. A new era began for French Guinea and for the country at the headwaters of the Niger. It was an important step forward in the plan of joining the Ivory Coast in French Guinea by an interior railway.

The Ivory Coast, between Liberia and the British Gold Coast, has a larger frontage on the ocean than either of its neighbors, and the great advantage, like all the French West African colonies, of free access to the great Senegal-Niger hinterland under the same flag. Lines drawn from the Ivory Coast and Dahomey directly north to Algeria pass all the way from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean through

French territory, won and consolidated by French daring and persistence in two generations. The most important part of the work, however, has been accomplished since the beginning of the twentieth century, and has been made possible by railway extension and native armies.

The French became acquainted with the Ivory Coast during the reign of Louis Philippe, while they were still involved in the conquest of Algeria. They did not make good intangible claims until 1883, when rumor had it that Germany was looking for colonies. The Ivory Coast was connected with the hinterland in just the opposite way to that of most colonies. The penetration was from the interior to the coast. After the fall of Timbuktu, when many officials and military men and explorers were occupied with the problem of connecting the upper Niger valley with the Senegal valley, a young marine officer conceived the plan of penetrating also toward the Gulf of Guinea. While routes were being opened up from the Niger to Senegal and to Guinea, he would open up a route to the Ivory Coast. Between the Niger and the Ivory Coast lay the mountainous Kong region. For eighteen months, with one French companion, Captain Binger was lost to the world. He finally appeared on the Ivory Coast, having blazed a route for France without firing a shot. Bingerville, the port terminus of the railway that now runs into the heart of the Kong country, commemorates one of the most remarkable and most useful feats in the history of African exploration.

The French have had much trouble with the natives of the Ivory Coast during recent years, and have been compelled to go to the expense of a number of punitive expeditions. Yellow fever, and lack of railways and roads, as well as the mountainous character of the Kong region, made administrative work very difficult. The troubles culminated in the rebellion of 1909, which spread among many tribes. Disarmament had to be undertaken on a large scale. To their amazement, the military authorities were able to gather in eleven thousand rifles. This was a forcible argument for the advocates of carrying through the subjection of the Sahara and the Sudan. For as long as vast regions were left to tribes who did not acknowledge French authority, and who could not be controlled, gun-running would continue; and local authorities, with few troops at their disposal and an enormous administrative area, would always risk a serious revolt when they tried to collect taxes.

The Ivory Coast-Kong railway serves a country rich in minerals and mahogany forests, and has advanced far enough to make the plan of joining Senegal, French Guinea, and the Ivory Coast by an interior railway system a reality of the near future. Those who scoffed a decade ago at the idea of Timbuktu being connected by rapid steamer and railway service with Dahomey, the Ivory Coast, Guinea, and Senegal, have only to look at the map to understand that they would be doubting Thomases if they refused still to believe in the transformations French genius is making in West Africa. Fifteen years ago, it took

three months to go from Dakar to Timbuktu. One can make the journey now in ten days. Fifteen years ago, French officials took a month for traveling from the Senegal River to the Niger River. Now they need two days.

Next to Senegal, Dahomey, the narrow little wedge between Togoland and Nigeria, has the most distinctive personality of the West African colonies. The Ivory Coast and Guinea owe their importance to the hinterland, and to the development of French influence in the upper Niger valley. Their prosperity is largely dependent upon that of the whole of French West Africa. Senegal has suffered, from the point of view of individuality, since it became a province of West Africa. This is illustrated by the way Dakar, administrative center for the group of colonies, has eclipsed St. Louis, the old capital of Senegal.[1] But Dahomey, farthest removed from

[1] "Dakar, in 1902, was only a simple chance landing place, without coal and without water, where twice a month the Messageries Maritimes Company threw off hastily its passengers in order to flee as quickly as possible towards coasts less desert and climates less unhealthy. To-day, Dakar, protected from the sea by a powerful dyke, receives on its two moles three or four steamers a day (I have seen eleven in one day) which find in abundance coal, drinking water, fresh vegetables. The city is growing and is being embellished. In a few years Dakar will be one of those cosmopolitan ports like Port Said or Colombo, where people are elbowing each other in the streets, and where the largest and swiftest vessels of the world cross each other's path. And yet, the plan of 1902 appeared rash even to those who wanted to believe in it. The Governor-General was charged with megalomania, and here after a decade the port is too small, and is already being enlarged."—M. Guy, former Governor of Senegal, in a lecture at the École des Sciences Politiques, April 16, 1913.

the influences that have brought into being since 1900 a French Empire in the Senegal and Niger valleys, still preserves her identity. Dahomey is an historic kingdom, inhabited by a race very different from those of the hinterland and the other French colonies. It was conquered and annexed to France in somewhat the same way as Madagascar during the last decade of the nineteenth century, and as Ashanti nearby in the first years of the twentieth century.

Like its neighbor, Togoland, Dahomey has a very small stretch of coast. But, unlike Togoland, its ports are not at the mercy of other powers. There is excellent shelter and deep water at Kotonu. By her possession of the Grand Popo, France, like Great Britain, holds a part of the natural coastline of Togoland. Railways penetrate inland from Kotonu nearly two hundred miles, and from the capital, Porto Novo, fifty miles along the Lagos frontier. There are less than seven hundred Europeans in the colony in the midst of a native population of nine hundred thousand. In the hinterland, between Dahomey and the Niger, is Bornu, which the British hoped to include in Nigeria, when their Protectorate was extended by Sir Frederick Lugard over the Sokoto Empire.

In Algeria and Tunis, and in most of the West and Central African territories, France has been able—

Dakar now has twenty-five thousand inhabitants, of whom over three thousand are French. Its police force numbers ten. St. Louis has about the same population, but only one-third as many French.

sometimes in defiance of treaty rights—to destroy, by gradual measures, the principle of the open door which Great Britain and Germany follow, and which has been forced upon Belgium. The open door means fair play and equal advantages for all. Neither in tariffs nor in concession regulations are advantages granted to the subjects of the nation holding the colony which are not granted to subjects of other nations. Only by maintaining the open door is Great Britain able to justify the holding of one-fourth of the world's productive territories. Only by maintaining—or rather establishing fairly—the principle of equal advantages to all comers can France hope to keep and develop properly her vast African empire. If she attempts, after this war, to extend to the West African colonies the iniquitous tariff régime that has been put into practice in Algeria, Tunis, and Madagascar, not only will her own real interests be jeopardized, but she will have to face another war with Germany within the next generation. A nation may hold, and justify her right to hold, colonies to the exclusion of other nations, by the exercise of superior colonizing ability. But it is unthinkable that she be allowed to make a national preserve of colonies in this period of world markets, *unless she has the force to continue to keep others out.*

Bound by strict treaty obligations, France has been unable to make tariff discriminations in the Ivory Coast and Dahomey. She has taken upon herself similar obligations in regard to Morocco. The result has not been favorable to French commerce. Dahomey illustrates the inferiority of French

to German commercial methods. In 1913, Germany had forty per cent. of the total commerce of Dahomey, against France's twenty-four per cent. German ships carried sixty per cent. of the exports. German ships embarked and disembarked twice as much tonnage as French ships. Seventy-five per cent. of the palm nut output, valued at two million dollars, was bought by Germans, and most of it sent to Hamburg, which has become the first market in the world for this product. From Dahomey and the Ivory Coast together, Hamburg bought nearly a million dollars' worth of other forest products. From Senegal, Hamburg took in 1913, peanuts valued at one and one-quarter million dollars against French purchases of thirty thousand dollars. Many tons of peanuts from French West Africa were transported to Hamburg on German bottoms, and reshipped from Hamburg to France on other German bottoms, and sold to French buyers. The French paid Germany two commissions and two freight hauls on products of their own colonies!

Last spring, when I was in the Riviera, I read in a local newspaper the following:

"It is necessary to call attention once more to the method and perseverance of the Germans in their effort to gain the commerce of our colonies. They have not stopped with creating at Hamburg a market for palm nuts rivaling that of Liverpool, and with getting their money's worth out of the products they brought to this market. Their chemists set to work, with the result that, aside from the manufacture of soap and candles, their industry has succeeded in extracting from palm nuts different vegetable fats,

appreciated for their cheapness in certain European regions, and which have a large market in America. More than this, they have been able to find on the spot a market for the residue, which has been adopted by stock raisers for nourishing cattle, and which unfortunately is not yet common as stock food in France and England. This way of getting all there is in a product permits them to pay the highest prices, and naturally it is towards the market where prices are highest that producers direct by preference their expeditions."[1]

I expected to read a splendid lesson, drawn by the writer from the wholesome truth he was putting before his fellow-countrymen. But instead of stating that Frenchmen must study German methods and try to emulate them, this writer proposed as a remedy for ruinous German competition the enactment of a law forbidding to Germans the privilege of doing business on any terms whatever with French colonies! This curious mental attitude—blindness, may we call it?—is alarmingly prevalent in France to-day. If what this writer says be true, what will be the result of the "remedy" he proposes? Producers will be cut off from the market where they get the best prices. They will be compelled to do business with merchants and manufacturers who are not alive to the full value of the product they are buying, or who do not know how or care to get the full value out of it. So they will not and cannot pay the prices Hamburg pays. The quotation I have cited proves that German competition is beneficial to the producer in the French colony. Who will suffer if this whole-

[1] Nice *Petit Niçois*, April 25, 1916.

some competition is destroyed by an arbitrary law? The whole world indirectly, but first of all, the French colony.

Senegal colony has four self-governing communes, and the five thousand French citizens return a deputy to the Paris Parliament. The other coast colonies have not as yet reached the self-governing stage. There are too few Europeans.

The British and German cotton-growing associations have not been alone in their efforts to make West Africa a new source of the world's cotton supply. The Association Cotonnière of Paris has been spending a great deal of money in West Africa for the past ten years. Cotton, as a wild plant, grows everywhere. The natives know its value, and make use of it in their weaving. But all attempts to cultivate cotton for the market have failed, as in the German and British colonies. The natives find easier money in peanuts and forest produce. Cotton-growing is hard work, and requires a long period of waiting to gather the harvest, and the willingness to put aside seed for next year. Only if they are under the close and strict control of white overseers will the negroes bother with cotton. That control cannot be exercised—hence the failure of cotton.

In spite of their hinterland, and the advantages they enjoy from administrative and territorial union with each other, the coast colonies of French West Africa are not at all satisfied. The enclaves belonging to other Powers are a continual source of irritation, and, from the French standpoint, spoil the

homogeneity of the Empire. French Imperialists maintain that British Gambia is altogether an anomaly. In the Agreement of 1904, Great Britain ceded Yarbutenda to France, together with the landing wharves on the river Gambia, and promised that if at any future time there was no longer free access by water from Yarbutenda to the ocean, further territory would be yielded. This removed the serious economic difficulty of Southern Senegal and the Dentilia hinterland of not being able to enjoy the natural advantage of water transport on the Gambia. When the country is fully developed, the advantage gained in the Agreement of 1904 will be of the most substantial character. Within two years of the signing of the Anglo-French Agreement, the British Foreign Office was approached with a proposition to exchange Gambia for territories in the New Hebrides or for the complete renunciation of French rights in Saint-Pierre and Miquelon. The French claimed that the British would never be able to make anything out of the possession of the valley of the Gambia, and that it was a thorn in the flesh of an ally that ought to be withdrawn. They represented also that the commerce of Gambia was entirely in the hands of French houses. Similar overtures were made by France to Germany in 1912 to secure the cession of Togoland in exchange for territorial and political advantages elsewhere. I have understood from a good source that this proposition was first made to Germany after the Agadir crisis, and that it was blocked by the unwillingness of Great Britain to assent to the compensations France

proposed to give Germany. The ambition of France to do away with Liberia altogether, and to buy Portuguese Guinea, was openly voiced the year before the war by a former governor of the Ivory Coast, who stands high in French colonial councils.[1]

Mauritania, as we have said before, was made a separate territory in 1903, at the time of the redistribution of Senegal territories and the formation of the Senegal-Niger colony. In 1909, when the decision to pacify the whole Sahara had been made, and when plans were definitely laid for seizing Morocco, Mauritania was made into a protectorate. Its northern boundaries have never been fixed, and taxes have not been widely collected from its population of nomad Moors.

Behind the four coast colonies and the Mauritania Protectorate lies the fifth province of West Africa, whose history belongs almost wholly to the period after the decree of 1902. In the decree constituting West Africa, the great hinterland was called "the territories of Senegambia and of the Niger." After the restoration of the Senegal Protectorate to Senegal colony and the creation of Mauritania, the upper valleys of the Senegal and the Niger were without definite status. It was felt that civil administration should take the place of military administration wherever possible, especially since railway and steamer communication had been established with the coast. The relation, too, of the hinterland with the coast colonies, and with the Governor-General at Dakar, was extremely uncertain. In 1904, "the

[1] See *L'Afrique du Nord* (Paris, 1913), pp. 119–121.

colony of Upper Senegal and of the Niger" was constituted. It was styled *colony* for want of a better word. It is unique among the colonies of Africa and of the whole world. Its boundaries are formed on the west and south by the French and other European West African colonies, on the east by a line from Lake Chad to the Tuareg-Azkar country on the southwestern border of Tripoli, and on the north by the Algerian sphere. It includes the upper valley of the Senegal River, two-thirds of the valley of the Niger, and a large bit of the Sahara Desert. In a territory of eight hundred thousand square miles there are six million natives and hardly more than a thousand Europeans. The eastern and northern portions of the colony are still under military control, but the river valleys are administered civilly. Timbuktu, near the top of the great bend of the Niger, is very nearly in the center of the colony. Just north of the bend of the Niger, the Sahara begins and stretches to the Algerian and Moroccan frontiers.

The tenth degree of longitude, from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic, passes from Tunis through Ghadames and Ghat, the westernmost points of Tripoli, to the place where the Gulf of Guinea turns south in German territory. West of the tenth parallel is the big bend of Africa. Almost all of this quarter of the continent is now in French possession. Spain in Morocco; Portugal in Guinea; England in the valley of the Gambia, Sierra Leone, and the Gold Coast; Germany in Togoland; and the negroes mismanaging Liberia under American protection; are

flies in the French ointment. But the great disappointments of France—"errors of vision," her Imperialists say—are the British in Nigeria and the Germans in Kamerun, stretching inland to the shores of Lake Chad, and disturbing France's "heritage" just across the desert from the Italian "intruders" of Tripoli.

The Germans in Kamerun, especially since the territorial readjustments of 1912 have disturbed the continuity of French territory and French influence from the Mediterranean to the Congo. The French are hoping, however, to remedy this by eliminating Germany in the Treaty of 1917.

The great fault of France, thirty years ago, was to allow the ubiquitous English to install themselves at the mouth of the Niger, and then later to take in a third of the Niger valley, and all of the Benué valley. Not only this, but even after French West Africa had been administratively organized, the British were allowed to extend their Protectorate over the Hausa States and through Bornu to Lake Chad. British alertness and vigilance, seconded by generations of experience and a fleet and a merchant marine, have enabled Britain to keep on the process inaugurated one hundred and fifty years ago of gathering in the choicest tit-bits for colonies everywhere in the world. West Africa follows the general rule. In 1891, when British authority was definitely established in the lower Niger valley, and the French were expending their energies against savage tribes of Senegambia and the upper Niger and pacifying desert wastes, Lord Salisbury ironically declared: "To

the French the Sahara and the northern caravan routes, the Niger where the cataracts are, the sand and the bush and the waterless wastes; to the English Sokoto, Bornu, and the splendid route of the navigable Niger and the fertile Benué valley." By the Agreement of 1904, the English allowed France a frontier with Northern Nigeria that did not quite push her into the desert. But on the whole, Lord Salisbury's words still contain the kernel of the matter. Britain bars France's outlet by the Niger to the sea. The French have reached Lake Chad at the price of herculean efforts and constant sacrifice of human life and treasure. But the sides of Lake Chad, from which there is exit by rich and fertile territories to the sea, are in British and German hands (all in British hands now). France holds the desert sides of Lake Chad, from which the exit to the sea passes through the Sahara to the north and to the west. The French at Lake Chad, in addition to a desert route, have several times as far to go to the sea as have the British. The Senegal, which the French control, is a very small stream compared to the Niger, which the British control.

The errors and disappointments, and the flies in the ointment, do not make West Africa any the less one of the epic colonizing feats of history, and a rich reward for the devotion and sacrifice of those who have given their lives to make West Africa French. In a brief review of this character, there is not the space to recount the exploits of many others who performed feats that rivaled that of Binger in traversing the country from the Niger to the Ivory Coast.

There was the exploration of the upper Senegal, the crossing from the Senegal to the Niger, the exploration of the Niger, the opening of the routes to Lake Chad from the Niger and across the Sahara from the north, and the opening of the route from Algeria to the Niger across the desert. First there were the explorers, who had no maps and no more knowledge of where they were coming out or whether they would come out than Columbus had. Then military expeditions followed, which had to overcome by far the greatest difficulties that any colonizing power in Africa has encountered in the way of armed resistance and of transporting supplies and of keeping open a line of communication. The French accomplished the bulk of their work of conquest before the days of wireless telegraphy, and when parliaments opposed even the smallest grant for African colonization. There was no glory, no reward in what they did. The metropolitan newspapers could hardly be induced to mention the battles in which French officers lost their lives.

From the standpoint of the pocket-book, France had begun to reap a rich harvest from the work of her West African colonizers several years before the Great War interrupted economic progress in Africa. In ten years the receipts of the general budget had more than doubled, and each year the surplus was increasing. Trade passed from twenty-six million dollars in 1905 to fifty-six million dollars in 1913. Nearly three thousand kilometers of railways, government owned, and a large river steamship service, government run, were bringing in a net

profit of over a million dollars a year. Plans were made to double the railway system, and to borrow one hundred and twenty million dollars for that purpose. In 1902, the only railway in French West Africa was the little line of a private company, joining Dakar and St. Louis.

West Africa has meant most to France, though, as a training school for army officers and as a reservoir of splendid faithful troops. The last two years have amply justified the plea that has so long been made in the Chamber of Deputies, that every bit of energy and money put into Africa would come back with interest when the day of France's need for more men arrived. For from Africa would be brought the trained soldiers to equalize France's inferiority in population to Germany. As an American and an Anglo-Saxon, I cannot overcome my personal prejudice against the idea of introducing African troops to fight white men. As a student of history, I have my misgivings about the ultimate wisdom of the Anglo-French policy of calling upon Africa and Asia to help fight their battle in Europe. But under the circumstances of 1914, when France found herself suddenly the victim of a long and methodically planned aggression, what Frenchman in his right senses would have opposed calling to the rescue every possible helper? They came from Senegal, from Morocco, from Algeria, from Tunis, from the desert, thousands of excellent soldiers, eager to fight for France. And they played an important part during two years up to the moment that the defense of Verdun proved the turning-point of the war.

Equal in military value to their possibilities as reservoirs of men are North and West Africa as training grounds for officers. Constant African fighting since 1900 has given to officers of the French army a more valuable experience in actual warfare than that enjoyed by the officers of other European Powers. Great Britain had officers with fighting experience—but they were few in number. The Germans had the training and the discipline, but it was of the schools. When the armies came into conflict in 1914, the practical advantage was wholly with France.

The Anglo-French Agreement of 1904 and the settling definitely of the limits and status of the French West African colonies made possible for the first time maps that were not guesswork. Frontiers were delimited with Great Britain in the Gold Coast and in Nigeria, and with Germany around Lake Chad and in Togoland. In 1907, an Anglo-French treaty fixed, in accordance with the spirit of the Agreement of 1904, the important border from the Niger to Lake Chad. Within a year this frontier was completely furnished with stone pyramids and other permanent marks for a distance of a thousand miles. The Sudan and Lake Chad frontiers with Kamerun and the Togoland boundary were finally settled by the Franco-German Commission that sat at Berne in the summer of 1912 to arrange the Morocco "compensations."

When the French went to Algiers, a line was drawn some few miles back from the coast beyond which it was believed they would never pass. The

conquest of the Kabyles marked another "extreme limit." But in time expeditions got all the way to the desert. That was certainly the end! The French penetrated the Niger valley by way of the Atlantic and the Senegal. They were south and north of the Sahara. In order to open a route to Central Africa, the West African penetration was carried beyond Lake Chad into the Sudan. In order to make secure the hinterland of Algeria and Tunis, and prevent slave-trade, gun-running, and the pan-Islamic propaganda, North African penetration was carried to the border of Tripoli into the Tuareg country. The Tuaregs inhabited both sides of the desert, and the oases of the desert. They were as numerous south of Timbuktu as they were south of Ghat, and they barred the way from the Niger to Lake Chad.

In 1900, French officers, who had taken part in desert expeditions and who were interested in the development of West Africa and the Sudan, began to declare that the Sahara must be pacified, and that all the caravan routes must be in the hands of the French. They were treated as madmen or fools. Ten years later what they advised was not only attempted, but was pretty well on the way of realization. A French Minister of War once had plans drawn up, and filed in the Rue Saint-Dominique for a Sudan expedition from Algeria. He counted on a force of forty thousand men—owing to the necessity of conquering the Tuaregs. Eventually they were conquered by a few hundred natives on camels under the command of a few dozen Frenchmen.

Establishing order in the Sahara became possible—and easy—when European and even Algerian methods were given up, and nomad tribes were organized militarily. By the *Méharistes* the French have succeeded in policing the Sahara, and making safe the caravan routes. The French flag now flies on every important oasis. In 1906, military patrols of West Africa and Algeria met in the Sahara. They have been meeting ever since. Rarely do they have to use their arms. The best way to get to Timbuktu and Lake Chad is still by Senegal. But crossing from Algeria is not impossible.

The military problem in West Africa has been solved. The problem of communications is well on the way to solution. Miraculous economic development depends wholly upon the solution of the labor problem. West Africa is a white man's country neither on the coast nor in the hinterland. Agricultural settlers, to take up and work the land, as in Algeria and Tunis, cannot be expected. Travel facilities, medicines, and knowledge of how to dress and what to eat and the precautions to take against fevers, have made it possible for white men to live and move about in the country. But aside from traders and officials, and managers of plantations, no Europeans live in West Africa. Given the security of an organized government, the direction of skilled men, the establishment of banks and commercial firms, and, above all, means of transportation, the natives of West Africa will have to work out themselves the destinies of West Africa. If the country is to go ahead, and develop wealth, the natives will have to

do the work. The labor problem, then, as everywhere in Africa, is the chief preoccupation of officials and students of these French colonies.[1]

Nowhere is the population as large as it ought to be. Nowhere do the natives show much disposition to work. Negroes have no sense about caring for their own health or the health of their children, and no thought of putting aside to-day something for to-morrow's needs. Plagues and epidemics spread very rapidly among them. They make no attempt to check illness in their families and in their communities. When they have a good year, and make money, they stop work until they have spent their surplus. As inseparable from the negro as his skin is the notion that one works only when he has to. Since West Africa is not a white man's country, the hope of the future lies wholly in the Europeanization of the natives. Physicians and dispensaries, teachers and schools are what West Africa must have. Economic prosperity is an idea of ours and a goal of ours. Civilization is what we have created,

[1] Slave-trade has practically disappeared. But house slavery, as in all European colonies where Islam is the religion, continues to exist, and is exceedingly difficult to cope with. In a circular of Dec. 4, 1905, M. Roume, Governor-General of West Africa, said: "The coming of native populations into a state of more advanced civilization is not accomplished by decrees. It will result only from a series of patient and convergent efforts, having for purpose the moral and material betterment of the native by assuring to each one his rights, especially the most sacred of all, the liberty of the individual." But, until the individual knows and feels that liberty is a right and his right, what can decrees accomplish? The abolition of slavery, like every other reform in the world, is a matter of enlightenment through education rather than of law.

and what we think is a thing to have. In parts of Africa where the white man can live, he can establish his ideas and his goal and his civilization by dispossessing the native of the land, and taking it for himself. In other parts of Africa, when we attempt to introduce our civilization we demoralize the native, both from the physical and social point of view, unless we can somehow get him to see things as we do and understand and appreciate the new environment as we understand and appreciate it. Unless physician and teacher inculcate into him our ideas of health and wealth he will have neither. Nor will the Europeans who live with him.

CHAPTER XVII

FRENCH PENETRATION INTO CENTRAL AFRICA

LAKE CHAD is south of the Sahara Desert, directly opposite the southernmost angle of Tripoli, on the line of longitude that passes through Sicily and Naples. British Nigeria and German Kamerun form its south and east shores. The rest of the lake is bordered by what the French Imperialists dreamed it would all be—French territory. Lake Chad stands about halfway across the African continent. Directly to the west the French colony of Senegal, with its great modern port of Dakar, lies on the Atlantic coast. Between Senegal and Lake Chad all is French territory. Directly to the east, at the depth of the Gulf of Aden, and holding the African shore of the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb, lies French Somaliland, with its port of Djibouti. During the last half of the nineteenth century Lake Chad was to mark the middle point of a transcontinental railway, just as real to French Imperialists as was the Cape to Cairo Railway to British Imperialists.

But while the French were expending their energies in the barren wastes of North Central Africa, the

British were occupied with realities. In South Africa, they were planning to absorb the Dutch republics. In North Africa, the reconquest of the Sudan by Lord Kitchener and his combined British and Egyptian army came just in time to frustrate the plans and hopes of France. The French had reached Fashoda on the Nile, almost to the Abyssinian border. They had actually planted their flag there. The British told them to take the flag down. It was either obey or go to war. They could not go to war: so they obeyed. The final argument in African colonization has always been force. There were many *coups* in African colonial politics before Agadir. The British, of course, argued that the whole valley of the Nile was Egyptian territory, abandoned only temporarily to the Mahdi, and that the French had no right there. But had the tables been reversed, the British certainly would never have hauled down the flag. Possession is nine points of the law—no, ten—if you have force on your side, *and only if you have force on your side.*

After the humiliation of Fashoda, France made an agreement about the Sudan, in which Tibesti, Borku, Wadai, and the Chad territory south to the Niger were recognized as hers by Great Britain in return for leaving the British in undisputed possession of the desert of Libya, at the eastern end of the Sahara, and of the whole valley of the Nile, and acknowledging British rights over Darfur.

The Sudan Convention of 1899 was a very reasonable arrangement. If one grants the intention of the British to remain permanently in Egypt, and the ad-

visability of their doing so, both for their own interest and for the interest of the Egyptians, the possession of the Egyptian Sudan was certainly essential to assure the future political security and economic prosperity of Egypt, and the action of Kitchener in compelling the French withdrawal from Fashoda was just and wise and logical. But at that time the French denied the British right to stay in Egypt. In fact, they had Great Britain's word that she intended to withdraw from Egypt. Hence the British claim to the upper Valley of the Nile, based on Egyptian rights that had practically been abandoned, was to the French bad faith and brutal bluff. But the British were going to stay in Egypt, and the French had their hands full pacifying and organizing the already tremendous territories in Africa to which they laid claim. By the Convention of 1899, France had a right to expect British diplomatic support against Italy and Turkey in the north, and against Germany who was making great strides in the hinterland of Kamerun. The Sudan Convention was the precursor of the general agreement of five years later, which made possible the Entente Cordiale. French, as well as British Imperialists, then, cannot in retrospect deplore the Fashoda crisis and the consequent clearing of the atmosphere between the two greatest African colonizing powers.

French West Africa, as we have seen, was formed into a distinct administrative area in 1902, and the military area of its hinterland colony extended as far east as Lake Chad. It was not until 1906, after the Anglo-French agreement of 1904 had been worked

out in detail, that the French were able to bring together their Sudan and Congo spheres of influence. By decree of February 15, 1906, French Congo was formed, with four provinces: the Gabun colony, the Middle Congo colony, the Ubangi-Shari-Chad colony, and the Chad military region. In 1910, French Congo became French Equatorial Africa.

Gabun is a coast colony on the Atlantic, just south of the Gulf of Guinea and taking in the bend of which Cape Lopez is the western point. Its northern frontier is the very narrow strip of Kamerun that separates French territory from Spanish Guinea (Rio Muni). The Gabun River, really a deep bay, from which the colony takes its name, is in the extreme north. At its mouth is Libreville,[1] the capital. The principal river, which runs for several hundred miles through the heart of the colony, and empties into Nazareth Bay, to the north of Cape Lopez, is the Ogowe. Here Port Lopez has been established. On the coast at the south, French territory is separated from Belgian Congo for a short distance by a little Portuguese enclave around Kabinda Bay.

Gabun, like other west coast colonies, is a heritage to France from the days of Louis Philippe. Libre-

[1] Libreville, as its name indicates, was, like Freetown in Sierra Leone, originally a settlement of emancipated slaves. When the intercontinental slave trade of Africa was destroyed in the middle of the nineteenth century, the principal part in this great work was played by the British and French fleets. It is natural that the influence of the two Occidental Powers along the Atlantic coast of Africa, exercised altruistically in this humanitarian movement, should have resulted in precious political and territorial advantages.

ville was founded in the year after the fall of the Orleans dynasty, and Cape Lopez was acquired during the Second Empire. The interior of the Gabun was made known to the children of my generation in English-speaking countries by the books and lectures of Paul du Chaillu. The hinterland of Gabun and the territory of the Middle Congo Colony were won by explorers in the late seventies and early eighties.

Inland, the Middle Congo colony occupies the north bank of the Congo for some hundreds of miles. Its capital, Brazzaville, which is directly opposite Leopoldville in Belgian Congo, is named for the intrepid French explorer who reached the Congo at this point thirty-five years ago, and prevented Stanley from occupying both banks of the river. Since the Agadir crisis was compounded with Germany, two spurs of territory reaching the Congo at Gonga and Mongumba, together with a substantial bit of hinterland, were ceded by France to Germany on September 28, 1912. These two projections of the Kamerun spoil the continuity of French territory from the Sudan to the Atlantic.

The third colony, Ubangi-Shari-Chad, comprises the regions north of the Belgian Congo, east of Kamerun and west of the Bahr-el-Ghazal province of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. Darfur is north of the eastern portion of the colony. The Ubangi River forms the larger portion of the boundary with Belgium. At the beginning of the sharp bend in this river, which is the most important northern tributary of the Congo, has been established the

capital, Bangui. In the colony are the headwaters of the River Shari, which flows into Lake Chad.

The fourth province of French Equatorial Africa is known as the Chad Military Territory. It forms the connection by land with the other portions of France's African empire, and has been won since the Sudan Convention of 1899. Kanem, northeast of Lake Chad, was conquered in 1903. Immediately afterwards, most of the sultans of Wadai accepted the French Protectorate. Wadai is the southern and largest of the three provinces of the Sudan the British consented in the Convention to regard as French. It lies between Lake Chad and Darfur. The other two provinces, Borku and Tibesti, are between the Sahara and the Libyan deserts, on the western border of Egypt, and southeast of Tripoli. Since the definite French occupation of Abeshr, the principal city of Wadai, in 1910, the French have sent many expeditions into Borku and Tibesti, as a part of the general plan of pacifying and keeping patrolled the Sahara Desert. We have spoken elsewhere of the Turkish activity in the last years of Abdul Hamid and the first two years of the Young Turk régime, which brought the Turks and the French into conflict in the oases between Tripoli and Lake Chad.[1] France established her rights in the hinterland of Tripoli just in time to confront Italy with a *fait accompli*. The Italian attempt to conquer Tripoli drew from the desert the most warlike of the tribesmen, and turned the attention of the Senussi towards a new foe. Since the Italians

[1] See above, p. 121.

went to Tripoli, the Senussi have directed their principal efforts against them.

France, while freed of pressure in the Lake Chad region, had not yet been able to call Borku and Tibesti more than a "sphere of influence" when the European War broke out. In the Wadai also, the French were not altogether masters of the situation. The Governor-General of Equatorial Africa complained that he had less than five thousand men for policing a country four times as large as France, while his colleague of West Africa could count on more than ten thousand troops. Events in Morocco led to the diminishing of military effort in 1913. Sultan Ali of Darfur never accepted the Anglo-French Convention of 1899. He paid a nominal tribute to the British as long as Khartum let him alone. Against the French, he was continually plotting. Ali helped the Senussi in their attack against Egypt in 1915, and in the spring of 1916 he came out boldly for the Turks and Germans, declaring that he must obey the Khalif's injunction to enter "the Holy War." The French garrisons in Wadai had been depleted to conquer and hold Kamerun. Serious trouble for the French was averted only by the prompt action of Sir Reginald Wingate, Governor-General of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, who sent an expedition into Darfur to occupy El-Fashr in May, 1916.

In 1901, a commercial convention was made between France and the Congo Free State. France was dependent, for the outlet of her trade, upon the Belgian Railway, and has remained so throughout

the period of our survey. Direct French communication to the coast will not be possible until the railway from Brazzaville on the Congo to Loango, on the Atlantic, is completed.

In the development of her Congo territories, France has had to face the same conditions, and has made the same mistakes, as the Belgians in Central Africa. Although it is not pleasant to do so, it is necessary to deal here rather fully with problems and abuses: for a review of European colonization in Africa in the twentieth century would not be complete without touching upon weaknesses that have arisen in French administration. It is only fair to say, however, that the criticism can be directed against European colonization in general in Central Africa. French maladministration is merely the specific illustration. The sources of information, except in the question of the effect of the *concessionnaire* system upon the open door principle in trade, are wholly French, and of unimpeachable authority.[1]

At the time the convention with Belgium was made, British firms claimed that they were being excluded from the possibility of developing their trade in the French Congo in exactly the same way as in the Belgian Congo. The whole country was being farmed out to French *concessionnaires* in violation

[1] See E. D. Morel's *British Case against the French Congo*, and Félicien Challaye's *Le Congo Français* (Alcan, Paris, 1909). M. Challaye was a member of the mission sent by the French Government in 1905, under M. de Brazza, to investigate conditions in the French Congo. His volume is invaluable eye-witness testimony, and is written carefully and judicially. I have borrowed constantly from it in this chapter.

of the Berlin Act. When representations were made to France, as the result of complaints from British subjects to the Foreign Office, Paris answered to London that the Berlin Act had become, in respect to monopolies at least, a dead letter. Arbitration, however, was agreed upon. But the *concessionnaire* system had become so deeply rooted that it was found difficult to remedy its abuses, both from the standpoint of foreign traders and of native victims, without a radical administrative reorganization. Funds as well as the intelligent and independent personnel for accomplishing this were lacking.

In 1904, an official investigating commission, under de Brazza, the famous explorer, who had opened up the Congo to France back in Stanley's time, started from Libreville, and made an extensive tour of the three French colonies. What they found was so disheartening that M. de Brazza declared that he would never have explored this country, and brought it under European control, had he realized what suffering and disaster European penetration was going to bring to the natives. Worn out by fever and broken-hearted, M. de Brazza died before his mission was completed.

At Libreville, after fifty years, there was not even a wharf, and the total European population amounted to sixty men and five women. The original inhabitants of the coast country, from whom the colony took its name, were rapidly dying out, killed by the vices introduced by Europeans. The natives of the Gabun hinterland declared that the concessions companies, who had them at their mercy,

were constantly putting up the price of the objects they sold them. The companies demanded always rubber, rubber, and more rubber. Trade was in kind, and the natives had no appeal from the arbitrary exactions of their taskmasters. Since taxes were not being used for the development of the country, but to enrich the companies and compel the natives to work for the *concessionnaires*, taxes were regarded as fines. To escape the taxes, the inhabitants of Gabun abandoned the edges of the river and hid their villages in the jungle. A decree of the Governor in 1904 forbade immigration to Kamerun, where the natives liked to go, because they were paid there for their labor.

At Loango, prosperity had been killed by the loss of through trade, which went to Belgium after the Free State Railway was built. The Loangos had the attitude of the Gabunese towards taxation. They would be willing to pay taxes, they declared, if only the money were used to give them roads and bridges and especially schools. But they paid, when they were compelled to, and got nothing in return. They were not allowed to leave the country. The *concessionnaires* recruited labor at Loango by force. The laborers were called "volunteers," and were given "contracts." When the de Brazza mission interrogated them, it was discovered that they had been taken inland "without knowing where they were going or what work they were going to undertake. They believed they were engaged for a year. They ask us with anxiety how many moons they must still remain here. The work is too hard and the

food insufficient; many of them are of heartsickening thinness. Their contract and pay books, which, according to the law, should be in their possession, are in the hands of their white foreman. What good would it do if they did have them? They do not know how to read. Most of these books, which ought to be viséd by a government official, have no signature. All contain this stipulation: 'The contract will be cancelled, with no indemnity for cancellation, when, for whatever motive, the laborer renders no more services to the company.' Warning to those who are accidentally injured or who fall ill!"

At Bangui, the commission found that the foreman of the companies exercised pressure upon the blacks to bring in rubber by seizing their women and children, and holding them as hostages until the allotted quota was brought to the company's compound. In 1904, at Bangui, one concessions company, which made a practice of this barbarous hostage system, shut up in a small hut sixty-eight women and children, without air and food and water enough to keep them alive. The crime happened to be discovered by a young French physician. He demanded their release. Forty-five women and two children were found dead. Only thirteen women and eight children were still alive. Some of them died in spite of all the exertions of their liberator. The case could not have been unique. It was discovered only because it happened on the path of travelers. The Government of the French Congo failed to take action because "proof was lacking," and the official who ordered the imprison-

ment of these hostages was soon after promoted from Bangui to Brazzaville. This is a statement of fact, substantiated on the ground by personal investigation. It happened only twelve years ago, and is a crime of the twentieth century.

In the High Shari, which is conceded to a company, at the end of 1904, the chief of the Bibigri tribe was arrested on the ridiculous charge of obstructing "the liberty of commerce," because he would not or could not make his people bring in the amount of rubber arbitrarily imposed upon his tribe by the *concessionnaires*. A month later he died in prison. To avenge his death, the Bibigris revolted, and killed nearly thirty of the black foremen, employees of the company, who were oppressing them. The troops who went to put down the revolt found in the houses of the natives the skulls of the foremen, filled with balls of rubber. "It was a striking symbol," wrote the scribe of the de Brazza mission, "well expressing the real cause of these cruel and awful revolts."

It was at Dakar, on his way back to France, that M. de Brazza died. His friend and companion wrote:

"The book one ought to re-read in the French Congo is the *Inferno* of Dante. All my life, I shall preserve the sadness of having seen, with my own eyes, a real hell. M. de Brazza saw a despotic administration, eager to establish badly calculated or vexatious taxes, to demand their payment by brutal procedures, to frighten natives, and to drive them from European control instead of bringing them under our administration by protecting them. He saw the

concessions companies, rapacious and cynical, trying to reconstitute anew slavery, to impose upon the blacks, by threat and violence, insufficiently remunerated work, instead of trying to attract them by free and loyal commerce. He saw how officials, by frequent brutalities, had fallen to the level of the most barbarous negroes. He knew in all its details the odious history of the High Shari: forced porterage, camps of hostages, razzias, and massacres. From these terrible discoveries, M. de Brazza suffered in his heart. This heroic sorrow, this sublime sadness, spent his strength and hastened his end. He said in dying: '*The French Congo must not become a new Belgian Mongala.*'"

In 1905, at Brazzaville, occurred the trial of two French officials of the High Shari for "voluntary homicide." There were several serious charges against them of murder of natives in their jurisdiction. It had taken two years to bring them to justice, and this was the first time white men had been prosecuted in a serious way before a French civil court. Messieurs Toqué and Gaud were brought to trial for crimes committed at Fort Crampel in 1903. There had been many rumors in connection with many officials. But evidence was hard to get. Probably nothing would have been done in this case, had it not been for the energy and insistence of Lieutenant-Colonel Gouraud, commandant of the Military Territory of Chad, who was determined to put a stop to the evil reputation France was getting among the natives of his jurisdiction because of the crimes of regularly commissioned colonial officials in Shari, where, according to one of the accused, Toqué,

every consideration of humanity had to be subordinated to the necessity of getting porters to carry rubber. "It was a general massacre we had to institute in order to make the service run," said Toqué. Against Toqué, the charges were: shooting a Moruba porter, who refused to carry burdens; ordering killed with a bayonet a native chief; drowning a porter who stole cartridges by having him thrown into the Nana Falls. Gaud was accused of: throwing a woman into the River Gribingui; beating men and boys; boiling a negro chief's head, and compelling his servant to drink the water afterwards; and other crimes of a revolting nature. Together the two men were accused of various unbelievable tortures, causing the death of several natives, and of tying a dynamite cartridge to a man's head, and blowing his head off.

All the crimes were not proved. The court went on the principle laid down by Dr. Cureau, in a study on the psychology of negro races: "The testimony of the negro in justice offers absolutely no guarantee."[1] But from the confessions of the accused and from testimony of white witnesses, the two cases of throwing a man into the Nana Falls and of blowing off another man's head with a stick of dynamite were proved. Toqué and Gaud were condemned each to five years imprisonment.

The condemnation provoked a great deal of astonishment and indignation among the Europeans of Brazzaville. The friends and associates of the condemned refused not only to shake hands with the

[1] See *Revue générale des sciences*, July, 1904.

judges but with those who ate with them. For the first time since they had been in the Congo, the Frenchmen and other Europeans who had sloughed off decency and civilization were reminded of the existence of law and order and justice. It had never occurred to them that a negro had rights. One French functionary drew distinction between homicide and *animalicide*. In his opinion, Toqué and Gaud were merely guilty of *animalicide*. Another young official, when the sentence was pronounced, cried out: "Are we to become naturalized negroes?" The military officials, however, who had come from the Chad district with the determination to see that justice was done, were highly satisfied with the verdict, and expressed in no uncertain terms their contempt of Frenchmen who could fall so low as to sympathize with and take the part of these degenerates. But Toqué and Gaud had been defended in court by the civil governor of Brazzaville!

For two years after the de Brazza investigation, there was ample confirmation of the reports of those who accompanied the great explorer on his last African trip in serious and widespread native uprisings. Some tribes arose *en masse*. Senegalese troops had to be used in large numbers to "pacify" those who had been goaded to the breaking point by torture and abuse of *concessionnaires* and their brutes of henchmen. An expedition, which started from Brazzaville to find a direct trade route in the unknown region between Lake Chad and the Congo basin, in order that the trade which was passing through Kamerun might be directed to French

posts, learned how terrible was native hatred and how difficultly bridged the chasm of native mistrust of the French.

Fortunately, the revelations of the de Brazza mission were not without wholesome effect in Paris. The French Congo has not become a new Belgian Mongala, although it was rapidly drifting that way. Much has been accomplished that was needed in the way of reform by the establishment of a common central administration in 1910.[1] But the evils of the old régime were not eradicated root and branch. Although greatly mitigated, they still remain. They always will remain in the French Congo until an abundant official class, recruited from the upper classes, is found to administer the country in the interest of the natives, instead of in the interest of their exploiters.

The blame that attaches to France and to her Colonial Ministry is in allowing the French flag to wave, and in assuming the responsibility of government, over regions where concessions companies

[1] New arrangements were made in 1910 with the chief *concessionnaires*. They were on the basis of cultivation or other actual use of the land. The companies were permitted to select their blocks of land, with definite limits. The title would revert to them in 1920, only if during ten years there was systematic exploitation and development by the *concessionnaires* themselves. All rubber concessions were to revert to the state in 1920, and after that time leases would be renewed yearly, subject to the production and conduct of the companies. Rights were recognized of natives to their own villages and to their local customs, and to all the produce of their own lands. They might also collect forest produce from undeveloped lands. Contracts between chiefs and companies for tribal labor were subject to the approval of the Governor-General.

are given uncontrolled power to exploit the blacks for their own benefit; and then in sending troops to punish the natives for doing what Frenchmen would do under similar circumstances, protecting their wives and children from dishonor, torture, and death. What a mockery to free the negroes of Central Africa from the slave trader, and then turn them over to soulless corporations with a thousand times more power to bully and drive and massacre than Tippoo Tib and his ilk! There is blame, also, for putting power in the hands of Senegalese brutes, and invariably supporting them in the exercise of that power. Most of all, there is blame in allowing France and Christian civilization to be represented by officials who would hardly find a place in the mother country outside of a jail. In the Congo region, what one could say to Portugal and Belgium during the first decade of the nineteenth century, one could say to France: If you are not prepared to assume the government of this country, in accordance with the standards of justice you insist upon in France, you ought not to have undertaken the government.

Washing dirty linen is a painful and unpleasant business. It is an unprofitable business, also, unless it serves some good purpose. I would not feel justified in speaking of the sad maladministration in the French Central African colonies, if I were not able at the same time to suggest the reasons for this maladministration, and the way in which it can be remedied.

Central Africa has an evil effect upon the moral sense of the white man, when left too much alone or entrusted with the exercise of uncontrolled power.

He becomes lazy, careless, neurasthenic, credulous. In continual contact with the brutality of the blacks, and their hopeless degradation, out of touch with the civilization whose magic is in the ability it gives man to dominate his natural bestial instincts by a cultivated spiritual control, the European quickly degenerates. He becomes as careless of human life as those around him. He commits acts of cruelty without a qualm, the remembrance of which haunts him continually years later when he returns to civilization. Only men of the strongest character and moral fiber, who have been born and raised in an atmosphere of culture, who have gone through the severe discipline of cultural education, who have inherited the habit of exercising authority, and who, when they return from their post, go by right of blood and ability into cultivated circles and to responsible positions, are fit to be entrusted with administrative posts in Central Africa. For this type of man alone is able to resist the demoralizing influences of solitude, degrading surroundings, and unlimited power of the Central Africa official.

The British send this type of man to Africa. Other nations do not.[1] Hence the joy of natives

[1] In his *Guide Pratique de l'Européen dans l'Afrique Occidentale*, Dr. Barot writes: "For those who have not the necessary moral force to endure two years of absolute continence, there is only one practicable line of conduct, temporary union with a well-chosen native woman." The advantages of such a step are glowingly set forth. Dr. Barot declares that no wrong is done to the temporary little wife, for native morality is not at all severe. "The former wives of Europeans are very much sought after by the blacks and generally marry very well." See pp. 328, 330.

under the British flag, and the misery of natives under other flags.

Let it be remembered that I am not speaking of commissioned army officers. I am speaking of administrative officials in the civil service. The very best men of France, gentlemen in the fullest connotation of the word, have served in the French African army. One may ask why the French army is able to draw the best while French colonial civil service recruits from a class not in any way representative of the best in French life. The answer is not hard to give.

As I look from my study window, I see four splendid boys playing in the sand. They are helping my children build a trench to let in the water when the tide comes up. In their faces, in their bearing, in their actions, they tell the story that only blood tells. Their father died just two years ago in the battle of the Marne. His widow said to me the other day, "My husband was born to fight the Germans, and he spent his life in learning how to do it." It is not the glamour of colonial service or the desire to build up a new world that has sent the best of France into Africa *in the army*. They went there to learn how to fight the Germans, and to train soldiers to fill the gaps in the French army caused by depopulation. They looked upon Africa as a school in warfare and a reservoir of warriors against the inevitable day.

The Frenchman of the upper-classes, when it is not a question of national defense, has no desire to go abroad and no reason for doing so. The upper-class

Englishman is pushed into the exile of colonial civil service by reasons of caste and by the law of entail. The money in the family goes to the eldest son, and the others, not wanting to engage in trade, enter government service. French law requires that a man's money be divided equally among his children. Then there is the family. English fathers and mothers bring their children up with the idea that they are going to leave them and work out their own salvation. French fathers and mothers bring up their children with the idea that they are going to keep them with them or near them as long as they live. To the Englishman of the upper classes, England is a country to be mildly proud of but not to live in until one is over fifty, and even then not all the time. To the Frenchman, France is a country never to be left except under dire necessity. To the Englishman, London is a city to visit occasionally between protracted week ends, but never to live in if you want to make a reputation for yourself. To the Frenchman, reputation is made only in Paris.

A very keen French critic once told Jules Ferry that Indo-China and Madagascar and the Congo would never be distinctively French, and would never bring glory or profit to France. "Why?" asked the Colonial Prophet. "Too far from Paris," was the laconic reply.

CHAPTER XVIII

EUROPEAN RIVALRY IN MOROCCO BEFORE ALGECIRAS

THE portion of Africa nearest Europe and America, and adjoining the most highly developed European colony in Africa, was, at the opening of the twentieth century, the most backward, the most unknown, the most inaccessible. Morocco, on account of the rivalry of the Powers, remained outside European "spheres of influence" until Great Britain and France compounded colonial differences in the famous Agreement of 1904. In the decade from 1904 to 1914, Morocco was "taken over" by France, but not until after Europe had been led from one international crisis through another to the catastrophe of a world war. Commercial antagonism, irreconciliable political aims, and traditional hatreds could have brought the Great Powers to a twentieth century war without Morocco. But without Morocco, war might have been deferred and the alignment of the Powers might have been different. The student of history may not be able to find in his studies positive assurance of the avoidability of war. But he certainly finds, even in contemporary history, positive assurance of the impossibility of predicting,

from decade to decade, which nations are to be allies and which are to be enemies.[1] Of this truth, Morocco is the present-day illustration.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, British and Germans were working together against France in Morocco. The British were more vigorous than the Germans in their opposition to the desire of France to repeat what she had done in Tunis by getting possession of the other "key to her house."[2] The British contention, frequently put into print, was that the independence of the Shereefian Empire must be upheld at all costs. Britain was the pro-

[1] The Crown Prince of Japan received a tremendous ovation in Petrograd during the last week of September, 1916. Ten years ago he would have been lynched. Turkish troops are fighting with Bulgarians against Servians in Macedonia. Three years ago, Bulgarians and Servians were fighting against Turks. Italy and Rumania are in the field against their allies of yesterday. A Greek army corps recently sought protection of the Bulgarians against France and England at Cavalla. The Sheriff of Mecca is fighting the Khalif of the Moslem world. The most popular contemporary Breton song contains a verse in which England is treated as the enemy of France at sea. The British army now occupies Normandy, with bases at Rouen and Havre, as a friendly army come to defend France. Not many years ago Guy de Maupassant put the following words into the mouth of a physician at Gisors in one of his most famous stories: "In spite of my hatred against the German and my desire for vengeance, I do not detest him, I do not hate him by instinct as I hate the Englishman, the real enemy, the hereditary enemy, the natural enemy of the Norman. For the Englishman has passed over this soil inhabited by my ancestors, has pillaged it and ravaged it twenty times, and my aversion for this perfidious race has been transmitted to me, with my life, from my father." See *Le Rosier de Mme. Husson*, in the collection *En Famille* (Ollendorf, Paris), p. 83.

[2] Speech of Jules Ferry on Tunisian policy in Chamber of Deputies, November 5, 1881.

tector of weak nations against the strong. What Emperor William said at Tangier in 1905, and what the German press wrote at the time of Algeciras and Agadir, is substantially what has been said in more than one Speech from the Throne of Queen Victoria and what the British press wrote before the bargain with France. When one reads what was going on in Morocco fifteen years ago, the pages consecrated by English writers of the present time to German intrigues in Africa are amusing and amazing reading. In their indignation against Germany and in the accusation that Germany has tried to "block the legitimate aspirations of other nations," as one eminent authority puts it, they indict, by the same token, their own policy in more than one part of Africa, as well as the policy of France, now their ally but fifteen years ago their bitter enemy.

As will be seen in this chapter and the chapters that follow it, I have deep sympathy and warm admiration for French policy in Morocco and British policy in Egypt. These two countries are far better off under British and French rule than they would be if Britain and France had stayed out. But I have no patience with insincerity in recording historical events and with the cant that sees only right in what one does oneself or what one's friend does, and only wrong when the identical thing is done by an enemy. We shall have a lasting peace on the day we recognize that human nature is the same the world over (and in particular diplomatic nature). If things have been done differently, and have brought different results, it is because special influences have

been at work in one case, or with one nation, that were lacking in another case and with another nation.

During the five years preceding the Agreement of 1904, France, thwarted at Fashoda and converted to the necessity of a constructive and logical African program, began her effort to secure the Moroccan "key to her house." The most effective opposition to her attempts to gain control of the Moorish army, to obtain harbor and mining concessions, and to secure a "rectification" of the Algerian frontier, was that of the British Legation. The German Legation was a very poor second. Britain and Germany, though their dual and common influence was sufficient to ruin the French program, were not able to obtain advantages for themselves. Much as she welcomed Germany's aid against France, Britain did not want a naval rival anywhere on the African coast opposite Gibraltar. Germany thought Egypt and Malta and Cyprus and Gibraltar were enough for Britain in the Mediterranean. France had a sincere desire, and a very good reason, to see peace and order and economic prosperity brought to Morocco. The Anglo-German policy paralyzed every effort, both of Moroccan and French authorities, to improve political and economic conditions in the northwestern corner of Africa. British policy in Morocco before 1904 is similar to that in Persia and Turkey, the two other independent Moslem states. Reforms that might bring political and economic strength were opposed on purely selfish grounds, and with no thought or care for the interests of the nations used as pawns in the diplomatic game. This fact is

irrefutable. Before April 8, 1904, the British Minister, advising the Sultan of Morocco as a friend whose interest he had at heart, urged him to resist French advances and combat French influences. After April 8, 1904, he told the Sultan that he must do what the French said. The British Minister at Teheran did exactly the same thing with the Persians in regard to Russia before and after the Agreement of 1907.

The present dynasty of Morocco was founded in 1660 by Reshid, a descendant of the Prophet, who began his career at Talifet, in the south near the desert; subjected the tribes of Udja and Riff; and finally established his capital at Fez. His recognition in the region of Udja marked the final disappearance of Ottoman authority in Morocco. Reshid never became sovereign of the whole of Morocco: nor did his successors. One cannot understand recent events in Morocco, unless he keeps constantly in mind the nature of sovereignty in the Shereefian Empire. There are three differences between the Moroccan conception of the state and ours:

1. The Sultan's authority depends upon his recognition by other religious chiefs, who are, like himself, descendants of the Prophet. There is a traditional right of blood but not of primogeniture.

2. The state is not a geographical conception. The Sultan rules over tribes, not over territories.

3. By no means all the tribes recognize the authority of the Sultan. Some never have recognized his authority. Morocco is divided into two distinct sections: the *Makhzen* and the *Siba*. The

Makhzen are the tribes who recognize the authority of the Sultan, and the Siba are those who do not. The Makhzen and the Siba are all mixed up in different parts of the country.

These three facts show how absurd was the Anglo-German contention that Morocco must not "lose her independence," and the French contention that the Sultan was responsible for the actions of all the tribes within the region our maps call Morocco. Before the British sold out the Shereefian Empire to France, the Sultan could always play one power off against another, and his anomalous "government" was allowed to exist. When France got a free hand, and Great Britain stood behind her by preventing Germany from assuming the traditional rôle she herself had abdicated, the Sultan was brought face to face for the first time with the necessity of representing *geographical* Morocco. He was asked to accept responsibility for and to act for tribes that did not recognize his authority and had not recognized the authority of his ancestors.

Spain and France, neighbors of this country of anarchy, had wars with Morocco in the nineteenth century. In both cases, England interfered to prevent them from securing the amelioration of the evils on account of which they had fought. The Moroccan question became international in 1880, when England and Spain, in an attempt to prevent France from taking the measures that were necessary (and which she had treaty right to take)to protect her Algerian frontier from tribal raids, called the Madrid Conference. Although France was vigorously supported


Lake Chad
FRENCH TERRITORY
EGYPTIAN SOUDAN
NIGERIA
Benue River
BRITISH EAST AFRICA
CAMEROON
CAMEROON
Fernando Po (Sp)
Princes I. (Port)
St Thomas I. (Port)
RIO MUNI (SPANISH)
LIBREVILLE
ATLANTIC OCEAN
Ogowe R.
FRENCH CONGO
Ubangi R.
STANLEYVILLE
EQUATOR
BONGO
L. Leopold II
BELGIAN CONGO
Kassai R.
BRAZZAVILLE
LEOPOLDVILLE
KABINDA
BOMA
BANANA
ANGOLA
SKETCH MAP SHOWING THE GERMAN-FRENCH BOUNDARIES 1912
BEFORE THE MOROCCO ACCORD
AFTER " " "
0 100 200 300 400 500 MILES

by the German delegates, British opposition compelled her to give up her ancient treaty rights in Morocco. The foundation of the internationalization of Morocco was laid. British diplomacy had only one thought, to prevent France or Spain from getting a fortified foothold opposite Gibraltar. In all the Morocco agreements the British Foreign Office has invariably insisted that France and Spain bind themselves not to follow the British example of putting fortifications in the Strait of Gibraltar. The fact of Great Britain, perched on the big rock in Spanish territory, forbidding Spain to fortify the African side of the strait, illustrates the world-old axiom that a nation's territorial rights are founded on force and maintained by force. The British took Gibraltar by force. They are there only by right of force. They will stay there as long as they have the force to defend Gibraltar. And as long as they have the force they will prevent others from imitating their example on the African side of the Strait of Gibraltar or anywhere else in the world.

British diplomacy anticipated in 1844 and 1860 the German attempts of 1906 and 1911, the difference being that the British succeeded where the Germans failed. In 1844, Great Britain prevented France from extending her protectorate over Morocco. In 1860, she prevented Spain from extending her protectorate over Morocco. Both times she would have fought, if the rival had not given way. Several times the British tried to extend their protectorate over Morocco, and would have fought any Power that opposed the project. The British flag does not

wave over Morocco now, only because Sir Evan Smith could not persuade the father of the present sultan to accept a protectorate,[1] and the London Cabinet did not dispose of the forces and ships that would be required to conquer the country. But if there had been extensive gold mines in the country to make the conquest worth while, the *pourparlers* of 1892 would probably have ended by Hassan yielding to force.

The Moroccan crisis, which was to bring about momentous results for the world, began in 1901 with the occupation by French troops of the oasis of Twat, on the northern edge of the Sahara Desert in the undefined hinterland between Morocco and Algeria. When one studies the map, with the plan of French penetration across the Sahara and the protection of the Senegal-Niger Colony in mind, and considers also that the administrative organization of the Algerian hinterland was an imperative necessity for the peace and prosperity of Algeria and Tunis, France cannot be accused of wanting to provoke the Sultan or of infringing upon his rights. But it was unfavorably commented upon by France's rivals, and things were whispered in the ear of Abdul Aziz. In the same year the assassination of a French colonist of Oran brought an ultimatum to the Sultan, supported by two warships at Tangier. In spite of Anglo-German opposition, the Sultan made two agreements in April and May, 1902, which opened up the way for France to interfere in the internal management of Morocco. France and the Government of the Sultan were to

[1] *Cf.* Bernard's *Le Maroc* (Alcan, Paris, 1915) p. 316.

work in accord in the frontier regions in matters concerning police, commerce, and customs. After repeated tribal raids on the frontier showed the inability—if not the ill will—of the Moroccan Government to live up to the agreements it had made, M. Jonnart, Governor-General of Algeria, called Colonel Lyautey in 1903 to undertake the task of pacifying the hinterland of Oran and of making the Algerian frontier secure against raids from Morocco. As just as he was strict, as judicious as he was energetic, as cool-headed as he was enthusiastic, Colonel Lyautey developed in his task diplomatic and military qualities that have brought him a seat in the French Academy, a generalship in the army, and the mission of making Morocco French.

From 1901, when France determined to make her African Empire what it could become, the French attitude toward Morocco was logical and justifiable. When Colonel Lyautey took charge of the frontier forces, it became energetic and unyielding. What France asked for she had a right to expect—that the Sultan of Morocco should exercise effective control over the tribes that were threatening the security and disturbing the prosperity of Algeria and the Algerian hinterland, or refrain from opposing France in taking the necessary military measures to call the Moorish tribes to order. From the French point of view, the line of argument to justify a "violation" of the Moorish frontier was unanswerable. If Morocco meant a definite geographical territory, the Government of Morocco was responsible for what happened in that territory. If the Sultan answered that he was re-

sponsible only for the acts of the Makhzen, *i. e.*, the submitted tribes, France was not attacking his sovereignty or his Government, when she punished unsubmitted tribes, *i. e.*, the Siba, and occupied their territories.

The difficulty of France lay not with Abdul Aziz and his native advisers, but with Kaid Maclean, the Instructor-General of the Moorish army, a Scotch adventurer in the pay of the British Foreign Office,[1] and the British Minister at Tangier. As long as these two men, aided by the German Minister, kept telling Abdul Aziz that it was his duty and his right to oppose the French thesis, France could be put before the world—even before her own people—as an aggressor, trying to bully the poor weak Moslem sovereign of the one remaining independent Moslem State of Africa.

The Sultan Abdul Aziz, son and successor of Hassan, was an ignorant and weak-minded young man, who might have lasted for a lifetime as nominal ruler of Morocco, supporting his authority upon the religious chiefs and expecting only homage and little

[1] Sir Harry Maclean was formerly an officer in the 59th Regiment, stationed at Gibraltar, who secured a temporary appointment with Sultan Hassan to organize his army. When he saw how nicely his bread was buttered in Morocco, Maclean decided to cast in his fortunes with the country. He acted as tout for concession hunters and other grafters, who wanted to get the ear of the Sultan. He was the pillar of strength upon whom the British Legation at Tangier depended to keep French officers out of the Moorish army, and to block the French proposals to establish a joint Franco-Moorish police control over the tribes that were opposing the French administrative organization of the Algerian hinterland and the western Sahara.

money from the Makhzen tribes. But he was incapable of seeing through the European intrigues and of avoiding the traps that were set for him. His brothers and other chieftains were bribed by European agents to conspire and revolt against him; the leaders of his army and his ministers drew subsidies from Tangier Legations; and tribes were instigated to attack him, to attack the French and the Spanish, and to kidnap European subjects. Nothing was too petty or too mean to be left undone by agents of European diplomatic representatives. The worst of all, however, was the way Abdul Aziz's credulity was imposed upon by concession hunters and merchants, who involved him in diplomatic controversies and in debts. Like Khedive Ismail of Egypt, he fell an easy prey to the European adventurers that surrounded him, and with whom his Ministers and favorites were in connivance and shared ill-gotten profits. His concessions and his extravagances gave the Powers the opportunity to interfere in the domestic affairs of Morocco. Out of the money he borrowed, Abdul Aziz got absolutely nothing either for himself or for his country. During his reign, Morocco fell into the clutches of European money-lenders. But no harbors were constructed; no roads or railways were built; and Abdul Aziz never occupied himself in any way with public works of any kind.

Abdul Aziz's purchases were of the most foolish and useless and naïve character. An adventurer interested him in photography. He bought cameras by the hundred, films by the thousand, and develop-

ing materials one might say almost by the laboratory! He took only a few pictures, and then gave up photography, because, as he confided to a friend, he found it was too expensive even for a Sultan. When he wanted a grand piano, he was told that pianos could be purchased only by the dozen at fifteen hundred dollars apiece. He was deeply interested in moving pictures, and had his own agents securing the best films for him in Europe. Once he invited a friend to see King Edward's coronation in Westminster Abbey. It was a wretched fake, with painted background and third-rate actors. He told the friend in all seriousness that this was the only film that had been taken inside the Abbey, and that he had to pay a bribe of several hundred pounds to the Dean of Westminster to get his operator introduced and hidden in the gallery over the choir. Once, when he was going from Fez to Tangier, he met a caravan of camels carrying his latest shipment of grand pianos. In the pouring rain, he had one of the pianos unpacked and set up by the roadside. He went up to it, singing la-la-la. On the third la, he struck a key of the piano with his index finger. Then he went on his way to Tangier. What remains of the Steinway Grand is still there by the roadside.

The beginning of the end in Morocco came two years before the Anglo-French Agreement, with the revolt of Bu Hamara against the Sultan. In October, 1902, Bu Hamara pretended that he was Mohammed, brother of Abdul Aziz and son of the late Hassan. He claimed to be the rightful heir to the throne and rallied around him the tribes who were beginning to

be alarmed by the European intrigues. His policy was anti-European, and he asserted that Abdul Aziz had forfeited all rights to the throne by conspiring with the foreign infidels to the detriment of the Shereefian Empire. Although Mohammed was actually alive at the time, a prisoner of his brother, the claims of Bu Hamara were accepted by many tribes. One cannot, in the absence of facts, assert that Bu Hamara was instigated by the French. But it is none the less true that his action gave to France the opening she had long been looking for. France proposed to send troops to Morocco to put down the insurrection of Bu Hamara. It was represented to Abdul Aziz by the British and German Ministers that consent to this proposition would be looked upon by his subjects as substantiating the very charge that Bu Hamara made against him. So French assistance was refused.

During 1903, Morocco fell into a state of complete anarchy. The insurrection spread alarmingly. In spite of serious reverses, Abdul Aziz kept his throne. There was no unity among his opponents, and he was able to borrow money to bribe important religious chiefs. The Government troops were not regularly paid. Although there was considerable revenue from the customs, his bribes and his indulgence in personal luxuries soon plunged Abdul Aziz hopelessly into debt. Creditors, *through their Legations*, began to press him.

In order to obtain food for her troops at Melilla, Spain was compelled to acknowledge Bu Hamara as Sultan. It was in this region that the Pretender was

strongest, and he had the Spanish at his mercy. Spain, in return for her recognition, secured from Bu Hamara mining concessions which were afterwards the subject of much discussion with France, and were finally disallowed. Germany and England had no direct interest in the revolution of Bu Hamara. For it affected only the district between Fez and the Algerian frontier. But they watched its progress none the less with anxiety, for they saw in the resultant anarchy an excuse for France to intervene.

At this critical moment, the Anglo-French Agreement of April 8, 1904, was signed. France and Britain agreed to let each other have a free hand in Egypt. Abdul Aziz found himself suddenly deserted by England. The British Minister, who had all along been warning him against the French and urging him to resist their intervention, which could lead only to the destroying of Moorish independence, turned overnight the deaf ear to his appeals. The Sultan was advised to make what terms he could with France. Abdul Aziz could look now only to Germany.

The English in Morocco were very bitter against their Government and just as hostile to the Entente Cordiale as were the Germans. Even now, more than a decade later, when England and France are united in the Great War, it is not impossible to find British residents of Morocco who feel still that their interests were sacrificed in a "deal" of international politics, of which the advantages to them were nil. For one must remember that British merchants and British trade have never prospered in French colo-

nies. No matter what assurances have been made to them, the British in Morocco tell you that sooner or later they will labor under the same disadvantages of the closed door that foreigners find in Algeria, Tunis, Madagascar, and Indo-China.

It is claimed by British writers that the Germans had no ground whatever for complaint when the Anglo-French Agreement about Egypt and Morocco was signed, and that no privileges would accrue to the French and British merchants and goods in the countries whose fate was sealed by this Agreement, that would not accrue equally to German merchants and German goods. This is not strictly true. In the Agreement, Great Britain protected her merchants from the contingency of French railways into eastern Morocco turning trade through Algerian ports to the sole advantage of France, by exacting a clause that British goods could travel over Algerian railways into Morocco without paying Algerian duties. The French, in return, received the same privilege on Egyptian railways leading into the Sudan. This is but one instance of how an agreement of this character discriminates against the commerce of a third nation, even where the principle of the open door is asserted to have been maintained. If British merchants and residents of Morocco, and French merchants and residents of Egypt, protected by a mutual dual engagement, were bitter against the Agreement of 1904, is it unreasonable that Germans should find cause for complaint and should appeal to their Government to defend their interests in the few places still left open to them in the world? Then,

too, we should never forget that however much we say to a foreigner that he is at home in our midst, he, on his side, feels a foreigner still. He is under the perpetual menace of a sudden change in his status, such as occurred in both Egypt and Morocco at the beginning of this war.[1] Even when peace is arranged, he will feel that he has not exactly the same privileges and advantages that are accorded to merchants and traders of the nation whose flag flies over the territory where he is working. It is no argument against this to point out the success of Germans in British colonies: for that success has been largely won by greater efforts and greater ability in spite of unfavorable circumstances. And as regards French colonies, English merchants and traders have only to consider their own experience to realize why the Germans were justified in protesting against Morocco becoming a French colony.

Abdul Aziz had little faith, after the desertion of England, in German support. It was too intangible —mere words—and the British Legation, untroubled by such a little thing as inconsistency, now began to urge him strongly to play up to the French. His inclination was to compromise with the French to save his throne. But he was too weak, and too afraid to act, to change circumstances.

The month after the signing of the Anglo-French Agreement, France had an excellent opportunity to

[1] The Johannesburg riots in May, 1915, resulted in property damage to German firms and residents of two and a half million dollars. The majority of the sufferers had settled in the Transvaal before the British conquest.

show internationally her position as "predominant Power." The famous Raisuli captured two Europeans, one a Greek who was a naturalized American, and the other a Britisher. Algerian police were landed at Tangier, and other steps taken to "preserve order" in the bandit-ridden neighborhood of Tangier, where order had never existed. A few months earlier, such a step would have been greeted by an indignant outcry in the London press. The new word of order having gone out from Downing Street, the "French protective measure" was sympathetically recorded and commented upon.[1] Abdul Aziz avoided complications with Americans and British by buying the release of the prisoners from Raisuli, and agreeing to other conditions imposed by Raisuli, which amounted virtually to an abdication of all pretense to sovereignty in the Mediterranean and Gibraltar regions of Morocco. In December, 1904, the French, alarmed by the growing anti-French feeling among all the different elements in Morocco, Siba as well as Makhzen, increased their troops at Tangier and sent a detachment to Rabat on the Atlantic coast. All Europeans were ordered by their Consuls to leave Fez, and a French invasion of Morocco was predicted.

But France still stuck to diplomacy. Bu Hamara and Raisuli, bitterly opposed as they were to Abdul

[1] A study of Reuter's Agency telegrams at this period shows how important it is for the American press to endeavor to become independent of London in presenting foreign news to the public. Our Associated Press gives Reuter telegrams to its subscribers without independent verification and no indication of the source.

Aziz, might easily be led to join the Makhzen tribes in rallying to the Sultan's support, if the French precipitated matters by force. A mission was sent at the beginning of 1905 to Fez to urge upon the Sultan a scheme of reforming Morocco, in which France would be the adviser and "elder brother" of the Sultan. The Berber tribes, incensed against France for having extended her aggression from Twat into the Figuig region, refused to obey a summons from Abdul Aziz to attend a Divan to "discuss the French proposals." They warned Abdul Aziz against listening to the treacherous words of the infidel. Most of the religious and tribal chiefs, however, assembled at Fez. The Divan, like all Oriental assemblies, was convoked for the purpose of assenting without discussion to the conclusion put before it by the Government.

At this moment occurred the first German intervention, of which so much has been written. Germany was not a party to the Anglo-French Agreement. She had no reason, then, to cease suddenly, as Great Britain had done, her interest in preserving the political and territorial integrity of Morocco. On March 31, 1905, Kaiser Wilhelm landed at Tangier, sent greetings to Abdul Aziz of Morocco, and let it be known in no uncertain terms that he regarded Morocco as an independent country, and intended, in spite of the English defection, to continue to support the Sultan against intrigues that were threatening to destroy him and his country. The Kaiser's visit to Morocco was only for two hours, but it gave Abdul Aziz and his Ministers courage to resist the demands of the French Mission. On May 28th, the

Sultan formally rejected the French proposals, referring to the decision of the Divan as the ground of their *non possumus*.

The Government of the Makhzen, accepting the suggestion of the German Minister, proposed an international Conference of all the Powers to decide upon the status of Morocco before the world. The British Foreign Office refused to accept the Conference, unless France were willing. M. Delcassé strongly advised the French Cabinet to refuse the proposal for a conference, *no matter what might happen*. His colleagues, however, fearing a war with Germany for which they were not prepared and on an issue that was not clear to their own electorate, much less to the world, did not see their way clear to follow the Foreign Minister's advice. M. Delcassé resigned. This was the beginning of the actual gathering of the war clouds that were to break a decade later.

The Conference was first set for Tangier, after long negotiations between the Powers and Morocco. During these negotiations, Abdul Aziz borrowed two and a half million dollars from German financiers, and gave to German contractors the concession for harbor work at Tangier. Bu Hamara continued his war against the Sultan, and it was believed that he might—perhaps with the connivance of the Makhzen—make some *coup* that would upset European calculations before the Conference met. The Oriental delay of the Moors caused the postponement of the Conference, and Bu Hamara's activity a change of its place of meeting. It was set finally for January 16, 1906, at Algeciras, a town on the Spanish coast near Gibraltar.

CHAPTER XIX

FRANCE GETS MOROCCO

THE Conference of Algeciras, and the Act which its delegates drew up after long and unedifying bickering, belongs to European rather than African history. I have dealt with it from the European standpoint, and given the main provisions of the Act, in an earlier volume.[1] The Act was unsatisfactory and futile, as are all international compromises that do not meet issues squarely. Instead of establishing definitely the status and privileges of France and Spain in Morocco under international sanction, and requiring of these two states an absolutely restrictive pledge to abide loyally by the status and keep loyally within the privileges, France and Spain were given police powers that might be interpreted by either more widely than the Act intended, without ground for accusation of violation of the Agreement and of breach of good faith. One can argue with equal force that it was a diplomatic defeat for Germany and a diplomatic defeat for France. Had German diplomats been sure of popular support at home, they would have insisted upon a much more strict limitation

[1] See my *New Map of Europe*, pp. 71–83.

and definition of the powers entrusted to France and to Spain. Had French diplomats been assured of British backing, they would have refused to sign the Act. But German public opinion was not convinced of the wisdom of showing the mailed fist over Morocco, which interested the Germans very little indeed: and the new Liberal Government in Great Britain was not in a position to promise France more than "sympathy."

Delegates left Algeciras without having accomplished the purpose for which they had come. In Germany, a storm of condemnation and ridicule met the announcement of the "decision" of the Conference. Those in France who cared at all were determined to ignore the Act. Spain, instead of having clearly defined rights by international agreement, was left to negotiate separately with France.

Germany's interests in Morocco, in spite of all the hubbub of the Mannesmanns and the solicitude of Dr. Rosen, were slight, potentially as well as actually. From the moment the Act of Algeciras was signed her statesmen and the Colonial Party and the Navy League regarded Morocco as the means of working upon the German electorate. They put forward the question of principle. Germany must have her place in the sun. She was not going to take away by force the colonies of others, but she was going to prevent others from extending their political sovereignty over territories not yet "grabbed," without Germany's consent and without giving Germany "compensations" elsewhere. Morocco

was to be used to get increased budget grants for the colonies, the army, and the navy. French statesmen and imperialists were equally alive to the possibility of using Morocco to work upon their electorate in exactly the same way. They began to enlighten the French nation on the value—no, more, the necessity—of Morocco in defending what France had already won and built in North Africa. They could put forth logically, truthfully, and tellingly the menace to the security and prosperity of Algeria and Tunis and of the recently created West Africa from anarchy in Morocco and a spread of Islamic agitation. Events since 1900 could be cited to prove the wisdom of having occupied Tunis, one of the keys of the house. Morocco, the other key, must also be taken.

At the bottom of the Morocco question was the gulf that had been made between the two nations by the Treaty of Frankfort. The unity and prosperity of Germany was dependent upon maintaining that Treaty. France would never be "France herself again" until the lost provinces had been returned. The North African Empire, moreover, was the Third Republic's consolation for Alsace and Lorraine. Was Germany now threatening to take that also from France? The fuel for keeping the Morocco question alive, then, was the mutual animosity between France and Germany. But the Germans did not feel as intensely as the French until the Morocco question proved that the British were standing behind the French. The present war had multiple causes. Morocco, however, can un-

hesitatingly be called a principal cause. On both sides of the Rhine, the Socialists foresaw this, and feared it. Before and after Agadir, they worked hard to prevent the catastrophe. Without the Balkan troubles, they might have succeeded. When they were taxed with lack of patriotism, they stuck by their guns without wavering. Only to avoid the shameful epithet of traitors did they finally weaken and give in. When they were opposing an aggressive colonial policy, increase of standing army, increase of navy, and the huge budget estimates of latter years for shot and shell and cannon, the Socialists believed they were combating chauvinism and not patriotism. In England, also, independent thinkers, advanced Radicals, and labor leaders fought jingoism, and sustained the thesis that *war is the spontaneous combustion that occurs when materials for making it are gathered.* In the midst of the conflict, Socialists and Radicals and dreamers are anathematized. Events, they are told, have proved the folly of their thesis. The roar of the gathered materials drowns their answer. But will not the historian give them reason?

Would Germany have been satisfied in the long run, if France had abided loyally by the provisions of the Act of Algeciras? Did German intrigues in Morocco induce, if not compel, France to refuse to abide by the provisions of the Act? These vital questions are answered by the polemicists[1] in a

[1] There are polemicists among European writers only since 1906. The best independent discussion of Algeciras and the years of tension following it are found in Arthur Bullard's *The Diplomacy of*

totally contradictory manner. Algeciras was a defeat for both France and Germany, as every compromise is a defeat for those who are advocating opposite solutions. Germany wanted the complete independence of the Shereefian Empire, and the refusal to acknowledge superior or "particular" interests of any Power or Powers. France wanted the free hand that she afterwards boldly took. The Powers signed an Act which, if the letter had been taken, would have prevented France from inheriting Morocco. On the other hand, the particular interests of France in Morocco were acknowledged by the Powers.

Sultan Abdul Aziz resented keenly the Conference at Algeciras. His feeling about the gratuitous assumption of the Powers to the right to decide the destinies of his Empire were shared by every religious and political chief in Morocco. There was no formidable and united resistance on the part of the Moors and Berbers to repudiate the Act. But, just as has happened in other Moslem lands when Europe took advantage of weakness, anti-infidel feeling was aroused. There had not been before Algeciras opposition to Europeans on religious grounds. Intelligent Moors realized that Morocco must fall under European influence. But they determined to postpone the evil day when their habits and usages of centuries would be rudely up-

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the Great War, a notable book that well deserves the careful study of students of contemporary history. Mr. Bullard has a better first hand knowledge of Morocco than any other American writer.

set by the imposition of an alien and infidel yoke. Europeans who believe that Moslem impotence and fatalistic acquiescence to foreign domination means indifference sadly delude themselves. The delusion may some day bring disastrous results. For the people whom they rule are not reconciled to the humiliation of being a subject race. I have seen at close range in many countries what is called Moslem *fanaticism.* I believe firmly that this miscalled fanaticism is not due to religion. Moslems hate Christians because they believe that Christians have taken advantage of their political weakness. They resent our assumption of superiority, and await with burning eagerness the day when they are able to strike, and strike to kill. Their impotence is due to their inability to understand the meaning of solidarity. But those who live in Islamic countries are never free from the shadow of the menace of an uprising.

Had they been able to unite in action, as they were united in spirit, the Moors could undoubtedly have presented so formidable a barrier to French penetration that France would have hesitated to undertake what she had in mind. But Abdul Aziz was not the man who could rally around his throne tribes that had never acknowledged his authority, and that were traditionally hostile to each other as well as to the Makhzen. The internal condition of Morocco made impossible internal reform. We must not forget that even if the French had been imbued with good-will and the best intentions in the world toward Abdul Aziz and his government,

they realized that treating with him as responsible sovereign of the whole country would have been much like President Wilson treating with Carranza when Huerta and Villa were in the field. Bu Hamara was still powerful. Raisuli was master of the Tangier district, and at the end of 1906, Abdul Aziz's brother, Hafid, rebelled against him with the intention of deposing him. Abdul Aziz had sent a representative to Tangier to negotiate "practical measures of reform" with the Ministers of all the Powers, ignoring the special position of France. But the Europeans in the coast ports were under French and Spanish protection, and Abdul Aziz could put in the field an army of only three thousand men.

In January, 1907, Abdul Aziz appealed to the Tangier Legation for a loan to maintain his forces against Hafid, Raisuli, and Bu Hamara. In March, after a French physician had been assassinated and the British Consular Agency attacked at Marakesh, France crossed the Rubicon. The Ujda district on the Algerian frontier was occupied. Events moved fast. When Abdul Aziz issued an edict calling upon the people to remain quiet, and protested to Europe against the occupation of Ujda as a violation of all treaties, Hafid was proclaimed Sultan at Marakesh. European control of customs was established to protect the creditors of Abdul Aziz. This led to an anti-European outbreak at Casablanca, a port on the Atlantic between Rabat and Mazaghan. France promptly sent cruisers to bombard Casablanca, and landed three thousand

troops to occupy the city on August 9th.[1] Moorish attacks against this expeditionary force necessitated a vigorous French campaign in the hinterland. At the same time, General Lyautey was given full authority from Paris to use the French forces in Oran to repress the lawless Moors on the western frontier, who were trying to dislodge the French from Ujda. The French occupation had begun.

The complete anarchy that reigned throughout 1908 demonstrated the hopelessness of Morocco existing in any other state than as a country from which Europe was completely barred or in which a European administration controlled the entire machinery of government, with full political and military powers. Abdul Aziz and Hafid were fighting

[1] Much was said and written at the time about the cruelty of the French in the bombardment of Casablanca, the occupation of the city, and the subsequent campaign. German and English residents of Casablanca, who saw commercial disaster for themselves in the French occupation, were assiduous in giving circulation to these stories, just as four years later the foreign residents of Tripoli sent out blood-curdling stories of Italian atrocities. Women and children certainly were killed in the bombardment and subsequently. The testimony I have gathered from eye-witnesses is conflicting, as it always is in such cases. Nothing is more difficult to get at than the exact truth of atrocities to non-combatants in a military expedition. Soldiers get out of hand. Much suffering is unavoidable. But that the military authorities do not try their level best to prevent excesses is improbable. During his march north from Reggio to Naples, Garabaldi had to order the execution of some of his bravest Red Shirts. He remarked at the time that the officers of invading armies were rarely responsible for the murder and pillage and theft of their troops, and that they ought always to be given the benefit of the doubt. Practically the same thing was said to me by General Chaffee, who commanded the American army at Tien Tsin

for the sultanate of the Makhzen. Bu Hamara remained an independent usurper in the Riff. Raisuli was supreme in the neighborhood of Tangier. France had to fight hard to maintain the foothold she had gained in Morocco. The Riff tribes were becoming a serious menace to Spain on the Mediterranean coast. Abdul Aziz and Hafid both appealed for French aid. After Hafid occupied Fez and defeated the loyal army in August, Abdul Aziz took refuge with the French. Germany then came to the support of Hafid.

The international—or rather Franco-German—tension over Morocco was brought to fever heat by the Casablanca incident. Five members of the Foreign Legion, three of them Germans, who were in the French garrison occupying Casablanca, deserted and took refuge in the German Consulate. The three Germans demanded repatriation. A native escort was sent to put them aboard a German vessel. They were taken from this consular escort by force by French gendarmes. The German Consul's demand for their release was refused. Germany at first asked that an apology be made before the incident was referred to The Hague Tribunal. But international public opinion was hostile to the German side of the case, and at this moment Kaiser Wilhelm was betrayed into the indiscretion of the much-bruited *Daily Telegraph* interview. So the German Foreign Office did not feel strong enough to insist upon the apology. A Solomon's judgment was gravely rendered by the Tribunal. The Hague avoided carefully pronouncing on the real issue,

i. e., whether France was at home in Moroccan territory. The incident showed, however, that public opinion was beginning to be inflamed both in Germany and France over the Morocco question.

In November, 1908, Abdul Aziz, who, after all the years of struggle, was not yet thirty, agreed to abdicate, if he were assured of his private property, a pension of thirty-five thousand dollars a year, and the right to live at Tangier. Hafid had now to gain recognition as Sultan from the Powers. At the end of the year, he received a communication from all the Powers through the French and Spanish Ministers stating that he must assume the debts of Abdul Aziz and agree to accept the provisions of the Act of Algeciras. Hafid proved himself a master at bargaining and dilatory tactics. He received a French Mission in January, 1909. While he was negotiating with the French he sent his Finance Minister to raise a loan in Europe, and strengthened his internal position by gaining a victory over Bu Hamara and by winning Raisuli through the gift of the governorship of the north. In April, a British Mission went to Fez, ostensibly to present some long outstanding British claims, but in reality to impress on Hafid the necessity of agreeing to do what he was told by France.

Hafid, however, continued to gain in strength by the disappearance of his rivals. The real Mohammed, Hafid's elder brother, conveniently died (perhaps he was poisoned) at Fez in June. Bu Hamara was captured in August, and taken to Fez in an

iron cage.[1] The more Hafid felt his strength, the more he was disinclined to allow the French to dictate to him.

Hafid succeeded in placating the French temporarily and winning their support by agreeing to reimburse France for the expenses incurred in the Algerian frontier and Casablanca expeditions, and to satisfy the claims of European creditors, the majority of whom were French. A host of hungry crows flocked to Tangier, and presented their claims before a commission. It is best to draw the curtain on this shameful business, in which the European Legations were involved. Morocco was saddled early in 1910 with a debt of twenty million dollars. The Moors received nothing from the loan. The control of the customs and harbor dues, the municipal duties on real estate, and the tobacco monopoly passed into European hands. The revenues were to be used to pay the interest on the loan. There was no compensation for the natives, as elsewhere in Africa, by having the loan devoted—in part, at least—to railways and other public works.

After the loan was arranged, Hafid again resisted the efforts of France to take over the administration

[1] He was kept in the cage for a long time, and then thrown to lions. Before they had mauled him to death, the executioner arrested him, and he was formally shot. The custom of keeping a prisoner of rank in a cage is very old in Oriental countries. Timur's treatment of Sultan Bayezid is one of the most famous examples. See my *Foundation of the Ottoman Empire*, pp. 255–256. Cage imprisonment is not unknown, however, in Occidental history. At Loches, near Tours, one can still see the place where Louis XI. kept Cardinal de la Balue suspended in an iron cage.

of Morocco. A campaign was then started in the French and British press. A year before, he had been extolled as a wonderful man, of strong character and promising future. Now he was charged with all sorts of unspeakable cruelties, of which the putting out of the way of Mohammed and Bu Hamara were only two counts on a long list. The Morocco *Times* correspondent, who was largely responsible for turning public opinion in England against Hafid, after having praised him at the time of his accession, told me that Hafid had really changed in nature during 1909 and 1910. He could not stand power, and rapidly became worse than the brother whom he had succeeded.

In the spring of 1911, many tribes rebelled against Hafid. He was besieged in Fez. This was the moment for which France had been waiting. Acting on the obligation which her position as "predominant power" imposed upon her, the French forces at Casablanca were reinforced, and two flying columns sent to relieve Fez. They were followed by a French army of eight thousand under General Moinier, which occupied Fez on May 21, 1911. The independence of Morocco was over.

As far as Europe was concerned, France would have had an absolutely free hand, in spite of the Conference of Algeciras, had it not been for Spain and Germany. With these two Powers, France was compelled to negotiate.

The interest of Spain in Morocco dated back to the end of the Middle Ages. It was natural that the Spaniards should feel, from the very fact of

geographical proximity, as much interest in Morocco as the Power that held Algeria. Spain claimed the coast line of the Mediterranean from Alcazar and Ceuta in the Strait of Gibraltar to the River Muluya, west of the Ujda region; and as far as El Arish on the Atlantic coast. Historically, said Spain, the whole of the Tetuan and Riff regions were hers. But possession is the only claim worth presenting in international diplomacy. *Nous y sommes; nous y restons.* While France was acting energetically on the Algerian frontier and on the Atlantic coast, Spain had been making great sacrifices to extend her authority in the hinterland of the Mediterranean region. Tangier was internationalized, because neither France nor Spain had been able before or after the Conference of Algeciras to get the other Powers to agree to giving up their rights there. While France was negotiating with Hafid in 1909, Spain had made a great military effort against the Riff tribes in the hinterland of Melilla.[1] When

[1] At first there were fifteen thousand Spanish troops at Melilla. A call for forty thousand reinforcements was made, which was later increased to seventy-five thousand. The tribesmen badly defeated the Spaniards on July 27th. It was necessary for Spain to make a regular hill campaign against the tribes to save her prestige, and to turn Melilla into a fortress. The Melilla campaign was the cause of serious internal troubles in Spain, especially at Barcelona, where there was an uprising at the end of July. I was in Barcelona during this uprising, and made a trip into the portions of Catalonia that were in the hands of the rebels. There was universal complaint against being sent to fight in Africa. Small wonder! In a few months, Spain had more men engaged and lost more killed and wounded than France during the whole period from the landing at Casablanca until all Morocco was, six years later, under French control.

Morocco was saddled with her debt the following year, it was agreed that Spain should receive twelve million dollars for expenses of the Melilla campaign. In 1911, when the *grand coup* was being carried on by France, Spain hurriedly sent troops to occupy various points in her zone, and almost came to blows with France. In fact, during the trying diplomatic period between the occupation of Fez and the settlement of the Franco-German controversy, France would have had serious trouble with Spain, if Spain had been a strong Power like Germany. But Spain was weak, and had to make the best terms with France that she could.

Hafid did his very best to embroil France and Spain. Up to the moment of General Lyautey's arrival as Resident-General in Fez, he and his counsellors continued their intrigues. But Spain, although she invoked her rights under the Hispano-Moroccan Treaty of 1860 to claim several ports on the Atlantic coast, finally signed a treaty with France at Madrid on November 27, 1912, by which she was content to receive the northeastern corner of Morocco, with the exclusion of Tangier. Even this portion she has not been able to organize as military territory, much less administratively. The Moors have been won over to French rule, but they still refuse to acknowledge Spanish authority in the zone France agreed to leave to her by the Treaty of Madrid. The international status of Tangier has not yet been settled. It militates greatly against the interests of Tangier, of France, and of Morocco to have the hinterland between Tangier and Fez

occupied by a Power that is unable to master the Tetuan and Riff tribes. It is probable that when the world's territories are readjusted at the end of the present war, Spain will find herself compelled to renounce the western portion, at least, of the territories she secured by the Treaty of Madrid. In the twentieth century, the state that cannot rule her colonies is bound to lose them. The law of the survival of the fittest works remorselessly.

The story of how the Germans sent a gun-boat to Agadir, the port of the Sus region, and held up France for compensation, belongs, like the Conference of Algeciras, to European history. We have not space here to go into the long and involved story of the controversy. On November 4, 1911, Berlin and Paris came to an agreement. Two treaties were signed. The first, to be presented to the Powers who were parties to the Act of Algeciras, recorded Germany's consent to the establishment of the French Protectorate, under condition that an equality of rights to all nations for trade, mining, and railway concessions, and coastal fishing, be guaranteed by France. The second treaty gave Germany compensation by the cession of two large pieces of the French Congo to her Kamerun colony.[1]

As soon as France had arranged to buy off German opposition, she did not wait longer to come to a definite understanding with Spain, or to hear from the Powers who had signed the Act of Algeciras. In fact, she could not wait. It was a case of going into the land to possess it fully, or leaving in extreme

[1] See above, pp. 306, 339.

peril her own forces and Europeans resident in Morocco. The situation required energy and military and diplomatic ability of a high order. On March 30, 1912, Sultan Hafid bowed to the inevitable, and signed the treaty placing Morocco under French protection. Less than three weeks later, Moorish troops in Fez mutinied. They massacred seventeen French officers and nine French civilians. Europeans other than French were not molested. Four thousand troops were hurried to Fez by forced marches. On May 26, General Lyautey entered Fez to take supreme command of Morocco. There were nearly forty thousand French troops in the country.

General Lyautey showed immediately a genius for doing the right thing that one is led by African colonial history to expect only of an Anglo-Saxon. General Moinier had fined Fez a million francs in punishment for the uprising. General Lyautey withdrew the edict. He put his finger immediately upon an injustice that was the principal cause of native hostility, just as it had been in Algeria,—the alienation of lands to French subjects and to natives who had been manifestly working for French political interests. He let it be known that France intended to do the square thing in every particular. There would be no injustice, no cruelty, no exploitation by the adventurers who followed the army.

For five months, General Lyautey had his hands full in pacifying the country. He deposed Hafid, whom the French had never been able to trust, and put on the throne Yusef, the third son of Hassan

to become Sultan. There was a pretender, who had captured Marakesh, to put down. In November, 1912, General Lyautey reported the pacification of Morocco, and asked for a loan of sixty million dollars to build railways and roads. During the first half of 1913, General Lyautey discovered that there was still much important military work to be accomplished. But just a year before the beginning of the European War, the French were able at last to devote all their energies to administrative organization and to economic development. It is a splendid tribute to General Lyautey that he was able to send a large part of his army to France in August, 1914, including contingents recruited from tribes that had been his bitter enemies eighteen months before.

Aside from two small military lines, there are as yet no railways in Morocco. The European War arrived too soon after the pacification to make possible a definite statement of how Morocco is thriving economically under French control. But the beginning is encouraging in every way, and is most flattering to the French authorities who have to cope with an international situation that presents many unsettled problems.

CHAPTER XX

EGYPT UNDER THE LAST OF THE KHEDIVES

THE most fascinating and best known portion of Africa, from the earliest days of history to the present time, is Egypt. The valley of the Nile plays no less important a part in world history to-day than twenty centuries ago or forty centuries ago or sixty centuries ago. More Americans go to Egypt than to other Mediterranean countries, with the exception of Italy. But no more in Egypt than in Italy are they interested in contemporary history. A guide (if I used the adjective insistent I would be guilty of redundancy!) came to me at Luxor last winter with an alluring project of a week's journey to ancient monuments. There were twelve items, I think. I crossed out all except the first, a moonlight donkey ride to Karnak. "I am here only for this evening," I explained. "To-morrow I must leave at six in the morning for Assiut." "But you have just arrived," he remonstrated, "and no one goes to Assiut anyway." He did not understand when I told him that there was too much history being made in 1916 A.D. to waste time on 1916 B.C. "You cannot be an American," he said, shaking his

head in disappointment and disapproval. Thousands of Americans who have visited Egypt since the beginning of the twentieth century know only one event of its modern history, the building of the Assuan Dam, and that because it was an "act of vandalism" that partly covered the Temple of Pylæ. And yet, Egypt under the Pharaohs and Ptolemies is not as interesting as Egypt under the Khedives. The pyramids are not as monumental as the Suez Canal, and the ruins of Luxor as impressive as the realities of Assuan. Many and glorious are the pages in Britain's Empire overseas, but none so wonderful as the Egyptian page. In Egypt one realizes that the inheritance of the Roman Empire has not fallen on the Osmanlis through Constantinople, but on the English through York.

Throughout the middle period of the nineteenth century, British foreign policy was built upon the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire lay between Europe and Asia. The Sultan of Turkey was the Khalif of the Mohammedan world. Russia was making great progress in Central Asia. This brought her to the northern and western confines of India, and extended her sovereignty over Mohammedan nations. If Russia became the master of Turkey, not only would she have access to the Mediterranean, but also she would control the destinies of Islam. The preservation of Britain's position in India and as predominant Power in the Mohammedan world depended upon checking Russia. British statesmen believed that the political independence and the territorial integrity of the

Ottoman Empire were essential to the British Empire overseas. The Crimean War was fought on this belief, and Russia was menaced with another war in 1877 in pursuance of the same policy. The Treaty of Berlin, which superseded the Treaty of San Stefano, was the work of British statesmen, who did not hesitate to sacrifice the Christian nations of the Balkans and the Christians under the Turkish yoke for the sake of British interests in India. This policy was abandoned because Egypt made no longer necessary its maintenance.

When the Suez Canal was projected, and even while it was being built, the British opposed it. The French were doing it, and French influence in Egypt seemed as much a possible menace to India as Russian influence in Turkey. The year after the Canal was completed, Germany crushed France. From that moment, it was possible for Great Britain to get control of the Canal. To make secure the control of the Canal, Britain must have the predominant position in Egypt. France would have to get out. I am stating the facts baldly. There was no deep-laid plot on the part of British statesmen to reap where they had not sown. Nations like individuals are moved by irresistible forces. The Canal was cut. Steam-driven ships had displaced sail-driven ships. India and other important parts of Asia were already in British hands. In Australasia a new Anglo-Saxon world was in the process of development. Great Britain had to control the path from east to west, which was far more important to her than to any other nation of Europe.

The British entered Egypt in 1882 in a legitimate way. An anti-European movement threatened the lives and property of Europeans, and the safety of the Canal, which had become an essential international waterway. The Khedive was powerless to restore order. Turkey, the suzerain state, could do nothing. France, invited to cooperate, refused to intervene. The British fleet and a small British army occupied Alexandria, Cairo, and the Canal, and restored the authority of the Khedive. An attempt was made immediately by British diplomacy to regularize the new situation. London announced that the army of occupation would be withdrawn when order was restored.

No student, who has gone into the history of the decade that followed, can find reason to question the good faith and sincerity of the British Government. A mistake was made in not asking consent of the Powers and Turkey to the proclamation of a British Protectorate. But it was a mistake that demonstrates the honesty of purpose, if not the statesmanship, of those who directed the Foreign Office through a very trying period. It would have been a calamity for Egypt as well as for the world had the British withdrawn. The Egyptians could not work out their own salvation. Turkey was incapable of taking back the country she had lost through her incapacity to govern. The Powers were unwilling to assume conjointly the responsibility of governing Egypt or of internationalizing the Canal. So the British authorities, supported by a garrison in Cairo, simply stayed on. There was nothing else to do.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the British had been eighteen years in Egypt. From an international point of view, the situation was just as it was in the beginning—and it remained so until Turkey's entrance into the present war led to the establishment of a British Protectorate.

Nominally, Egypt was an autonomous *vilayet* (province) of the Ottoman Empire ruled by a *khedive* (viceroy). The relations between Turkey and Egypt had been arranged by agreements between sultans and khedives. The khedives acknowledged the suzerainty of the sultans, and paid an annual tribute. After Ismail, succession in the khedivate was from father to son and not (as should be the practice in an Islamic country) to the oldest living member of the house of Mohammed Ali. The Turkish flag was used in Egypt, and the spiritual overlordship of Constantinople acknowledged by Cairo. The relations between Egypt and other nations had been established by treaties with Turkey. Europeans and Americans enjoyed the privileges of a capitulatory régime as in Turkey. Their interests were looked after by consuls-general in Cairo, exercising diplomatic functions, and consuls and consular agents in other cities. Justice was administered in consular courts and in mixed tribunals of European and Egyptian judges. The Egyptian debt was under international control, with representatives of the Powers supervising the expenditure of revenues affected to pay the interest on the debt. All nations had the same privileges in regard to customs and doing business in the country. The

Government of the Khedive was exercised by a ministry, with a premier, as in European states, but, as in Oriental states, the Khedive kept legislative authority in his own hands. His national council and national assembly were advisory bodies, possessing only such authority as the Khedive was willing for them to enjoy.

Practically, Egypt was quit of Turkish control with the tribute and the flag. The ruler of the country was the British Consul-General, who ruled through advisers in the different ministries. For the sake of form, the diplomatic agents of other countries looked upon the Khedive as ruler of Egypt, and carried on negotiations with the Khedive's ministry. In fact, all matters were decided at the British Agency. The Khedive was a figurehead: and his ministers were figureheads. Britain ruled with the hand of a master. The final authority was the British Cabinet, to whom the Consul-General made an annual report.

Great Britain's position in Egypt was maintained by a garrison in the Cairo citadel, and by control of the Egyptian army through British officers, who held the principal commands.

This situation was possible only through the impotence of Turkey, the acquiescence of the Powers, and the willingness of the Egyptians to live under British authority. In order to stay in Egypt, it was necessary for the British officials to keep Turkey and the Powers from interfering, and to prevent a movement in Egypt on the part of the Khedive and the educated Egyptians to take back into their own

hands the control of the country. From the very beginning, it was realized that this could not be accomplished through force—save as regarded Turkey. The Powers would accept the *de facto* régime in Egypt only if the British succeeded in making the country prosper, so that the interest on the debt could be paid, and in affording security and equal opportunity to all Europeans to reside and to do business in the country. As far as the Egyptians were concerned, the task of Great Britain was to give them good government and prosperity.

The British were able to stay in Egypt during the last two decades of the nineteenth century, and to make the Egyptians and the world in general accept the *status quo*, all the while strengthening their position, not because of the garrison in the Cairo citadel, but because of the ability to send to Egypt, for the civil administration and for the army, men whose genius was matched only by their devotion. British officers built up anew the Egyptian army. British engineers solved the problem of irrigation. British administrators attacked successfully the political, social, and economic problems of bringing peace and prosperity and contentment out of anarchy and poverty and oppression. The supervising agency of this remarkable achievement was the British Consul-General, Sir Evelyn Baring, afterwards Lord Cromer.

There is no need here to go into the economic history of Egypt under British control. Twenty years after the British entered Egypt, Lord Cromer was able to write that the institution of slavery

was virtually defunct; the *corvée* (forced labor) practically abolished; the *courbash* (whip) no longer employed as an instrument of government; the army efficient and well-organized, and the abuses under the old recruiting system swept away; new prisons and reformatories built and the treatment of prisoners in conformity with principles generally adopted in Europe; the sick nursed in well-equipped and well-managed hospitals; lunatics no longer treated like wild beasts; means provided for allowing peasants to free themselves from the grip of money-lenders; a very great impulse given to education in all its branches; the Assuan Dam opened, which would provide one-third of the agricultural area of Upper Egypt with perennial irrigation; modern railways running from one end of the country to the other; more than one hundred million dollars spent on railways and other public works, all saved out of the resources of Egypt, without recourse to foreign capital or increase of the public debt; cotton-raising developed so as to make Egypt one of the first producers of the world; Alexandria and Cairo transformed into great cities of the European type; Alexandria and Port Said developed into ports and coaling stations of mondial importance; and the Suez Canal made secure as the waterway of four continents. The Egyptian Treasury contained an accumulated surplus of thirty million dollars, which was increasing annually by nearly three million dollars. When one contrasts the economic and financial history of the mother country, Turkey, during the same period, and social conditions in Egypt and other Islamic

countries, the benefit of British rule cannot be contested.

But the whole story of Egypt in the twentieth century impresses us with the truth of the fact that man liveth not by bread alone. No nation is contented with material blessings. Nations, like individuals, are in an unhealthy state when they have not developed by their own efforts, and are profoundly unhappy when they are not managing their own affairs. It is vain to try to persuade them that they are better off under guardianship of another nation stronger and more intelligent and more capable than themselves. There is no more profound truth in the history of human relationships than that the benefactor is as much hated as the taskmaster. Only when gifts are solicited and appreciated—and not always then—is the giver liked. It is rare that charity helps any one. Assistance ought to be on the *quid pro quo* basis. Above all things in the world it is impossible to help a man upwards morally when you consider yourself his superior, and he knows that you consider yourself his superior. I suppose this will be considered rank heresy by many of my readers. But it explains the history of Egypt in the last fifteen years. Instead of marveling at the ingratitude and blindness and shortsightedness of the Egyptians, and denouncing the folly of their aspirations, it is best to realize that their sentiments are probably just what ours would be if we were in their place.

Abbas Hilmi came to the throne, upon the death of his father, Tewfik, in 1892, when he was a boy of

eighteen. From the very beginning of his reign, it was impressed upon him by Lord Cromer, Colonel Kitchener, and other British officials with whom he came in contact, that he must realize which side his bread was buttered on. He was given all the show of power with none of the reality, and whenever he seemed disposed to have an opinion contrary to that of London or the British Agency, Lord Cromer talked to him like a Dutch Uncle. He made the best of it: because he had to. But one can hardly blame him for not appreciating his benefits as much as his benefactors did, especially as it was constantly in his mind that, although they were doing the handsome thing by Egypt, they were inspired, not by love for Egypt, but by the fact that Great Britain must stay in Egypt in order to keep control of the Suez Canal. The thought must often have occurred to him that the British had no real right, except that of superior force, to rule the country which his ancestors had wrested from the Turks and into which the khedives had tried to introduce modern civilization long before Lord Cromer came. I take Abbas Hilmi here as the illustration of the general attitude of well-born and educated Egyptians, whether they are of Arabic, Turkish, Coptic, Syrian, or Armenian origin.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, in Moslem lands education in missionary colleges and in European and American universities, and general contact with Occidental civilization, inspired the younger generation with the desire to establish a democratic and representative form of government.

The movement was, of course, primarily directed against the despotism of Oriental systems of government. Had it not been for the fact that in some Moslem countries, such as Egypt and India, Europeans were already in control, and in others, such as Persia and Turkey, were endeavoring to gain control, this movement would have been purely political, and would not have affected international European politics. Partly for this reason and partly for the reason that the smartest and most advanced and best educated elements within the Moslem countries were the Christian minority, the Young Turk, Young Persian, Young Indian, and Young Egyptian movements very quickly took on an unfortunate religious character. So the democratic ideal became hopelessly diverted. It was the mixing of oil and water. Islam is an admirable social democracy within the Moslem world. But it does not grant equality before the law to non-Moslems, and it is irreconcilable in theory and practice with the modern state, endowed with representative institutions, that has been evolved by Christian civilization. The Young Moslems wanted Christian Occidental institutions, without their foundation and without their spirit. The result was anti-European and anti-Christian propaganda that would have brought either anarchy or oligarchy, had the Young Moslems succeeded in carrying out their program. Their partial success in Persia and in Turkey did, in fact, bring anarchy in Persia and oligarchy in Turkey. Egypt and India were saved by the strong hand of their British master.

Coupled with the Young Moslem movement was the pan-Islamic movement, launched by the Old Moslems. It, also, was anti-European and anti-Christian. It has failed just as the Young Moslem movement has failed, because the spirit of solidarity is lacking in Islam, and because the great mass of the followers of Mohammed are so ignorant that they cannot grasp the possibilities and the advantages of political union. Moslem countries will have neither national nor international awakening until they have passed through the stage of popular education and until they have produced their Montesquieus, their Lockes, their Adam Smiths, their Diderots, their Voltaires, their Rousseaus, their John Stuart Mills, and their Herbert Spencers. Their great Revolution will come only after they are capable of a *Tugendbund*.

Egypt, the connecting link between Moslem Asia and Moslem Africa, the home of enlightened Young Moslems and of the most fanatical element of Islam, refuge and pasture-ground of the most Tory of Turkish pashas, vital milestone on Britain's path to India, neighbor of Arabia and the Holy Cities, was the maelstrom of Islamic agitation during the first decade of the twentieth century. What the British had to face in Egypt and how they faced it is an all-important page in contemporary history. Three Consuls-General, Lord Cromer, Sir Eldon Gorst, and Lord Kitchener played a larger part in the history of the world than they were aware of when they were dealing with the Egyptian Nationalist movement.

Mustafa Kamel built his Nationalist propaganda upon the hope of French intervention in Egypt.

He imbibed his democratic notions and conceived the idea of a free Egypt in Paris. He was "taken up" in certain circles and frequented certain *salons* where the principal topic of conversation was how the French hated the English. This was the year of Fashoda. When I first knew of Mustafa Kamel, he was being flattered and filled full of ideas by several influential Frenchmen and one celebrated Frenchwoman (it is not necessary to mention their names now, for they have since become as intensely Anglophile as they were then Anglophobe). Mustafa Kamel was very limited intellectually. But his French friends saw in him the best sort of a firebrand to throw into Egypt in revenge for the attitude of Lord Cromer and Lord Kitchener at Fashoda. For Mustafa Kamel had enthusiasm and magnetism and the gift of public speaking—just the qualities of the demagogue. He could be inspired and controlled by French journalists working discreetly behind the scenes.

At the end of 1899, Mustafa Kamel returned to Cairo from Paris, and gathered around him by his brilliant, though superficial eloquence, the educated young men of Egypt. He would not have had the ghost of a chance to succeed among intellectual and thoughtful people, had it not been that they were continually smarting from the fact that the British in Egypt, residents as well as officials, treated them as social inferiors. In order to extend his propaganda to the *fellahin*, he founded the Arabic newspaper *Lewa*. Its success was phenomenal. Within a year, *Lewa* became the most influential newspaper

in Egypt. The *fellahin* could not read, but the local Moslem clergy gathered the villagers around them, and read to them of the new glory that would come to Islam when the English were expelled.

At the very beginning, the Nationalist movement dug its own grave. Mustafa Kamel and his associates thought that giving their propaganda a religious character was the essential factor of success; but in doing this, they defeated the very end they thought they were advancing. Although Mustafa Kamel considered himself almost a Frenchman and looked to France for support, he was too stupid to see that his agitation was directed against the interests of those on whose cooperation he was banking. The Egyptian Nationalist movement was launched by Frenchmen to make trouble for the British. It paved the way for the Anglo-French *entente!* Mustafa Kamel's speeches and writings in Egypt, and the Young Egyptian congresses in Switzerland, caused alarm among far-seeing French statesmen, who saw in pan-Islamism a menace to their own interests fully equal to the menace to British interests. From the moment of its birth, the Egyptian Nationalist movement was a boomerang to the French. The most bitter Anglophobes began to feel the necessity of an understanding with Great Britain. There was the same reaction in Russia.

Nothing in contemporary history is more fascinating than the study of the change in Anglo-French relations between 1898 and 1904. The student is convinced of four things: that common interests rather than common ideals bring nations together

into political alliances; that these common interests are decided by a few men, who are able, even in democracies, to lead their nations along paths that the people at large are wholly ignorant they are following; that the success of these few men in winning and keeping the power to decide the destinies of their fellow-countrymen is assured by the cooperation of press agencies and newspapers; and that the appeal to national honor and patriotism is in reality an appeal to the two basic passions of mankind, pride and pocket-book. When the storm breaks, and the nation finds itself in danger, there can be no doubt that the men who go to war are imbued with the highest and noblest qualities, and give their lives gladly in defense of their homes and their loved ones. God forbid that the slightest aspersion be cast upon the motives leading heroic soldiers to suffer and endure and die for their country. But in following the gathering of the storm clouds, *before they break*, one sees clearly the iniquity of secret diplomacy. We are in hell now, and have to get out of it the best way we can. But if students and writers are honestly and courageously devoted to their high calling, they will do all in their power to enlighten public opinion, in the hope that the next generation, by taking into its own hands the decision of national policies and national destinies, will avoid another descent into hell.

The Anglo-French Agreement of 1904 was a death-blow to the Egyptian Nationalist movement and to the success of pan-Islamism, which depended upon the rivalry of the two European Powers who had most

to do with Islam. It came just in time. France needed a free hand in Morocco and West Africa and the Sudan. Great Britain needed to be relieved of French opposition in Egypt. Not only were the Nationalists gaining in strength, but Turkey was beginning to interfere with the British occupation.

The extension of the Ottoman railway from Damascus to Medina and Mecca brought Great Britain and Turkey into conflict over the question of the control of the Sinai Peninsula. To anticipate the Turks, Lord Cromer sent Egyptian troops to occupy posts on the west side of the Gulf of Akaba. They found the Turkish flag flying there. The Turks demanded a boundary line which would have brought them to the eastern bank of the Suez Canal. The British Ambassador at Constantinople was instructed to demand the withdrawal of Turkish garrisons from the peninsula, and to insist upon the right of Egypt, under the Sultan's *firman* of 1892, to administer the peninsula. The British claim really rested on a telegram of Lord Cromer, appended at the time to the *firman*, to which the Ottoman Government had then "raised no objection." Turkey had to give in, and the safety of the Canal was assured. It was at this same time that the Turks were active in the hinterland of Tripoli, and France was having a similar discussion with the Sublime Porte over the Turkish garrisons the French had found in the Sahara on the route to Lake Chad. The benefit of the Agreement of 1904 began to be evident to many Frenchmen who had not up to this time become

reconciled to it. This was the period, also, of the Conference of Algeciras.

The discussion with Turkey brought about much unrest in Egypt, where the Nationalists were in open sympathy with Turkey's side of the case. A British soldier was beaten in the streets of Cairo, and on June 13, 1906, the villagers of Denshawai assaulted five British officers who were shooting pigeons. One of them was killed, and two others seriously injured. The natives were arrested and tried by a special tribunal. Four were hanged, two sent to prison for life, ten for shorter terms, and eight were flogged. As there was no doubt that the villagers acted under great provocation, and had not attacked the officers with intention to kill, the severity of the sentence caused a great outcry in England, and had a very bad effect in Egypt.[1] It gave to the Nationalist party support among the *fellahin* that had been lacking before.

In the midst of the Nationalist turmoil, Lord

[1] I first visited Egypt three years later, when the Nationalists were in close connection with the Young Turks. I found the Denshawai executions invariably called "the massacre" by the Young Egyptians. After a lapse of six more years, during my visit of 1916, "the massacre" was still vivid in the minds of many to whom I talked. They spoke of it as the unforgettable and unforgivable crime that had revealed to them the bitterness and injustice of their slavery. More than one Egyptian drew the parallel between the British military caste and the Prussian military caste, and said that the officers who were shooting pigeons against the protest of the villagers richly deserved the beating they got. There was no evidence whatever that the villagers intended to kill them. The provocation must have been very great: for the *fellahin* are peacefully inclined, and have very little courage.

Cromer resigned after twenty-five years of service. We have already spoken of the wonderful work he accomplished in the economic and social regeneration of Egypt. I have not thought it necessary to go into this side of Egyptian contemporary history. The literature on the subject is voluminous, and accessible to English-speaking readers everywhere. Lord Cromer himself has written in detail the history of his quarter century in Egypt.[1] From a material point of view, it is the record of a miraculous achievement. But the Egyptians never forgot that Lord Cromer was a British official, ruling them against their will, and always putting British interests before Egyptian interests. A most intelligent Egyptian, who is a believer in a limited British control of Egypt, an admirer of British methods and British results, and an influential supporter of the present British Protectorate, said to me recently: "During the first fifteen years of the British occupation, Lord Cromer was the right man in the right place. We needed just his type. But he fell short of greatness, and did not build a lasting monument, because he failed

[1] The two volumes, *Modern Egypt*, are well worth the attention of the general reader. The third volume, *Abbas Hilmi*, written since the war started, is totally unworthy of its author, and is a sad testimony to the fact that the sanest and fairest of men were swept away by passion and prejudice after the outbreak of the present war. If there is anything that is repugnant to the Anglo-Saxon nature it is kicking a man when he is down. Undoubtedly, Lord Cromer regrets very deeply this little volume, which represents neither his spirit nor that of his fellow-countrymen. We must throw out *Abbas Hilmi*, and judge Lord Cromer by *Modern Egypt*. We can give no higher praise to the book than to say that it is worthy of the subject and the writer.

to realize that the people to whom he had given the material benefits of European civilization, for the very reason that he had given them those benefits, had come to the place where they refused longer to be treated as children, and wanted other things that are the right and privilege of European civilization. Egypt was his child. But if he had had a son, and treated him straight through twenty-five years as he treated Egypt and Egypt's Khedive, he would have had exactly the same result. He left us unloved." This was certainly the verdict of Egypt at the time. A farewell demonstration was organized at the Cairo Opera House. Except the officials, who had to go for fear of losing their places, no prominent Egyptians were present. The only member of the khedivial family in attendance was Prince Said Halim (now Grand Vizier of Turkey), who was on the outs with the Khedive and went to spite him. When Lord Cromer departed from Cairo, elaborate military and police measures were taken to protect him from insult and bodily injury.

The program Lord Cromer left for Egypt was: abolition of the capitulations, so the Government would have control over the foreigners in the country; participation of all residents in a legislative body; an ideal of Egyptian nationality, which took in all the inhabitants, irrespective of race, religion, or extraction.

The new Consul-General, Sir Eldon Gorst, was a man of pronounced democratic tendencies and liberal sympathies. He started in by determining not to "put on airs," and his Jeffersonian simplicity led

him to appear in the streets of Cairo hatless, astride a donkey. This, of course, was the ridiculous other extreme of pomposity. Aloofness in a high official is no greater weakness than "hail fellow well met." In a speech to his staff, Sir Eldon declared that the aim of the British occupation was not to rule the Egyptians, but to teach them to rule themselves. This was immediately taken up by the Nationalists, who asked the embarrassing question: *How can a nation be taught to rule themselves so long as they are not granted the slightest bit of real responsibility and real authority?*

Mustafa Kamel died in February, 1908. He did not live to see the success of his party in the elections for the Legislative Council, and the dissension immediately following, which resulted in a party split. The Nationalist program was: administrative independence of Egypt under khedivial authority; fulfillment of British pledges to terminate occupation; representative institutions with full political and administrative powers; free primary education in the Arabic language; preferential employment of Egyptians in government services; extension of jurisdiction of mixed courts to criminal cases in which foreigners are concerned. In December, the Council passed a unanimous motion, calling upon the Government to initiate legislation to give the country full participation in internal administration. The Council called attention to the fact that only twenty-four per cent. of the boys of school age were given an opportunity to go to school.

The Young Turk Revolution, which gave Turkey a

Constitution and a Parliament, had a tremendous repercussion in Egypt. The Nationalist newspapers reprinted the glowing articles of the English press in commendation of representative government in Turkey, and asked how the English could sincerely sustain the Young Turks while they suppressed the Young Egyptians. *Lewa* began to publish violent and inflammatory articles. When the Khedive and his Cabinet did not come out boldly for the Nationalist cause, they too received as severe press criticism as the British "intruders." The answer was that which has invariably met the first efforts of people for self-government in every country: a press law, with a system of fines, suspensions, and suppressions, was introduced. But it was wholly contrary to the Liberal spirit of Anglo-Saxondom, and gained for the Nationalists sympathy and active support in England, which might have helped greatly their cause, had they not resorted to violence and crime. On September 14, 1909, the twenty-seventh anniversary of the British occupation, the following telegram was sent from Cairo to the British Prime Minister and the Turkish Grand Vizier:

"A meeting of six thousand Egyptians assembled here to-day desires to convey to Your Excellency the unanimous and energetic protest of the Egyptian people against the British occupation, and demands from to-day the evacuation, relying upon the engagements and solemn oaths of the Queen's Governments. Moreover, to gain our friendship is preferable for English honor than to lose our hearts and support."

On February 20, 1910, the Egyptian Premier, Boutros Pasha, was assassinated by a Moslem Nationalist, who had been correspondent for *Lewa* at the Young Egyptian Congress in Geneva the year before. No connection was proved between the assassination and the Nationalist party. But the Nationalists—or rather the radical element of them—did not condemn the crime. In fact, they considered the assassin a hero: and he has become their martyr. This crime was the culmination of the breach that had long been growing among the Nationalists. Boutros Pasha was a Copt. The Copts could no longer sustain a national movement that had become anti-Christian. The moderate section of the Moslems among the Nationalists were certain that the party policy of violence was ruinous. They seceded.[1] In the summer of 1910, there were

[1] The split really occurred in 1908, but there were hopes for two years of a reconciliation. The temperament of the Egyptians makes them opposed to violence. One might say that the middle-aged and elder Egyptians had never looked upon the program of the Nationalists with a feeling other than that of misgiving and alarm. The "Party of the People" was formed, which claimed to be in entire sympathy with the Nationalists' demands upon Britain, but believed in confining the propaganda to a rational and courteous discussion of the problem of emancipation, and in refraining from an agitation that would awaken religious fanaticism and hatred of foreigners. This Party founded its own newspaper, *Garidah*. The Nationalists claimed that the new Party represented notables and rich proprietors. But there was a question of division far more serious than that of Liberal and Conservative temperament. The Nationalists advocated close union with Turkey, while the Party of the People believed that the only hope of Egypt was in keeping absolutely free. Later, a third party, the partisans of the Khedive, through the newspaper *Moyaed*, pronounced for a propaganda to convince the British

two Young Egyptian congresses in Europe, one branch sitting at Geneva and the other at Brussels. Both called on England once more to fulfil her pledges to evacuate Egypt.

A popular movement can be successful only if it fulfils three conditions: remaining united; enlisting a number of men who have political prestige and wealth; and winning the officers of the army. The Nationalist Party, although all Egyptians were in sympathy with its general aims, failed in all three of the essentials of success. At the beginning, the movement would have amounted to nothing, had it not been backed by French influence. After the French abandoned them, the Nationalists would not have been a serious menace, had they not been able still to enlist influences outside of Egypt: pan-Islamism and the Young Turks in the suzerain Ottoman Empire, and radical sentiment in England. The Turkish aid disappeared with the Italian and Balkan wars, and English help was largely lost by the assassination of Boutros Pasha.

Former President Roosevelt, on his way home from a hunting trip in Central Africa, arrived in Cairo shortly after the assassination of Boutros Pasha. According to his usual custom of getting down off the fence and taking the bull by the horns, Mr. Roosevelt told the students of Cairo University that

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that it was to their best interests to fulfil the solemn promise made to evacuate Egypt. The Khedivial party, having no illusions concerning the ability of the Egyptians to start a revolution without or with the aid of Turkey, knew that evacuation or the granting of self-government would come only from the free act of the British.

he did not consider Egypt ready for self-government,[1] and later in London he told the British that they ought either to rule Egypt or to get out. While the first statement shocked Liberals on both sides of the Atlantic, and the second was a rude jolt to the complacency of insular Britons, none who was acquainted with the situation contested the truth of either observation. When press and Parliament were full of Mr. Roosevelt's "impetuosity," Sir Edward Grey, commenting on the Roosevelt speech at the Guildhall, stated for the first time openly and without equivocation that Great Britain intended to rule and was not going to get out. This was an answer, not only to Mr. Roosevelt's critics, but also to the Egyptians, who had just been celebrating with enthusiasm the rejection by the Egyptian General Assembly of the proposition to extend for forty years beyond 1968 the concession of the Suez Canal Company. Sir Edward Grey paraphrased the saying of President Cleveland, by declaring that in Egypt "we have to consider facts rather than theories." His attitude was very different from the vacillation of earlier Liberal Foreign Secretaries.

The Copts are the descendants of the Egyptians who were not assimilated by the Arabs at the time of the Mohammedan conquest. They took

[1] The New York *Nation* of April 7, 1910, commenting unfavorably upon this speech, declared: "Egyptians . . . have the recent experience of Turkey to hearten them." The most serious American journals, even after nearly two years, were still in complete ignorance of what was happening in Turkey.

the language and many of the customs of the conquerors, but preserved their religion. As in Turkey, this surviving Christian element of the earlier civilization, by the fact that it remained politically inferior and socially distinct from the ruling race, developed remarkable commercial abilities. As the Moslems were prevented by their religion from exercising the profession of money-lending, the Copts became the bankers. All through the Near East the Christians—Greeks, Armenians, Syrians, and Copts—are what the Jews are in Christian countries, and for similar reasons. When European civilization and European finance and European economic and political conditions were introduced into Moslem lands, the Christian elements were already prepared to take advantage of the revolution effected by contact with the Occident. The missionaries who came, finding the door shut to their proselytizing efforts among the Moslems, started in to catholicize and protestantize the Eastern Christians. Not many were weaned away from their own Church. But almost all came under the educational influence of the missionaries. They learned our ways and our languages. This, also, was a tremendous advantage in enabling them to profit by the new conditions. So it was not unnatural that the Moslem ruling races became jealous of their Christian subject races, and suspected them of being a reason for and party to European intervention, and the humiliating political infeodation of Mohammedan Africa and Asia to Christian Europe. The Christians of the Balkan Peninsula and Asia Minor

have unquestionably been victims of European colonial ambitions and rivalries.

The Copts, like the Armenians in Turkey, looked upon the constitutional movement in Islam as a means of deliverance from the bond of servitude and the ever present shadow of massacre. They were not only willing, but eager, to cooperate in the Nationalist movement, until they realized that the Young Moslems connotated nationality as religious and racial, and not geographical. The assassination of Boutros Pasha was an unwelcome, though not unexpected, awakening. Shortly after the crime, Sir Edward Grey, in answer to an interpellation in Parliament, declared that "it is false that England in Egypt is sowing dissension between the Copts and the Moslems." This is undoubtedly true. The suspicion arose, probably, from the fact that the British administration in Egypt, under Sir Eldon Gorst, began to do all in its power to alienate promising Nationalists from the cause by the bribe of giving them Government positions; and that this policy aroused the resentment of the Copts against the Moslems and made easier the stifling of liberal aspirations and Anglophobia in the younger generation.

Against the advice of the head of their Church and of some of their leading men, the Copts held a Congress in March, 1911, in Assiut, which was attended by five hundred delegates. The ostensible object was to "remove the causes of difference between the various communities, constituting the Egyptian nation." Sir Eldon Gorst rejected all

their demands. Their chief complaint was that they were discriminated against in the filling of public offices. One finds it very difficult to sympathize with the Coptic position, on grounds of their best national interests as well as of elementary justice. The Copts had more than half the posts in the Egyptian civil service, although they comprised less than ten per cent. of the population! They argued, and still argue, that this is because they have ten times as many educated young men as the Moslems.

The fatal weakness of education upon Orientals, Moslems as well as Christians, is the demoralization that seems to follow it. When an Oriental has his diploma, he feels that he is a gentleman, and that he must follow a profession in a big city, or get a Government position. He does not want to return to his village. Farming, where he has to do any of the work with his own hands, is unthinkable. Commerce is unattractive. Business is for men without an education. For those who have not the money or persistence or brains to qualify for a profession, Government service is the *summum bonum*, no, the *solum bonum*. Cairo and Alexandria are full of young men, whose education has spoiled them for any other pursuit than that of sitting around *cafés*. Not until we can instil into the Oriental mind that agriculture and commerce are dignified callings, demanding the best brains of the nation, will education prepare Oriental nations for self-government. The East needs primary education and industrial schools, where enthusiastic and devoted teachers

glorify by example as well as by precept the dignity of labor, before it needs more colleges and universities. The young Oriental, who possesses financial resources, is able to go to Europe or America for his higher education. The village boys had better be taught farming and stock-raising and trades and business.

Sir Eldon Gorst died in July, 1911. Long before the end came, he was a very sick man, and, perhaps largely for that reason, seemed discouraged and pessimistic. His last public utterance on Egyptian affairs was: "The policy of ruling the country in co-operation with native ministers is, at the present time, incompatible with that of encouraging the development of so-called representative institutions. . . . The recent experiment has, so far as the Legislative Council and General Assembly are concerned, proved a failure, and the results derived from them have not been in accordance with our intentions or hopes."

Italy's declaration of war against Turkey, for the purpose of taking away the last province of the Ottoman Empire in Africa, marked the beginning of a crisis in the relations of Europe to the Near East that has not yet ended. The British Cabinet knew that a strong man, who was intimately acquainted with the Egyptian situation, must be appointed to Sir Eldon Gorst's place. There was only one man who filled the bill. From the first days of the British occupation to the Boer War, Kitchener had made his career in Egypt. He returned in November, 1911, to grapple with a situation that needed "the

big stick" as well as intimate personal experience of Islam, Egypt, Turkey, and North African military conditions. The situation was one of great delicacy. Turkey had a right to call upon Egypt for aid, or at least to allow the passage of troops and military supplies. But Great Britain, through diplomatic agreements, was bound to preserve the neutrality of Egypt. Even those Egyptians who were hostile to a *rapprochement* between Egypt and Turkey, sympathized with Turkey on sentimental as well as religious grounds. Italy seemed to be attacking Islam. The way the war was started, and the inability of the Italians to solve the military situation they had created for themselves in Tripoli, disgusted everybody in Egypt, Europeans as well as natives. I have never met a British official who sympathized with Italian ambitions or Italian methods.

Lord Kitchener succeeded remarkably in suppressing agitation and in strengthening Britain's hold on Egypt. In view of the test that was going to come in 1914, Kitchener's three years in Egypt, following the Gorst régime, were extremely fortunate for the British Empire. A mad conspiracy to assassinate the Khedive, the Prime Minister, the British Consul-General, and two judges was discovered in 1912 in the inner circle of the Nationalist Party. It gave Lord Kitchener the opportunity to suppress *Lewa*, and to put the moving spirit of the Nationalists into jail for fifteen years. Lord Kitchener built extensive barracks at Cairo. He devoted his energies to organizing an efficient secret service throughout Egypt, and to getting a complete hold on the native

officers of the army. He made an excellent move to win the Moslem clergy by creating a Ministry of Wakfs (religious foundations). Trying to control the expenditure of the revenues from religious foundations along European lines had proved as impolitic as it was hopeless. If the Moslem clergy had some leeway in the spending and accounting for the Wakf revenues, they would be more satisfied to accept a tolerant British control. If occasionally a village Imam wanted to buy a goat with the money instead of repairing the mosque, why interfere and gain his ill-will?

Lord Kitchener's report for 1913 was able to show splendid economic progress, and a continuance of the material benefits that Lord Cromer's administration had given to Egypt. There was no political unrest. But the increase in crime was alarming. The British Adviser in the Ministry of Justice, who had examined carefully the *dossiers* from all over the country stated that crime was in no sense due to poverty or to lack of means to lead an orderly life. The elections at the end of 1913 were marked by a complete indifference of voters. Egypt was apathetic. The Egyptians were showing an annually increasing tendency to break the law. Murders and theft over-taxed police and judges.

CHAPTER XXI

EGYPT BECOMES A BRITISH PROTECTORATE

LITTLE was said about the Khedive in the last chapter: for there was little to say. He had reigned for over twenty years when the war of 1914 broke out; but he had not ruled. During the last ten years of the Cromer régime, Abbas Hilmi had frequently been troublesome. He had never been dangerous. In the man himself, the gambler's spirit was lacking. From the moment he arrived at the age to realize the humiliation of his position, he rebelled inwardly. Like the great majority of his fellow-countrymen, he detested the English, and wanted to get rid of them. But he was cowed by Lord Cromer: for he had been told plainly that opposition meant deposition. He had a splendid "berth" as Khedive of Egypt,—honors, money, palaces. To win power he would not risk privileges.

Had there been no Nationalist movement and no pan-Islamic movement at the beginning of the twentieth century, Abbas Hilmi would have remained innocuous, and British Consuls-General could have continued to snap their fingers at him.

But a ruler who put himself at the head of a popular movement could easily have been dangerous to the British administration. From the legal point of view and from the moral point of view, he would have had right on his side, and nowhere in Europe would public sentiment have rallied to his support more quickly and more generously than in the very country from which the intruders came. Abbas Hilmi missed a great opportunity of becoming ruler of Egypt when the Nationalist Party was in its hey-day. There would have been strength, and a glorious opportunity for Abbas Hilmi, also, had he come out boldly and staked his throne upon the question of loyalty and fulfillment of obligations to his suzerain, the Sultan of Turkey. He had several excellent opportunities to put the British in an embarrassing position before the Moslem world and in the eyes of Europe as well. If the Khedive had come out openly as a supporter of the pan-Islamic movement, and had he refused to accede to Cromer's demands in connection with the Sinai Peninsula controversy, the British would hardly have dared to depose him, and the Turks might have gained their point. There was much nervousness in British Cabinet Councils over the effect of the pan-Islamic agitation in India, and the new Parliament was extremely Liberal. Lord Cromer had the good fortune to be dealing with a weakling.

Sir Eldon Gorst tried to establish friendly relations between the Palace and the British Agency. This he succeeded in doing, in spite of the change in the situation in Egypt after the Young Turk

Revolution, which occurred in the second year of Sir Eldon's incumbency. There seemed to be a real attachment between the Khedive and the Consul-General. When Sir Eldon Gorst was dying, Abbas Hilmi made a visit to England to see him. For a while, the Nationalists, especially those of the moderate wing, had high hope that the Khedive would assert himself, and demand on behalf of his people a radical change in the humiliating policy of keeping Egypt in complete political tutelage. When the Italian War brought Lord Kitchener once more to Egypt, Abbas Hilmi had his last chance to come out unequivocally on the Turkish side or to assure the British that they could count upon his loyalty. He did neither. He drifted along, suspected by the British of intriguing with their enemies, and hated by the Nationalists and Turks for failing in his duty as ruler of the nation and as vassal of the Sultan.

Abbas Hilmi spent much time at his estates in Turkey, and was at his summer home on the Bosphorus when the European War began. He refused to declare for the Allies, and stayed on in Turkey after the Turks decided to cast in their fortunes with the Germans. Like every one else who was in touch with what was happening at the Sublime Porte, Abbas Hilmi knew well enough, from the very beginning of the war, that the Young Turks intended to cast in the lot of the Ottoman Empire with the Central European Powers. A member of the Khedivial family, Prince Said Halim, was the Sultan's Grand Vizier. Had Abbas Hilmi's past attitude been one of constant and courageous opposition to

the British occupation of his country, his defection might have had serious results for the British. As it was, the Khedive had become a negligible quantity with his own subjects. The hotheads had tried twice to assassinate him.[1] The moderates knew that he was a hopeless barrier to getting any concessions from the British. It was the chance for Great Britain to depose the Khedive, and to establish a definite status by making Egypt a part of the British Empire. Abbas Hilmi's desertion of his country and his unpopularity among all classes of his subjects made his deposition easy. The state of war with Turkey dissolved Britain's obligations to the Sultan.

Shortly after his deposition, I saw Abbas Hilmi in Vienna. He was cheerful and unruffled, and did not seem worried about having lost his throne. I think he was not at all misled by the hope that German victory would lead to his reinstatement in Cairo, rid of the British occupation. Like Abdul Aziz and Hafid in Morocco, his only preoccupation was the thought of the revenues from his estates.[2] Of these he felt that he would be assured. Not only were the British just, but they knew how important it was to purchase immunity from intrigues.

[1] The second attempt was in Constantinople on July 25, 1914, just a week before the war. The bullet hit the Khedive in the face. The assailant stated that he was moved by the desire to rid Egypt of a ruler who was betraying his people by refusing to lead them.

[2] Hafid, whom the French had deposed in Morocco after they found that he would not work loyally with them under the Protectorate, was consoled by a large pension. But he, like Abbas Hilmi, believed in the ultimate success of the Germans, and risked his pension to cast in his fortunes with them. The last I heard of him he was living in a German *milieu* at Barcelona.

Abbas Hilmi is like many a man born with a silver spoon in his mouth. He had homage and wealth through no effort of his own, and the joy of privileges was ample compensation for renouncing the glory of responsibilities. Will and ability are rarely handed down from father to son: the former is developed through necessity and the latter through effort.

Lord Kitchener, also, was away from Egypt when the war broke out. He was needed at home for the greatest task of his life. During the first three months of the war, Egypt was forgotten in the tremendous march of events in Europe. I was in Paris during these months. My especial interest in the Near East led me to scan eagerly the newspapers for telegrams from Constantinople and Cairo. Only once was there mention of Egypt, when a news item, given out in London, announced that it had been found necessary to intern Germans and Austrians. But the entry of Turkey into the war, and the defection of the Khedive, brought a new situation. From Berlin it was announced that the Turks were going to reoccupy Egypt. The importance of this menace was, of course, the Suez Canal. If the Germans could get control of the Canal, they would strike a more serious blow at the British Empire than by any other move they could make. I was in Berlin when the Egyptian campaign was being widely discussed in the press and in political circles. Great hopes were expressed, through the seizure of the Suez Canal, not only of winning the war by bringing Britain to her knees, quickly,

but also of permanent German control of Asiatic commerce.

Immediately upon receipt of the news in Cairo that hope had been abandoned of preventing Turkey from joining Germany, the numerous Turkish agents and the dangerous agitators among the Egyptians were quietly gathered in by the police, and deported to Malta before they knew what had happened. Sir John Maxwell, who was in command of the British Army of Occupation,[1] was given full powers from London, and assured that the first Australian and New Zealand contingents would be started immediately to complete their training in Egypt. Other troops were sent out from England. Sir John Maxwell, like Lord Kitchener and Sir Reginald Wingate, was one of the "old guard" of British officers in the Egyptian army, who made their career in Egypt. He knew all the ins and outs of Egyptian life, and the attitude of the leading men toward the British occupation. He was one of those rare Englishmen who had won the affection of the Moslems. Bitter enemies of the English have assured me that Sir John was the type of man

[1] In 1906, the British forces were increased by a cavalry regiment, an artillery battery, and an infantry battalion. This increased the expense for the maintenance of the British troops, borne entirely by Egypt, from half a million to three quarters of a million dollars per annum. *Cf.* Mr. Haldane's speech in the House of Commons on July 5, 1910. One tremendous advantage that Great Britain enjoys from her colonial empire is the ability to have in training and ready for use, without any expense to the British taxpayers, soldiers and army officers and civilian officials. Many of Britain's most celebrated administrators and generals have been developed with very little, if any, expense to the budget.

to popularize British rule in Egypt, if only there were more of his kind. He did not make the Egyptians feel that they were social inferiors. When he called the Bedouin Sheiks to the British Agency on November 2, 1914, and broke the news to them of the state of war with Turkey, he was talking to friends, and not to a group of men who bowed to his will only because he had superior force. They agreed to stand by him. This was the beginning of Germany's deception concerning the Khalif's power over the Mohammedan world, which came to the climax eighteen months later in the rebellion of the Shereef of Mecca.[1]

The great problem was to secure a new ruler for Egypt. It was known at this time that the Khedive would not return, and the news was a relief, for Abbas Hilmi would have been an embarrassment, if not a danger, to the British. Negotiations were opened with the uncle of the Khedive, Hussein Kamel, the eldest living representative of the family of Mohammed Ali. Under Mohammedan law he should have been the ruler of Egypt. Prince Hussein was in no hurry to accept the British overtures. He was a man of the old school, who had been from his youth a reader and a thinker. His culture was wholly French, and he could not speak English. His European experience and his European associations were mostly with France. He had been in

[1] The story of this far-reaching event, which is going to have a vital part in the relations of Imperial Britain and Imperial France with Islam, and in the future of Western and Central Asia, is treated in my *New Map of Asia*, now in preparation.

exile in his youth, owing to differences of opinion with his father, the Khedive Ismail, and since the British occupation had abstained from mixing in politics. His passion was agriculture, and he had lived for thirty years the life of a country gentleman. Of all the princes of the khedivial family, Prince Hussein alone had abstained from entering the service of Abdul Hamid, and becoming contaminated by the degrading Yildiz Kiosk influences. He had no illusions about the hopeless degeneracy of the Turkish ruling caste, and the inability of the Young Turks to recreate a strong Islamic state in the spirit of Occidental and twentieth century civilization. On the other hand, he was thoroughly convinced that the inherent liberal spirit of the French and British nations made them the safe mentors and just guardians of Islamic interests.

After six weeks of *pourparlers*, Prince Hussein consented to accept the rulership of Egypt under a British Protectorate. On December 17, 1914, the British Government announced that the relation between Turkey and Egypt was severed, and that Egypt was now a British Protectorate. Sir Henry McMahon was appointed High Commissioner. The next day Prince Hussein became Sultan of Egypt. I have had the honor and privilege of several long conversations with the Sultan, and have had from his own mouth the story of the negotiations of November and December, 1914, and the explanation of the motives that led the Sultan to accept the call to rule Egypt under British protection. The Sultan is a great admirer of Mohammed Ali, the founder of

his House. He believes that it is his duty to carry out the program of Mohammed Ali, the two cardinal points of which were: complete separation from Turkey, and the introduction of Occidental civilization. The intention of Turkey to reconquer Egypt with the aid of Germany threatened to overthrow the successful achievement of Mohammed Ali in freeing Egypt from the Turkish yoke. The retention and strengthening of the bond between Great Britain and Egypt was the best way of securing to the Egyptians the complete realization of the economic and social prosperity that had been initiated by Mohammed Ali, and to which the ancestors of the Sultan had given their lives.

The Khedive's Premier, Rushdi Pasha, rallied to the new régime, and consented to stay in office as head of the Sultan's Cabinet. Most of the leading Egyptians followed his example. The idea of the permanency of the British occupation was far less distasteful than that of seeing the material prosperity of the country and the security of life and property jeopardized by a Germano-Turkish invasion. Even among the older pashas of Turkish origin, who hate the British cordially for having destroyed their power of exploiting the natives and their privilege of dipping into the public treasury, there was little joy at the thought of having to deal with the Young Turks. In no country in the world are conservatives in favor of a change in the *status quo*. The class that has wealth in lands and investments, the class that has social prestige and privileges, and the class that holds public offices, stand

together to stand pat. I have been greatly amused in reading glowing accounts of Rumanians of Transylvania, Italians of Trieste, Croatians of Agram, and other inhabitants of *terre irredente*, who burn to welcome delivering armies. Personal observation on the ground has taught me that in all the countries of whose nationalist and irredentist movements we hear so much, the prime movers and agitators are college professors and professional men and students, who have little or nothing to risk or lose by a change of government. The peasants feel the call of blood only after they have been worked upon and stirred up by priests and schoolmasters and paid political agents. The landowners and manufacturers and business men rarely allow their heart to run away with their head. They know which side their bread is buttered on. They worship the golden calf of the *status quo*. In many countries, they have confessed this to me with frankness. Egypt is no exception to the general rule.

The Turks tried hard to make an attack upon Egypt before the British were able to assemble sufficient troops for the defense of the Canal and for overhauling the Egyptians. General Maxwell felt it wise to recall the Egyptian garrisons and the initial British forces that had been sent to the Turkish frontier. They fell back to the Canal, leaving to the Turks the task of operating in the desert of the Isthmus and the mountainous and roadless Peninsula. The Turks reached the Canal with twelve thousand men on February 2, 1915, and tried to force their way across at several points. They

believed that if they once got into Egypt a popular movement would sweep the British out of the country. But the guns of French and British warships, moored in the Canal, prevented the execution of this project. The risk had been too great, however, for the lesson not to be learned. Egypt was fortunately on the way from Australasia to the battlefields of Europe. During 1915, it was made the training ground for Australians and New Zealanders, the half-way station for British and Indian troops on their way to and from India, and the base for the Dardanelles and Mesopotamia operations. Thus several hundred thousand men could be kept in the country all the time, without immobilizing them.

When the Turks fortified El Arish and Akaba, and began to build their railway to the Egyptian frontier, they spread the report broadcast in Egypt that they were coming back in force in 1916 to deliver the captive province from the yoke of the infidel. In spite of a rigid censorship and an extensively organized secret service, news of the humiliating disasters inflicted upon the British by the Turks at Gallipoli and in Mesopotamia, and of the failure of the Salonika expedition to save Serbia, reached every village of Egypt. As prestige means everything to the Orientals, and as the British knew that their hold on Egypt was solely that of force, the beginning of 1916 brought to the Suez Canal an army organization separate from that of the Army of Occupation. A new general arrived, with his own staff, and a system of defense was organized that would make it

impossible for the Turks to reach the Canal a second time. I had the privilege of visiting these defenses. When the attack against Verdun called me back to France, I left a disappointed lot of Tommies and Colonials. There was some fighting on the western front against the Senussi; but the Canal remained farther from "the front" than Paris. During the spring and summer of 1916, the British undertook to clear Egyptian territory, *i. e.*, the Isthmus and the Peninsula, of the enemy. They did not get the revenge they longed for, the chance to meet the Turks when the tables, as far as geographical advantages were concerned, were turned in British favor.

The failure of the Turks to accomplish anything against Egypt counterbalanced the effect in Egypt of Gallipoli and Mesopotamia. The mass of the Egyptians would have welcomed Turks and Germans, had they invaded Egypt after a successful battle with the British forces. But they would have risked nothing until they were certain of the success of the invaders. Under no circumstances would the Egyptians have risked an uprising against the British. The internal security of Egypt depends upon the defense of the Canal.

The present war was needed to convince the British nation and the British dominions overseas of the necessity of making Egypt a permanent British possession. The Suez Canal is the artery binding India and Australasia to the Mother Country, and it was fitting that Indians and Australians and New Zealanders should have an important part in its

defense. What would have happened had Britain yielded during the past thirty years to the insistent demands (the demands of some of her own statesmen) to evacuate Egypt? After the lesson of this war, only the Britisher, who is a Little Englander and who wants to see the Empire disbanded, will argue for giving up Egypt.

The attack on the Suez Canal made clear the destiny of Egypt, if Britain emerges from the war the victor. I did not hesitate to ask the Sultan what he expected would be Britain's attitude towards maintaining the Protectorate after the war. His answer was frank and unhesitating. "You need only to look at the British troops in Egypt, and to consider where they came from," said His Highness, "to realize how splendidly this war is proving the solidarity of the British Empire, and the importance of the Suez Canal to the British Empire. After the war, when Britain has demonstrated that she could hold by countless sacrifice of blood and treasure, in which the colonies fully cooperated, her great Empire intact, it is unlikely that the Suez Canal and Egypt will be less necessary to England than now or than before the war. I should not have accepted the Sultanate under British protection, had I not been loyal to, and sympathetic with, those whom long and intimate experience have taught me are the true friends of my people and of my family. I have consented to work, at the age of sixty-four, with the English for the regeneration of my country, and for the fulfilment of the wonderful dreams for Egypt and her people that have come

to me from my august ancestor, the founder of my House."[1]

Success in securing a ruler from the khedivial family, and in keeping the country quiet during the trying periods of the beginning of the war, the Turkish attacks on the Canal, the Senussi raids, and the Gallipoli and Mesopotamia fiascoes, must not be interpreted by the British, however, as a sign of the loyalty of the Egyptians to the Protectorate and of their satisfaction with the past and present of British rule. I do not know what Egyptians may say to British friends and British journalists. It is probable that they are especially guarded in their observations during war time. But they have spoken out of their heart to me. Without a single exception, Christians as well as Moslems, from extreme Anglophiles to extreme Anglophobes, the Egyptians are dissatisfied with the way in which British rule has developed in Egypt, and sincerely and ardently desire a change. Sultan, Prime Minister, Cabinet, and notables, are at one in their demand that Egypt should have—and have immediately—a very much larger measure of self-government than has been allowed to her during the past.

In 1916, I noticed many changes from the Egypt of 1909, when Young Turks, Young Persians, and Young Egyptians had high hopes of establishing a constitutional régime in Moslem countries. There

[1] This interview in full, which was passed for publication by His Highness, was published in my correspondence to the New York and Paris editions of the *New York Herald* and the *Philadelphia Evening Telegraph*, January to March, 1916.

is a difference of attitude toward many problems affecting national life: disillusionment in political matters; sadness in educational matters. But on one point there is no change. The opinion is exactly the same. The Egyptians resent the pretension of the British to manage their internal affairs for them. They want to get rid of the officials who have installed themselves, not always tactfully, in the ministries as masters in every branch of administration. They are like every other nation in the world in wanting to run their own affairs. They grant that they may run them badly for a while. But their argument is unanswerable. They ask you to point out a single nation in history that has evolved into a self-governing community without having gone through a long period of imperfection, mistakes, and errors, even of revolution and anarchy. The Egyptians have three serious charges against the system of ruling Egypt which Lord Cromer laid down. The impartial observer, with the facts before him, admits that these charges are amply substantiated.

1. *The British officials in Egypt do not put first the interests of the country in which they are living, from which they draw their salaries, and whose Sultan they are supposed to be serving.*

The system of having the internal affairs of a nation managed by men whose allegiance is to the sovereign of another nation and who take their orders, not from the Sultan and his Cabinet, but from a foreign official, is pernicious in the extreme, and bound to have disastrous results in the long run. Until it is

changed, no reasonable man can blame the Egyptians for saying that they are in the position of a conquered race, held in bondage by force. Their masters may take care of them in the best way possible, looking after their subjects' interests, and giving them benefits that they would not have if they looked after their own interests. But they are in bondage all the same. Is it not an Anglo-Saxon maxim that just government derives its authority from the consent of the governed?

2. *The British officials do not feel and care for Egypt and the Egyptians as it is essential they should feel and care to fill properly their positions.*

The great majority of the officials have no interest in the "natives." They dislike them, and speak disparagingly of them. They tell you frankly that their motive for being in Egypt is to serve British interests and draw their pay. They resent the fact that they are disliked, although they make little effort to be liked; are impatient with the folly of the natives for not knowing a good thing (the British administration) when they see it; and are angry at what they term Egyptian ingratitude. The few who have given their lives to Egypt, and have actually shown proof of self-sacrifice and devotion, are grieved over the lack of appreciation they receive from the people. It is hard to get under the skin of a Britisher. He feels that he is a superior being. As he is wholly indifferent about your attitude towards him he never bothers his head about what you are thinking of him. Other nations frequently speak of a British attitude as "deliberately insulting."

That is not true. It is farthest from the British mind to be insulting. The action in question is instinctive—not thought out or willed. An Englishman of the upper class would be the most surprised man in the world if he discovered that you thought he was not acting considerately and courteously. There is no more charming thoroughbred in the world than the English gentleman—to those whom he knows. Those whom he does not know are nonentities to him, and if he were to think the matter out, he would arrive at the conclusion that he does not see why he is not a nonentity to them also. The reasoning is this: he does not bother me. Why should I bother him?

One afternoon in Shepheard's Hotel, an officer who belonged to a London regiment and whose accent was South England to perfection, was disconcerted and provoked when I asked him a question about Melbourne. "How did you know that I was an Australian?" he asked. "By the way you walked through the hall," I answered. "You looked at people with evident interest as you came toward me. Had your Oxford accent been innate and not acquired you would have seen no one in the hall." The British official in the African colonies is generally a gentleman, with the temperamental limitations of his class. He voices the mental attitude of Great Britain in her dealings with other nations. He never considers for one moment the fact that other individuals than himself, and other races than his own, have, and have a right to, *amour propre*.

With untutored savages and with peasants, the British attitude goes. Only when there is the ele-

ment of injustice—as at Denshawai—do the uneducated classes rebel against it. But the upper class Egyptians, who have blood and traditions and education, hate like poison the way most Englishmen treat them. They tell me that they do not blame the Englishman for his views and his temperament. But they do blame him for forcing those views and that temperament upon them in their own country.

3. *As the civil service has developed, the British Government has not been able to send a uniformly high class of officials to Egypt. The Egyptians are made to accept in many official positions men whose mental caliber would not enable them to fill similar positions in Great Britain.*

This is undoubtedly true. I have seen numerous examples of it. The Egyptian civil service has in it many splendid men. But there are others who are decidedly second rate. The Egyptians are very quick to recognize the second-rate man. If a man has marked ability and splendid training, or is a thoroughbred, and if there is confidence in his integrity and in his sense of justice, respect and even admiration will be given to him. He may be disliked; but his authority will be acknowledged. It is a lamentable injustice and abuse of power, however, to put over a weaker nation, in positions of superior authority, men whose judgment and training are inferior to those to whom they give orders. There is a striking case of this at the present time in one of the Egyptian ministries. The adviser in question has many warm supporters among the British in Egypt, but, when I put the question straight, I

never found one who would not admit that in England this adviser could not possibly obtain a position such as the one in which the Egyptians are compelled to defer to his judgment and his decisions. And it is a position second to none, from the Egyptian standpoint, in importance in uplifting their nation!

I have tried to show in this volume how much the British Empire owes to the class of men England, of all nations, is alone able to send abroad in great number for colonial military and administrative positions. But the supply, as the case of Egypt shows, was not unlimited before the war. It is unfortunately the very class that has suffered most heavily during the past two years. The British Government cannot hope to replace soon the men who have fallen in Flanders, Gallipoli, and Mesopotamia.

It would seem to the outside observer, then, not only that the British should be very slow to assume new and extensive colonial responsibilities, but also that they should endeavor, wherever possible, to retrench in the using of the best element of the British nation. Never has there been a demand far in excess of the supply, because the upper class has placed self-imposed restrictions upon its field of activity. A new condition will confront the British Government after the war.

My space is too limited to discuss the international problem that Great Britain has to face in regularizing her position in Egypt. Since fifteen Governments have by treaty a privileged position in Egypt, it will be necessary to treat with them all to secure their

consent to the abolition of the capitulations and to the establishment of the Protectorate. The negotiations to this end may demand in some cases the offering of compensations. But they ought not to be difficult. British administration of justice, British handling of finances, and British principles of equal tariffs and the open door are sufficient guarantee that the new *status quo*, far from injuring foreign residents or merchants, will be distinctly to their advantage

The great problem is that of the internal government of Egypt. Great Britain will have the acquiescence and support of the Egyptians in leaving in her hands entirely the foreign relations of Egypt and all matters relating to the Canal and to the zone between the Canal and the Ottoman Empire. For it is freely recognized by all that British Imperial interests demand, and have a right to demand, that the Suez Canal be under British control. But no Egyptians, as far as I have been able to ascertain, are going to support the present humiliating system of internal administration. Since they are unable to overthrow it, they may have to continue to tolerate it. One hopes, however, that British statesmen will see that the interest of the Empire is best served by letting the Egyptians have the same chance that their own forebears had of working out political salvation.

CHAPTER XXII

THE CREATION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN UNION

ONE summer afternoon, when I was indulging in my favorite recreation of rummaging in the stalls of the second-hand booksellers along the Seine quays in Paris, I came across a little duodecimo volume of less than three hundred pages, which bore the title: *Woman, Her Past, Her Present, and Her Future.* Even to an eighteenth-century author, who lived long before the days of feminism, the project of telling all about women in one little book must have appeared ambitious, unless he were a bachelor or a monk. I was amused at the temerity or ignorance of the writer. I feel that I am laying myself open to a similar criticism in trying to discuss the South African Union in one small chapter of a book covering all of Africa. But some mention must be made, even if it be of an incomplete and summary character, of the formation of a great European state out of territories colonized by white men. Only in South Africa has Europe been able to become indigenous, racially and politically.

In his farewell speech, when he resigned the High Commissionership of the South African colonies,

Lord Milner called upon the people to be faithful to the idea of imperial unity, which alone would solve the most difficult and persistent problem of South Africa. "The Dutch can never own perfect allegiance to Great Britain," he said, "but the British and Dutch alike can unite in loyal devotion to an Empire state in which Britain and South Africa are partners. The true Imperialist is also the best South African." These remarkable words, uttered by a man who never failed to see clearly into the heart of a problem, expressed the conviction that came to moderate Dutch and moderate British after the Transvaal and the Orange Free State were granted responsible government.

The work of the Colonial Convention, assembled to agree upon the form of union and the constitution, extended over eighteen months. There were many particular interests to be considered, and several crises arose, which threatened to wreck the project altogether. Both Natal and the Transvaal showed an uncompromising spirit, and a perfect willingness to refuse to come in, if what they called their rights and interests were not taken into account. Cape Colony had a negro franchise. The Orange Free State, being very markedly Boer, held out on the education question. In the end, however, the four colonies were able to agree. Their decision was hastened by the railway question and the tariff war, of which we have spoken in a previous chapter. Rhodesia stayed out. The conditions of union were formulated by the colonies themselves, and presented to the Home Government merely for sanction, and not

for decision or revision. All these conditions, except the question of the inclusion of the native protectorates, were *sine qua non*. This was clearly impressed upon the Imperial Parliament, when the Bill for union was presented. Delegates representing the different elements and parties in South Africa were present in the House of Lords and the House of Commons when the Bill was read. Some of the provisions were distasteful to Parliament. Opposition was strong, however, only against the provision which excluded from the Union Parliament and governing functions persons who were not "of European descent." Only because the Imperial Parliament was given clearly to understand that striking out this provision would wreck the Union were the Liberals induced to allow it to stand. The native franchise stood for the province of Cape Colony. But even that could be taken away by two-thirds vote of the Union Parliament. As changes in the constitution were subject to the veto of the King, the Radicals were persuaded that this franchise was not in jeopardy. The "Union of South Africa" was formed by Royal Proclamation on December 2, 1909, and Herbert Gladstone, raised to the peerage, was appointed as first Governor.

From this moment, South Africa became a self-governing dominion of the British Empire, like Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Direct authority of the Crown remained only in the protectorates, of which we have spoken previously; but they were eventually to be transferred to the Union. Seven years after the close of the Boer War, Boer and Briton

were united in a common effort, with common privileges and responsibilities, to work out the destinies of European civilization in South Africa. The Union is the most remarkable achievement of British statesmanship in the history of the Empire. It was possible only because the Home Government had the courage to grant responsible government to the former Boer republics, and the wisdom to refuse to override the decisions of the colonies in regard to their particular interests and their common interests. It proves the peculiar genius of Anglo-Saxondom for creating and fostering democratic institutions. The British are very far from being democrats from the social point of view. Politically, they have established the only real democracy that exists in the world to-day.

One finds everywhere in Africa a refutation of the argument so often heard in the United States against government ownership of railways. Great financial benefit has come to almost every European colony in Africa where the Government has from the beginning exploited the railways, or has later taken them over from private corporations. Especially is this true in South Africa. Cape Colony and Natal, as well as the two Dutch republics, own their railways. When the Union was formed, common state ownership and state management was instituted without a hitch. There were no private interests, influencing legislators, to be considered. The South African railways are free from concessions. Even the refreshment privilege, which used to be farmed out, has been taken over by the State. Capital for rail-

way construction is raised by increase of the state debt, and purely public considerations dictate railway extension. Not only are the railways in the South African Union self-supporting, as in the Sudan and almost everywhere else in Africa; but after interest charges on the capital invested and expenses of management are paid, the State has a very large surplus for the purposes of the general budget. A study of the statistics of the various lines reveals the advantage of the common wealth to the Commonwealth. The Cape and Free State railways are run at a loss. The coal and Rand lines of the Transvaal pay the deficit. This enables the State to maintain existing and to develop new lines on a sound economic basis. When the country that is being opened up by the railways is developed, the new lines will become self-supporting, and the financial advantage will accrue to the State. Some of them, whose construction was dictated in the beginning by political considerations, would have been built by private capital only under conditions that would later have proved onerous to the State. As it is, the people will possess the values they have themselves created. Inhabitants of the Transvaal, who view the railway question from a selfish local point of view, complain that they are being mulcted to afford the Cape Colony and Free State people the luxury of better railway service than their present resources and earning capacity give them the right to expect. If living were only from day to day, the complaint would be just. But the Transvaal enjoys reciprocal advantages from its membership in the Union.

There is unhampered access to the sea for the land-locked colony. Food products, wood, and other materials necessary for the Transvaal's development are received without the duties that might have been imposed, had the members of the Union continued their separate existence.

Since the union, South Africa has not made much progress in solving the negro question. Between the census of 1904 and 1911, the native population increased more rapidly than the white. The Europeans passed from 1,117,000 to 1,276,000; natives from 4,059,000 to 4,697,000. If the protectorates had been included, the proportion of whites to blacks in South Africa would have been less than fifteen per cent. Without the protectorates, it is scarcely more than twenty per cent. The policy advocated by General Hertzog and a large portion of the Afrikanders to establish distinct zones of settlement for natives, wholly aside from the formidable storm of protest that would have greeted such a measure in England, was hardly a practicable suggestion. The Crown lands, though large in extent, are mostly barren and far from railways. A bill to segregate the blacks in this way was presented to the Union Parliament in 1914. It had the weakness of all attempts on the part of white men to "give" natives a portion of what they have taken from them. It failed to provide either sufficient land or the right sort of land, and would have been as crying an injustice as the disgraceful—I might better say contemptible—Indian reservation bills of the United States. It was also open to the grave suspicion of

being a measure inspired by the Boer farmers to get cheap labor: for had the bill passed, the blacks of many regions, especially in the Orange River, would have been at the mercy of the farmers. The supply of mining and agricultural labor in other parts of the Union would have been depleted. From the point of view of safety, also, segregation of natives seems unwise in a country where they are in so great a numerical superiority to colonists and increasing more rapidly than colonists. One feels that the South Africans are safe without having to keep on foot a large military and police force only because the blacks are scattered.[1]

The negro problem in South Africa is unfortunately developing in the same way that it has developed in the American Southern States. With the advance of civilization and the disappearance of slavery, giving to the blacks freedom of movement and the right to vote, social antagonism, with its evils and its distressing manifestations, has arisen. When negroes come into the enjoyment of economic and political equality, they feel keenly the withholding of the social equality that it is not in the nature of the white man to grant. The advocacy of segregation on a wholesale scale is the logical development of local segregation. Custom, sanctioned by law, enforces separate transportation facilities, separate schools, separate residence quarters, separate hotels, and separate restaurants. To the educated and refined negroes, travel is hell. How can they help suffering

[1] Rhodesia was very hostile to this bill, fearing its passage would result in a wholesale exodus northward of blacks and poor whites.

from being made pariahs? Others, who through no fault of their own have not white blood in their veins, are driven by their social ostracism to become criminals. When one studies this problem from the psychological point of view, the frequency of the unspeakable crime is not surprising. Adequate protection of the white woman is the nightmare of South Africa fully as much as of the American Southern States. When Lord Gladstone revised the death sentence in a Rhodesian rape case, he found that white men who lived in communities where they were outnumbered or equalled by negroes would never admit the possibility of extenuating circumstances in a crime of this sort. His ignorance or lack of appreciation of local conditions led him to commit an unpardonable blunder. There was a howl of indignation from one end of South Africa to the other.

European civilization has brought also to South Africa the war between capital and labor, which has developed in exactly the same way as in all states where there is universal manhood suffrage. As we have explained in describing the problems of South Africa before the union, the early days of the labor movement on the Rand were not very successful, because there was no unemployment, and because the native labor question, with its social side, complicated the problem. Later, the white men engaged in mining grew to the number of nearly fifty thousand, and there were a hundred and fifty thousand European industrial workers scattered throughout the Union. The emigrants to the Transvaal from England were

DAMARA LAND
MATABELE
RHODESIA
LAND
BULUWAYO
BRITISH
PROTECTORATE
Limpopo River
Walfish Bay
Tropic of Capricorn
PIETERSBURG
TRANSVAAL
GERMAN
SOUTH WEST
AFRICA
PORTUGUESE
EAST
AFRICA
MAFEKING
PRETORIA
LOURENÇO MARQUES
Delagoa Bay
BECHUANA
LAND
VRYBURG
POTCHEFSTROOM
JOHANNESBURG
SWAZI
LAND
Majuba Hill
TONGA
LAND
KROONSTAD
WAKKERSTROOM
Vaal River
ORANGE
RIVER
COLONY
HARRISMITH
LADYSMITH
GRIQUA
LAND
WEST
KIMBERLY
Modder River
ZULU
LAND
COLENSO
Tugela R.
NAMAQUA
LAND
Orange River
JACOBSDAL
BLOEMFONTEIN
NATAL
HOPETOWN
Colesberg
BASUTO
LAND
PIETERMARITZBURG
DURBAN
BETHULIE
Orange River
ALIWAL NORTH
GRIQUALAND
EAST
VICTORIA
RICHMOND
BURGHERSDORP
PONDO
LAND
TEMBU
LAND
CAPE
COLONY
QUEENSTOWN
TRANSKEI
INDIAN
OCEAN
SOUTH ATLANTIC OCEAN
BEAUFORT WEST
GRAHAMSTOWN
EAST LONDON
WORCESTER
PORT ELIZABETH
PORT ALFRED
CAPE TOWN
Algoa Bay
Mossel Bay
Cape of Good Hope
BRITISH
GERMAN
PORTUGUESE
THE
SOUTH AFRICAN
COMMONWEALTH
SHOWING BOUNDARIES OF CONSTITUENT
STATES AND COLONIES—1906
50 100 200 300
ENGLISH MILES
Wm. J. WILSON

almost all of them strong trades-union men, and brought their ideas and their propaganda with them. although British imperialism, even in the new country, was anathema to them. They fraternized with the Boers who had drifted from the farms to the cities. International socialism took no account of racial antagonism between Briton and Boer. In the last general election the Labor party returned four members to the Union Parliament. There have been strikes in South Africa, and very serious labor riots. The police and military had to be called out in Johannesburg in 1913, and there was street fighting that resulted in considerable loss of life. Seventy per cent. of the rioters were Afrikanders, but all the leaders were English. Most of them, like Bain and Crawford, had been in America, and brought to the solution of South African labor problems methods they learned in Colorado and West Virginia.

From the first days of the Union, General Botha has been the commanding figure in South Africa, and General Smuts has been the loyal coadjutor of General Botha. The Boers formed a majority of the electorate in the Cape, the Orange Free State, and the Transvaal. They form a majority of the electorate in the Union. It is clear, then, that from the moment the Boer War disenfranchisements were terminated in the Cape, and the two former republics were granted self-government, there was no hope of an imperial policy except by the aid of the Boers themselves. Had the Boers all been recalcitrant and unwilling to consider that they had anything to give to or receive from the British Empire, self-govern-

ment would inevitably have led to civil war and the revoking of the constitutions, or complete separation from Great Britain.[1] But General Botha as Premier of the Transvaal, and Mr. Merriman as Premier of the Cape Colony, formed Boer parties that were favorable to a South African Union under the British flag, and to reconciliation with the British element in the colonies.

Lord Gladstone offered General Botha the premiership of the Union of South Africa until a general election could be held. A coalition ministry was proposed, with the inclusion of Dr. Jameson and some of the British party, but General Botha was keen enough to realize that if he took the English into his bosom, he would estrange much of the Boer support he needed to carry out the reconciliation program he had in mind. So he made General Smuts Minister of the Interior, and included General Hertzog, who represented the extreme Boer party of the Orange Free State. General Botha stated that his program would be: the unification of the white population, sympathetic treatment of natives and colored persons, the preven-

[1] The Dutch Reformed Church has a membership of nearly seven hundred thousand, more than half the total population of European descent in South Africa and Rhodesia combined. The official census figures of 1904 and 1911 show that the population of the Orange Free State increased more than five times as fast as the population of Cape Colony and Natal. The Transvaal increased over four times as fast. The Boers have much larger families than the British. Their distribution, also, is stronger. They are not congregated in cities. They have lands and permanent sources of wealth. Unfortunately, the alarmingly large class of "poor whites" has a large Anglo-Saxon element in it.

tion of Asiatic immigration, a broad and conciliatory educational policy, and everything that would tend to a rapid economic development.

In the general election on September 15, 1910, General Botha's Nationalist party, comprised wholly of Boers, carried 67 out of 121 seats. So he had a majority over the British, the irreconcilable Boers, and the labor members combined. We cannot go into the political history of the next few years. General Botha was greatly helped in keeping down racial animosity by the splendid attitude of Dr. Jameson, who had the political wisdom and the patriotism to continue to support unwaveringly General Botha after the coalition ministry project was refused by Botha. Dr. Jameson had to resist the pressure of his political friends, and to stand the criticism of the British section of the press. It is not too much to say that Dr. Jameson's policy was almost as important a factor in making the Union successful as General Botha's. These two men were imbued with the spirit of "live and let live." They had rare moral courage in the midst of the passion and prejudice and blindness of many of their political associates.

In 1913, the split that had long been expected among the Boers was made definite by the withdrawal of General Hertzog from the Botha Ministry. A new party was formed, which called itself the National party. General Botha's moderate Boers preferred the title of South African party. Although General Hertzog, who was at one time a judge in the Free State, has always remained a fanati-

cal Afrikander and has never abandoned the early Krugerism in his attitude toward the *uitlanders*, he has unconsciously—perhaps involuntarily—developed by his intimate contact with the English social graces and a breadth of vision. It is impossible to believe that his fanatical opposition to the imperial deal reflects his own sober judgment. The benefit that South Africa receives from British sovereignty, the inevitable triumph of English over Taal, and the impossibility of reviving the old pastoral simplicity of Boer life must certainly be realized by a man of his keen intellectual gifts. What one honestly believes, and the position one assumes in public for sentimental and political reasons, are often radically different. General Hertzog, unlike General Christian De Wet, did not involve himself in the rebellion of 1914. But he was outspoken in his opposition to a South African campaign against the German colonies, to the Enemy Trading Bill, and to proposals to interne German subjects in the Union and put their property under sequestration.

In the general election of 1915, General Botha lost thirteen seats, and continues to hold office only by the support of the British party. The political situation is very much involved at present, owing to the unusual external and internal problems aroused by the war. At present, General Botha is between two fires. Many Boers believe that he is too British, and is sacrificing the interests of South Africa to those of a decadent and disappearing Empire. Most of the British tell him that he has not the backbone to be loyal in the sense they have of that word. Recently,

in desperation, when he was being pressed to disregard the Boer opposition to the measure to increase the pay given to South African contingents in the Imperial army, General Botha turned to the British members of his Parliament, and cried, "You ought not to press me! You know I am standing on the brink of a volcano." If they have any sense, the British in South Africa will not press too hard the man to whom they owe the fact that their flag is still waving throughout the Union.

CHAPTER XXIII

THE REBELLION IN SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS AFTERMATH

AT a special session of the Union Parliament on September 14, 1914, a resolution was passed by ninety-two to twelve declaring that the House was whole-heartedly determined "to take all measures necessary for defending the interests of the Union and for cooperating with his Majesty's Imperial Government to maintain the security and integrity of the Empire." But even the loyal Dutch of the Union were for the most part opposed to an expedition into German Southwest Africa. They felt, for they knew their countrymen, that it was asking too much of the Boers to call upon them to be aggressively British, and to fight, when they were not being molested, for the interests of the Empire of which they were an unwilling part. Their fears were immediately justified.

General Beyers, Commander-General of the Union Defense Force, resigned the day after the close of the special session of Parliament. His letter of resignation expressed surprise at Great Britain's newly awakened anxiety to protect small nations. As a Boer, it was impossible for him to believe that the

reasons given for British interference to save Belgium were anything else than hypocritical cant.

When Beyers was called a traitor by the English section of the press, Boer loyalists, although they considered the tone of Beyers's letter a bit strong, declared that he was a man whose honesty could not be doubted, and that he had acted from the purest motives. It is difficult to judge the working of the mind of a man who believes he is a patriot. For the sake of his country, almost any man lies and dissimulates, exonerating himself on the ground of patriotism. Beyers probably thought he was doing what was right. But certainly his action would have been less open to suspicion of bad faith had he resigned the post which bound him to British allegiance before the British troops had been withdrawn for service in Europe, and before he had taken part in the councils that planned the campaign against German Southwest Africa. General Smuts, in accepting the resignation of Beyers, pointed out that the plan of operations decided upon had been recommended by Beyers, and that there was no hint given by Beyers, when the campaign was discussed, of his opposition to a campaign against the Germans or of his intention to resign. General Smuts denounced General Beyers also for having communicated the letter of resignation to the press before it was given to the Government, and for his insinuation that the loan of £7,000,000 granted to South Africa by the Imperial Parliament was a bribe to induce the Union to take part in the war.

The campaign against the Germans, which is

described in another place, had already begun when Lieutenant-Colonel Maritz, who commanded the force in the northwest of Cape Colony, rebelled. On October 8th, Maritz refused to acknowledge an order relieving him of his command, and imprisoned the men who brought the order. Their commander, Major Bouwer, who was sent back with an ultimatum from Maritz, reported that the traitor had German guns and a German force at his command, and was sending as prisoners into German Southwest Africa all the Union officers and men who refused to denounce their allegiance to Great Britain. Martial law was immediately proclaimed throughout the Union.

There is no doubt that the great majority of the Boers of the Orange Free State, and possibly a good half of those in the Transvaal and the Afrikander districts of Cape Colony, were potential rebels. British authority in the Union depended upon the loyalty of the more important of the Afrikander leaders, and particularly upon General Botha and General Smuts. It is not too much to say that if these two men had adopted the same attitude as General Hertzog, South Africa would have thrown off British allegiance, or at least would have made impossible the expedition against German Southwest Africa.

Maritz's action, on the other hand, would have had no serious results were it not for the defection of General Beyers and General Christian De Wet. For his commando was routed and fled into German territory in less than three weeks. But at that

moment rebellion broke out in the Orange Free State and in Western Transvaal, De Wet commanding in the former and Beyers in the latter.

On October 21st, General Christian De Wet made a speech at Vrede, a town in the north of the Free State, in which he declared that though he had "signed the Vereeniging Treaty and sworn to be faithful to the British flag, the Boers had been so downtrodden by the miserable and pestilential English that they could endure it no longer. His Majesty King Edward VII. had promised to protect them and had failed to do so." When De Wet and Beyers took the field, they were joined by three members of the Union Parliament, and by Mr. Wessel Wessels, a member of the Defense Council of the Union. Preachers of great influence in the Dutch Church went through the country calling upon the people to take arms against the British. Among the Dutch clergy a statement was circulated in which Maritz was warmly defended. In this statement one finds a sentence which furnishes food for thought to those in England to-day who are cursing the memory of Sir Roger Casement and failing to lay any blame whatever upon Sir Edward Carson for what has happened recently in Ireland

"Next year (1915) it will be twenty years since Jameson made his raid on the Transvaal to steal our country, to kill our Government, to destroy our existence as a people, and in addition our nationality forever, and in all that time we have never had the good fortune to meet a single Englishman or Englishwoman who condemned the raid, not to speak of

detestation and of making Jameson out to be what Maritz is now being made out to be."

The manifesto of the rebellion was signed by Beyers, De Wet, Maritz, Wessels, Pienaar, and Fourie. It has not been published in the press, and is worth quoting, to indicate what the rebels had in mind

"When we subscribed to the Treaty of Vereeniging and laid down our arms, we were a crushed and beaten people, driven to the verge of starvation and despair by the dishonorable tactics of a vigorous and powerful enemy—our resources exhausted and our homes destroyed—but we accepted the inevitable, and were content to forego our nationhood and our liberties for the sake of the future of our people. We were prepared to keep our allegiance to Great Britain, as long as we could do so with honor to ourselves and without ingratitude to our friends. Now, however, we are called upon to choose between this doubtful claim upon our loyalty to a relentless conqueror, and our gratitude to a friendly nation, which extended its sympathy and help in the time of danger. We are being betrayed into this act of base ingratitude either by the folly or treachery of our own Government. Was it not enough to ask us to forget the terrible scenes we witnessed a few years ago, either as men on the field of battle, fighting for our hard-won freedom, or as youths flying with our despairing women-folk from our burning homesteads, or in the concentration camps seeing them dying in thousands around us, but must we now be compelled to take up arms against a nation that gave us a helping hand in our troubles, and plunge our people into the horrors of an extremely doubtful European War? For our part we are prepared to shed the last drop of blood

rather than be guilty of such cowardly baseness, and we call on all those who love honor and friendship and gratitude to assist us in resisting it. We have no wish to shed the blood of the people of South Africa, English or Dutch—far from it—but we must emphatically declare that the members of the present Government have betrayed their trust, and no longer represent the real feelings of the people of South Africa. We most emphatically declare it to have been a gross libel on the honor of his countrymen for General Botha to lead the Imperial Government to believe that the Afrikander people were willing to enter into active and unprovoked hostilities against the German nation, with which they had no possible quarrel, and to which, indeed, they are closely united by ties of blood, friendship, and of gratitude. It was clearly his duty to inform the Imperial Government that, while it could rely upon their passive loyalty and obedience, it was too much to expect that they would willingly and openly invade German territory. The consequence, therefore, of the present civil strife must rest, morally, at any rate, on his shoulders and those of his Government. For ourselves, we shall not lay down our arms until the Government is removed from office, and all idea of invading German territory is frankly abandoned. We are fully aware of the gravity of our position, but no other course consistent with honor was open to us, and we leave our motives to be finally judged by the honorable instinct of all men. Expediency may demand that we be regarded and treated as rebels, but justice and truth will always proclaim our conduct as inspired by the truest patriotism. We do not desire to set up a Republic or any other form of Government, against the wishes of the majority of our fellow-citizens. All we ask is that the people as a whole be allowed to say whether or not they wish to declare war against Germany, or any other nation. We wish

to govern ourselves in our own way without fraud or coercion from anyone, and we call upon the people to assist us in attaining that ideal."

The rebellion was crushed by the energy and decision of General Botha and General Smuts, who put unhesitatingly all the weight of their influence with the moderate section of the Afrikanders and of their military skill and organizing ability into the task. General Smuts recalled part of the little army that had been sent to occupy the coast towns of German Southwest Africa, and succeeded in raising in three weeks thirty thousand armed volunteers, most of them Boers. General Hertzog and ex-President Steyn, whose allegiance was doubtful, realized immediately that the rebellion would not succeed, and did everything in their power to open up negotiations between the Government and the rebels. But General Smuts, master of the situation when he saw that the rebels could not muster more than ten thousand armed men and had to depend upon a junction with the Germans for ammunition, cannon, and reinforcements, declared that he could not treat with rebels. They must be run to the ground and forced to surrender unconditionally.

So prompt was the action of the loyalist forces that the rebels were never able to form a junction of their own commandos, much less to get in touch with the Germans. Only a few hundred men with General Kemp were able to reach German territory. Within seven weeks all the Boers in arms, except those who got away with Kemp, were killed, captured, or sur-

rendered voluntarily. General Beyers was drowned in trying to cross the Vaal River on December 9th. At the end of December the last rebels were dispersed. About seven thousand in all had surrendered or were captured.

On the day the rebellion was announced, a prominent Transvaal Boer said: "Without organization, arms, ammunition, or supplies; without a known grievance or cause, or definite aim; without a common plan or an acknowledged leader; they move, like the ants, the locusts, and the springbok, as if an unknown law of nature compelled it. Who can understand the Boers? They are my people, but they beat me!"[1] On the whole, the observation of this British sympathizer (probably an official) was just. In one particular, however, he was wrong. There was a "known grievance." There was a "cause." There was a "definite aim"—not definite from the military point of view, but certainly definite politically. I have taken the pains to read through a great deal of polemical literature on this subject. There is still much confusion, much contradiction of fact, and too little perspective to get a comprehensive idea of what happened in South Africa only two years ago. But certain facts do stand forth uncontradicted. And, in looking at the rebellion of 1914 from the point of view of what preceded it and what

[1] I am indebted to an anonymous writer in the *Round Table* (London) for March and September, 1915, and June, 1916, for valuable articles on the background and consequences of the rebellion. They are admirably and sanely written, as are all the articles of this indispensable review.

has followed it, there is possibility of forming a judgment that may not need radical revision.

It has not been proved either that the rebellion was inspired by German agents, or that it was an organized attempt to regain independence. If it had been the former, the trials of the ringleaders would certainly have brought out the fact. If it had been the latter, much more enthusiasm for the cause could have been aroused in South Africa by a plain statement when the first commandos took the field. It was not well enough and wisely enough organized a movement to be considered separatist in character. More than this, it is exceedingly doubtful that men like De Wet and Kemp and Beyers—or any other important Boer, in fact—were interested, or would risk anything, for a movement to regain independence. Influential Boers did not want a restoration of the old order. They knew that any movement for independence would be prejudicial to their own interests as well as to those of the Boer nation. Had the movement been organized by German agents or by plotters against the British Crown, it certainly would have been postponed until a more favorable moment.

The prevalent view in South Africa is that the leaders drew blindly ignorant followers after them in the hope that their movement would lead to the downfall of the Botha-Smuts régime, and the coming to power of a real Afrikander Cabinet. They counted on Botha and Smuts not getting enough Boer support to oppose them. After they had actually taken arms, they would have been willing to stop the movement

without a single shot being fired if Botha and Smuts had signified their intention to resign, and go before the country in a general election.

To a certain extent, this interpretation is true. But English writers have not been willing to come out squarely with a statement of the issue the Hertzog-Steyn party wanted referred to the country. The rebels were the extremists and hotheads of the opposition to Botha and Smuts. The issue was this: no aggressive campaign should be undertaken against German Southwest Africa, especially by an army *drafted* into service, without consulting the country. The proposal of the Imperial Government that South Africa undertake the conquest of the neighboring German colony with Union forces, accepted by General Botha, was the one and sole cause of the rebellion. General Botha knew that the Boers did not want to fight. He decided to draft an army. A portion of the Boers resisted. They called it "an armed protest" and not "a rebellion."

As we have seen elsewhere, ever since the formation of the Union, the unadulterated Afrikanders, while accepting the British "yoke," stood squarely against the Imperialists in maintaining that their ideal was a South African Union, united with the British Empire only as a matter of convenience. They were willing to live in harmony with their fellow-citizens of British origin in the development of a Commonwealth, and to give allegiance to the British Crown, so long as the British did not attempt to use South Africa for serving general British interests. The Imperialists, on the

other hand, maintained that South Africa was now an integral part of the British Empire, and that all should be loyal to the "mother country." But England was *not* the mother country of the Boers!

The outbreak of the European War brought the test. Was South Africa also at war with Germany? Did allegiance mean the necessity of the Boers taking up arms to attack a nation against whom they had no grievance and with whom they were united by traditional ties of blood and sympathy? Only if the Germans invaded South Africa, and not before that time, ought they to be called upon to fight. What interest had they in the quarrel between England and Germany? What advantage would come to them from shedding their blood to conquer the German colony? The fate of German Southwest Africa did not interest them, and anyway it would be decided upon the battlefields of Europe, and not by anything they might do or by any sacrifice they might make. This was the opinion of a great majority of the Boers. Had it not been the opinion of a great majority, the Government would not have been afraid to put the issue before the country in a general election.

Immediately after the rebellion was put down, the question arose as to the punishment to be meted out to the rebels. On November 11, 1914, General Botha stated that all who surrendered voluntarily before November 21st would not be criminally prosecuted at the instance of the Government, except those who had taken a leading part in the rebellion or who had committed acts in violation of the rules

of civilized warfare. On December 10th, the Prime Minister declared:

"Let us remember that this has been a quarrel in our own South African household, that all of us will have to continue to live together in that household in the future, and while we do our duty in seeing that never again shall there be a recurrence of this criminal folly, let us be on our guard against all vengeful policies and language, and cultivate a spirit of tolerance, forbearance, and merciful oblivion of the errors and misdeeds of those misguided people, many of whom took up arms without any criminal intention. While just and fair punishment should be meted out, let us also remember that now, more than ever, it is for the people of South Africa to practice the wise policy of forgive and forget."

On December 20th, he reiterated his plea to the British element to try to understand how the Boers must feel.

"For the loyalist Boers," he said, "it has been an unhappy, indeed a tragic ordeal, to have to hunt down and fire upon men — some of them their relatives, many of them their friends—who were once their comrades in arms. The Dutch loyalists regard the whole rebellion as a lamentable business, upon which the curtain should be rung down with as little declamation, as little controversy, as little recrimination as possible. The loyal commandos have had a hard task to perform. They have performed it. The cause of law and order has been, and will be, vindicated. Let that be enough. This is no time for exultation. Let us spare one

another's feelings! Remember, we have to live together in this land long after the war is ended!"

It would have been well if General Botha's wise words had been heeded. But racial animosity was strong—stronger than it had ever been since the days of the Boer War. South Africans of British extraction, unable to put themselves in the other man's place, clamored for drastic punishment. They declared that the loyalist Boers had done only their duty, and that the rebels must be tried and executed. They insinuated that the loyalist Boers had, during the course of the campaign, carried their feeling for the rebels so far, that they tried to do as little killing as possible, with the result that the lives of many British loyalists, fighting for the flag, were needlessly sacrificed.

The rebels who had been Government officials or who held positions in the National Defense forces were tried by court martial and dealt with according to the law. One of the signers of the proclamation, Fourie, was executed on December 21st. The punishment of the others was left to Parliament, which met on February 26, 1915. For the leaders it was decided that, after being tried for high treason before a competent court, and found guilty, imprisonment with or without hard labor for life, or for a term of years, or a fine not exceeding £5000 might be imposed. The rank and file of those who had not taken advantage of the amnesty offer of November 21st were dealt with by a general clause imposing certain civil disqualifications for a period of ten years.

But they were not disenfranchised. General Botha was extemely anxious not to lay himself open to the charge made so tellingly against Dr. Jameson in Cape Colony after the Boer War, that he used the punishment of disenfranchisement to reduce the electoral power of his opponents.

The curtain would have been rung down very quietly on the rebellion, and its aftermath, from an internal point of view, might not have increased the racial antagonism already existing, had it not been for the outcry raised in Parliament and in the loyalist press throughout the Union against these very wise measures. General Botha found himself denounced by the English loyalists for having been afraid to fulfil his duty in punishing the rebels; while his Boer opponents continued to declare that he had sold himself to the English by acknowledging that there had been a rebellion at all!

From the standpoint of immediate Imperial policy, the cooperation of South Africa in the conquest of German Southwest Africa and German East Africa was a great success. Had the rebellion not occurred, the expedition to Southwest Africa, composed as it originally was almost wholly of soldiers of British extraction (for General Botha at the very beginning of the rebellion found himself compelled to withdraw the obligation to serve, knowing that it could not be enforced), would have been a long-drawn-out affair, if not a failure. As it was, the loyalist Boer commandos, who put down the rebellion, furnished a splendid army for Southwest Africa, and have been since a factor in the conquest of East Africa. Accord-

ing to the *Round Table*, nearly seventy thousand men were under arms against the rebels and in the Southwest African campaign. Twenty-four thousand are in British East Africa in the autumn of 1916. Seven thousand five hundred joined Kitchener's army at their own expense, and eleven thousand are serving in France and Egypt and Macedonia with the overseas contingents. The proportion of Boers in the British army to-day is naturally not nearly as great as that of volunteers of British extraction. But it means a lot to the British Empire that young Boers are serving voluntarily in her army.

From the ulterior standpoint, one may have at this time misgivings about the wisdom of using South African troops for the conquest of the German colonies. Conquered as they have been by South African blood, Great Britain is not free to use them as pawns for bargaining in the Peace Conference. This may cause considerable embarrassment at the end of the war. Sufficient to the day, however, is the evil thereof.

In South Africa, since the rebellion, there have been disquieting events to prove that anti-British feeling is still strong. In the general election of October 20, 1915, General Botha's strong majority dwindled to half. The radical Boers, who call themselves the Nationalist Party, won twenty-seven seats. General Botha has a majority now only with Unionist (British loyalist) support. When the Enemy Trading Bill came before Parliament, General Hertzog stated bluntly that his part German ancestry did not permit him to view Germany as an

Englishman would. The Nationalists, and some of General Botha's followers as well, fought this bill tooth and nail. They fought equally a bill to raise the pay of volunteers fighting overseas to the amount given by Canada and Australia, although this had been insisted upon by the entire English-speaking section of the electorate at the polls, and was supported by the labor members. General Botha's own party was so much in sympathy with the Nationalists on the question of refusing to burden the South African taxpayer more than was absolutely essential to pay the men who were fighting Britain's battle, that General Botha could not press the matter. He declared to the Unionists, when they tried to get his support for the measure, "You have no right to press us. I assure you, we are standing on the brink of a volcano, and you know it."

When Lord Kitchener's tragic end was reported, there was much satisfaction in the Transvaal. In the Orange Free State, some towns held public celebrations.

Racial strife and antipathy will not cease in South Africa as long as one element in the population desires to have the relation of the Union to Great Britain that of a colony to the mother country. This will never be. But it is possible for Boer and Briton to live in harmony side by side and to fuse eventually into one race—a race markedly Anglo-Saxon—if Great Britain is content to have her flag wave there as a symbol rather than as a reality.

CHAPTER XXIV

THE CONQUEST OF THE GERMAN COLONIES

THE successive declarations of war during the first few days of August, 1914, left the four German colonies in Africa, and the Germans in other parts of Africa, in a hopeless situation. The mastery of the sea was assured to the enemies of Germany when Great Britain decided to join them. There was no help, then, from the outside. Togoland and Kamerun were completely surrounded by colonies of the Allies. In Southwest Africa Germany had Portugal on the north, and in East Africa on the south. On the other frontiers were the enemy. From the very beginning, Portugal, the ally and dependent of Great Britain, was a constant threat to these two colonies. There were many thousands of German subjects living outside of German territory in other African colonies. They had refuge only for a year in Italian colonies. There was nowhere else in Africa where they were unmolested, except in Abyssinia and Liberia, and the wee colonies of Spain. But even in Spanish Morocco and internationalized Tangier the Germans were not safe.

In the new French Protectorate of Morocco, at the very beginning of the war, conspiracies of German

consuls and merchants were discovered. Those who could get away fled into the Riff and to Spain. The rest were interned. Some, against whom complicity in plots could be proved, were tried before French courts-martial and shot. In Tripoli, German consular officials and others who the Italian authorities claimed were military officers in disguise were found to be in relations with Arab "rebels." Some were imprisoned, and others expelled. There was no immunity for Germans in French and British and Belgian colonies. In some parts they were treated with leniency at first. But the news of German successes and German excesses in Europe, coupled with the desire to put out of the way commercial rivals, led to imprisonment in concentration camps and forcible liquidation and sequestration of business interests everywhere.

There were very many old established German residents in the South African Union, and some in Rhodesia. Among them were men who had contributed in a most important way to the development of South Africa. In fact, the older German firms had been the invaluable coadjutors of Cecil Rhodes in the last two decades of the nineteenth century. The Boers were very friendly to the Germans, and even after the rebellion and the Southwest Africa campaign public sentiment would not allow bona fide German residents of the Commonwealth to be molested. The sinking of the *Lusitania*, however, led to disgraceful riots in Johannesburg and elsewhere. Germans were maltreated, and their homes and business places looted and destroyed.

The British element in the Commonwealth agitated in Parliament, after the passage of an Enemy Trading Bill, for the internment of all Germans and the sequestration of their properties. Only the return of a Parliament in the general election of 1916 in which General Botha's moderate Boers were caught without a majority between British and Boer fanatics has saved the Germans from experiencing a fate similar to that of those in British Crown Colonies.

The Germans of Egypt were not more immune, owing to the peculiar status of the country, than were the Germans of Morocco. They were interned in concentration camps. Their extensive business interests were put into the hands of receivers appointed by the British authorities, and forcibly liquidated.

From the very first day of the war, Germany had no hopes for Togoland, whose geographical position put the colony at the mercy of France and Britain. There were less than two hundred Germans in the colony, who had military training, and they could muster only a thousand natives. The British sent a force from the Gold Coast to occupy Lomé on August 6, 1914. At the same moment, a French army invaded Togoland from Dahomey. The Germans offered to capitulate, if given honors of war. Unconditional surrender was demanded. The Germans retired into the interior to Kamina, where the most powerful wireless station in Africa, which could communicate with Berlin, had just been completed. On August 22d, the Germans attacked the combined French and British forces between Atakpame and the coast. Beaten back, they destroyed the wireless

station, and surrendered on August 28th. The conquest of Togoland was completed in the first month of the war.

In the other three colonies, the Germans expected to be able, not only to resist successfully, but to make things hot for their enemies throughout Africa. In Southwest Africa they relied upon a Boer rebellion. In Kamerun, they expected to arouse the adjacent French Sudan and Northern Nigeria against France and Great Britain. In East Africa, they expected aid from Arabia, Egypt, and the Sudan. But the disloyalty of the Boers in South Africa, as we have seen in the last chapter, did not materialize into a serious danger for the Commonwealth. And the Germans were all wrong in their calculation of the effect the alliance with Turkey and the proclamation of the Holy War would have upon Islam in North and Central Africa. Not for a moment was French or British authority seriously menaced in any African colony. One might put the statement a little more strongly. Far from being embarrassed by holding Moslem colonies and protectorates in Africa, France and Great Britain have found in these possessions a source of strength and great aid in prosecuting the war. African Moslems have constituted a very precious element in the French armies in Europe.

Giving tit for tat and a little more, Great Britain has turned the tables on the Turks and Germans who counted her possession of Egypt a military weakness, and has used Egypt to wean away the Shereef of Mecca from his allegiance to Turkey.

What fighting France and Italy have had to do in

Morocco and Tripoli was in no sense a repercussion of the European War, but the continuation of military operations of the ante-bellum period. In all Africa, only the Sultan of Darfur responded to the Khalif's call to the Holy War. He waited nearly two years, and when he was getting ready to make trouble in the Sudan, he was quickly suppressed by a small expeditionary corps from Khartum.[1] The only other fighting in Africa, outside of that involved in the conquest of the German colonies, was on the western and eastern frontiers of Egypt. On the west, the Senussi, who had been carrying on a very successful campaign against the Italians in the Tripolitaine, attacked the British at the end of 1915. They occupied Sollum, and advanced at several points towards the Nile valley from the Libyan Desert. But they were very soon driven out of Egyptian territory, and suffered heavily. In the east, the Turks advanced across the Isthmus of Suez, and attacked the Canal in March, 1915. The attempt was unsuccessful. In 1916, the British kept a large army on the Canal, which they had fortified very carefully.[2] At the time of this writing, the

[1] See above, pp. 19 (note) and 341.

[2] I had the privilege of visiting the British army on the Suez Canal in January and February, 1916. In the latter month, the system of defenses had been worked out sufficiently for the visitor to get a good idea of the plan and a firm conviction that the Germano-Turks would never attack successfully the Canal. The General Staff detailed an officer to show me the first lines to the east of the Canal, and allowed me to see the maps they had made of the Isthmus. Whatever fault there had been in 1915, it is sure that a year later the British were in a position not to be caught napping again.

British forces have cleared the Turks out of the Isthmus, and are waiting only for the progress of the Arab rebellion against Turkey to cooperate with the Shereef of Mecca in the occupation of Palestine.

German Southwest Africa was quite unprepared to repel an invasion. The Germans had no army in the colony. Since the Herero War, peace had reigned and the Germans had devoted themselves to economic development. In spite of absurd stories that have been written to the contrary, the armed forces of the colony were only large enough to do police duty, and their supply of arms and ammunition did not enable them to offer serious resistance to the overwhelming forces General Botha was able to bring against them. The situation had possibilities for the Germans, only if the Boer rebellion had been successful, or if all the Boers had refused to bear arms against them. The Southwest African campaign demonstrated beyond the possibility of doubt either that Germany was not expecting a war with Great Britain, or that, in case of war, there was no intention to stir up the Boers. This statement may be contested. But it is difficult to see how a General Staff such as the German one has proved itself to be would not have been organizing and preparing thoroughly for years in Southwest Africa, if Southwest Africa had been in the plan of future military operations.

The operations of General Botha are uninteresting: for when an army of fifty thousand, well equipped for every possible need, goes after an army of five thousand in a country where supplies are lacking and munitions once used cannot be renewed, what is there

to write about? The Commonwealth forces were not very well handled, for they allowed the Germans to escape time after time. When the capital, Windhuk, was occupied on May 12th, after the South African forces had been four months in the field, the Germans retired to the north. When they were followed to Grootfontein, and there was nothing to retire to except bush, and no food to be found along the only line of retreat, the Germans, to the number of thirty-five hundred, surrendered on July 9, 1915. The Germans, against overwhelming odds, maintained their force practically complete. One does not know whether to credit German skill or to discredit the skill of General Sir Duncan Mackenzie, who seemed totally unable to get any good out of all the advantages he possessed.

In Kamerun and East Africa, while the odds in the way of supplies were equally great against the Germans, they were not overwhelmed by a huge army as in Southwest Africa. So they were able to get the best out of skill and resourcefulness, courage and endurance. The bitterest enemy of the Germans must acknowledge that their defense in Kamerun and East Africa stamps the officers who conducted the troops in these two colonies as the very best sort of sportsmen. In Kamerun the Germans held out for a year and a half, and then succeeded in avoiding capture. In East Africa, after more than two years of being cut off from the outside world, they are still in the field, with a navy and four armies against them.

As there were not many German troops in Kam-

erun, and the British in Nigeria believed they would be received by the Kamerun natives as liberators, they counted on a six weeks' campaign to destroy or capture the German forces in Kamerun. On August 25, 1914, a Nigerian force crossed the frontier. In the following week two other British columns invaded Kamerun. The Germans brought up their mobile native troops with lightning rapidity, and drove back into Nigerian territory the invaders. On the coast, owing to the protection of warships, French and British troops were able to effect landings at the ports. At the mouth of the Kamerun River, Duala, the capital, was occupied, and forty thousand tons of German shipping captured. The war continued throughout the whole year of 1915, all three of the belligerents employing black troops. When the Allies were able to bring up their heavy guns against a fortified post, the Germans had no chance whatever. But they held out each time until the Allies had expended an enormous amount of invaluable ammunition, and destroyed the buildings and supplies that could not be moved. Never once were their enemies able to surround them. Their three thousand black soldiers, led by two hundred and fifty white officers, completely baffled the efforts of Major-General Dobell's eight thousand British, French, and Belgian soldiers. When their ammunition gave out, they had so manœuvered their retreat as to be able to cross to safety into Rio Muni, the little Spanish enclave in Kamerun.

Admirable as the Kamerun campaign was, from the German point of view, it was rivalled by that in

East Africa. The Wangoni rebellion, in 1906, had taught the Germans in East Africa what the British and French had long known, the value of recruiting and training native soldiers. The mistake of the Herero rebellion in Southwest Africa was not repeated. White troops were recalled, and some natives from German New Guinea introduced to incorporate with East African levies. During the eight years between 1906 and 1914, the Germans in East Africa paid great attention to native troops, and built up a splendid army. When war was declared in 1914, they did not wait to be invaded. They crossed into the Belgian Congo, attacked posts in Rhodesia, and threatened the British East African frontier. On the lakes, there was naval warfare. Until the Home Governments of their enemies were able to give serious attention to the problem of the conquest of East Africa, the Germans were fairly evenly matched with their neighbors. For there were not many troops in British East Africa and Uganda, and practically none in Rhodesia and Nyasaland, save what were absolutely essential for police purposes. There were twenty thousand black troops in the Belgian Congo. But the Belgian authorities felt they had their hands full in looking after their own territories, and were content to remain on the defensive.

At the beginning of 1915, three companies of British Indian infantry, who were holding the post of Jasin in German territory, were surrounded by German black troops, who forced them to surrender, after an attempt at relief had failed. It was, on a

very small scale of course, a prelude to Kut-el-Amara. The Indians were sacrificed to the rashness of their British officers, who were betrayed by overconfidence and disdain of the enemy into an unjustified forward movement that ended in humiliation. At the end of 1915, the Germans were in possession of the whole of the East Africa colony, coast line and boundaries as well as interior. It was decided to call upon the South Africans to conquer the colony, and General Smith Dorrien was appointed to command the invasion. Early in 1916, the British General resigned his command "for reasons of health"—the polite and invariable formula—and was succeeded by General Botha. Germany's declaration of war upon Portugal brought another enemy into the field.

The reports from East Africa during the spring and summer of 1916 were very vague. But each official bulletin brought the news of a new success for the combined South African, Rhodesian, Portuguese, Belgian, Indian, and British armies. On September 4th, Dar-es-Salaam was captured, and on the 18th, the two last footholds of the Germans on the coast fell into the hands of the British. The whole line of railway across the colony was occupied before the end of September. It is probable that when this book goes to press, the conquest of the last German colony in Africa will have been completed. As there is no neutral territory to which they can retire, the Germans will be compelled to surrender.

The story of the Great War in Africa has demonstrated two things, one of which was not expected by

the Germans, and the other of which was not expected by their enemies.

The collapse of their hopes of Islamic uprisings, or rather a coordinated Islamic movement in North and Central Africa, is a severe blow to Germany and her allies. By the same token, it is a remarkable testimony to the hold France and Great Britain have over the natives under their flags.

The ability of German officers in Kamerun and East Africa to command the loyalty of their native troops and the cooperation of the inhabitants of these two colonies is a big surprise to France and Great Britain, and disproves the thesis that the natives of the portions of Africa over which Germany ruled were eager to welcome British and French liberators.

In conclusion, by the test of this cataclysm, which has brought half of Europe against the other half, one can affirm the stability of European institutions in Africa, and the lack of desire or power of the inhabitants of any part of Africa to change the political status under which they have been brought during the last two decades.

CHAPTER XXV

AFRICAN PROBLEMS FOR THE PEACE CONFERENCE

IF one maintains that the attitude of the Powers towards the problems that come before the Peace Conference depends upon the military position of the two groups of belligerents at the time the armistice is signed, he can see no use in discussing peace problems. For there will be no peace problems. The victors will refuse to consider problems. They will impose conditions on the time-honored basis of "*Væ victis!*" It will be a peace in which superior force is the decisive factor, not only the combined superior force of one group of belligerents over the other, but the comparative superior force of the states in the victorious group. If peace is made on this basis, the war will have been fought in vain.

Europe will remain an armed camp. The victors will need standing armies to maintain their terms. The vanquished will hope to reverse the decision of force by building up bigger armies than they ever had before and by diplomatic intrigue. France did this after 1815 and 1870, Russia after 1854 and

1878, and Austria-Hungary after 1859 and 1866. Great Britain all the while was guided by the sole consideration of throwing in her sword to prevent any continental Power from becoming strong enough to menace her world supremacy.

But in this war, from the very beginning, France and Great Britain have made the issue a moral one. They appeal to the whole world for sympathy and for support on the ground that they took up the sword for the sake of humanity. Premier Viviani, in the Chamber of Deputies, and Prime Minister Asquith, in the House of Commons, solemnly declared in the name of France and Great Britain that these two Powers were not fighting for territorial aggrandizement, but for the principles of international law and the freedom of small nations. Germany, on the other hand, was convicted before the court of world opinion of being the aggressor and actually starting the war, and of attacking Belgium wholly without provocation, although she had assumed the international obligation to maintain Belgian neutrality. Russia's recent record was worse than that of Germany, and her cruelties in the initial campaigns fully as shocking. Neutral public opinion throughout the whole world, however, sustained unhesitatingly the cause of the Entente Allies. There was deep sympathy with the wrongs inflicted upon little Belgium and little Serbia. There was disgust of German methods of beginning and conducting the war. But most of all, neutral public opinion rallied to the Entente Allies because of belief in the sincerity of the appeals made for its

sympathy on the ground of fighting the battle of humanity.

The small neutrals in Europe are at the mercy of the combatants. Whatever they may think, the expression of their thoughts is muzzled by geographical and economic conditions. Even if they were free to translate thought into action, the force they could muster would not count for much on sea or on land. The South American states are dependent upon foreign capital, foreign products, foreign markets, and foreign steamship lines. They must acquiesce in the general international decisions of the United States and Europe. The three large South American countries, Brazil, Chile, and Argentina, have together only about ten per cent. of the population of European origin that the United States possesses. In wealth and resources as well as in population, the important neutral is the United States. By institutions and by blood, it is natural that the overwhelming majority of Americans should sympathize with France and Great Britain.

But one cannot insist too strongly upon the point that the people of the United States do not hate—do not even dislike—the people of Germany. What they do hate is the picture of Germany that has been held up before them during the war—a nation, gone mad by lust for power and blood and destruction, blindly upholding a ruler and statesmen who have upset the peace of the world, trampled upon small nations, and violated the principles of humanity in order to dominate the world. In sharp relief to

this picture is that of the Entente Allies, nobly struggling to save the world from Prussian militarism, sacrificing themselves to defend humanity, and pledged to a peace that will establish the world upon a new basis of justice and freedom for all mankind.

As long as the pictures remain as they are, the Entente Allies are assured of American sympathy. If they are the victors, and go to the Peace Conference to fulfil the pledges of their statesmen, with the intention of establishing peace on a durable basis, they will have American cooperation and American support. As this cooperation and support will be a precious asset, it is the duty of American writers, who have loyally supported from the very beginning the cause of the Allies, to present and to discuss problems of the future Peace Conference in a spirit of frankness.

In international relations, the African settlement is going to be as important and as significant for the future as have been the African developments. The history of Africa in the last generation, and especially in the decade immediately preceding the war, shows the vital part of European rivalry in Africa in forming the alliances and in stirring up the friction that made a European War inevitable. Unless the African settlement is made upon a basis of broad statesmanship, the peace treaty will contain embers of a fire unquenched, ready to break out again when fresh fuel is thrown upon it.

The great question is this: Will Germany be excluded from Africa, or will she be readmitted to

cooperate in the development of the continent on a basis that will give satisfaction to the abilities and necessities and aspirations of the German people?

The partisan, in the heat of the conflict, opens his eyes in amazement and indignation at this question. He denounces you as a pro-German. If you convince him that you are sincere in your friendship, he asks how you can be so naïve as to expect the Allies to return to Germany what they have taken from her. "We have Germany at our mercy. She is beaten. She and all her partners must pay the price of their crime against civilization. Do you not believe in punishment?"

This reasoning is precisely that of Germany in 1870. Germany declared to the world that she was not fighting the French, but was mercifully ridding them of their War Lord, who was trying to lead France along the path followed by the first Napoleon. But the lust of pillage and conquest caught the Germans with the first victories. The resistance of France maddened them. They told the neutral world they could not afford to be kept in continual jeopardy by the militarist ambitions of France. They must annex territory (which had once been German) to protect themselves against French aggression. The memory was still alive of the invasion of Germany by the first Napoleon, and they burned to wipe out the humiliation of Jena and Napoleon's entry to Berlin. They had to bring France to her knees and *punish* her. The punishment was a boomerang. Instead of securing the tranquillity of the next generation, the Treaty of

Frankfort has brought disaster upon the children of those who imposed it upon France.

Aside from the argument of punishment, the only justification of France and Great Britain for retaining the German colonies would be: economic necessity of keeping the colonies; or the claim that Germany had forfeited her right to them, through barbarous treatment of the natives or incapacity to administer and develop the colonies. A survey of the distribution of African territory, and the history of the last decade of European colonization in Africa, are sufficient to make invalid both these grounds.[1] Even were there reasonable doubt here, is not the heavy loss of men and money during the present war going to retard the administrative and economic development of the colonies France and Great Britain already possess? Is it wise to assume new obligations?

If the Entente Allies have in mind the destruction of Prussian militarism, this can be best accomplished by giving Germany a large part in the development of Africa. The student of German politics during

[1] The reports of British consuls in the German colonies, and of governors and other officials of adjacent British colonies, from 1906 to 1913, are high in their praise of German efficiency and German courtesy, and of the fact that British trade and traders received fair treatment. Commerce was far easier and more profitable for British in German than in French and Portuguese colonies. Several officers of the British army, *speaking since the present war began*, have assured me that in boundary commissions and other common tasks, they got along better with the German officers than with those of any other nation in Africa. "They are really more our sort, you know," was the candid confession.

the past fifteen years is convinced that sufficient popular support for army and navy credits was gained by the German *Weltpolitik* advocates only because they were able to convince the electorate of the necessity of colonies, both for excess population and for markets, and that the rivals of Germany were doing all in their power to grab what was left of the world and to prevent Germany from getting her "place in the sun." The population and resources of Germany increased marvelously since the accession of the present Kaiser. The advocacy of a policy of establishing overseas dominions, where great markets for exports could be developed, raw materials grown, emigrants saved to *Deutschtum*, and German *Kultur* and language spread, was resisted for many years by the German electorate. But in recent years imperialism, fostered by these arguments, has become no less attractive to the Germans than to the French and British.[1] National instinct is the same the world over.

[1] Englishmen think exactly as Germans do. In a visit to New Zealand in 1916, Sir Rider Haggard declared: "We are anxious to see that the men who leave Great Britain . . . remain somewhere within the shadow of the British flag, and do not settle in the United States or Argentine or some other foreign country . . . the Empire cannot afford to lose these people. . . . No expense is too great and no thought too high to give to the problem of how to retain within the Empire our own citizens." Commenting on this statement the *Auckland Star* said: "The material progress and strength necessary for safety depend upon man-power, and the Empire must see that that power is conserved by every possible means. Emigration to places beyond the Empire must be vigorously discouraged. . . . The point to be emphasized now is that men and women desirous of a change must be kept within the Empire." The *Round Table* for September, 1916, remarks that Sir Rider

The Germans bubbled over. Perhaps they ought not to have done so. But could they have helped it? Where did they have a good chance to expend the newly-created excess of national energy and national pride and national creative longing? When a bottle is overflowing, and you try to keep in the cork, the bottle breaks, and the hand that pressed down the cork gets hit by flying pieces of glass. A repetition of the act is folly. Here is the kernel of the European problem.

After an unsuccessful war, if their eyes are opened to the unwelcome truth that they have been deluded by their leaders into fighting a policy of encirclement that had no truth in it, the German people will themselves make short work of the Kaiserism, Junkerism, and Prussian militarism we abhor. But if their colonies are taken from them, and they are shut off from trading with Africa and Asia and Australasia, they will find in the peace terms of their enemies ample justification for having fought the war, and will give their Kaiser and his statesmen and generals credit for having done their best to avert the conspiracy whose existence will have been proved in their eyes by the fact of its success. Instead of being chastened and repentant, they will be defiant. Instead of mourning the useless sacrifice of fathers and sons, of husbands and brothers, the dead will be martyrs of a sacred cause, whose memory will keep alive the determination to devote energies and brains,

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Haggard's appeal is curiously like those made by Froude in 1870 in his articles on England and her colonies in volume ii. of *Short Studies on Great Subjects.*

and to consecrate the new generation, to the building up of a new war machine. The enemies of Germany could not prevent this. You can knock a man down. But if you want to keep him down, you must sit on him, and keep sitting on him. He who imposes his will upon another by force generally becomes the victim of his victory.

There is another extremely important consideration that should convince statesmen of the wisdom of welcoming Germany to a more important part than she has yet had in the development of European civilization in Africa. There are ninety million Germans in Central Europe. If they are barred from overseas development, they will own Poland in spite of the efforts of the Poles and Russians, and they will be masters of the Balkan Peninsula and Asia Minor. Many Germans have been opposed to the colonies, and are glad now that their country has been put out of Africa, for the very reason that all the energies and resources of Germany might be redirected to the *Drang nach Osten.* The way to prevent Germany from remaining, even after a crushing defeat, the greatest military and political factor in Europe is to give her an outlet—an ample outlet—in Africa. The policy of trying at every turn to forestall the hesitating development of German colonial enterprise was highly successful in Africa and elsewhere. It gave to Great Britain and France larger colonial empires and commercial and political advantages, of which the Occidental Powers have made excellent use. It obstructed German "intrigues" in Asiatic Turkey and Persia.

It prevented Germany from establishing coaling-stations and naval ports. But it is exacting now a fearful toll of French and British lives. Were the gains worth the price that is being paid? One doubts seriously whether they were gains—or even diplomatic advantages. A river, deflected from one channel, finds another. If it does not, it bursts over the dam, and gets back into the old channel. *It does not stop running.* The natural economic laws at work in the world cannot be set aside by diplomatic combinations. You cannot get rid of a fact by refusing to see it. From the physical as well as the intellectual standpoint the Germans are the most powerful ethnic group in Europe. They are unrivaled in their energy, their discipline, and their commercial and scientific ability. In number, they equal, if they do not surpass, the Russians. Their geographical position is the strongest of the European races. Damn them if you will; but there they are.

The United States is vitally interested in a wise and politic settlement of the European War. We have potent reasons, aside from resentment over the Belgian invasion, the nefarious activity of submarines, and the intrigues on American soil, to wish for the destruction of Prussian militarism and the return of the German people to the rest of the world's way of looking at things. We have no faith in Russia. Her attitude toward Poland and toward the Jews is as abominable as it was before the war. The only explanation of the failure of liberal public opinion in France and Great Britain to come out generously and impressively in favor of Poles and

Jews is that political blackmail—unofficial, perhaps, but none the less powerful—has kept London and Paris newspapers silent. The alliance of Russia and Japan fills us with the gravest misgivings about the future of China. The time is not far distant when duty and interest may impose upon us intervention in the Far East. An unbridgeable chasm between the Occidental Powers and Germany would lead to an alliance of Germany with Russia and Japan to dominate Asia. This is not prophecy. On your chessboard, you can point out moves and combinations of moves from study of and experience in other games. You cannot, of course, foresee what move the player will make. But you can tell him what will happen if he makes the move.

The surest means of establishing the security of Europe against Prussian militarism is to take away from the reactionary elements in Germany the arguments by which they have won and hold the support of the German electorate. A regenerated, democratic Germany, cooperating with the rest of Europe and with America in the work of developing and civilizing the world, will be born out of this war, if internationalism, instead of nationalism, and the higher interests of humanity, instead of the particular interests of the strongest, are the ruling factors of the Peace Conference.

The happiness of our children, in a world where peace and harmony reign, depends much upon the new map of Africa.

INDEX

Abbas Hilmi, Khedive of Egypt, 399–400; character and opportunities, 421, 423; deposed, 424

Abdul Aziz, Sultan of Morocco, 362 *et seq.*, 378 *et seq.*; agrees to abdicate, 383

Abyssinia, 96–105; Italy and, 97, 99; Emperor Menelik, 97, 99, 102, 103; Dr. Rosen Kaiser's envoy to, 99–100; German and Austrian commercial treaties, 100; French and British convention, 100–101; death of Emperor Menelik, 103; civil war in, 103; future of, 104

Adowa, battle of, 1896, 4; defeat at crushing blow to Italian colonial aspirations in East Africa, 118

Africa, European development of, possible only with increase of transportation facilities and production, 31; islands of, 31–42; Boer war marks a step forward in making it a white man's country, 50–51; colonial adventures of Italy in, 115–129; Spanish colonies in, 115 n.; Germany's entrance into, 173–174; stability of European institutions in, 480

African problems for the Peace Conference, 481–491; will Germany be excluded from Africa at end of European War?, 484–486; considerations in favor of giving Germany a part in development of Africa, 486–490; American interest in a wise settlement, 490–491

Afrikander Congress at Worcester, December, 1900, 44

Agadir incident, 388

Albert, King of Belgium, visits Congo, 162

Albert Nyanza, Lake, unavailable for irrigating the Sudan, 20

Algeciras, European rivalry in Morocco before, 355–373; Conference of 1906, 373, 374, *et seq.*

Algeria and Tunis, the nucleus of the French African Empire, 130–146; French enter Algeria in 1830, 132; French occupation of Tunis sanctioned, 133; Tunis and Morocco the keys to France's house in Africa, 134 and n.; Tunis invaded, 134; Algeria conquered during reign of Louis Philippe, 135; French government of, 135 *et seq.*; Algeria did not prosper till inhabitants were given voice in government, 137–138; Algerian trade with France and commercial development, 138–139; education in Algeria, 139–140; extension of Algerian territory, 141; Tunis invaded and French Protectorate established, 141; early economic progress of Tunis, 142; political advantages to French of holding Tunis, 143–144; crux of French problem in northern Africa, 144–146

Ali, Sultan, of Darfur, 19 and n.

Anglo-French agreement of 1899, 18; of 1904, 18, 358, 359, 368, 369, 405

Angola, or Portuguese West Africa, 257–263
Ashanti, revolt of, 282–283
Atbara, railway to, 11
Atbara River, bridge over, 11

Basutoland, 83
Belgians in the Congo, 147–172; *see also* Congo
Bernard, Colonel, Financial Secretary at Khartum, 9–10
Beyers, General, 70; a leader in rebellion in South African Union, 454 *et seq.;* drowned, 461
Bismarck, telegram to German Consul at Cape Town, 174
Boers, result of the Boer War a benefit to, 50–51; oppose introduction of Chinese labor in South Africa, 61–62; agitate for responsible government, 67–68; demand that Orange Free State be given responsible government at same time as Transvaal, 69; determined that franchise shall not be granted to natives and coolies, 72; conflict over use of Taal in South African schools, 74–76; opposed to attacking German Southwest Africa, 454; potential rebels, 456; form most of army of General Smuts which crushes rebellion in South African Union, 460; attitude of, towards Great Britain and in European War, 463–464; in conquest of German Southwest and East Africa and in overseas contingents, 467–468; *see also* Boer War, Transvaal, South Africa, and Orange Free State.
Boer War, last years of, 43–49; British disappointment at prolongation of, 43; Afrikander Congress denounces British conduct of, 44; French public opinion hostile to Great Britain, 44; Kaiser Wilhelm's refusal to receive President Kruger checkmates Boer hopes of aid from Europe, 44; martial law proclaimed in Cape Colony, 44; Lord Kitchener's proclamation of August 7, 1901, 45; concentration camps, 46–47 and n.; "National Scouts" in, 47–48; defeat of Lord Methuen the last Boer victory, 48; Boer independence out of the question, 48; Vereeniging Conference, May 15, 1902, 48–49; terms of peace, 49–50; British loss in, 50; result of war a benefit to Boers and the whole world, 50–51
Botha, General, 66, 70; influence in South African Union, 449 *et seq.;* aids in crushing rebellion in South African Union, 460
British in East Africa and Uganda, 206–227
British East Africa, boundaries, 206; frontiers established, 211; administration, 212; pacification and economic development, 212–214; native disturbances, 214–215; missionary work, 215–216; white colonization, 217 *et seq.;* conflict between settlers and chartered company, 218 *et seq.;* opposition to Jews and Asiatics, 219–221; to limited leasehold of land grants, 221–223; to favoritism toward natives, 223–225; to government without representation, 225–226; settlers in the European War, 227
British West Africa, 276–298; four colonies in, 276–277; *see* Gambia, Sierra Leone, Gold Coast Colony, and Nigeria.
Bu Hamara, revolt of, in Morocco, 366–369; death of, 384 n.

Cairo, convention signed January 9, 1899, at, 5–6
Canary Islands, 32
Cape Colony, *see* South Africa and South African Union
Cape to Cairo Railway, 196
Cape Verde Islands, 252–253
Casement, Roger, report on the Congo, 151–152
Central Africa, *see* Nyasaland and Rhodesia
Central Africa, French in, 335–354
Chad, Lake, environing colonies, 335
Chad Military Region, 338, 340
Chamberlain, Joseph, decides to visit South Africa, 53; his problems and action there, 53 *et seq.*; result of his visit, 57; proposed Transvaal war "contribution," 64–66; promise and warning to Boers, 67
Chinese labor in South Africa, 61–63
Churchill, Winston, on Uganda, 207–208
Concentration camps, in Boer War, 46; mortality in, 46 and n.
Congo, the, Belgians in, 147–172; Congo Free State established, 147; area and boundaries, 147–148; history for first ten years of twentieth century a sad and revolting page of history, 149; question of Belgium's fitness for stewardship of, 150 *et seq.*; report of Mr. Casement on, 151–152; Lord Cromer on, 152–153; indignation in Belgium at Casement and Cromer reports, 154; Commission of Inquiry appointed, 155; its report, 155–156; King Leopold cedes Congo Free State to Belgium, 157; attitude of Great Britain and Germany towards the transfer, 158–159; Belgian promises not believed in England, 160; death of King Leopold raises hopes of awakening of Belgian conscience, 162; visit of King Albert to Congo, 162; conditions improving, 163; native right to land ownership, 163–164; railway construction, 165–167; products of, 168–169; administration and finance, 169–171; future of, in connection with adjustments at end of European War, 171–172
Congo Free State, *see* Congo
Congo, French, 338
Congo River, 147 *et seq.*
Congress, Afrikander, 44
Conquest of German African colonies, 470–480
Cromer, Lord, 2; on necessity to Egypt of reclamation of the Sudan, 4; financial policy for the Sudan, 6–7; points out need of railway from Nile to Red Sea, 11; on slave trade in the Sudan, 12; on Belgian misgovernment of Congo, 152–153; in Egypt, 397–398 *et seq.*; native judgment of his administration, 408–409
Cyrenaica, Turkey withdraws opposition to Italian occupation, 123; Italian progress in, in 1913, 127

Dahomey, 312, 313, 317–320
De Brazza, M., investigation of conditions in French Congo territories, 343–345
Delagoa Bay, failure of British effort to claim, 265
Delarey, General, defeats Lord Merthuen in Boer War, 48
Dernberg, Dr., on conditions in German East Africa, 240
De Wet, urges continuance of Boer War, 49; leader in rebellion in South African Union, 457 *et seq.*
Djibouti, 107

Dulmadoba, British defeat at, 113

East Africa, *see* British East Africa, German East Africa, Portuguese East Africa
Education in Algeria, 139–140
Educational facilities in the Sudan, 16–18
Egypt, necessity to, of reclamation of the Sudan, 4; convention with Great Britain, January 19, 1899, 5–6; loans to the Sudan, 8–9; under the last of the Khedives, 391–420; necessity to Great Britain of control of Suez Canal, 393; British enter, 394; international status of, 395; real control in British hands, 396; economic progress, 398; "Young Moslem," movement, 401; Islamic agitation, 402; Nationalist propaganda, 402 *et seq.*, 410–413; change in Anglo-French relations, 404–405; Turkish boundary dispute, 406; native judgment of Lord Cromer's administration, 408–409; Sir Eldon Gorst succeeds Lord Cromer as Consul-General, 409; Copts secede from Nationalists, 412; Colonel Roosevelt's speech, 413–414; action of the Copts, 414–417; death of Sir Eldon Gorst, 418; Lord Kitchener succeeds him, 418; strengthens Britain's hold in Egypt, 419–420; character and opportunities of Khedive Abbas Hilmi, 421–423; Khedive deposed, 424; entrance of Turkey into European War creates new situation in Egypt, 425; troops sent to, 426; made a British Protectorate, 428; Turkish attack upon, 430; military protection strengthened, 431–432; value of, to Great Britain, 432–433; destiny of, 433; dissatisfaction with British rule in, 434–439; internal government the real problem in, 440
Elgin, Lord, orders suspension of Chinese labor importation in South Africa, 69
El Obeid, railway extended to, 9, 12
Eritrea, 119
European War, outlook in Sudan at opening of, 24–25; Morocco a principal cause of, 376–377; African problems for the Peace Conference, 481–491; issues in, and neutral attitude towards combatants, 482, *et seq.;* American interest in a wise settlement of, 490–491

Fashoda, Marchand expedition to, 18
Fashoda incident, 336
Fez occupied by French, 385
France, and Sudan boundary disputes, 18–19; African islands of, 33; efforts to secure Morocco, 358 *et seq.;* gets Morocco, 374–390; occupation of Morocco begins, 380–381; negotiations with Spain and Germany over Morocco, 385 *et seq.;* Morocco placed under protection of, 389
French African Empire, *see* Algeria and Tunis
French Equatorial Africa, 338
French in Central Africa, 335–354; distribution of territories in Central Africa, 335; conquests and territorial adjustments, 336–337; Chad Military Region, 338, 340; Gabun, 338–339; Middle Congo Colony, 338, 339; Ubangi-Shari-Chad Colony, 338, 339; maladministration of Congo territories, 342 *et seq.;* abuses of *Concessionnaire* system, 343, *et seq.;* de Brazza investigating commission and its report, 343–345; effect of reve-

French in Central Africa—*Con'd.* lations of de Brazza report, 350; effect of Central Africa on moral sense of the white man, 351–352; qualities necessary for administrative officers, 352; reasons for respective personnel of French army and colonial service, 353–354
French in West Africa and the Sahara, 312–334; Gabun, 312, 313; Dahomey, 312, 313, 317–320; Guinea, 312, 313, 314; Ivory Coast, 312, 313, 314–316, 319; Senegal, 312, 313, 322; Senegambia, 313, 324; the "open door" principle and German effort to gain commerce of French colonies, 319–321; cotton culture, 322; economic difficulties and territorial adjustments, 323; Senegal-Niger Colony, 324–325; British and German colonies disturb the continuity of French territory and influence, 325–327; colonizing difficulties, 327–328; economic progress, 328–329; West Africa a training school for army officers and a reservoir of troops, 329–330; frontiers delimited, 330; pacification of the Sahara, 331–332; economic and labor problems, 332–334

Gabun, 312, 313, 338–339
Gambia, 276–277
Garstin, Sir William, and irrigation in the Sudan, 20–21
German African colonies, conquest of, 470–480
German East Africa, 228–243; most important of German colonies, 228–229; boundaries, 229–230; German East Africa Company and development of its territories, 230–231; German colonial expansion in Central Africa prevented, 232; claim that Germany acquired African colonies by trickery unfounded, 232–233; German pioneers in East Africa discouraged at home, 234 *et seq.*; railway development, 234–237; administrative organization of the colony started, 237; rigid bureaucracy a handicap, 238; German idea of treatment of Mohammedanism, 238–240; Dr. Dernberg on conditions in, 240; increase in trade, 241; German public opinion champions cause of natives, 241–242; abolition of serfdom demanded, 242; resistance of colony to British invasion, 243; conquest of, 476–479
German East Africa Company, 231
German Southwest Africa, 173–188; boundaries, 173; entrance of Germany into Africa, 173–174; German method of colonization, 174–175; German development hampered by British possession of Walfisch Bay, 176; agriculture difficult, 176; Land Bank established, 177; metals in, 178; diamond fields, 178–180; German administrative and colonization plans, 180–182; native uprisings, 183–185; transformation effected by war, 186; increase of colonists, 186; crisis of 1910, 187; conquered by the South African Union army in 1915, 188, 475–476
German West Africa, 299–311; *see* Togoland, Kamerun
Germans in Africa, hopeless situation of, at opening of European War, 470; treatment of, in British, French, and other colonies, 470 *et seq.*
Germany, and the Congo question, 158 *et seq.*; Rhodes believes harmony with, essen-

Germany—*Continued.*
tial to Great Britain's peace and to accomplishment of plans in Africa, 246–248; unpublished treaty with Great Britain in 1898, regarding Africa, 247; and Great Britain drift apart, 248; declares war on Portugal, 275; working against France in Morocco, 356 *et seq.*; intervention in Morocco, 372; negotiations with France as to Morocco, 385 *et seq.*
Gladstone, Lord Herbert, first Governor of South African Union, 443 *et seq.*
Gold Coast Colony (British), 276; Ashanti revolt, 282–283; Northern Territories added to, 283; valuable market for British trade, 284; mining wealth, 284–285; Togoland conquered, 285
Gordon College, 14–15
Gorst, Sir Eldon, report for 1909, 23–24; Consul-General of Egypt, 409; death of, 418
Great Britain, in the Sudan, 1–30; drops the Sudan, 1; vision of reconquest of the Sudan, 2; problems of colonial administrators, 2–3; impossibility of direct protectorate over Sudan, 4–5; convention with Egypt regarding Sudan, January 19, 1899, 5–6; guarantees interest on loan for Sudan, 9; and Sudan boundaries, 18–19; African islands of, 32–33; dictates terms of peace at end of Boer War, 49; loss in Boer War, 50; policy in Somaliland, 106–114; and the Congo question, 151 *et seq.*; Portugal in vassalage to, 244–245; Rhodes sees peace and prosperity for, and accomplishment of African plans, only in harmony with Germany, 246–247; unpublished treaty with Germany in 1898 regarding Africa, 247; and Germany drift apart, 248; agreement with France in 1904, 248; agreement with Russia in 1907, 248; alarm in, over possibility of Germany getting coaling stations and naval bases in Portuguese colonies, 249–250; willing to fight to maintain her world supremacy, 251; working against France in Morocco, 356 *et seq.*; enters Egypt, 394; holds real control of Egypt, 396; economic progress of Egypt under, 398; deposes Khedive of Egypt, 424; makes Egypt a British Protectorate, 428; South African Union most remarkable achievement of British statesmanship, 444; *see also under* names of British African colonies.
Grey, Sir Edward, and affairs of the Congo, 158, 160
Guinea, 253–254
Guinea (French), 312, 313, 314

Hafid, Sultan of Morocco, negotiations with France, 383 *et seq.*; signs treaty with France, 389
Hertzog, General, head of extreme Boer party in South Africa, 450 *et seq.*
Het Volk, Boer political party, 70–71
Het Volk, Pretoria newspaper, 70 n.
Hobbhouse, Miss, on concentration camps, 46
Hohenlohe, Prince, on treatment of Mohammedanism, 238–239
Hussein Kamel, becomes Sultan of Egypt, 428; on destiny of Egypt, 433

Ignorance of uncivilized peoples, 13 n.
Indian colonist rights and Indian immigration in South Africa, 63–64

Irrigation in the Sudan, 20–21
Islands of Africa, 31–42
Italy and Abyssinia, 97, 99
Italy, colonial adventures of, in Africa, 115–129; *Risorgimento* literature of, 116; Italians settle in northern Africa, 116; occupy strip of Red Sea coast and enter Somaliland, 117–118; battle of Adowa, 1896, 118; concentrates attention in Tripoli, 120; annexes African province of Turkey, 123; war with Turkey, 124; treaty of Ouchy, 125; progress in Cyrenaica in 1913, 127; value of Tripoli, 127–128; repercussion of European War proves that Italy had not conquered Tripoli, 129
Ivory Coast Colony (French), 312, 313, 314–316, 319

Jameson, Dr., leader of Imperialist or Progressive Opposition in South Africa, 53; effect of his policy on success of South African Union, 451

Kaiser Wilhelm, *see* Wilhelm II.
Kamerun (German colony), boundaries of, 299–300; acquired by Germany, 304; extension of colony, 305–306; products, 306; maladministration, 307–308; railway and telegraphic communication, 310; education in, 311; conquest of, 476–477
Khalifa, escapes from Omdurman, 21; killed, 21
Khartum, railway connection with, 11; King's Day at, 27
Kitchener, Lord, 2, 4, 6, 11; opens Gordon College, 14; proclamation of August 7, 1901, 45; declines to consider proposals of Vereeniging Conference, 48; leaves South Africa, 50; Consul-General in Egypt, 418
Kruger, President, reception in Paris, 44; Kaiser Wilhelm refuses to receive, 44

Labor problems in South Africa, 58–63
Ladysmith, relief of, 43
Leopold II. of Belgium and Congo Free State, 147, 150, 151, 155, 156, 157, 159; death of, 1909, 162
Liberia, 93–96
Livingstone, David, explorer, and Central Africa, 189–190
Lorenzo Marques, and controversy over Transvaal traffic, 78–82

Madagascar, history and development of, 38–42
Mafeking, relief of, 43
Mahdism in the Sudan, 21–24
Manning, Sir William, report on Somaliland, 111
Marchand expedition, 18
Mauritania, 313, 324
Menelik, Emperor of Abyssinia, 97, 99, 102, 103
Methuen, Lord, defeated and taken prisoner in Boer War, 48
Meux, Lady, will of, 102 n.
Middle Congo Colony, 338, 339
Milner, Lord, 47; declines to consider proposal of Vereeniging Conference, 48; becomes Governor of Transvaal, 50; proposition to solve political problems in South Africa, 54; opposes Transvaal war "contribution," 66; prosperity of Transvaal largely due to, 91; advocates idea of imperial unity in South Africa, 442
Mohammedanism, German idea of treatment of, 238–240
Morocco, one of keys to France's house in Africa, 134 and n.; European rivalry in, before Algeciras, 355–373; influence of Moroccan affairs on world war, 355; French efforts to

Morocco—*Continued.*
secure, 358 *et seq.;* crisis in, begins in 1901, 362; revolt of Bu Hamara, 366 *et seq.;* Anglo-French Agreement of 1904, 368, 369; first German intervention in, 372; Conference of Algeciras arranged, 373; Act of Conference futile, 374 *et seq.;* acquired by France, 374–390; a principal cause of the European War, 376–377; French occupation begins, 380–381; Abdul Aziz abdicates, 383; tactics of Sultan Hafid, 383 *et seq.;* French occupy Fez, 385; independence over, 385; French negotiations with Spain and Germany, 385 *et seq.;* treaty signed placing the country under French protection, 389; pacification of, 389–390
Mullah Mohammed Abdullah, rise of power of, in Somaliland, 109; British policy regarding, 110; again becomes active, 111 *et seq.*
Mustafa Kamel and Nationalist agitation in Egypt, 402 *et seq.*

Nadji Bey, 123–124
Natal, the problem of, 82–89; *see also* South Africa and South African Union
National Scouts, hostility to, 54–55
Niger, *see* Senegal-Niger Colony
Nigeria, boundaries, 276–277; made a separate colony in 1886, 286; administrative changes in, 286–287; population and area, 287; agitation against liquor traffic in, 288–290; conquest of hinterland; 290–294; cotton-growing experimentation, 295–296, history of, indicates the secret of British success in African colonization, 296–298
Northern Territories added to Gold Coast Colony, 283
Nyasaland, 189–195; boundaries, 191; population, 192; recruiting of natives for work outside the Protectorate prohibited, 192–193; native antagonism, 193; spread of Mohammedanism, 194–195

Omdurman, battle of, 2; Khalifa escapes from, 21; celebration of the Prophet's birthday in, 27–30
Orange Free State, annexed to British Empire, 45; constitution granted to, 71; elections in, 71; rebellion in, 457 *et seq.; see also* South Africa, South African Union, and Boer War
Ottoman Empire, British foreign policy in middle of nineteenth century built on its maintenance, 392
Ouchy, treaty of, 125

Peters, Dr., and development of German East Africa, 230 *et seq.*
Portugal, national debt of, 271; anti-colonial policy of radicals, 272; attitude in European War, 274–275; Germany declares war on, 275
Portuguese colonies in Africa, 244–275; Portugal in vassalage to England, 244–245; delimitation of Portuguese possessions by other colonizing Powers, 244–251; increase of German trade in, 249; Great Britain alarmed at possibility of Germany getting coaling stations and naval bases in, 249–250; extent of, 251; enumeration of, 252; Cape Verde Islands, 252–253; Guinea, 253–254; Sao Thomé, and Principe, 254–257; Portuguese West Africa, or Angola, 257–263; Portuguese East Africa, 263–271 (*see* Portuguese East Africa); nature of Portuguese colonial administration, 271; colonies a question of international

Portuguese colonies—*Continued.*
importance, 273–274; prospect of retention of, 275
Portuguese East Africa, 263–271; geographical position, 263; importance of possession by Portugal to Great Britain and France, 263–264; failure of British attempt to claim Delagoa Bay, 265; trade rivalries, 266–267; problem of, 267–269; chartered companies, 269–270; revenues parasitical, 270–271
Portuguese West Africa, or Angola, 257–263
Principe, 254–257

Railways in Sudan, 8, 9, 11, 12
Rand, the, 55
Rebellion in South African Union, 454–469
Rhodes, Cecil, and South Central Africa, 189–191; and South African Company, 195; Boer War essential to accomplishment of his plans, 197; divergent British and Boer opinion of, 197 n.; saw peace for Great Britain and realization of his African plans only in harmony with Germany, 246–248; effort to accomplish this, 247–248
Rhodesia, boundaries, 191; beginning of development of, 195; environing states and their relation to railway and other development, 195–198; agitation for expropriation of Chartered Company, 199–202; land problem, 200, 201 and n.; development of Southern Rhodesia, 203; efforts to attract immigration, 203; rapid development of Northern Rhodesia since 1910, 204; stays out of South African Union, 442
Risorgimento literature of Italy, 116
Roberts, Lord, 43, 44

Sahara, French in, 324, 325, 331–332
Sao Thomé, 254–257
Selborne, Lord, High Commissioner in South Africa, 90
Senegal, 312, 313, 322
Senegal-Niger Colony, 324–325
Senegambia, 313, 324
Sierra Leone, 276, 282; revenue, 278; hut tax causes revolts, 278; secret cannibalistic societies, 279–280
Slave trade in Sudan, 12–13
Slavery, in Zanzibar, 36–38; abolished by French in Madagascar, 40; defunct in Egypt, 398
Sleeping sickness, 208–209
Smuts, General, supports General Botha in South African Union, 449 *et seq.;* aids in crushing rebellion, 460
Somaliland, British policy in, 106–114; location and population, 106; Anglo-French accord of 1904, 107; French Somaliland, 107; Italian Somaliland, 108; geographical position of British Somaliland, 108; rise of power of Mullah Mohammed Abdullah in, 109; policy regarding Mullah laid down, 110; Mullah again becomes active, 111 *et seq.;* British withdraw from interior posts, 111; Sir William Manning's report, 111; discussion in British Parliament and press, 112–113; British defeat at Dulmadoba, 113; dervishes still on the offensive in November, 1914, 114
South Africa, last years of Boer War and reconstruction period, 43–91; evolution in, since 1900, 52; Mr. Chamberlain decides to visit, 53; labor problem, 53; other problems to be settled, 54 *et seq.;* hostility to National Scouts in, 54–55; result of Mr. Chamberlain's visit to, 57; the mines

South Africa—*Continued.*
and the problem of white, black, and Chinese labor, 58–63; Indian colonist rights and Indian immigration, 63–64; the Transvaal war "contribution," 64–66; granting responsible government to the Transvaal and Orange Free State, 67–72; the Taal against English in the schools, 72–76; conflicting local interests of contiguous colonies under the same flag hasten union, 77–82; the problem of Natal, 82–89
South African Union, army conquers German Southwest Africa, 188
South African Company, begins development of Rhodesia, 195; charter extended, 200
South African Republic annexed to British Empire, 45
South African Union, 441–453; Colonial Convention, 442; Union formed by royal proclamation, December 2, 1909, 443; government ownership of railways in, 444–446; negro question in, 446–448; war between capital and labor, 448–449; Boers form a majority of electorate in, 449; political parties and movements in, 449–453; rebellion in, 454–469; martial law proclaimed, 456; manifesto of rebels, 458–460; Generals Botha and Smuts crush rebellion, 460; causes of rebellion and attitude of Boers, 461 *et seq.*; racial animosity strong, 466; Boers in conquest of German Southwest and East Africa and in overseas contingents, 467–468; anti-British feeling still strong, 468–469
Southwest Africa, *see* German Southwest Africa.
Spain, interests in Morocco and negotiations with France, 385 *et seq.*
Spanish colonies in Africa, 115 n.
State ownership of public utilities, in the Sudan, 8 n.; in South African Union, 444–446
Suakim abandoned as railway terminus, 11
Sudan, the, Great Britain in, 1–30; dropped by Great Britain, 1; battle of Omdurman made possible reconquest of, 2; British vision of reconquest of, 2; Great Britain's problems in, 2–3; necessity to Egypt of reclamation of, 4; impossibility of direct British Protectorate over, 4–5; convention of British and Egyptian governments, January 19, 1899, 5–6; exact status not yet determined, 6; financial policy for, 6–7; cost of reconquest, 7; public works, 8–9; State ownership of public utilities, 8 n.; commercial development, 9; railways in, 11–12; extent of territory, 12; slave trade, 12–13; Gordon College, 14–15; educational facilities, 16–18; boundary adjustments, 18–19; irrigation problem, 20–21; Sir Reginald Wingate's administration of, 21–30; population, 23 n.; outlook at opening of European War in 1914, 24–25; only one revolt against the Government, 25–26; King's Day in Khartum, 27; celebration of the Prophet's birthday at Omdurman, 27–30
Sudan Book of Loyalty, The, 25
Sudanese, characteristics of, 26
Sudan, Port, railway terminus on Red Sea, 9, 11
Suez Canal, 393 *et seq.*
Swaziland, 83

Taal, the, against English in South African schools, 72–76
Tana, Lake, advantages for irrigation of the Sudan, 20–21
Tangier, French increase troops

Tangier—*Continued*
at, 371; visit of Kaiser Wilhelm to, 372
Togoland (German colony), conquered by Gold Coast forces and French, 285; boundaries of, 299; acquirement of, by Germany, 300; development of, 301–303; cotton growing in, 309; railway and telegraphic communication, 310; education in, 311; conquest of, 472–473
Transvaal, proposed war "contribution," 64–65; Great Britain decides to forego the "contribution," 66; responsible government granted to, 71; first elections in, 71; prosperity of, largely due to Lord Milner, 91; rebellion in, 457 *et seq.*; *see also* South Africa, South African Union, and Boer War.
Treaty of Vereeniging, *see* Vereeniging Conference.
Tripoli, Italy concentrates attention in, 120; lost to Ottoman Empire, 121; rivalry of European nations and Turkey regarding, 121 *et seq.*; Italo-Turkish War mostly confined to, 124; value of, 127–128; repercussion of European War proves that Italy had not conquered, 129
Tuaregs, 331
Tunis, one of keys to France's house in Africa, 134 and n.; 141–144; *see also* Algeria and Tunis.
Turkey, ambitions regarding Sudan and Tripoli, 121 *et seq.*; war with Italy, 124; treaty of Ouchy, 125; impotence to resist Italy's occupation of Tripoli, 125
Turks, feelings towards the various European nationalities, 126

Ubangi-Shari-Chad Colony, 338, 339
Uganda, British Protectorate declared, 206; importance of, 207, 208; sleeping sickness, 208; progress of Christianity in, 209–210; agricultural development, 210
Union, South African, *see* South African Union.
United States, and Liberia, 93, 95; interest in a wise and politic settlement of European War, 490–491

Vereeniging, Conference at, 48; proposals of, declined, 48; accepts terms of peace for ending of Boer War, 49
Victoria, Queen, 44
Victoria Nyanza, Lake, rejected for irrigating the Sudan, 20
Vilonel, General, 47
Von Trotha tries to "stamp out" rebellion in German Southwest Africa, 184

Wady Halfa, railway to Atbara, 11
Walfisch Bay, possession of, by British hampers German development in Southwest Africa, 176
Wellcome Laboratories, 15
West Africa and the Sahara, French in, 312–334; *see also* British, German, and Portuguese West Africa.
Wilhelm II., Kaiser, refuses to receive President Kruger, 44; visit to Tangier, 372
Wingate, Sir Reginald, 6; on Lord Kitchener, 14 n.; anticipates threatened attack of Sultan Ali, 19 n.; his administration of the Sudan, 21–30

"Young Egypt" party, 23
"Young Moslems" in Egypt, 401
"Young Turks," 122 *et seq.*

Zanzibar, history and development of, 34–38
Zululand, 84 *et seq.*